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Community vulnerability and capacity in post-disaster recovery: the cases of Mano and Mikura neighbourhoods.. Yasui, Etsuko 2007

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 COMMUNITY VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY IN POST-DISASTER RECOVERY: THE CASES OF MANO AND MIKURA NEIGHBOURHOODS IN THE WAKE OF THE 1995 KOBE EARTHQUAKE  by   ETSUKO YASUI   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in   THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  (Planning)     UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   December 2007   ? Etsuko Yasui, 2007    iiAbstract  This is a study of how two small neighbourhoods, Mano and Mikura, recovered from the 1995 Kobe (Japan) earthquake, with a particular focus on the relationship between community vulnerability and capacity. Few studies have examined these interactions, even though vulnerability reduction is recognized to be a vital component of community recovery. Drawing from literature on disaster recovery, community development, vulnerability analysis, community capacity building and the Kobe earthquake, a community vulnerability and capacity model is elaborated from Blaikie et al.?s Pressure and Release Model (1994) to analyze the interactions. The Mano and Mikura cases are analyzed by applying this model and relating outcomes to the community?s improved safety and quality of community lives. Based on the experience of Mano, appropriate long-term community development practices as well as community capacity building efforts in the past can contribute to the reduction of overall community vulnerability in the post-disaster period, while it is recovering. On the other hand, the Mikura case suggests that even though the community experiences high physical and social vulnerability in the pre-disaster period, if the community is able to foster certain conditions, including active CBOs, adequate availability and accessibility to resources, and a collaborative working relationship with governments, the community can make progress on recovery. Although both Mano and Mikura communities achieved vulnerability reduction as well as capacity building, the long-term sustainability of the two communities remains uncertain, as issues and challenges, such as residual and newly emerging physical vulnerability, negative or slow population growth and aging, remained to create vulnerability to future disasters. The case studies reveal the interactions of community vulnerability and capacity to be highly complex and contingent on many contextual considerations.    iiiTable of Contents Abstract................................................................................................................................. ii Table of Contents................................................................................................................. iii List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures.................................................................................................................... viii Notes on Style........................................................................................................................x Glossary of Frequently Used Japanese Terms......................................................................xi Acknowledgement.............................................................................................................. xii Dedication.......................................................................................................................... xiii CHAPTER 1  Learning from the Kobe Earthquake..............................................................1 1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................1 1.1.1. Disasters and Society...........................................................................................1 1.1.2. Significance for Japan and Planning ...................................................................2 1.2. Theories Informing the Study.....................................................................................6 1.2.1. Theoretical Background.......................................................................................6 1.2.2. Working Definitions of Community Vulnerability and Community Capacity Building .......................................................................................................................10 1.2.3. Understanding Disasters in the Context of Community Development .............11 1.3. Research Questions...................................................................................................13 1.4. Qualitative Research Approach ................................................................................14 1.5. Qualitative Case Studies for this Study?Interviews and Field Work......................16 1.6. Organization of the Thesis........................................................................................17 1.7. Conclusion................................................................................................................19 CHAPTER 2  Understanding Community Recovery and Community Development.........20 2.1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................20 2.2. Disaster Management and Community Recovery....................................................21 2.2.1. Disaster Management?Four Phases.................................................................21 2.2.2. Disaster Recovery?Gaps between Theories and Practices..............................22 2.2.3. Theorizing and Conceptualizing Community Recovery ...................................25 2.2.4. Shaping Recovery Planning...............................................................................30 2.3. Vulnerability Analysis ..............................................................................................32 2.3.1. Challenges in Understanding Vulnerability.......................................................32 2.3.2. Vulnerability Analysis Model............................................................................35 2.3.3. Alternative Approach?Capacity to Deal with Vulnerability............................39 2.4. Community Planning for Disasters...........................................................................43 2.5. Community Development.........................................................................................45 2.5.1. What is a Community? ......................................................................................45 2.5.2. Types and Characteristics of Community Development ...................................47 2.5.3. Building Community Capacity..........................................................................49 2.5.4. Community Organizing .....................................................................................52 2.5.5. Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) ........................................................53 2.5.6. The Challenge for Capacity Building and Roles of Government......................55 2.6. Conclusion................................................................................................................57   ivCHAPTER 3  Community Development and Japan as a Context.......................................59 3.1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................59 3.2. Overview of the Japanese Urban Development Context..........................................59 3.2.1. The Historical Development of Urban Planning in Japan.................................59 3.2.2. Inner-City Struggles?Efforts to Change the Local Planning Approach ..........62 3.2.3. Disaster Management Policy.............................................................................63 3.2.4. Machizukuri (Japanese Community Planning)..................................................65 3.3. Negotiating the Context: Emerging Civil Society and Voluntary Sectors in Japan .68 3.3.1. Weak or Strong??Civil Society in Japan .........................................................68 3.3.2. Emerging Volunteerism in Japan .......................................................................72 3.3.3. The Historical Development of Neighbourhood Associations in Japan............76 3.4. Conclusion?Community Development and Disaster Recovery in Japan...............81 CHAPTER 4  Overview of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake......................................83 4.1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................83 4.2. The Impacts of the Earthquake.................................................................................85 4.2.1. General Background..........................................................................................85 4.2.2. Economic Impact...............................................................................................88 4.2.3. Damage: Fragile Urban Infrastructure...............................................................91 4.2.4. Vulnerable People and Communities.................................................................95 4.2.5. The Poor Practices of Disaster Management.....................................................96 4.2.6. A Key to Survival?Neighbours and Communities ..........................................98 4.3. Recovery Activities in the Affected Areas..............................................................100 4.3.1. Overview of the Ten Years since the Quake....................................................100 4.3.2. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plans..........................102 4.3.3. Hyogo Phoenix Plan ........................................................................................103 4.3.4. The Disaster Restoration Land Readjustment Plan (Fukkou Tochi Kukaku Seiri Jigyo) .........................................................................................................................105 4.3.5. Population Recovery........................................................................................106 4.3.6. Housing Problems............................................................................................109 4.3.7. Different Impacts and Different Levels of Recovery of Wards in Kobe City .112 4.3.8. Volunteers and NPOs and CBOs?Filling the Gaps between Government Services and People?s Needs .....................................................................................115 4.3.9. Roles of CBOs in Another Context .................................................................117 4.4 Conclusion?Lessons Learnt from the Kobe Earthquake .......................................118 CHAPTER 5  Research Framework and Methods ............................................................121 5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................121 5.2. The Theoretical Context .........................................................................................123 5.2.1. Vulnerability in the Context of Japan?Adaptation and Application of Blaikie et al.?s Vulnerability Analysis Model ........................................................................123 5.2.2. Building Community Capacity?An Alternative Approach............................128 5.2.3. Community Development................................................................................130 5.2.4. Community Recovery......................................................................................131 5.2.5. Research Framework?Conceptual Map to Organize Key Elements of the Research.....................................................................................................................133 5.2.6 Anticipated Results...........................................................................................136 5.3. Research Methods...................................................................................................137   v5.3.1. Case Studies.....................................................................................................137 5.3.2. Field Work .......................................................................................................139 5.3.3. Data Collection................................................................................................141 5.3.4. Ethical Issues ...................................................................................................146 5.3.5. Analysis of Data...............................................................................................149 5.4. Conclusions ............................................................................................................150 CHAPTER 6  Case Study 1?Mano Community..............................................................152 6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................152 6.2. Mano Community Development ............................................................................153 6.2.1. Overview .........................................................................................................153 6.2.2. Mano?Community of Blue-Collar Workers ..................................................156 6.2.3. Emergence of Mano Community Development Activities?the 1960s Anti Pollution Movement ..................................................................................................157 6.2.4. The Involvement of Mr. Miyanishi as a Community Planner .........................163 6.2.5. The Mano 20-Year Community Plan...............................................................165 6.2.6. Accomplishments of Mano Community Development ...................................170 6.2.7. A Community Group for Future Leaders.........................................................175 6.2.8. Community Organizations, Participation, and Networking ............................177 6.2.9. Building Community Capacity........................................................................179 6.3. Mano Community Recovery from the Kobe Earthquake.......................................183 6.3.1. Overview .........................................................................................................183 6.3.2. A Bucket Relay to Put Out a Fire?An Example of Mano?s Problem Solving Approach ...................................................................................................................186 6.3.3. The First Three Days .......................................................................................189 6.3.4. Long-Term Recovery Activities ......................................................................192 6.3.5. Housing Recovery ...........................................................................................195 6.3.6. Population Change...........................................................................................200 6.3.7. Community Plans and Land Use Plans............................................................203 6.3.8. Betterment of Community?People and Resources........................................206 6.4. Conclusion..............................................................................................................209 CHAPTER 7  Case Study 2?Mikura Community and Machi-Communication (CBO) ..213 7.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................213 7.2. Mikura Community Development..........................................................................216 7.2.1. Overview of community development before the disaster..............................216 7.2.2. Historical Background of Misuga District Development................................218 7.2.3. The Misuga District, Integrated or Fragmented?.............................................223 7.3. Mikura?s Community Recovery from the Kobe Earthquake..................................225 7.3.1. Overview of the Impacts from the Earthquake................................................225 7.3.2. Early Recovery Period.....................................................................................226 7.3.3. Volunteer Assistance for Mikura Community .................................................231 7.3.4. The Official Establishment of Machi-Communication ...................................233 7.3.5. Housing Recovery ...........................................................................................235 7.3.6. Population recovery.........................................................................................237 7.3.7. Land Use Recovery .........................................................................................239 7.3.8. Mikura Block 5, 6, and 7 Neighbourhood Association ...................................245 7.3.9. The Role of Machi-Communication (MC)?Goals and People......................246   vi7.3.10. Accomplishments of MC?Cooperative Housing.........................................249 7.3.11. Accomplishments of MC?Plaza Five ..........................................................252 7.3.12. Accomplishments of MC?New Community Center....................................254 7.3.13. Accomplishments of MC?Networking........................................................259 7.3.14. Roles of Local Government after the Disaster ..............................................262 7.3.15. Continuous Residents? Participation in Land Readjustment Project.............264 7.4. Conclusion?Is Mikura Safer and Better Than Before? ........................................271 CHAPTER 8  Vulnerability, Capacity and Recovery Analysis .........................................275 8.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................275 8.2. Mano Community Vulnerability, Capacity, and Recovery Analysis ......................276 8.2.1. Recovery from the Kobe Earthquake ..............................................................276 8.2.2. Vulnerability and Capacity Conditions and Changes......................................278 8.2.3. Relationship between Capacity and Vulnerability...........................................282 8.3. Mikura Community Vulnerability, Capacity, and Recovery Analysis....................289 8.3.1. Recovery from the Kobe Earthquake ..............................................................289 8.3.2. Vulnerability and Capacity Conditions and Changes......................................291 8.3.3. Relationship between Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis............................294 8.4. Comparing the Two Case Studies...........................................................................301 8.4.1. Different Recovery Processes..........................................................................301 8.4.2. Reflections on Anticipated Results..................................................................302 8.4.3. Comparing the Mano and Mikura Communities.............................................304 8.5. Conclusion..............................................................................................................308 CHAPTER 9  Conclusions?Contributions, Implications, and Future Research .............315 9.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................315 9.1.1. Summary of Research Findings.......................................................................315 9.1.2. Application of Blaikie et al.?s Model...............................................................318 9.2. Contributions of Study............................................................................................321 9.2.1. Vulnerability Studies .......................................................................................321 9.2.2. Community Development Studies...................................................................324 9.2.3. Japanese Community Planning and Disaster Planning....................................325 9.2.4. Disaster Recovery............................................................................................326 9.3. Implications for Theories and Policies ...................................................................326 9.3.1. Implications for Planning Theories .................................................................326 9.3.2. Implications for Policies..................................................................................327 9.4. Recommendations for Future Research?Limitations and Possibilities................329 References .........................................................................................................................334 Appendices ........................................................................................................................355 Appendix A:  Disaster Restoration Land Readjustment Projects..............................355 Appendix B:  Community Development Approach by Miyanishi Yuji.....................357 Appendix C:  People of Machi-Communication (MC) .............................................359 Appendix D:  Financial Management of Machi-Communication.............................360 Appendix E:  Letters of Ethical Review Approval....................................................362   viiList of Tables Table 2.1: Comparison of Three Themes of Community Development..................................48 Table 3.1: Functions of Japanese Neighbourhood Associations..............................................80 Table 4.1: Scale and Damage of the Great Hanshin Earthquake.............................................88 Table 4.2: Assessment of Earthquake Damage and Distribution.............................................89 Table 4.3: Number of Wooden Housing Units Built in Pre-W.W.II in Kobe City as of 1993 ....94 Table 4.4: Seven Years of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake ..........................................100 Table 4.5: The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plan Budgets ............................104 Table 4.6: Kobe City and Wards Population Change ............................................................107 Table 4.7: Comparisons in Kobe City and Wards Pre- and Post-Disaster Period .................113 Table 5.1: Factors and Potential Indicators of Community Vulnerability.............................127 Table 5.2: Factors and Potential Indicators of Building Community Capacity.....................129 Table 5.3: Factors and Potential Indicators of Community Development.............................131 Table 5.4: Factors and Potential Indicators of Community Recovery...................................132 Table 5.5: Relationship between Vulnerability, Capacity, Community Development and Recovery ......................................................................................................................137 Table 5.6: List of Interviewees and Interview Dates.............................................................144 Table 6.1: Comparison of Housing Types and Conditions prior to the Disaster ...................160 Table 6.2: Facilities Built in the 1970s in Mano....................................................................161 Table 6.3: Census Population Composition Change (1960-2005) ........................................166 Table 6.4: Chronological List of Mano Community Development Activities (1950s to 2003) .170 Table 6.5: Age Distribution of Doshikai (as of November 1988)..........................................175 Table 6.6: Attributes of Doshikai (Occupation) (as of November 1988) ..............................176 Table 6.7: Summary of Damage in Mano Community..........................................................183 Table 6.8: Disaster Damage Comparison for Mano, Nagata, and Kobe................................185 Table 6.9: Fire Damage Comparison among Four Districts in Nagata Ward........................187 Table 6.10: The First Three Days?Summary of Mano Response Activities .......................190 Table 6.11: Long-Term Recovery Activities in Mano Community.......................................194 Table 6.12: Complex Ownership Situation in Mano in 1981................................................196 Table 6.13: Population of Mano Community Since 1990 .....................................................202 Table 6.14: Number of Foreigners From Early 1990s to 2006..............................................202 Table 7.1: Chronology of Mikura Community Development and Disaster Recovery ..........215 Table 7.2: Mikura Community in 1995 (consisting of Mikura 5, 6 and 7 Blocks) ...............225 Table 7.3: Damage Comparison between Mikura, Mano, Nagata, and Kobe .......................226 Table 7.4: Relationship of Property Ownership in Mikura 5 and 6 Blocks in Pre-Disaster Period.....235 Table 7.5: Population Change in the Mikura Community Since 1990..................................238 Table 7.6: Mikura 5 & 6 Blocks Town-Building Council Meeting and Participants ............265 Table 8.1: Mano Community Recovery.................................................................................276 Table 8.2: Mikura Community Recovery..............................................................................290 Table A.1: Disaster Restoration Land Re-zoning Projects ....................................................355 Table A.2: Disaster Restoration Urban Renewal Projects .....................................................356 Table A.3: List of Key Actors in Machi-Communication......................................................359 Table A.4: Machi Communication Income............................................................................360   viiiList of Figures  Figure 2.1: Vulnerability Pressure and Release Model ...........................................................36 Figure 4.1: Area of Magnitude and Epicentre .........................................................................85 Figure 4.2: Map of Japan.........................................................................................................86 Figure 4 3: Hanshin Highway..................................................................................................91 Figure 4.4: Massive Destruction of Kobe Urban Area............................................................93 Figure 4.5: Map of Hyogo Prefecture, Kobe City and Wards ...............................................114 Figure 5.1: Japan?s Vulnerability Pressure and Release Model.............................................125 Figure 5.2: Community Vulnerability and Capacity Model..................................................134 Figure 6.1: Map of Kobe City, Nagata Ward and Mano Community....................................153 Figure 6.2: Map of Mano Community...................................................................................154 Figure 6.3: High Density of Buildings in Mano....................................................................154 Figure 6.4: Narrow Isles in Mano..........................................................................................155 Figure 6.5: Mano Community Meeting.................................................................................158 Figure 6.6: Mano Residents Visiting a Factory .....................................................................159 Figure 6 7: Planting Greenery in Front of their Homes.........................................................162 Figure 6 8: Park Maintenance by Mano Residents................................................................163 Figure 6.9: Houses Completely Destroyed by the 1995 Earthquake in Mano ......................184 Figure 6.10: Mano Residents Sheltering in Higashi Shiriike 6 Chome Park ........................186 Figure 6.11: Mano Emergency Relief Headquarters Meeting in Mano Elementary School......191 Figure 6.12: Collective Housing............................................................................................198 Figure 6.13: Senior Home .....................................................................................................198 Figure 6.14: Renovated Kindergarten....................................................................................199 Figure 6.15: Widened Road...................................................................................................199 Figure 7.1: Map of Kobe City, Nagata Ward and Mano Community....................................216 Figure 7.2: Mikura 5, 6, and 7 Blocks and Misuga District ..................................................217 Figure 7.3: Fires Affected the Mikura Community and Misuga Higashi on January 17, 1995..Figure 7.4: Disaster Restoration Land Adjustment Plan for Mikura 5 and 6 Blocks............240 Figure 7.5: Widened Street and Newly Built Houses............................................................241 Figure 7.6: Maps of Mikura 5 and 6 Blocks Comparison Between Pre-Disaster (01/1995) (Left) and Post-Disaster (06/2001) (Right)..................................................................242 Figure 7.7: An Empty Space and a High-Rise Apartment.....................................................243 Figure 7.8: An Empty Space..................................................................................................243 Figure 7.9: Mikura Five.........................................................................................................250 Figure 7.10: Plaza Five Gathering.........................................................................................253 Figure 7.11: Volunteers Transporting Lumber.......................................................................257 Figure 7.12: Mikura Residents Participating in the Construction.........................................257 Figure 7.13: A New Community Center................................................................................258 Figure 7.14: Elementary School Field Trip ...........................................................................260 Figure 7.15: Resident Volunteer ............................................................................................260 Figure 8.1: Mano Vulnerability and Capacity Conditions in Pre- and Post-Disaster Periods 279 Figure 8.2: Mano Relational Map of Capacity and Vulnerability in Pre- and Post-Disaster Period (adapted from Figure 8.1).................................................................................283   ixFigure 8.3: Mikura Vulnerability and Capacity Conditions in Pre- and Post-Disaster Periods.....292 Figure 8.4: Mikura Relational Map of Capacity and Vulnerability in Pre- and Post-Disaster Period (adapted from Figure 8.3).................................................................................295    xNotes on Style   Japanese names most commonly take the form of family names first, followed by given names. In this thesis, for Japanese names, the family name comes first and is followed by the given name without a comma (,) excluding the thesis references. Italics are used for Japanese words in general, with the exception of names of places and organizations, such as Kobe, Nagata, Hyogo, or Hanshin Fukkou Shien NPO. Many Japanese names of organizations, groups, and companies are difficult to translate as they are ?proper nouns? and therefore they are not always translated into English. Those Japanese terms and words are often accompanied by an English translation which I place in parentheses right after when the Japanese words are first introduced. English translations are provided for references written in Japanese.       xiGlossary of Frequently Used Japanese Terms   bousai  disaster prevention bousai machizukuri  disaster resistant community planning burakumin  outcasts chonaikai  neighbourhood association fukkou  reconstruction Fukkou tochi kukaku seiri jigyo  The Disaster Restoration Land Readjustment Project fukushi  welfare Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai  The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake jichikai  neighbourhood association kodokushi  lonely death machi  town machizukuri  community planning Machizukuri jorei  The Community Building Ordinance Machizukuri kyogikai  Town-Building Council nagaya  small, wooden, semi-detached house (Nagaya is a type of apartment building with a number of residential units connected under a single ridge-pole. It can be translated to long house or, row house that is wooden-framed house, often poorly maintained, and offered to low-income families.) saigai  disaster shinsai  earthquake disaster        xiiAcknowledgement  This research could not have been completed without generous assistance from many individuals. I would like to thank Professor Anthony Dorcey for his long-term role of supervising my research. I would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. David Edgington, Dr. Dawn Currie, Dr. Wayne Greene, and Dr. Stephanie Chang, for their time, commitment, and encouragement. I am most grateful to these professors for their continuous support. I would also like to thank Machi-Communication (CBO) and its staff members, Mr. Tanaka Yasuzo, Mr. Miyasada Akira, and other dedicated staff members and volunteers for their generosity in allowing me to conduct the study of Machi-Communication. I am very thankful to the residents of the Mikura community for their kindness and openness in accepting my presence. I really appreciate Mr. Miyanishi Yuji for sharing his valuable resources, as well as his time to increase my understanding of Mano Machizukuri. I would like to thank other individuals I met during my field work, such as government officials, academics, CBO organizers, and survivors of the earthquake, for helping me gain invaluable insights and knowledge.  I could not have produced such a long and demanding body of English writing without the help of my editor. I would like to thank Mr. Jonathan Pickup for his patient, persistent, and dedicated assistance. I would also like to thank my school administrators for their generous assistance that could allow me to take every step of this long process. Finally, my family and friends have provided me with the inspiration and determination necessary to undertake this long endeavour. I am thankful for the role they played in keeping me motivated and on track. In particular, I want to thank my sister, Shikata Sachiko for her endless encouragement and sense of humour throughout this process.    xiiiDedication   For people who suffered from the Kobe earthquake. And for my son, Kensuke and my daughter, Chihiro.    1CHAPTER 1  Learning from the Kobe Earthquake  1.1. Introduction  1.1.1. Disasters and Society The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake on 17 January 1995 (commonly known as the Kobe earthquake) was a pivotal event in the field of disaster studies both because of the large scale destruction it caused in one of the most urbanized areas in Japan and the complexity of the long-term reconstruction tasks that followed it. The earthquake killed 6,434 people, and as many as 320,000 people were left homeless. More than 245,000 houses were either completely or partly destroyed (Fire and Disaster Management Agency 2007). Material damage was estimated at around 10 trillion Yen1 (Miyamoto 1996c: 15). The Kobe earthquake was one of the most devastating natural disasters in Japan?s modern history. In particular, this disaster revealed the fragility of many urban systems and the built-environment in Kobe created in the pre-disaster period.  Disasters are not only natural but also social events. ?Without people, there can be no disaster? (Susman et al. 1983: 264). When vulnerable populations are at risk, hazardous events often result in severe destruction to human society (O?Keefe et al. 1976; Blaikie et al. 1994). It is difficult if not impossible to predict every occurrence of natural disasters; however, it is possible to minimize existing risk and vulnerability of communities before a natural hazard strikes to reduce the extent of the damage, and more importantly to plan for recovery processes in advance so that the affected communities can achieve recovery more                                                  1 10 trillion Yen = US$ 84.3 billion (US$1.00 = 118.62 Yen as of 07/30/2007)   2effectively. Neglecting to make such efforts to manage and plan for disasters can cause disaster events to be much worse than they would otherwise be. It is society?s responsibility to prevent or mitigate potential disasters by minimizing risks and vulnerability.   1.1.2. Significance for Japan and Planning The large scale and magnitude of the Kobe earthquake resulted in severe impacts, and Japanese society coped with the situation in both positive and negative ways (Shigemori 1996). Although Japan is affected by various types of natural hazards almost every year, it was the first time in the post-W.W.II period that one of Japan?s highly developed and modernized cities was severely affected by a large scale earthquake. Kobe city, which the quake hit directly, became one of the most industrialized and urbanized regions in Japan during the post-war reconstruction process. Over the years, the region had been highly developed as an urban metropolitan center. Yet at the same time, certain negative factors, such as an increasingly aging population, poor housing development, out-dated disaster preparedness policies, and poor awareness of risk management had contributed to generating urban physical and social vulnerability to natural disasters, especially, in the inner-city areas of Kobe (Shigemori 1996; Nakabayashi 2004). The earthquake destroyed the industrial infrastructure and urban facilities, and revealed the fragility of the urban living environment of the dwellers. Although the emergency relief process involved a wide range of activities, such as managing volunteers, communications between intra- and inter-government agencies, and infrastructure recovery (including debris management, re-zoning and community planning), local governments and communities were not adequately equipped to manage   3these processes, and not well prepared to deal with the massive destruction caused by an earthquake (Tierney and Goltz 1997).  The Kobe earthquake gave a series of lessons to the communities of Japan on how vulnerable Japanese society was to natural disasters (Wisner et al. 2004). Fragile urban life styles were completely disrupted when the lifelines (water, electricity, gas, phone, and transportation) were suddenly unavailable. Urban communities depended heavily on such urban infrastructure and without them communities could not continue their daily routines. Before the earthquake the urban systems (i.e. rail roads, highways, water, gas, phone, garbage collection, and sewage management) were well managed and maintained by public and private facilities and services, but once major infrastructure collapsed, normal urban life became impossible (Miyamoto 1996b). These communities stopped functioning once they lost the connection to these lifelines. Some rural communities in Awaji Island affected by the earthquake had different experiences from communities in the urban area (Miyamoto 1996a; Nishibori 1996). There were wells in the rural area that made water available for drinking as well as farming when the public water supply was stopped. The farmers had some stocks of food from what they grew in their fields; therefore, they were able to live for a while without immediate emergency relief. Some of them had large tools and machinery for farming that were used to open doors, cut poles, and dig debris to rescue victims who were trapped inside of destroyed houses (Miyamoto 1996a; Nishibori 1996). This does not suggest that rural communities can respond to disasters better, but it can suggest that certain conditions of communities (e.g. availability of resources, accessibility to resources, and skills and knowledge as to how to use these resources) can make a difference for communities in emergency situations. If there   4were certain conditions that contributed to the outcomes of disaster recovery, it is important to investigate what they were and why and how they influenced positively or negatively the recovery process of the community.  This earthquake also brought to light the importance of local neighbourhoods in post-quake recovery. A series of reports emerged on how members of the affected neighbourhoods helped each other to survive through the most difficult times (Inui 1998; Konno 2001; Evans 2001) Neighbourhood associations (NHAs) as well as volunteers from outside became critical actors for some communities during the recovery period. NHAs have a long tradition in Japan, while emergency relief volunteers are a relatively recent phenomenon. Of particular importance, some studies argued that a community?s long-term development efforts including NHAs and volunteer contributions, land use planning, housing improvement, and community services for senior residents, could influence effective recovery, such as in the case of the Mano community in Kobe (Inui 1998). It is vital therefore to understand what roles NHAs and volunteers played in the disaster recovery process and what their limits were in order to improve existing community disaster planning practices in Japan. Moreover, although the Japanese government was severely criticised at first, their reconstruction efforts eventually resulted in impressive accomplishments within a limited amount of time (e.g. most lifelines were back in service within three months of the event) (Hyogo Prefecture 2006a). The recent tragedies of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, and the Kashmir earthquake in October 2005 have all illustrated how difficult it is to manage a series of reconstruction tasks effectively, and by comparison, the Japanese government contributed greatly to achieving a complex recovery   5process and reaching impressive recovery outcomes in a relatively short time period. While focusing on the recovery activities of the affected communities in Kobe, it is also important to examine local government disaster management practices that were relevant to communities in order to understand the government approaches to disasters which influenced the long-term community reconstruction following this disaster.  Local communities in Kobe were not prepared for the earthquake because the Hanshin region had historically suffered from water-related disasters, such as typhoons and flooding, and consequently earthquakes were not considered to be a threat in the past. Although disaster prevention activities have been carried out in most communities in Japan to some extent, because Japan has been affected by various kinds of natural disasters over the years (Arakawa 1964), most communities in this region were not able to effectively respond to the massive destructive force caused by this earthquake. Even though the earthquake itself was unexpectedly catastrophic and its severity was difficult to predict, it is essential to learn from this experience how the long-term recovery process after the earthquake could have been more effective had there been different or greater efforts to make disaster mitigation and recovery plans in advance. It seems that this is an opportunity for Japanese planning to address how to allocate existing resources in a more appropriate manner, how to deal with existing community problems, and how to develop disaster planning so that communities can reduce their existing vulnerability, be prepared for, and plan in advance to respond to and recover effectively from such events.     61.2. Theories Informing the Study 1.2.1. Theoretical Background This study draws on theories and literature from disaster recovery, vulnerability analysis, community development, and capacity building in order to understand how certain communities recovered from the Kobe earthquake. First, an investigation of conceptual and empirical literature from the field of disaster recovery is made to examine how communities recover from disasters. It is important to review the existing literature to identify how communities have dealt with post-disaster reconstruction efforts and what constitutes critical recovery activities, and to ascertain what theories were developed from these studies. Although the study of disasters is a growing field, the study of the post-disaster activities of affected communities, in particular, needs further attention to develop a systematic understanding that will enable the improvement of community recovery from disasters (Mileti 1999; National Research Council 2006). The literature suggests that returning to normalcy after a disaster is not enough (e.g. physical rebuilding of things as they were before), as it often reproduces vulnerable conditions in a community similar to those that existed before the disaster. Therefore, the objective of recovery efforts should be to create a safer and better community?making improvements in areas that were community problems and issues in the pre-disaster period (Haas et al. 1977; Wisner et al. 2004). I argue that in order to improve existing recovery practices, more attention must be given to vulnerability reduction as part of the achievement of successful recovery.   According to Blaikie et al. vulnerability is defined as:  the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural   7hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone?s life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society (Blaikie et al. 1994: 9).   Individual vulnerability is, therefore, often characterised by a person?s age, gender, physical and mental ability, race and ethnicity, class, occupation, religious preference, minority status, etc. On the other hand, community vulnerability involves not only the conditions of individual community members? vulnerability mentioned above, but also the interactions among various past practices of social, political, economic and community development (Sen 1981; Hewitt 1983; Blaikie et al. 1994; Varley 1994; Fordham 2006). Therefore, to identify community vulnerability, this thesis examines characteristics of community?s existing neighbourhood planning, disaster planning, leadership, residents? participation, networking, and the relationships with the local government. Although community vulnerability reduction requires collective efforts, there have not been many studies to understand the conditions of community vulnerability and how this vulnerability can be reduced by collective approaches of the community.  Vulnerability analysis also uses the term ?capacity? to mean a coping ability of the vulnerable groups used to reduce their vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 1994; Moser 1998; Davis 2004), though the literature does not often discuss operational levels of vulnerability reduction by applying the idea of ?capacity.? The roles of community and its capacity to assist affected individuals have long been discussed (Moore 1958; Korten 1980; Anderson and Woodrow 1990; Moser 1996; Wallrich 1996; Bolin and Stanford 1998); however, the findings from these discussions were not well integrated with disaster recovery studies to reduce community vulnerability and build community capacity. Because there have not been many attempts to fully identify the interactions between vulnerability and capacity, there   8needs to be an innovative approach to help communities to understand how community capacity influences vulnerability, and to help them to integrate vulnerability reduction with disaster recovery planning. Drawing from community development literature, capacity is considered as: the interaction of assets, resources, and knowledge existing within a given community that helps in solving collective problems and improving or maintaining the well-being of a given community (Chaskin et al. 2001). Community development is, according to the literature, a planned effort for solving common problems (e.g. issues of health, education, welfare, and the environment) and also an attempt to build community capacity (e.g. increasing community physical, human, and financial resources, community networks, and community plans) (Green and Haines 2002). Community planning can help organize community?s activities in terms of both the physical and social aspects of community life as well as establish a collaborative relationship with governments, business, community-based organizations (CBOs), and other interest groups. If a community can increase its capacity through community development practices, such as development of a community economic plan, resolving community social issues, and building networks among CBOs, this can contribute to enhancing its ability to undertake effective community recovery. It is therefore important to consider community development practice as an integral part of disaster planning and vice versa, yet there are not many successful cases of this integration offered for communities to learn from and to apply.  Japanese community development practice, namely Machizukuri, is introduced in this thesis to facilitate the discussion of Japanese community development in relation to disaster recovery in Japan. Machizukuri is the Japanese term for community-based planning (Miyanishi 1986; Ishida 1987; Evans 2001; Sorensen 2002; Hein 2003). Although Japanese   9communities have long been organized by Neighbourhood Associations (NHAs), the roles of these organizations in community planning (Machizukuri) are not clearly defined other than that they play an important role in increasing communications among residents and between the local government and communities. A number of other types of community-based organizations besides NHAs exist in Japanese communities, but they are simply identified as socializing/ networking/ interest-led groups that can help disseminate information and prevent crimes (Tanaka 1990; Nakamura 1990). They are not often considered to take active roles as advocates or to empower the residents to initiate community problem solving processes (Pekkanen 2003). This thesis examines roles of these community-based organizations (CBOs) in the emergency situations suggesting that their contributions could make differences in the outcomes of recovery if other conditions are met.  Historically, Japanese urban planning has been implemented by the central government which has the power to control local governments and communities. ?Widespread community building initiatives (Machizukuri) and an active citizenry are relatively recent phenomena, dating back only to the 1980s? (Hein 2003: 240). Japanese community development practices have been created and developed in response to various major social issues, such as war-reconstruction activities, anti-pollution movements, and natural disasters that forced communities to deal with their own problems (Kurasawa 1990). Although the idea of Machizukuri is commonly accepted by the government today, communities are not necessarily given authority to make their own decisions. Machizukuri practices vary depending on a number of factors, such as the level of participation from the residents as well as the relationship between local government and communities. Some communities are very active in their involvement in community development with little   10influence from the local government, while others totally depend on the local government to carry out community activities. Considering the fact that Japanese political systems have been historically top-down, and the status of civil society is relatively weak, such circumstances strongly influence the future success of Machizukuri practices?community capacity building (Sorensen 2002; Edgington 2003). This thesis also investigates the pre- and post-disaster periods of communities in order to understand effective community development that could create a basis for community capacity building (Machizukuri).  Disaster planning has also been led by the central government, and local governments have had limited power to make decisions and take actions. After the Kobe earthquake of 1995, communities have been encouraged to take more active roles in disaster planning and the local governments are expected to support them (Wakayama 2005; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure Transportation 2006). Yet, the relationships between local government and communities, as well as the roles of community-based organizations at the policy level, which can be one of the key factors in successful disaster planning, are still not clearly defined, and it is essential to address these issues.   1.2.2. Working Definitions of Community Vulnerability and Community Capacity Building Drawing from the existing theories and empirical data addressed above, conceptual elements are organized in order to assist in this study?to help develop research questions and appropriate research methods. The unit of analysis in this thesis is small scale local community. Community vulnerability and community capacity are used as key terms in this study in order to explain and identify the complex conditions of community recovery from   11the Kobe earthquake. Community vulnerability in this thesis is defined as the characteristics and conditions of a community that make it susceptible or prone to natural hazards. These characteristics and conditions include social disintegration, lack of community planning, lack of resources or access to resources, lack of knowledge and skills as well as inadequacies in the built environment (infrastructure and buildings). Community capacity in this thesis is defined as a community?s collective ability to solve common problems and enhance community safety and quality of life. It includes democratic decision-making approaches, collective action approaches, the creation and improvement of community planning practices and implementation, the existence of CBOs assisting with specific community needs, and efforts to achieve a collaborative relationship with local governments and businesses.   1.2.3. Understanding Disasters in the Context of Community Development Disasters reveal existing problems of social and physical vulnerability and highlight the effects of existing uneven distribution of and unfair accessibility to resources in the affected communities (Hewitt 1983). There has been little study of what factors and actors are important for carrying out community recovery after disasters that achieves both effective recovery and vulnerability reduction. Vulnerability analysis can help explain who the groups at special risk are and why they are susceptible to natural disasters (Blaikie et al. 1994). Unfortunately, this theory does not offer any practical tools for actually reducing vulnerability (Wisner et al. 2004). Through exploring the community recovery activities in the Kobe earthquake, this study aims to understand how in the pre- and post- earthquake periods the affected communities? vulnerability was reduced or increased and if their capacity was an influential factor in minimizing vulnerability. How capacity and   12vulnerability interacted with each other is explored in order to identify certain community conditions that can reduce vulnerability and enhance capacity.  If a community is less resourceful, less socially integrated, has poor community development practices and relationships with different levels of government, and is physically and socially vulnerable, what should it do to achieve recovery? Can vulnerable communities achieve effective recovery following a disaster? If the answer is ?yes,? then what are the factors and elements that help them accomplish recovery? If the answer is ?no,? then what are the reasons that make them unable to recover and force them to remain vulnerable? The existing disaster theories and empirical data only partially answer these questions, and there are few studies that fill in the gaps in knowledge of how a community recovers and how vulnerability reduction can be carried out (Morrow and Peacock 1997; Bolin and Stanford 1998). Such questions are important to address, yet they remain unanswered. Studies carefully observing communities in the post-disaster period as well as identifying effective recovery factors at the community level are needed in order to increase understanding of community planning for disasters and vulnerability reduction processes. In the next section, specific research questions are raised in order to increase understanding of the issues identified above.    131.3. Research Questions This research addresses the following overarching question: How do community vulnerability and capacity interact in influencing post-disaster recovery at the small scale local level? The interaction between community vulnerability, community capacity and community recovery can be addressed by examining a series of more specific sub-questions: 1.  Within a particular community, what were the conditions of community vulnerability and capacity before and after the disaster? (How can vulnerability and capacity be measured? What are appropriate indicators of vulnerability and capacity? How were the conditions of vulnerability and capacity changed or improved?) 2.  If vulnerability was reduced through the recovery process, what were the influential factors that resulted in this reduction during recovery period? (Who were the key actors and what were the key activities influencing the reduction of vulnerability? Why were the factors influential in reducing vulnerability through the recovery activities?) 3.  If capacity was enhanced, what were the influential factors that resulted in this enhancement through the recovery activities? (Who were the key actors and what were the key activities influencing the enhancement of capacity? Why were the factors influential in enhancing capacity?) 4.  If community development was well implemented in a community before the disaster, did the community have a better chance of an effective recovery? (Can good community development practices contribute to long term reconstruction processes? How and why did a long-standing history of community development contribute to   14achieving recovery? How did community development influence the outcomes of disaster recovery? How did a community with poor community development practices achieve recovery?)  1.4. Qualitative Research Approach This study investigates how communities recovered from the Kobe earthquake by examining the interactions between community vulnerability and community capacity in two neighbourhood case studies. This large scale urban disaster revealed the high level of vulnerability of the inner-city of Kobe and the complexity of recovery processes. It was particularly evident that the disaster impacts were distributed unevenly at the community level and that the most vulnerable areas in Kobe suffered the most. As there are many inner-city areas in Japan at high risk of disasters, it is critical to understand how communities in the inner-city areas in Kobe dealt with the Kobe earthquake disaster with their very limited resources and highly vulnerable conditions. Without a detailed examination of disaster affected communities, it is difficult to understand community specific conditions of vulnerability and capacity. I chose two communities, Mano and Mikura neighbourhoods, located in Nagata ward, Kobe city, where the earthquake impacts were most severe, in order to observe changes and improvements in the community conditions that were made during the reconstruction phase. In order to address the research questions outlined above, I applied an approach (detailed in Chapter 5) that allows an exploration of the conditions of differently experienced community vulnerability and the communities? activities for reducing it. Natural disasters are very complex and multifaceted events that require not only quantitative methods, but also   15qualitative exploratory approaches that enable researchers to collect detailed and in-depth data to grasp the specific disaster circumstances (Stallings 1997). Qualitative methods can help grasp meanings of disasters in society (Tierney et al. 2001), identify unique impacts at the small scale local level, and explicate relationships among certain factors in a specific local district/ neighbourhood context (Phillips 1997; Stallings 1997). Recent research in disaster studies, in particular those studies aimed at understanding the social consequences and meanings after disasters, is increasingly interested in exploring approaches to identify complex conditions of risk and vulnerability and strategies to reduce them (Enarson and Morrow 1998; Fordham 1999; Fothergill 1999; Bankoff 2003). To understand community recovery in relation to community vulnerability and community capacity, I chose qualitative case study methods. These qualitative research methods are effective for the achievement of the goals of this study because they can help identify the complex relationship between vulnerability and capacity. The benefit of the case study approach is that it allows for detailed examination of social phenomena. The case study method is also particularly appropriate for exploratory studies or the hypothetical developmental stage of research (Neuman 2000). I selected the Mano and Mikura communities which experienced the Kobe earthquake quite differently, although both suffered from high physical and social vulnerability prior to the earthquake in 1995. Both communities were characterized by population decline, aging population, fragile old wooden housing, high building density, narrow streets and mixed residential and industrial land uses located near to each other. Mano (detailed in Chapter 6) is a community with relatively high social integration and a long-term good relationship with the City of Kobe government. It is famous as an example of Japanese ?Machizukuri,? and the   16stories of its remarkable reconstruction efforts after the Kobe earthquake are widely known (Hirohara 1996; Inui 1998; Evens 2001; Shiraishi et al. 2002). The second case, the Mikura community (detailed in Chapter 7) is a small poor neighbourhood with relatively ineffective community development practices prior to the quake and which had fewer resources (e.g. CBOs, and skills and knowledge for community planning and implementation). However, with the rise of volunteerism, a community based organization Machi-Communication (MC), was created specifically to assist Mikura community with re-building and reconstruction in the aftermath of the earthquake (Suga 2002).  1.5. Qualitative Case Studies for this Study?Interviews and Field Work As mentioned above, two communities, Mano and Mikura, were selected for the case studies. I focused on fieldwork to gain a detailed understanding of the conditions of the Mikura community. It was also necessary to obtain data through interviews and field observation due to the limited availability of literature on this community. Unlike Mikura, the Mano community has been studied widely; I depended primarily on existing literature to obtain data for Mano (Mouri 1980 and 1989; Makisato 1981; Miyanishi 1995; Hirohara 1996; Inui 1998; Evans 2001; Konno 2001; Shiraishi et al. 2002), though I was able to interview a Mano community planner, Mr. Miyanishi Yuji fairly extensively. In total, 22 individuals participated in interviews as part of my studies. They were staff members of Machi-Communication (MC), volunteers with MC, planners and academics advising MC, a community planning consultant, residents of Mikura, local city officers in the planning sections, a Hyogo Prefecture government officer, and Mr. Miyanishi. These interviews were conducted between May and October 2003 in Kobe city. During this period, I visited Mikura   17almost every day for field observation, and participated in a variety of MC?s community activities, such as lunch services and senior resident?s gatherings. Through participation in these meeting, I made myself familiar to the Mikura community and residents (details of the methods are discussed in Chapter 5).  1.6. Organization of the Thesis Building on this introduction, the following chapters are structured to address the research questions. Chapter 2 reviews literature relating to disaster management, community recovery, vulnerability analysis, and community development with a view to understanding recovery planning activities as collective efforts to achieve successful recovery. Vulnerability reduction is identified as one of the critical factors in implementing disaster recovery activities. The important contribution of community capacity building to the achievement of a safer and better community after a disaster is also addressed in developing the research framework. Chapter 3 focuses on Japanese planning approaches, including Machizukuri (the Japanese version of community planning), the historical development of neighbourhood associations, urban planning, and disaster planning in Japan in order to lay out the background of the study. The impacts of and reconstruction efforts following the Kobe earthquake are introduced and discussed in Chapter 4 in order to provide the specific context of the study.  Chapter 5 develops a conceptual framework and methodological approach. It draws together the conceptual elements of the study that are discussed in the previous chapters to construct the research framework and questions. Vulnerability and community capacity are identified as key concepts for understanding communities? their development practices and   18recovery experiences. The factors and indicators of community vulnerability, capacity, community development efforts and community recovery are summarized and listed in tables. The research questions are re-framed and refined in preparation for the analysis of the data from the two case studies. The chapter also indicates how field work was carried out, data collected and analyzed, and ethical issues addressed.  Chapters 6 and 7 introduce the two case studies. Chapter 6 focuses on the Mano community. It outlines the historical development of Mano community, and the reconstruction efforts after the Kobe earthquake. It also examines Mano community vulnerability and capacity before, during and after the disaster through the application of the research framework developed in the previous chapter. Chapter 7 focuses on the Mikura community. It covers the historical development of Mikura community and the reconstruction efforts after the Kobe earthquake. Mikura community vulnerability and capacity before, during and after the disaster are examined and some comparisons are made while applying the research framework.  Chapter 8 integrates the case study analyses to summarize the response to the research questions. The research framework facilitates the identification of community vulnerability and capacity and the ways they interact with each other before and after the disaster. The last chapter, Chapter 9, provides a summary of the findings to draw conclusions and implications for relevant literatures. This chapter also discusses the limitations of the study as well as the implications of the study with respect to policy development and future research possibilities.     191.7. Conclusion  This chapter introduced an overview of the thesis and underscored how and why the Kobe earthquake reconstruction efforts carried out by the two communities, Mano and Mikura, in the inner-city area of Kobe are the main focus of the study. To understand how communities recover from disasters, community vulnerability and capacity are chosen as key concepts to explore community recovery processes, as well as community development activities in the pre-disaster period. The study is undertaken in the belief that certain community conditions that could improve the existing characteristics of vulnerability and certain community activities that could increase levels of community capacity might be identified, and that they could contribute to the improvement of future disaster planning.     20CHAPTER 2  Understanding Community Recovery and Community Development 2.1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to explore the existing literature dealing with disaster recovery, vulnerability analysis, and community development in order to understand the theoretical development of these fields and discuss current theories and some gaps between theories and practices. Also, it examines the nature of current approaches to disaster recovery, and their contributions to the achievement of effective recovery. The chapter highlights gaps in existing recovery theories and uses vulnerability and analysis of it to further understand community recovery from disasters. It then proceeds to show how theory informs the analysis of the two case communities in Kobe city after the 1995 earthquake.  The vulnerability theories are introduced in this chapter in order to define the terms ?vulnerability? as well as the ?capacity? of communities. The chapter not only defines the two concepts but looks at their interaction?how capacity acts to help communities cope with vulnerability. In the chapter, I argue that in order to incorporate the concept of capacity into existing vulnerability analysis it is necessary to understand the mechanism of community capacity building, and that further elaboration of this term is required in the field of community development studies. While introducing and examining theories of community development, I discuss the roles of community organizing, capacity building, and community-based organizations (CBOs) that are culturally relevant to Japan and argue that these are important factors that must be considered in order to improve existing disaster recovery and vulnerability analysis.    212.2. Disaster Management and Community Recovery 2.2.1. Disaster Management?Four Phases  Carr (1932) was the first to focus on different phases of activities involved in the aftermath of disaster events. He attempted to classify a disaster event by time sequences in order to understand the series of changes and experiences (disruption, disorganization, confusion, reorganization, and readjustment) caused by a disaster. Carr argued that ?the sequence-pattern concept tells us that things happen in a cycle of linked events? (ibid: 217). Later, a number of disaster researchers applied different codifications (i.e. prevention, preparedness, warning, emergency, relief, response, recovery, reconstruction, adjustment, mitigation) in studying disasters (Barton 1969; Dynes 1970; Mileti et al. 1975). The U.S. National Governor?s Association (1979) defined four phases of disaster activity as mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery in their report in 1979, which became influential in designing approaches to disaster management (Neal 1997). The four phase concept has been widely acknowledged and applied to disaster activities. Although commonly accepted, the four phases to describe and identify disaster management activities can be inherently problematic as this approach may encourage standardizing disaster events. It also gives the impression that disaster activities can be predictable and ordered as Haas et al. (1977) claimed. In reality, each disaster phase overlaps with the others and each phase can only be understood in the context of the others (Godschalk et al. 1999; Neal 1997). Despite its weaknesses, the model is useful, and it is helpful to have a clearer understanding of the constituent phases. The four phases are defined by Godschalk et al. (1999) as follows: preparedness includes short-term preparation activities, such as evacuation and warning; response includes short-term emergency aid and assistance, such as   22search and rescue, debris clearance; recovery includes post-disaster activities, such as rebuilding of damaged structures and restoration of existing urban operations; and mitigation includes ?any action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human life and property from natural hazards? (Godschalk et al. 1999: 5-11).   2.2.2. Disaster Recovery?Gaps between Theories and Practices Many researchers claim that the recovery phase has been least understood and least investigated compared with other phases of disaster (mitigation, preparedness, and response) (Haas et al. 1977; Rubin et al. 1985; Quarantelli 1989; Berke et al. 1993; Mileti 1999; Tierney et al. 2001; Chang 2005; Olshansky 2005). Even terms that disaster researchers have used for the actions taken in the aftermath of a disaster such as reconstruction, restoration, rehabilitation, rebuilding, restitution, and recovery are often not used with consistency (Quarantelli 1999). This lack of consistency perhaps reflects the growing pains of a sub-field of study within the larger and well-established body of disaster studies.  Disaster recovery studies to date have mostly focussed on individuals and households in order to understand human adaptation to disaster?how disaster victims respond to the extreme situation, how they change their behaviours afterwards, and how they deal with stress (Dynes 1970; Quarantelli 1994; Hilhorst 2003). Only a few studies examine how victims have attempted to restore their communities in the long term (e.g. 10 years after the disaster). Many other scholars have approached disaster recovery through specific issues, such as issues of economic and business recovery (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969; West and Lenze 1994; Tierney 1995; Chang 2001), disaster policies and management (Cuny 1983; Rubin 1991; Berke and Beatley 1997; Topping 1998a), housing and population (Quarantelli   231982; Bolin 1994; Comerio 1998, Hirayama 2000) and individual experiences (Bolin and Bolton 1983; Oliver-Smith 1991; Paton et al. 2003).  Historically, community recovery from natural disasters has not been the main focus of disaster management. First of all, this is because governments often focus on dealing with recovery of buildings, infrastructure and other wide-area urban facilities, and rehabilitation of individual homes and property damage. Rebuilding local communities in terms of social networks, community integration and services, population recovery, restoring job markets and local business recovery has often not been considered part of the scope of government recovery efforts. Second, recovery has often been seen as an individual responsibility. Consequently, communities where individual victims belong are often not a high priority on reconstruction project lists. Indeed, for some scholars in the past, long-term impacts from disasters were not considered to pose a significant problem to individuals or communities in the first place; disaster recovery tended to be considered as a straightforward activity focussed on rebuilding infrastructure, and not requiring the complex processes necessary to bring everything back to normal (Wright et al. 1979). Such misunderstanding of the nature of the disaster recovery process has concealed many problems faced by disaster survivors in the long term. Third, the dominant views in disaster management consider individuals and communities as helpless victims because their daily routine was disrupted by the disaster. These views hold that once everything is back to normal as the infrastructure, urban lifelines, and housing are restored, individuals as well as communities will be able to return to normalcy as a matter of course. Taken together these views have undermined the fact that disaster victims are often able to make sensible decisions with limited resources and in extremely stressful situations. Although disaster affected individuals and communities played   24critical roles in disaster recovery processes there has been little study of it (Fritz 1961; Mileti et al. 1975; Siegel, Bourque, and Shoaf 1999). In this thesis I argue that these are significant gaps in disaster recovery approaches and that the net result is that community recovery remains underdeveloped in disaster management practices.  Simile (1995) studied roles of collective actions through organized citizen groups in two communities (one community affected by Hurricane Hugo and the other community affected by the Loma Prieta Earthquake). She concluded that the pre-disaster period collective behaviours could be one of the critical indicators to predict post-disaster period collective behaviours (ibid). In other words, if a community is better equipped with CBOs which are actively involved in community development in the pre-disaster period, there is a better chance for the community to maintain the high level of the participation in community recovery activities in the post-disaster period (ibid). Buckland and Rahman (1999) studied patterns and levels of community development by examining the relationship between disaster preparedness and response in three communities affected by the 1997 Red River Flood in Manitoba. Buckland and Rahman suggested that communities with higher levels of physical, human, and social capital were better equipped for disaster preparedness as well as recovery (ibid). These studies support the ideas that better community development practices in the pre-disaster period that can potentially result in positive outcomes in disaster recovery.   Despite the fact that many disaster scholars have already pointed out the great needs to identify the important roles and contributions of local communities in recovery in times of disaster, it seems that only a handful of studies have been focused on community recovery issues to meet such needs (Demerath and Wallace 1957; Moore 1958; Forrest 1972; Haas et al. 1977; Rubin et al. 1985; Berke et al. 1993; Dynes and Tierney 1994; Simile 1995; Bolin   25and Stanford 1998; Buckland and Rahman 1999; Mileti 1999). Slowly but surely recognizing such shortcomings of disaster research in the past, disaster researchers have increasingly come to view the disaster recovery phase as an important opportunity for communities to rebuild, re-develop and recover from their losses (Schwab et al. 1998). Regardless, more studies are needed to explore factors that could contribute to encouragement of communities? positive, productive, dynamic and multilayered activities in the recovery phase (e.g. the use of CBOs, the existence of local leaders, high levels of community vitality, and good relationships with other local governments and businesses). Furthermore, in order to improve existing policies and planning in communities, it is important to consider such practical applications for short and long-term disaster planning. While making revisions to existing disaster policies, governments and communities need to create more detailed community reconstruction plans that are tailored to the specific needs and interests of the community. The next section extends the discussion of existing disaster recovery literature in order to identify, in detail, gaps between existing theories and practice.  2.2.3. Theorizing and Conceptualizing Community Recovery The first major work on long-term community recovery was undertaken by J. Haas, Kates, and Bowden in 1977 (Rubin et al. 1985; Berke et al. 1993; Bolin 1994). In their classic study ?Reconstruction Following Disaster,? which involved research on communities in San Francisco, Anchorage, Managua, and Rapid City, they define community recovery as a series of sequential and chronological activities determined by the magnitude of disasters (Haas et al. 1977: 13). According to Haas et al. (ibid), disaster recovery efforts are aimed at rebuilding and replacing urban functions and are governed by complex interactions between   26pre-disaster trends, available resources, and value-driven choices. Haas et al. develop a model of the recovery process to help better understand activities during the recovery period at a macro scale (e.g. the city or region as a whole). Their model of recovery activities identifies four stages in the post-disaster recovery phase.  The four stages are 1) an emergency period?which involves coping with the immediate aftermath of damage, destruction, death, injury and general malfunction; 2) a restoration period?involving a return to relatively normal functioning of social and economic activities; 3) a replacement reconstruction period?this involves the rebuilding of capital stock to pre-disaster levels, and return of social and economic activities to pre-disaster levels or greater; and 4) a commemorative, betterment and developmental reconstruction period?which involves improvement and development of the damaged areas in order to increase safety and to better the communities (ibid: 2-3). Haas et al. concluded that, based on their empirical research, each of the four recovery stages takes ten times the duration of the previous phase. ?For all our studies, restoration and reconstruction were approximately ten-fold and hundred-fold multiples of the emergency period? (1977: 18). They distinguished between various types of emergency activities in a time sequence to suggest that recovery activities occur in an organized and continuous way. They studied these activities in terms of how decisions are made, and developed a timetable and check lists for the decision making process to improve future recovery plans (1977: 261-293). Haas et al. argue that once the emergency period is over, communities tend to experience the re-emergence of ?the ongoing forces that produced the characteristics of the predisaster city? that are ?the primary determinants of the city of the future? (ibid. 1977: 25).      27They found that a number of factors affect the rate of disaster recovery. These include: the magnitude of damage and loss; resources for recovery; prevailing disaster trends??rapidly growing cities recover rapidly; stable, stagnant or declining cities recover slowly and may even have their decline accelerated? (Kates and Pijawka 1977: 19); and leadership, planning and organization (ibid.). They also discussed population loss and recovery; influence of the market economy trends; policy issues; housing availability and the tenancy situations in the pre- and post-disaster period; issues of class (economic and political) composition in the communities; land-use planning issues; and overall development issues. These issues they discussed in their analysis are crucial topics for any community?s recovery still today and are covered in the present research in the case studies of Mano and Mikura communities affected by the Kobe earthquake.  Throughout their study, Haas et al. stressed the importance of developing and improving ?pre-disaster planning for reconstruction? since ?there is little [attention] aimed at long-range restoration or reconstruction? (ibid: xxxiv). Ultimately, the recovery process is intended to enable communities to ?use every reasonable opportunity to make the city safer? (ibid: 68). In a summary, Haas et al. described recovery as follows:  The central issues and decisions are value choices that give varying emphasis to the early return to normalcy, the reduction of future vulnerability, or to opportunities for improved efficiency, equity and amenity. Overambitious plans to accomplish these goals tend to be counterproductive. Major opportunities to improve the reconstruction process lie in early recognition of certain overlooked problems, people, functions and areas; the reduction of uncertainty about the future for those who live and work in the city; and the preparation for reconstruction before the disaster comes (ibid: xxvi).  According to Haas et al. (ibid), through addressing overlooked problems and reducing vulnerability and risk during the reconstruction stage, a community can create an opportunity to achieve the betterment and improvement of the community. Such problem-solving   28activities involve different approaches for different communities under different conditions. In Haas et al.?s (ibid) analyses, activities directed towards the family level, community employment issues, and planning and policy decision making processes were addressed, but there was little discussion associated with actions taken at the small scale neighbourhood level as a collective approach that could contribute to the betterment of communities (e.g. organizing and re-building of neighbourhoods, increasing community networks, and putting effort into finding and solving common problems regarding long-term disaster recovery). Haas et al. (ibid) also argue that the larger the damage, the longer the duration of recovery. However, after witnessing the Kobe earthquake, Murosaki (1996) of Kobe University argues that recent urban disasters are so complex and create so many consequences for the affected regions and communities that it is not always the case that the scale of the damage and loss correspond with the magnitude of the hazard event. Similar hazard events can result in very different impacts in different communities (1996: 55).  Criticisms of Haas et al.?s work provide very valuable insights into community recovery and the consequent debates enrich the further conceptualization of community recovery. Rubin et al. (1985) found that the four stages of the recovery model are not always an accurate depiction of reality because recovery efforts are not necessarily sequential, and can occur simultaneously or take random sequences. Hogg (1980), who studied the long-term recovery process of Venzone, Fruili, found that the recovery process did not proceed in the clear-cut order that Haas et al. lay out and the amount of time required for each activity is unique to each community (Hogg 1980). Quarantelli (1989) and Wilson (1991) also assert that the long-term recovery process cannot be ordered and predictable. Further, the Haas model tends to view disaster survivors as if they are a homogeneous group with similar   29interests and needs. Many studies reveal the heterogeneous and often conflictual nature of communities involved in the recovery process (Hoover and Bates 1985; Quarantelli 1989; Phillips 1991; Morrow 1992; Bolin 1994; Peacock and Ragsdale 1997). These important findings contribute to the improvement of existing theories and practices of disaster recovery and even though numerous critics disagree with some of their findings, Haas et al.?s model is still useful as a starting point to understand the dynamic process of community recovery activities (Berke and Beatley 1997: 35). As Haas et al. claim, many disaster practitioners and researchers strongly agree that returning communities to where they were before the disaster might merely mean reproduction of vulnerable conditions that would make them vulnerable to future disasters (Haas et al. 1977; Hewitt 1997; Bolin and Stanford 1998; Enarson and Morrow 1998; Mileti 1999; Wisner et al. 2004). It is imperative to consider not only how and what to recover, but also what conditions are expected to be achieved in the end. Haas et al. see the ultimate goal of recovery to be to make things ?safer than before? or at least to make every effort to make the city safer (1977). Quarantelli (1999) states that recovery is an attempt at ?bringing the post disaster situation to some level of acceptability. This may or may not be the same as the pre-impact level? (ibid: 3). Community recovery is therefore defined here as an opportunity to achieve vulnerability reduction, and long-term community development that makes the community safer than before and less vulnerable than before. The next section introduces current community recovery plans and how they are implemented.     302.2.4. Shaping Recovery Planning To understand the dynamics of post-disaster recovery, I discuss current practices of disaster recovery plans. Schwab et al. (1998) introduced a basic recovery plan for emergency planners and practitioners to apply. Their step-by-step planning process included consideration of who the emergency task forces were in the situation, which government agencies needed to be involved, and how disaster reconstruction plans could be created in the pre-disaster period. Schwab and others (ibid) roughly divided the process in to three steps?pre-disaster, short-term recovery and long-term reconstruction. They claimed that if there was a recovery plan in place in advance, the disaster stricken areas could respond more quickly and effectively. They argued that the pre-disaster period was critical for the opportunity it provided to prepare recovery plans in advance (ibid). Smith and Deyle argue that:    If planners have a unique and important role to play in the recovery process, this role must correspond to their abilities to analyze problems, define alternative solutions, and fashion these solutions into plans. However, the need for rapid action and decision making in much of the post-disaster environment militates against careful data collection, analysis, and consideration. Since the opportunities to do these tasks exist almost exclusively in the blue-sky, pre-disaster environment, the major role for planners exists prior to disasters. The post-disaster, morning-after role of planners is to interpret these pre-disaster plans and make them applicable to the recovery process (1998: 254). Although it is difficult to make a plan under uncertain conditions, it is still important to go through the process of recovery planning in advance. Topping (1998b) raised questions related to land-use planning issues that many disaster-affected communities in the past have had to deal with. Land zoning and building codes are often issues with regard to the improvement of safety and the long-term betterment of a community in the reconstruction period. If these plans and regulations are well placed beforehand, the literature suggests that   31they can decrease serious conflicts and delays in the achievement of recovery (Topping 1993; Ishida 1996; Murosaki 1996; Schwab et al. 1998).  Furthermore, Murosaki (2004) claims that such planning practices have to be employed at the community level. Drawing lessons from the Kobe earthquake, Murosaki argues that today?s urban disaster recovery takes longer, affects a wider geophysical area than was previously thought, and involves various unpredictable and complex social, economic, and political issues (ibid). Disparities among affected communities have been widened over time which is reflected in the fact that the recovery process varies from community to community. Murosaki (ibid) argues that because every community has different historical development and visions for its future, a community recovery plan has to be created in a way that meets each community?s particular needs and interests. Today, many disaster researchers and practitioners argue that the recovery period is not the end of the disaster, but rather the beginning of future disaster preparation.  Disaster recovery involves continuous efforts to identify overlooked problems, clarify uncertain community visions and projects, reduce vulnerability and risks, and increase alternative solutions and resources (Haas et al. 1977, Mileti 1999; Smith and Deyle 1998; Reddy 2000). Recovery planning is therefore, ?one of the greatest sources of opportunity? to improve existing community development practices (Reddy 2000). Recovery is no longer considered to be simply an activity to bring a community back to normal. ?Returning to where they were before? is not an appropriate goal since that can merely re-create the same vulnerable conditions of the pre-disaster period. This is an opportunity for community planning to reduce the community?s vulnerability (Haas et al. 1977; Bolin and Stanford 1998; Mileti 1999; Reddy 2000). The next section discusses current approaches to vulnerability   32reduction through reviewing existing literature to learn how vulnerability is defined and how it is at least theoretically analyzed.  2.3. Vulnerability Analysis 2.3.1. Challenges in Understanding Vulnerability There are certain dominant views about disasters: that they are natural and unexpected events; that adverse impacts from a disaster are distributed evenly and therefore all victims require disaster assistance equally; that actions taken for them are to fulfill material needs, and once done, self-help is expected. The vulnerability paradigm challenges these myths about disasters and claims that disasters are complex interactions between extreme natural events and human social development (Hewitt 1983; Varley 1994; Fordham 1999; Bankoff 2003). In this study, I consider vulnerability as characteristics and conditions of individuals or groups that influence their ability to respond or cope with the impact of a natural hazard (e.g. gender, race and ethnicity, age, education, housing ownership, rural/urban nature, infrastructure and lifelines, demographic trends, medical service availability, and so forth). Vulnerable populations often experience harsher consequences from disasters than others, and self-help sometimes does not work for these populations due to their overwhelming levels of severe disaster impacts. As a result, it is often impossible for the vulnerable to achieve full recovery to the same level and at the same speed as the less vulnerable populations since they lack access to resources without public assistance. It is   33vital to find ways to minimize vulnerability in the community in order to achieve effective recovery.  The influential work of social geographer Kenneth Hewitt (1983) contributed greatly to the development of vulnerability analysis. His edited book entitled, ?Interpretation of Calamity from the Perspective of Human Ecology? (1983) consists of criticisms of traditional views of natural disasters as ?acts of god,? as well as criticisms of the dominant scientific and technological approaches to natural disasters. It provides an alternative view to explain natural disasters as ?social phenomena? and illustrates how disaster risks and impacts are unevenly distributed and how vulnerable groups suffer as a consequence (Hewitt 1983).  While vulnerability analysis has grown within disaster studies, the concept of vulnerability has also received attention from other fields of study, concerning issues, such as health, poverty, and climate change. With emerging new ideas and approaches stimulated by these other disciplines, the application of the concept of vulnerability has increased in scope and the concept has undergone new interpretations. One new approach is the integration of the idea of Amartya Sen?s (1981) ?entitlement approach? that has been adopted by many scholars (Swift 1989; Blaikie et al 1994; Bohle et al. 1994; Moser 1998; Adger 1999) to define vulnerability as insecurity, or a lack of command or rights over resources.  Sen, an agricultural economist, defines entitlement as ?the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces? (1981: 497). He argues that people do not starve to death because there is not enough food, but they die because they do not have adequate command or ownership to acquire food even if there is plenty of food in a market. ?What the entitlement approach does is to take up the acquirement problems seriously? (Sen 1984: 244).   34It is not only the problem of accessibility but also of distribution. He attempts to explain the relationship between starvation, poverty, and famine by elaborating on the interconnectedness between resource availability and command over resources (food), to which the old traditions of economics do not pay much attention (Sen 1984). Taking Sen?s arguments, vulnerability scholars elaborated on the concept of vulnerability as an ?inability to establish entitlement to enough food? (Sen 1981: 8) or an inability to create access to resources necessary for people?s well-being. The entitlement approach has made a critical contribution to today?s conceptualization of vulnerable populations by elaborating on the idea that ?the system of laws and rights is crucial to the well-being of those who may be at risk? (Hewitt 1997: 156).  To analyze people?s vulnerability is to come to a thorough understanding of people?s living conditions in the context of their everyday social realities. The difficulties of dealing with vulnerability lie not only in the fact that the causes of vulnerability are very complex and difficult to recognize, but also that it is very hard to assess vulnerability because vulnerability is often produced as the result of interactions between social, economic, political and cultural conditions. Vulnerability is also a relative term so that it should be used in comparison to other individuals or groups of people. Moreover, vulnerability is location and time sensitive (i.e. different places and different times can influence conditions of vulnerability) (Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin and Stanford 1998). Recently, Cutter et al. (2003) have developed a model to compute a summary score to identify vulnerable conditions in the United States?the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) (ibid). They developed a method to add or subtract various vulnerability conditions, such as economic status, gender, race and ethnicity, age, employment situation, occupation, family structure, education, housing   35ownership, rural/urban nature, infrastructure and lifelines, demographic trends, medical service availability, and so forth. Their results clearly identified that New Orleans was one of the most vulnerable cities in the United States before Hurricane Katrina struck the region (Cutter et al. 2003). More studies like Cutter et al.?s are needed to recognize threatening conditions of vulnerability so that communities and decision-makers can take actions to minimize their potential risks for future disasters. The next section introduces how vulnerability is analyzed in order to further understanding of the current approaches to vulnerability.  2.3.2. Vulnerability Analysis Model Blaikie et al. (1994)?who developed a model to understand the causes of vulnerability in the context of disasters and its progression?define vulnerability as:  the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone?s life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society (Blaikie et al. 1994: 9).  In this model, they illustrated how disasters occur when natural hazards affect a vulnerable population. ?Their vulnerability is rooted in social processes and underlying causes which may ultimately be quite remote from the disaster event itself. It is a means for understanding and explaining the causes of disaster,? Blaikie at al. argues (ibid: 22).  According to Blaikie et al?s Pressure and Release Model, the progression of vulnerability may precede through the following three accumulated phases?root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions (see Figure 2.1):    36Figure 2.1: Vulnerability Pressure and Release Model (Source: Blaikie et al. 1994: 23; Wisner et al. 2004: 51)  According to Blaikie et al., root causes are economic, demographic, and political processes that cause increases or decreases in vulnerability. Root causes are the most distant of factors influencing vulnerability in this model, yet they are deeply rooted in the society and the world economy which often makes them very difficult to eradicate. Root causes also reflect power relationships in a society. The distribution of power and imbalance of power can make certain individuals and groups vulnerable. More importantly, power relationships     THE PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY      1              2             3    ROOT   DYNAMIC             UNSAFE              DISASTER      HAZARDS   CAUSES        PRESSURES             CONDITIONS                                Limited  access to ?  Power ?  Structures ?  Resources     Ideologies ?  Political systems ?  Economic systems Lack of ?  Local  institutions ?  Training ?  Appropriate skills ?  Local investments ?  Local markets ?  Press freedom ?  Ethical standards in public life  Macro-forces ?  Rapid population growth ?  Rapid urbanisation ?  Arms expenditure ?  Debt repayment schedules ?  Deforestation ?  Decline in soil productivity Fragile physical environment ?  Dangerous locations ?  Unprotected buildings and infrastructure  Fragile local economy ?  Livelihoods at risk ?  Low income levels  Vulnerable society?  Special groups at risk ?  Lack of local institutions  Public actions ?  Lack of disaster preparedness ?  Prevalence of endemic  disease  Earthquake  High winds (cyclone/ hurricane/ typhoon)  Flooding  Volcanic eruption  Landslide  Drought  Virus and  pests RISK = Hazard ? Vulnerability  R = H ? V   37often determine who has access to resources, which is another important factor in making some segments of the population vulnerable (ibid). Dynamic pressures are considered as ?processes and activities that ?translate? the effects of root causes into the vulnerability of unsafe conditions? (ibid: 24). Dynamic pressures are midway between root causes and unsafe conditions and ?operate to channel root causes into unsafe conditions? (ibid: 24). Therefore, dynamic pressures are considered to include such things as rapid population growth, epidemic disease, rapid urbanization, war, foreign debt, and deforestation. Dynamic pressures also include elements of the institutional setting, such as lack of local institutions and appropriate skills, that contribute to transforming factors of root causes into unsafe conditions (ibid: 24-25).  At the end of the progression of vulnerability in the model (Figure 2.1), are unsafe conditions, the tangible and specific conditions that vulnerable populations may experience; the reality of their vulnerability (ibid: 25). Unsafe conditions are both physical and social conditions that influence the characteristics of vulnerable individuals and groups.  It may be helpful to look at an example of how the various levels of factors (root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions) interact. For example, a female disabled person can be vulnerable due to her socially marginalized situation?being a woman and disabled (root causes), which accelerates when local governments do not have an appropriate policy to secure an affordable home for her, or her community does not have adequate support programs to meet her daily needs (dynamic pressures). Under such circumstances, she has to live in an inexpensive home which is a poorly maintained fragile building (unsafe conditions). If a hazard, whether an earthquake or flood, strikes, her home would experience severe damage from the hazard.     38Blaikie et al. demonstrate how people?s vulnerability can be aggregated or reduced depending on a society?s economy, politics, and other cultural norms and traditions. A disaster occurs when two opposing forces come together:  those processes generating vulnerability on one side, and physical exposure to a hazard on the other. The image resembles a nutcracker, with increasing pressure on people arising from either side ? from their vulnerability and from the impact (and severity) of the hazard on those people at different degrees of vulnerability (Blaikie et al 1994: 22).  According to Blaikie et al., Risk (Disaster) = Hazard ? Vulnerability (Wisner et al. 2004)2. When a physical event takes place where a vulnerable population lives, we have a disaster. As O?Keefe and his colleagues argued in 1976, ?Disaster marks the interface between an extreme physical phenomenon and a vulnerable human population. It is of paramount importance to recognize these elements. Without people there is no disaster? (ibid: 566). Cannon (1994) also argues that: The processes which make people more or less vulnerable are largely (but not exactly) the same as those which generate differences in wealth, control over resources, and power, both nationally and internationally. The Vulnerability concept is a means of ?translating? known everyday processes of the economic and political separation of people into a more specific identification of those who may be at risk in hazardous environments (ibid: 17).                                                    2 In the first edition of ?At Risk? by Blaikie et al, they expressed the formula as an addition equation (i.e. Risk (Disaster)=Hazard+Vulnerability) (1994). In the second edition of their book (Wisner et al. 2004), they changed the formula to a multiplication equation (i.e. Risk (Disaster)=Hazard?Vulnerability).   39People?s vulnerability is reproduced by human development which is an accumulation of everyday decision-making, planning and implementation. Factors influencing individual vulnerability are age, physical and mental disability, race and ethnicity, gender, religious and political preference, education, occupation, income, housing ownership/ tenancy, etc., which in turn are influenced by geographic, physical or environmental conditions (e.g. whether or not the region is mountainous; whether it is urban or rural; whether it is close to water; whether it is farmland, etc.) as well as the characteristics of communities or neighbourhoods where individuals live (e.g. whether the community is highly integrated or not; how resourceful the community is; whether the community has effective planning; whether the community has a collaborative relationship with local government).  These lists of vulnerable forms and conditions provide some basic examples of how and what to look at in considering people?s vulnerability. Vulnerability analysis involves understanding various elements of individuals? or communities? daily activities and how they interact with each other to intensify their vulnerable conditions. Many other disaster researchers have followed Hewitt?s idea (1983, 1997) of the everydayness of disasters and people?s vulnerability (Wisner 1993; Cannon 1994; Varley 1994; Lewis 1999).   2.3.3. Alternative Approach?Capacity to Deal with Vulnerability Blaikie et al.?s (1994) model is valuable and meaningful when it is used to understand what factors are influencing vulnerability and how those factors are accumulated. A problem arises when vulnerability is treated at an operational level to achieve vulnerability reduction. To resolve such a limitation, some vulnerability studies have begun recognizing the   40capability of the vulnerable. These studies recognize that, to a degree, vulnerable populations are capable of handling their own vulnerability (Anderson and Woodrow 1989 and 1990; Longhurst 1994; Blaikie et al. 1994 and 2004; Moser 1998; Fordham 1999). Because the word ?vulnerability? means being prone to or susceptible to damage or injury, social vulnerability to disaster also implies an inability or incapacity on the part of persons and groups who are considered to be socially vulnerable. However, it is quite often the case that vulnerable populations are capable of dealing with various problems and challenges during a disaster period. Moreover, people can be vulnerable in that they are poor and disabled, but the same persons can also be young and a member of the majority group in the society. In other words, vulnerable groups do not necessarily have only vulnerable characteristics, but they also often have characteristics of those who are not vulnerable (e.g. they may be wealthy, young, physically and mentally healthy, members of majority groups, or men) (Hewitt 1997; Bolin and Stanford 1998; Pelling 2003). Therefore, identifying groups of people by their vulnerable characteristics alone would lead to an inaccurate view of their conditions because they also have many other characteristics and abilities. Today vulnerability researchers pay attention to the concept of people?s capacity to respond to the challenges of disaster vulnerability (Anderson and Woodrow 1989 and 1990; Blaikie et al. 1994; Cannon 1994; Longhurst 1994; Moser 1996; Pelling 2003; Davis 2004; Wisner et al. 2004). However, there seems to have been little effort made to understand the relationship between vulnerability and capacity.     41Davis (2004) further elaborates the idea of capacity to redevelop the formula that he and other researchers created in 1994 (Blaikie et al. 1994). Incorporating the idea of capacity, the equation is expressed as (Davis 2004): Disaster (or risk)  =  Hazard ? Vulnerability      Capacity     H?V D = C  According to this relationship, capacity building can play a critical role in minimizing the scale of disasters though what and how such capacity is developed and used is not clearly stated by the vulnerability scholars.  Moreover, there has been little discussion on how vulnerability is accumulated at a community level as well as how capacity is built at a community level if community vulnerability reduction is a part of the objective for community recovery. There are studies explaining that vulnerability is reduced when individual and community resilience is present (Timmerman 1981; Adger 2000; Klein et al. 2003; Paton et al. 2003; Manyena 2006; Buckle 2006; Pooley et al. 2006). Resilience is defined as ability to cope with, adopt, buffer, and bounce back from adversity or hazardous events (Holling et al. 1998; Pelling 2003). This ?resilience? concept can help identify community?s various types of capacities and recognize a fine difference between community?s ability to absorb or bounce back risks and impacts and an ability to improve effectiveness of community disaster management. Such an analysis requires further research to address the different nature of capacities, in this research, thus, ?capacity? is broadly used as a factor to influence community vulnerability.   42Moreover, social capital has become one of the important concepts in the field of disasters (Buckland and Rahman 1999; Dynes 2002; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). Social capital is often defined as social ties and community networks, which have influential impacts on community vulnerability. Putnam (1995) and other scholars, such as Portes (1998) and Stoecker (2003) argue that social capital can affect certain individuals and groups positively and negatively. Social capital can be a sign of community?s solidarity and integration, but high social capital does not always result in only positive consequences for communities. Social capital can be used to identify thickness or poorness of social networks in a community. However, because the present research focuses on community?s ability to deal with community issues rather than examining trusting relationships and neighbourhood ties (social capital), community capacity is used as a concept to describe collective ability that can enhance not only effectiveness of problem solving processes, but also richness of community integration. To understand how community capabilities are used to manage or reduce their vulnerability, and to develop practical tools to implement vulnerability reduction at a community level, more studies are required. In this research, vulnerability reduction is considered as a part of a community?s responsibilities since vulnerability is better managed by collective actions rather than by individual actions (Moore 1958; Wallrich 1996). Community vulnerability in this thesis therefore is defined as a characteristic and condition of a community that makes the community susceptible or prone to natural hazards. These characteristics and conditions include inability to enhance social integration and networks, lack of or fragility of community?s resources, issues of accessibility, lack of knowledge and skills as well as issues relating to the built environment (infrastructure and building   43conditions). The following sections discuss the important roles of community planning and community development in vulnerability reduction in order to identify community capacity as is one of the influential factors in achieving community disaster recovery and vulnerability reduction.   2.4. Community Planning for Disasters Some studies of the Kobe earthquake suggest that individual recovery is faster if the community the person lives in is well integrated (e.g. it has high levels of social networks and resident?s participation, it has well established community-based organizations and it is resourceful) (Hanshin Fukkou Shien NPO 1995; Inui 1998; Choi et al. 2004). Communities undergoing natural disasters often experience moments of chaos and disorganization and have to depend on emergency relief agencies and government assistance. However, during the reconstruction period, communities deal with a series of recovery planning tasks while restoring community autonomy and protecting community interest for the future as well as the present. Existing literature suggests that there are strong correlations between a community?s various assets and resources in the pre-disaster period and the community?s ability to cope with stressful events, such as natural disasters (Moore 1958; Leighton et al. 1963; Simile 1995; Reddy 2000). Also, disaster researchers find that locally oriented recovery approaches can bring positive contributions to disaster mitigation and recovery (Mileti 1999; Godschalk et al. 1999; Buckland and Rahman 1999). Yet, there are few studies of how communities can integrate existing disaster planning and the community planning of daily operations. As discussed in the previous section, community capacity can play an important role in vulnerability reduction, but capacity building approaches are not well   44incorporated into existing disaster management. How communities can regain their independence while establishing collaborative relationships with local government is one of critical components for communities in achieving disaster recovery, but there is no research to investigate the relationship between community, local government and the outcome of disasters, for example. Moreover, what kinds of efforts are needed for communities to achieve vulnerability reduction is not clearly addressed in the existing literature.    The role of planning, particularly community-based planning, is considered one of the areas most in need of improvement in order to integrate the skills and knowledge of community recovery, vulnerability reduction and community capacity building. The idea is that planning for community recovery must involve not only the physical rebuilding of a community, but also community development efforts that can promote social networks, community leadership, the ability to solve common problems, and the enhancement of community independence in order to minimize community vulnerability.  However, to date, there are only limited interactions between planning and emergency management. Britton and Lindsay (1995) argue that: For most of the world?s urbanised areas, the spheres of city planning and emergency planning remain unintegrated. That is theory and practice of city planning has not been blended with the principles and conventions of emergency management, even though there are significant commonalities between them (ibid: 95-96). According to Britton and Lindsay (1995), community planning and disaster planning are not well integrated because community planners and emergency managers have different backgrounds in terms of their historical and theoretical development, and because they have conflicting roles in practice (ibid). Historically, disaster management has been reactive, short-term oriented, top-down and government-dependent, all of which have been strongly   45influenced by the civil defence practice of ?command and control? (Dynes 1994). Disaster management views disaster as an emergency, as chaos, and as an unexpected extreme event. On the other hand, because planning also considers disasters as emergencies, daily planning activities are separated and planners feel they should focus on non-emergency issues such as population growth, economic development, urban renewal, education, health, and conservation (Britton and Lindsay 1995). Since disaster management activities are all interrelated with aspects of local planning such as land zoning, building regulation, and housing policy, it seems most beneficial if community development and disaster management efforts are well coordinated, if not intertwined with each other (Godschalk et al. 1999). The next section introduces the literature on community development in order to understand current practical approaches to community development and community capacity building.  2.5. Community Development 2.5.1. What is a Community?  In this thesis, communities are defined as groups of people living in a geographically recognized area. A community is also a place where people can take collective actions to solve common problems (Green and Haines 2002). Although it can be important for some studies to refer to a neighbourhood as a political unit (Williams 1985) separated from community, in this thesis, the words neighbourhood and community can be used interchangeably (Morris and Hess 1975: 21-22). Community and neighbourhood are considered to describe any of the following: a geographic place; social interaction on matters of shared concerns about specific interests; social organizations or institutions that offer   46opportunities of enhancing interactions and bonds among residents; and the set of obligations and responsibilities to help other members (Rubin and Rubin 2001: 97; Green and Haines 2002: 4). The long-term development of communities requires various processes and actions. There are different ways to identify such diverse processes and functions. For instance, Warren and Warren (1977) identified six kinds of neighbourhood functions:  1.  As a sociability arena?A community provides an informal communication space,  2.  As an interpersonal influence center?Members of a community influence each other?s behaviour and values,  3.  As a source of mutual aide?Members help each other out in an emergency, and take care of each other, 4.  As an organizational base?A community provides bases for local organizations, such as women?s/children?s/senior?s clubs, PTAs,  and local branches of larger organizations, 5.  As a reference group?A community provides a basis for one?s identity and a sense of belonging,  6.  As a status arena?A community provides spaces and occasions to show personal achievements and well-being  (ibid: 16-25).  The authors do not mean that any particular community will necessarily perform all of these functions. Some communities may perform all of these functions but other communities may perform only one or a few of them depending on the culture, income, ethnicity and race of the communities (ibid: 25-26). Warren and Warren (1977) argue that neighbourhoods can provide many possibilities for social change and a promise for democracy that ?no other social group seems to be as well equipped to do? (ibid: 204). They point out that community-based organizations (CBOs) play a major role in clarifying and identifying the solutions to problems (ibid: 204), and they are often better equipped than government and private industry to maximise the potential functions of the community in working together to improve and solve existing problems (ibid: 206). In this study, these six   47functions are considered to be some of the major characteristics of community integration and solidarity.   2.5.2. Types and Characteristics of Community Development Community development encompasses a wide range of disciplines and practices. Although community development practices vary from community to community, all community development originally began as part of efforts to plan for and bring about improvement in a community. The term ?community development? came into common usage after World War II due to the strong emphasis on social reconstruction following the war. Community development was recognized as ?a group of people in a locality initiating a social action process (i.e. planned intervention) to change their economic, social, cultural, and/or environmental situation? (Christenson et al. 1989: 14). I use the definition of community development elaborated by Green and Haines (2002): ?a planned effort to produce assets that increase the capacity of residents to improve their quality of life? (ibid: vii). These assets may include several forms of resources available to a community, such as physical, human, social, financial, and environmental resources.  Broad practices of community development are difficult to grasp. Christenson (1989) identified three different community development themes: self-help, technical assistance, and conflict through which communities can initiate a social action process to improve their current situations and achieve community betterment? (ibid: 32). Christenson suggested that these categorizations involve considerable overlap and concludes that ?the most successful community development efforts use a little bit of each theme? (ibid: 32.). Table 2.1, shows the relationship between community issues or problems experienced by certain members of   48the community and those who play central roles in dealing with them. Although this is a broad analysis of community development, it can provide a general sense of community development practices and helps focus on some concrete issues that will be dealt with in this instance in communities in Kobe (e.g. roles of change agent, types of clientele, speed of change, and sustainability of change).  Table 2.1: Comparison of Three Themes of Community Development Themes  Roles of Change Agent Task/Process Orientation Typical Clientele Speed of Change Sustainability of Change Self-Help Facilitator, educator Process Middle-class Slow Excellent Technical Assistance Advisor, consultant Task Leaders, administrators Moderate Good Conflict Organizer, advocate Process and task Poor, minorities  Fast  Weak (Christenson 1989: 33) As defined earlier, community development is a planned effort to produce assets that increase the capacity of residents to improve their quality of life. Garkovich (1989) argued that through the building of local capacity, community development is achieved. According to Garkovich, capacity is defined as: the ability of residents to articulate needs and to identify actions to solve these needs. Local capacity also represents the ability of residents to mobilize and organize local or extra-local resources in the pursuit of community defined goals (Ryan 1987). Simply put, local capacity engages organizations, leadership, and citizens in the community development process (Garkovich 1989: 197). In order to plan and achieve successful community development, communities need to enhance community capacity and community capacity is built through a series of activities including identifying problems, mobilizing and organizing community resources, fostering leadership, encouraging residents participations, and so on. Because one of the ways to   49implement effective community development is through community capacity building, the following section discusses capacity building and develops a working definition of community capacity.  2.5.3. Building Community Capacity Historically, a common practice for dealing with neighbourhood problem was for governments and social service agencies to take a ?needs-oriented? approach to seek solutions. This needs-oriented approach tended to look at the deficiencies and weaknesses of the community (Kretzmann and McKnight 1993). More recently, social scientists prefer to focus on a community?s skills, assets and capabilities which can be utilized in solving their problems (McKnight and Kretzmann 1996; Chaskin et al. 2001; Rubin and Rubin 2001; Green and Haines 2002). These scholars define skills, assets and capabilities slightly differently, but they mostly include human, social, cultural, physical, financial, and environmental capital as part of a community?s capacity to enhance further development of the community. Chaskin et al. (2001) define community capacity as follows: Community capacity is the interaction of human capital, organizational resources, and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain the well-being of that community. It may operate through informal social processes and/or organized efforts by individuals, organizations, and social networks that exist among them and between them and the larger systems of which the community is a part (Chaskin et al. 2001: 7).  Increasing attention to understanding community capacity is rooted in the response to social problems arising in modern urban centres over the last four or five decades, such as ameliorating urban poverty (Alinsky 1969; Chaskin et al. 2001; Fraser et al. 2003: 417). Although community capacity building is a ?relatively newly defined area of policy and   50practice? (Chaskin et al. 2001: 93), it is expected to enhance interactions among community social, human, financial, and physical capital and resources in order to achieve community development. Green and Haines (2002) assert that one of the objectives of community development process is to build capacities (or assets) in communities. Community capacity building is therefore achieved as part of community organizing efforts by actions and planning led by community based organizations (CBOs). Before introducing the literature on community organization and CBOs in the next section, the importance of public participation is addressed. According to Green and Haines (2002), public participation is a prerequisite for the democratic community development approach. They argue that there are at least four types of public participation: public action (initiated by citizens for their own purposes); public involvement (initiated by government for administrative purposes); electoral participation (activities to elect or vote for representatives); and obligatory participation (activities in which participation is compulsory) (ibid: 35-36). They refer to Sherry Arnstein?s (1969) ?ladder of public participation? to explain the different degrees of participation and the differing power relationships with government.  Green and Haines (2002) argue that although achieving public participation is a difficult task, maintaining the level of participation once achieved is probably harder. Because people participate for specific reasons, when they do not have a reason, they generally do not get involved. Similarly, people who have become involved will often cease to be involved once the initial reason for involvement has disappeared. Social relationships are one of the most influential reasons for people to participate?to meet new people and also to do things with their friends. Such activities enhance a community?s social capital and   51higher levels of social capital can help further mobilize people (Putman 1995). However, as Green and Haines (2002) suggest, there are various factors that lead people not to participate. These may relate to lack of time, but also to lack of childcare, transportation, and advanced information (ibid: 38). They also suggest that to achieve higher and long-term public participation, ?residents need to see real, direct benefit of participation . . . residents typically need to see that their actions are having some impact? (ibid: 38). As Arnstein (1969) argues, ?there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process? (ibid: 217). Communities must gain real power to make decisions and take actions to improve their quality of community life as an essential part of their community development practices.  Through building community capacity, communities are able to restore what they have lost in disasters including material losses, community networks, and community autonomy. In this study, community capacity is defined as a community?s resources as well as its collective ability to solve common problems (community organizing) and further enhance community safety and quality of life. Capacity also includes a democratic decision-making approach, collective action approaches, the creation and improvement of community planning practices and implementation, the establishment of CBOs to assist with specific community needs, and efforts to achieve a collaborative relationship with local governments and businesses.    522.5.4. Community Organizing Saul Alinsky (1962; 1969; 1989) pioneered an approach to community development, "Community Organizing," in which people work together to solve problems under the leadership of community organizations and organizers. While witnessing the struggles for civil rights in Chicago in the 1960s, Alinsky envisioned community organizing as a way to regain democracy and social justice (1962; 1969; 1989). Although Alinsky?s approach was considered as radical or ?conflict? based (Alinsky 1969, 1989; Morris and Hess 1975; Christenson 1989), community organizing is now widely applied and has been further developed by community scholars and activists (Morris and Hess 1975; Kahn 1991; Rubin and Rubin 2001). Morris and Hess (1975) declare that the work for community organizing is not to confront the centers of power, but to create new institutions that ?can create the seeds of future society within the present one? (ibid: 37). According to Rubin and Rubin (2001), ?community organizing involves mobilizing people to work together to solve shared problems. . . Through organizing and development people gain the confidence and tools to collectively resolve societal problems? (ibid: xi). Si Kahn (1991) also asserts that: In organizing we begin to rediscover our own needs and demand that they be filled. In doing so we discover our strengths, our roots, our heritage. We relearn the skills of cooperation, of collective action, of working together, or supporting each other. In this knowledge and this experience is the beginning of real power for people. Organizing is for people with problems. It is good as a tool, a weapon, a means (ibid: 11).  Community organizing focuses on mobilizing people to solve problems as a critical part of community process. Community development is often widely accepted as a process of overall community building. Rubin and Rubin (2001) define community organizing and development as the following:    53Community organizing involves bringing people together to combat shared problems and to increase peoples? say about decisions that affect their lives. Community development occurs when people strengthen the bonds within their neighborhoods, build social networks, and form their own organizations to provide a long-term capacity for problem solving. When many people and many organizations join together to combat injustice and inequality they create a social movement (ibid: 3, italic original). Although both community organizing and development have their own roots, today their activities and objectives are often closely related to each other. It can be difficult to distinguish what types of activities fall under community organizing versus community development. Chaskin et al. (2001) view community organizing as the process of community capacity building and do not use the term ?community development? to explain their approach. This study defines community organizing as a part of community development, which involves not only solving shared problems, but also addressing inequalities of resources (wealth and power), promoting democratic values and practices, enhancing the standard of living, and building a sense of community (Rubin and Rubin 1992; Green and Haines 2000).   2.5.5. Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) The literature suggests that community-based organizations (i.e. any organizations based in a community which often contribute to enhancing community and individual?s life) play a critical role in community development (Alinsky 1969; Warren and Warren 1977; Mesch and Schwirian 1998; Keating and Krumholz 1999; Rubin and Rubin 2001; Chaskin et al. 2001; Green and Haines 2002; Silverman 2004; van der Plaat and Barret 2006). Community-based organizations today perform a wide range of functions that assist residents of complex and diverse communities in various facets of their lives. Rubin and Rubin (2001)   54classify different types of CBOs according to their missions?those that strive to improve social equity (social equity organizations), those that increase social justice (social justice organizations or pressure/protest organizations), those that provide a good or service (social production organizations), those that enhance community identity (community identity organizations), and those that strengthen community defense (community defense organizations) (ibid: 14-15).  These community organizations can also be classified by their complicated and evolving relationships with government. Pressure organizations lobby, petition, or persuade politicians, or negotiate with bureaucrats within the conventional rules of the system. Protest organizations work ?outside of the conventional rules, because those in the organization question the legitimacy of the rules? (Rubin and Rubin 2001: 15). Social equity and social production organizations may work with government, or work under government contracts. Community identity and defense organizations may partner with a government agency (ibid: 15-16). Moreover, what kind of relationship a CBO can establish with government?whether if it is equal, subordinate, assisting, or confrontational?is vital, as the relationship influences the outcomes of the CBO?s activities. To address problems of existing policies and promote social change, CBOs often challenge government (Greens and Haines 2002: 73).  There are a number of advantages of having CBOs assist community activities. First, CBOs can help empower people. Second, CBOs can provide continuity while community membership may change. Third, CBOs can provide expertise. Finally, CBOs can help the members to respond to problems more quickly (Rubin and Rubin 2001; Green and Haines 2002: 62). Although government agencies, private businesses, and various interest groups inside and outside of the community can also have a great influence on a wide range of   55community activities, CBOs can play a key role in the community development process (Green and Haines 2002: 72).   2.5.6. The Challenge for Capacity Building and Roles of Government As discussed in this section, capacity can embrace a wide range of processes, activities, and relationships of a community. One of the concerns about the community capacity building approach is whether or not it really promotes inclusive solutions to community problems (Shirlow and Murtagh 2004). Advocacy planner, Paul Davidoff (1965) raised the following question about community capacity building many years ago??who gets what, when, where why and how?? (ibid: 336). The capacity building approach needs to address this complex question in order to fully promote community development as a way of enhancing community life. The capacity building process often implies inclusiveness and collectiveness of the community; however, who is actually representing communities is not clearly addressed.   Another concern in regard to current community planning practices is whether building community capacity is really ?manageable, or even possible? (Simpson et al. 2003: 278). According to Simpson et al. (2003), recent increasing attention to community capacity building is in fact creating pressure on communities to ?take responsibility for their own development? and ?to cease relying on government for direction and solutions? (ibid: 278). Simpson et al. wonder if a community can truly achieve self-sufficient community development projects with their own hands with the resources provided through local volunteerism. In their case study, they found that recent high interest and expectations regarding the community capacity building process can merely put pressure on some   56communities and deplete rather than foster the possibilities and opportunities to increase community capacity.  Especially for poorly resourced communities, community capacity building is not really a plausible approach. For such communities, government interventions and close assistance is critical, both financially and technically, to establish the foundations they need to build their capacity (Keyes et al. 1996; Keating and Krumholz 1999). It is critical to acknowledge the fact that no components of community capacity?including human, social and economic capital?can simply replace effective public policy and government assistance (Bridger and Luloff 2001). The challenge for government is to determine how to balance the power between local governments and communities, how to allocate appropriate skills and resources, and how to encourage participation without creating unreasonable pressures ?on time, personal energy and finances of residents? (Simpson et al. 2003: 284). Both local governments and communities need to recognize the complexity of the decision making process and to decide on appropriate ways of allocating resources in order to enable effective capacity building processes.   Community capacity building can contribute to the enhancement of current community development practices and lead to an increase in the community quality of life. However, it is important to note that, especially in the Japanese context, community capacity building is effective if national and local governments provide favourable environments for communities. Community life involves not only building and maintaining infrastructure and public facilities, but also providing for fundamental public needs with things such as education, health programs, a welfare service, employment opportunities, and safety. Without government efforts to provide these basic services, communities cannot sustain their   57daily needs. Community capacity building approaches need to recognize the important roles of government.    2.6. Conclusion In this chapter, I reviewed existing recovery studies, vulnerability analysis, and community development literatures and some gaps were identified. Drawing from this literature, I develop a research framework for this thesis in order to fill in some of the gaps that exist in the theories and empirical studies. Community recovery was shown to be an opportunity for a community to reduce its vulnerability, better itself, and ensure sustainability for future generations (Haas et al. 1977; Bolin 1998; Mileti 1999; Reddy 2000). However, few studies have been done to learn how effectively recovery can be achieved at a community level. To understand the difficulties surrounding community recovery theories and practices, I explored current vulnerability literature, since community vulnerability reduction is one of the areas that community needs to deal with while achieving disaster recovery. Vulnerability analysis (Blaikie et al. 1994; Wisner et al. 2004) helps understand how vulnerability is produced and what factors influence vulnerability. It also provides an in-depth analysis of how vulnerability is accumulated through different levels of socioeconomic, cultural, political and environmental factors (root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions) (ibid). However, vulnerability analysis does not offer practical tools to guide how vulnerability can be reduced at an operational level, though many vulnerability scholars suggest that there is a correlation between vulnerability and capacity. Community capacity plays an important role in influencing existing vulnerability, yet how the two interrelate with each other in a community is not clearly understood from existing studies.    58There is a lack of research that develops theories to explain how community vulnerability is reduced (e.g. whether it is a part of collective efforts of communities, and whether it is critical that community capacity building takes place before disasters). To understand how communities take collective actions, characteristics of community capacity, and how capacity is increased, community development literature was reviewed. Community development is ?a planned effort to produce assets that increase the capacity of residents to improve their quality of life? (Greene and Haines 2002: vii). Broad themes of community development were introduced. It was shown to come about through self-help, technical assistance, or conflict that is treated strategically by CBOs and leaders who take the roles of facilitator, educator, advisor, consultant, and organizer or advocate (Christenson 1989). Community organizing and contributions of CBOs were identified as the critical elements in achieving successful community development through capacity building in developing a research framework. To further build up the framework, in the next chapter, community development within the specific context of Japanese community development practices is discussed.      59CHAPTER 3  Community Development and Japan as a Context 3.1. Introduction This chapter analyzes the different factors influencing community development in the larger context of Japan as a whole and how these factors affect communities? capacity and vulnerability. Because community development differs depending on the historical, economic, political and social background of the communities, Japanese urban planning, community-based planning and overall disaster planning is examined. Through a literature review, this chapter introduces theories and an empirical analysis of a recent emerging concept of ?Machizukuri? (Japanese community based planning) in order to understand overall community development practices in Japan. Community development does not merely focus on a formal plan, but it also concerns how members of the community are involved and how they solve their problems. The current state of civil society in Japan and the historical development of volunteerism and neighbourhood associations are therefore examined. The aim is to lay out the various factors that are key elements for both increasing capacity and reducing vulnerability in the context of Japan.   3.2. Overview of the Japanese Urban Development Context 3.2.1. The Historical Development of Urban Planning in Japan Whether they were feudal lords or monarchs, leaders in pre-modern Japan had their own ways of controlling their land and people. The oldest planned city in Japan was recorded 1,300 years ago in Naniwa (near Osaka city) (Watanabe 1993: 79). However, most scholars   60of Japan?s urban development agree that the Meiji Era (1868-1909) was the beginning of the modern period in Japanese urban planning development (Ishida 1987). Although there was already legislation in place to control the urban environment in Tokyo?the Tokyo Urban Area Improvement Ordinance of 1888?there were no urban planning laws to regulate cities across Japan in a comprehensive manner until 1919.  In the early 1910s, a group of architects and government officials began to study the western experiences in this emerging field as they sought solutions for increasing urban problems caused by rapid industrialization and urbanization. The result was the enactment of the City Planning Act of 1919, which became the nation?s first general planning act for major cities. It has been commonly called the ?Old Act.? It controlled the nation?s planning system for nearly half a century and was the decisive factor for the development of Japanese cities until it was replaced by the City Planning Act of 1968, or ?New Act? (Watanabe 1993: 293). The Old Act was influenced by western planning approaches at the time: the Garden City movement of Ebenezer Howard; the 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act in England; and the City Beautiful Movement in the 1910s in America (Watanabe 1993). Since then, the planning profession in Japan has been influenced by Western planning in many ways, yet Japanese planning has been quite different from that in the West in many ways as well, especially those in which planning is implemented. Japanese planning has had strong ties with the government compared with the Western planning profession. Although planners in the West often work for the government, they have more independence from the government than do planners in Japan. Japanese city planning has often meant simply government led activities (e.g. land-use planning, building codes and standards, urban renewal and nation-wide infrastructure development) (ibid: 38-39).    61According to Ishida (1987), the City Planning Act (1919) had very centralized rules that did not give any authority to the local cities and towns for planning and implementation. The Act introduced new ideas and rules such as building codes, land use zoning, land readjustment, land management, and training of planning professionals. This planning act helped to modernize Japanese cities, and to prepare the basis for a capitalist system, but it did not support a democratic climate at the municipal level of government, nor did it involve residents in the planning process. ?This framework was maintained even when the law was finally amended in 1968, as urban planning then became an agency-delegated function of the state to be carried out by local government? (Nakai 2002: 18).  Japanese urban planning therefore has been a means of top-down, ?state development?; the government recognized its limits when it came to small scale development in local communities. In 1980 the District Planning (Chiku Keikaku) system was introduced, allowing for planning at a district level. With the introduction of the District Planning system, the Basic Building Act was revised and amendments helped stimulate development projects at the local community level. The Mano community in Kobe city was selected as a pilot model community and the Mano District Plan was created in 1980. In 1981, Kobe City first introduced the ?Kobe shi Chiku Keikaku oyobi Machizukuri Kyotei touni kansuru Jorei,? known as ?Machizukuri Jorei? (Community Building Ordinance) for communities to propose their own neighbourhood development plans to the City Mayor. The Kobe Machizukuri Ordinance was the first ordinance of this kind ever created in Japan (Kobayashi 1994). Although the details of Machizukuri history and movements are discussed in the next section, this ordinance allowed neighbourhoods in Japan to take the initiative in the decision making process for their own neighbourhood development issues. Recently, in 2000, minor revisions   62were made to the Urban Planning Act of 1968 to allow local communities to engage more fully in improving the quality of their community life (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation, City and Regional Development Bureau 2003).   3.2.2. Inner-City Struggles?Efforts to Change the Local Planning Approach Community development practices face major problems every time major nation wide events occur. World War II caused massive damage to Japanese society (119 cities were affected and 2,350,000 houses destroyed). The government needed to help the country recover from the losses as soon as possible, and aimed to reconstruct the cities to the same development levels as Western societies as soon as they could. The rapid reconstruction and development efforts caused problems such as the large scale production of deficient housing, poor public infrastructure and facilities, environmental destruction, high population density, and urban sprawl. Although Japan had gained remarkable economic success by the 1960s, the people in Japan who contributed to this achievement experienced poor living conditions as a consequence (Ishida 1996; Nishibori 1996).  In the 1960s, once traditional urban centers were too congested to grow any larger, many businesses and industries sought better locations in order to expand their economic activities. Soon the inner city areas were depopulated and in decline. The rapidly developed urban inner-cities were no longer economic centers but rather urban planning problems (Alden et al. 1994). The 1960s was a period when people clearly expressed their frustrations towards their living conditions. They actively participated in social movements, and protested various government decisions and plans. Communities became passionate about air pollution, historical heritage, the right to sunshine, anti-large scale development plans, harsh   63working conditions, the lack of playgrounds, daycares, schools, parks and libraries, and the need to improve paved streets, storm water management, the sewage system and emergency preparedness. Individuals often protested against virtually anything that the government decided upon or implemented (Ishida 1987).  In order to respond to these demands from citizens? movements, the Old Act was revised in 1968, in a way that would allow more democratic process and the implementation of urban planning. The New Act includes new measures for public participation, and the delegation of responsibility and authority to local governments. However, many scholars in urban studies point out that this New Act has failed to achieve its objective of a decentralized and democratic decision making (Ishida 1987; Watanabe 1993; Nishibori 1996). In the New Act, the meaning of public participation is not clearly defined, and the methods for releasing information are not specifically discussed, nor is the right to public participation spelled out. A public hearing or meeting for a new project or plan is not legally required and as a result public participation is optional. Many local governments still make decisions unilaterally, even though they do not have the legal right to do so (Ishida 1987).    3.2.3. Disaster Management Policy Urban planning policies have been revised whenever Japan experienced major destruction from natural disasters, wars and other tragic accidents, such as oil tank or nuclear plant explosions. The first attempt to plan cities for disaster prevention was made after the   64Kanto Earthquake3 (1923). The earthquake itself killed 106,509 people and completely or partially destroyed 310,000 houses. The fires that erupted immediately after the quake burned 3,350 ha. 1,300,000 people became homeless as a result (Hanes 2000). Architect Kataoka Yasushi was one of the pioneers in incorporating safety issues into urban planning and strongly advocated the use of reinforced concrete for public buildings and of developing street plans to prevent future disasters (Watanabe 1993: 123). The building code for urban areas was first created in 1920 but did not include any measures specific to disaster prevention. Although architects and seismologists had been studying earthquake-proof buildings since the late 1880s, it was only in 1924, after the Kanto earthquake, that the code was modified to enforce fire and earthquake-proof buildings (Ishida 1987). The Kanto Earthquake reconstruction plan was soon issued and the plan greatly contributed to Japanese urban center development (Watanabe 1993). Massive amounts of money and human capital4 were given for the reconstruction of infrastructure in Tokyo metropolitan areas (Watanabe 1993) which enabled them to achieve recovery within seven years.  Until 1961, when the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan was developed, disaster prevention or reconstruction policies were created in response to individual events as ?special? or ?limited time? policies to meet specific needs (Hori 1998). Prior to the Kobe earthquake, the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan had only been revised once, after the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake. The Plan, according to Hori (1998), did not fully address disaster recovery issues because, at that time, the fundamental objective of disaster plans was aimed at how to predict and how to eradicate the cause of hazards. Policy makers did not focus on                                                  3 It was measured to be a magnitude of 7.9 (Ishida 1987). 4 According to Watanabe (1993), about 830,000,000 Yen (measured in 1930) was spent between 1923 and 1930 and in total 6000 engineers and government officers worked on the reconstruction projects (ibid: 274).    65recovery plans since prediction and prevention efforts were expected to stop the occurrences of disaster. In other words, there would be no disaster; therefore, no recovery would be necessary (Hori 1998).  Six months after the Kobe earthquake, the government thoroughly revised existing disaster management measures and created the ?Amendment of Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention? in July 1995. According to the revised Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention, local governments are expected to create, develop, and improve their own disaster relief and restoration plan. However, some critics say that the plan is still, at a fundamental level, highly centralized; the bureaucratic and top-down nature of the central and local governments has not changed. In reality, efforts to decentralize decision-making through revision of emergency measures may be in vain (Hori 1998). Since the Kobe earthquake, the government has made further minor revisions several times. These revisions were intended to minimize existing risks and to prepare for possible disasters in the near future. More reconstruction issues were discussed and recovery plans were recommended to local governments to create and improve current local government?s disaster management plans (Cabinet Office 2006).   3.2.4. Machizukuri (Japanese Community Planning) Since the 1960s, as a result of a number of social and environmental issues, such as public health, housing affordability and disasters, it has become common for people to organize interest groups such as neighbourhood associations to discuss their pressing concerns (Kurasawa 1990). It was also around the same time that many progressive approaches were taken by local radical politicians and private planning consultants. Such   66emerging approaches and directions are the origins of contemporary Japanese community-building (Machizukuri) efforts. Since then, Machizukuri activities have contributed to stimulating the realization of community development and empowerment (Hayashi 2000).  As mentioned earlier, Machizukuri Jorei (the Community Building Ordinance) was first created in Kobe City and since then this ordinance has played an important role in enabling neighbourhoods to engage in their own community development plans. One of the issues stipulated in this ordinance is that residents can establish a town building council (Machizukuri Kyogikai) and this council represents the residents in the community. Under the Kobe Community Building Ordinance, the council has the right to know about any development activities in the designated area and the council can make suggestions regarding any of the plans before they start. The council can even request that a plan be cancelled if it threatens their standard of living. They can also propose a plan to the Kobe Mayor and if they need some expert help, the City of Kobe will provide support and hire experts (Kobe City 1981). From 1980 onward, Machizukuri as the local resident?s active participation in community development has become popular for communities in Japan. The creation of the community building ordinances has helped communities that want to establish Town-Building Councils which enable their needs and concerns to be heard by the government and which further the planning and visioning of their communities? futures. Little study has been undertaken of the role the councils play in community development practices. Many communities in Japan have a number of CBOs, including Town-Building Councils and Neighbourhood Associations. How each of the CBOs and government interact is unclear   67since most of the members take multiple roles in different organizations, making it difficult to distinguish one CBO from the other (Tanaka 1990; Nakamura 1990; Hashimoto 2007).  In particular, how existing neighbourhood associations are involved in Machizukuri activities has not been clearly identified and defined. Edgington (2003: 215) addresses such points and argues that the Jichikai (the resident?s council/ neighbourhood association) is not really a part of the Machizukuri movement even though this neighbourhood association has played a critical role with respect to community integration or solidarity in Japan for a number of years. Ooto et al. (1999) argue that the existing community organizations are often established on a very small scale or sometimes without geographical boundaries. This makes it difficult to work with them to discuss community plans. Moreover, these organizations tend to exercise top-down decision making approaches that are not appropriate for carrying out Machizukuri (Nakamura 1965; Kurasawa 1990; Tanaka 1990; Ooto et al. 1999). Therefore, Jichikai or neighbourhood associations (NHAs) are not mentioned in the Community Building Ordinance.   Many scholars studying Japan agree that the Kobe earthquake triggered citizen activism (Sorensen 2002 and 2007; Edgington 2003; Hirohara 2002; Hayashi 2000; Hein 2003; Osborne 2003). The Kobe earthquake triggered new thinking about the role of local community planning so much that Machizukuri became a popular term and was considered a sign of civil society improvement. To some extent it came to represent the antithesis of top-down state-driven planning (Nakai 2002) or ?a paradigm shift from a top-down techno-bureaucratic approach to a bottom-up collaborative approach? (Murayama 2005). As part of the reconstruction efforts in Kobe after 1995, 73 Town-Building Councils were established and, soon after the quake, in total, 100 Town-Building Councils were active in the re-  68building of their communities (Kobe Machizukuri Centre 1999)5. The councils? contributions to the recovery of communities (e.g. negotiation with the local government, implementation of land use zoning or redevelopment projects, and stimulating community networks) are well recognized today and the idea of creating safer communities is now an essential element of Machizukuri (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation 2006). The long-term role of these councils over the last 10 years or so is difficult to evaluate as yet, as is their future role. However, whether they continue to take active roles in community development at the present and whether they will disband in the future and existing neighbourhood associations will take over their roles in maintaining the existing community practices are questions that need to be examined in order to identify the contributions and shortcomings of town-building councils and neighbourhood associations in community development practice.     3.3. Negotiating the Context: Emerging Civil Society and Voluntary Sectors in Japan 3.3.1. Weak or Strong??Civil Society in Japan Sorensen (2002) suggests one of the unique features of Japanese post-war development has been ?Japan?s extremely weak civil society? (ibid: 336). Johnson (1995) shares with Sorensen (2002) the view of Japan as a successful capitalist society and argues that a Japanese model of capitalism has been possible only because there is ?a strong state and a weak society? (Johnson 1995: 67). Masuda (1957), an urban historian, also notes this                                                  5 According to Mr. Miyanishi, a Mano community planner, many of these councils discontinued their activities once major disaster reconstruction efforts were implemented (interview with Mr. Miyanishi: 10/10/2003).    69weakness. Masuda suggests the historical processes and realities of social, cultural, political and economic development have left Japanese civil society somehow immature.  It would be a long interesting debate to determine if civil society in Japan is flourishing; whether it is promoting quality of life for everyone; whether it is advocating for equality and equity; and whether it is fostering collective actions to pursue democracy. Is it true that civil society is really about noble causes and well-intentioned actors, or can it have some negative consequences as well? Defining what civil society means requires diverse theories and ideas from a wide range of fields. It is not the objective of this research, but when the term is used here, it takes a broad meaning which has emerged in the modern era, of ?a domain parallel to but separate from the state?a realm where citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes? (Carothers 1999: 18). Proceeding from this view, the idea of civil society has been broadened and described in a more tangible way. Civil society is ?the organized, nonstate, nonmarket sector? (Pekkanen 2003: 118). It encompasses all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market. It includes various interest groups, which Carothers describes as;  not just advocacy NGOs but also labor unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations, and others. It also incorporates the many other associations that exist for purposes other than advancing specific social or political agendas, such as religious organizations, student groups, cultural organizations (from choral societies to bird-watching clubs), sports clubs, and informal community groups (Carothers 1999: 19-20).   Can active, diverse associations and organizations play an important role in strengthening civil society? Can a strong civil society lead to the advancement of democracy and positively influence existing policies so as to improve the quality of life? It is tempting to   70think that ?a strong civil society ensures democracy.? It is tempting to make correlations that ?a weak civil society leads to a lack of ?civic engagement? and ?social trust?? (Carothers 1999: 21). However, some evidence in Japan and Germany suggests that civil society with a low profile can help establish better relationships between civil society and the state (Carothers 1999; Fukuyama 1992). Carothers concludes that ?civil society groups can be much more effective in shaping state policy if the state has coherent powers for setting and enforcing policy. Good governmental advocacy work will actually tend to strengthen, not weaken state capacity? (Carothers 1999: 26). Civil society is therefore a critical component of democracy, but it is not the solution per se. no matter if it is strong or weak. Civil society must maintain a healthy relationship with the state as the state and civil society should work hand in hand to enhance each other, not to undermine each other. ?Civil society cannot be understood in isolation, but it must be understood in relation to the state, not in opposition to it? (Schwartz and Pharr 2003: 28).  With this idea in mind, let us consider how Japanese community development has taken place, and whether it was a result of collaborative work between the state and civil society.  . . . , whereas European and North American thinkers often wrote of ?civil society? between 1750 and 1850, few Japanese promoted or even discussed the idea of civil society from the late nineteenth century to 1945. Indeed, its translation (shimin shakai) did not appear in common Japanese parlance until the postwar era. During the prewar era, most Japanese would have regarded ?civil society? as inappropriate and illegitimate. The sticking point was the term ?civil.? While many Japanese embraced the Western word ?society,? the vision of a society governed by ?citizens? (shimin) explicitly challenged the fundamental notion of imperial sovereignty. Put simply, there were no ?citizens? in prewar Japan?only ?subjects? of the emperor (Garon 2003: 43) (italics in the original).    71The idea that there are no citizens in Japan, that there are only residents of specific neighbourhoods, or there are just groups of people who are affiliated with their companies, schools, clubs, and families is contested and is still a controversial issue (Smith 1983: 127; Knight 1996: 225). It is not an established fact that Japan lacks every element of civil society. Garon (2003) argues that there have been many signs of civil society emerging in Japan in its history, however, civil society in Japan has been less vigorous, and the state often retains the power and authority to oversee the activities of civil society. Many Japanese scholars characterize ?the strong state and weak civil society? (Masuda 1957; Johnson 1995; Knight 1996; Sorensen 2002) as one of the unique features of Japanese postwar development.  Therefore, city planning in Japan is commonly understood as state interest enabling activities. Planning from above has been so strong that the development of citizen?s interests and activities has been inhibited. As a consequence, people remain disempowered and dependent on the government. Sorensen (2002) describes such unique features of Japanese urban planning processes and systems:  To an extraordinary degree, however, early planning developments in Japan were the work of a small group of elite bureaucrats in the Home Ministry, professors at the University of Tokyo, and a few others. A fully developed city planning system was created based on best practice in the West, and was then operated as a national system, carried out by local governments under the direct and close supervision of the national ministry. This imposition of city planning from above has continued to shape attitudes towards city planning to the present (ibid: 337).   To summarize Japan?s urban planning in relation to the state and civil society: first, the state has power to control its people; second, the government administration is rather centralized and top-down; third, local government is relatively weak; fourth, larger corporations and businesses are protected by the state; fifth, city planning has often served   72state interests of economic development; and sixth, there is little history of social struggle for civil society. As many Japanese scholars argue, the Japanese central government has been effective in pursing economic development focused practices which undermine, to some degree, further enhancement of civil society, yet such approaches have certainly benefited the people in Japan greatly by providing standardized material wealth, infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and overall public services. It is important to note that even though the Japanese government?s planning process is still highly top-down and bureaucratic, it has laid out the critical foundation to help enhance Japan?s community capacity building.    3.3.2. Emerging Volunteerism in Japan  Although Japanese citizen activities may be relatively weak, they are not non-existent. So, what are some of these activities in Japan? Volunteerism, a citizen activity that has gained considerable attention, is fairly new in Japan. Preoccupied with post-war reconstruction, it was not until the early 1970s that Japanese citizens were able to have more time for themselves (Honda 1993) to participate in the public realm. In the 1980s, organized citizen groups grew gradually as the public witnessed the inadequacy of government services and recognized the need to supplement them. By the 1990s, discussions about citizen?s public participation as an important part of citizen activities were given serious attention, which formed a foundation for the legitimate status of citizen activities. In response to growing numbers of individuals organizing as non-governmental, non-profit, and local issue   73oriented groups, on December 1, 1998, the Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities?commonly known as the NPO Law (Tokutei Hi-eiri Katsudo Sokushin-ho) was put into effect (Mochizuki 2002). By February 28, 2003, over 10,000 groups had registered as NPOs. The number continued to increase and as of February 28, 2007, 30,619 groups were recognized as NPO groups by the Japanese Cabinet Office6.   The voluntary activities conducted by these organizations have often been associated with the fields of welfare, public health, and education, particularly in programs promoted by the local governments. The nature of voluntarism in Japan seems to be more of a complement to local government activities than a charitable contribution, or pursuit of purely individual interests. Honda (1993) argues that voluntarism in Japan is therefore people?s participation in governmental programs as a part of their roles as citizens. Through volunteering in the government?s daily operations, people participate in community building and take responsibility to assist in local problem solving. One of the reasons why it is difficult to distinguish between citizens? participation and the local government service is because there is little discussion of how well individuals and groups have developed their independence, autonomy, and self-governance in relation to the state (Knight 1996).                                                   6 http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/npo/data/pref.html (access date: 02/28/2003), http://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/data/pref.html (access date: 04/10/2007).   74According to John Knight (1996), the distinction between private and public is blurred in Japan because people truly believe that the state represents them and they represent the state. He further argues that ?the point is that there exists a chronic inability even in postwar Japan to imagine a public realm separate from, or independent of, the state. . . As a result of this absence of countervailing institutions, the state continues to dominate the public realm? (Knight 1996: 224). Instead of independence from the state, people in postwar Japan identify themselves in affiliation with various kinds of groups such as their companies, neighbourhoods, schools, clubs, and families. This ?groupism? demands high group commitment among Japanese, and for them, ?one?s actions will reflect on one?s group? (Smith 1983: 127). ?In a ?group-oriented society? like Japan, therefore, order in public space is not a function of public norms strictly speaking, but of the power of particular group norms to regulate public space? (Knight 1996: 225). The low crime rate in Japan is one of the positive sides of this group-centeredness. On the other hand, according to Knight, a negative side is: This intensity of partial attachments (particularly those of company affiliations) in Japan is seen to preclude any significant commitment to the public domain beyond. Japanese society, as a consequence, is marked by a dearth of voluntary activity, low standards of public behaviour, and contracts which lack a binding quality (Knight 1996: 225). Under these historical and cultural circumstances, it was difficult for anyone to predict that more than 1.3 million people in total would participate in volunteer emergency relief efforts after the Kobe earthquake. When the earthquake hit the Kobe region on January 17, 1995, massive numbers of volunteers were gathered and soon they were organized as groups and organizations to increase efficiency in providing disaster assistance. Many scholars agree that this emergence of non-governmental organizations has become a   75triggering event for the re-birth of civil society in Japan (Sorensen 2002; Takayose 1999a; Tatsuki 1998, Edgington 2003). How these volunteer movements will influence the existing relationship between the state and civil society in the future is still unknown. However, these voluntary organizations have certainly contributed to supplementing the government?s services, and reaching out to satisfy the survivors? diverse daily needs.  Since the Kobe earthquake, volunteerism has become very popular and commonly accepted. Whenever there is a disaster or tragic event around the world, volunteers do not hesitate to go and help. Being involved in volunteer activities like this?emergency response types of activities?has not traditionally been a common form of voluntary activity in Japan. However, people in Japan have spent a fair amount of their time doing non-paid/ voluntary activities for many years in other realms, such as neighbourhood associations, PTAs, baseball clubs, women?s clubs, senior?s clubs and so no.  Japan has a long tradition of local voluntary organizations such as neighbourhood associations with remarkably high participation by the residents, which leads some researchers to argue that ?Japan has always had a strong civil society? (Curtis 1997: 141). Widely spread all over Japan, community-driven, and with high membership, neighbourhood associations are one of the unique community characteristics of Japan. Most Japanese scholars agree that neighbourhood associations (NHAs) represent high social capital (Fukuyama 1997; Pekkanen 2003; Tsujinaka 2003; Sorensen 2002 and 2007) and those who argue Japan?s high social capital, often point to this as a sign of civil society. Pekkanen (2003) however argues that the roles of neighbourhood associations are dissimilar to those that Western societies have embraced as the roles of community organizations. He claims that the main function of civil society in Japan is not advocacy?effectively influencing   76policy outcomes and shaping public opinions (ibid). Moreover, some scholars argue that neighbourhood associations are often seen as the direct product of government and they may not be active agents promoting civil society (Konno 2001). To further investigate these issues, the historical development and current conditions of neighbourhood associations in Japan are discussed in the next section.   3.3.3. The Historical Development of Neighbourhood Associations in Japan The origins of neighbourhood associations can be traced back to different time periods of Japan?s history. According to Sato (2003), although their purposes were similar, there were two different resident associations which evolved in Japan?s history. One (often called Burakukai) was created in the Muromachi era (1338-1573) in rural areas to enforce feudal systems for farmers and fishermen. The other (often called Chonaikai) evolved after the Onin war (1467-1477) in order to maintain law and order for merchants and other dwellers in the urban areas. In the Edo era (Tokugawa Shogunate, 1603-1867), these resident associations became more organized and recognized by the authorities as a means of maintaining and controlling the lives of merchants, retailers, other urban dwellers, peasants and villagers. One of those associations called a ?five-family group (Gonin Gumi),? consisted of five households in a neighbourhood which acted as a unit to take care of each other. The feudal government used this association to create a system where residents would take care of neighbourhood problems such as minor crimes, unpaid taxes, or moral issues, by themselves. Each unit was responsible for their members? conduct and they collectively had to take the consequences of an individual?s action. If one of them was unable to pay taxes, for instance, somebody in the group had to pay the taxes for them. It was an extremely   77convenient system for the Shogunate to levy taxes, prevent crime, maintain sanitation, and mitigate fire or flood risks. Such neighbourhood associations were expected to maintain law and order, enforce rules, and provide moral and ethical support for their members (Sato 2003). ?Although it was used principally as a political tool, it did nevertheless develop as an autonomous body of neighbourhood families for the handling of community problems? (Masland 1946: 356).  When the Meiji government reorganized local jurisdictional boundaries in 1940, they brought the idea of this Five-Family Group system into these newly united towns and villages in order to preserve the self-sufficiency of the people?s daily activities and production processes (Nakanishi 1997). The system was called, Chonai-kai, Buraku-kai, or Jichi-kai7, which are now commonly translated as Neighbourhood Associations (NHAs). There were only certain rural areas that recognized the NHAs prior to 1940, but the Meiji government gave legislative recognition to the NHAs and created them nation wide to be utilized under the city and ward level government systems in 1943 (Nakanishi 1997; Masland 1946). The NHAs were well established and played a key role in assisting the central government during the W.W.II period. Soon after Japan?s defeat in the war, the system was viewed as a threat by the occupation authorities, and it was abolished in 1947. Although it was officially banned, in practice the system remained. It supported the Japanese post-war period of regional and local community development, and constituted a base for grass-roots movements (Nakanishi 1997).                                                  7 Jich-ikai seems to consist of a larger geographical unit, such as a whole elementary school catchment area while Chonai-kai can be just one block (cho) of a neighbourhood.   78Currently, neighbourhood associations play a central role in organizing social activities at the neighbourhood level. They also assist with the distribution of city government publications, post notices of waste collection schedules, maintain the cleanliness of public spaces, etc. Membership in NHAs is based on the household, not the individual. NHAs are not recognized by Law or even local government ordinances so that the membership is voluntary in principle, yet every household is expected to become a member. The board members, such as a head, deputy, secretary, accountant, and accounting auditor are typically changed every year and members take these roles when their turns come. It is almost compulsory for a household to take responsibility for the different positions in NHAs when their turn comes. Some scholars argue that NHAs tend to retain the traditional decision-making approach, top-down and bureaucratic, which has become unpopular with some residents who are not in positions of power (Tanaka 1990; Nakamura 1990). The NHA is the most widespread type of group organized by residents. According to Akimoto (1990), the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs conducted a survey in December 1980 and counted a total of 274,733 NHAs in Japan (ibid: 149). Roughly one third of them, were established before W.W.II. The number of NHAs increased as the population grew, but the growth has slowed down as overall population growth in Japan has declined. In 1992, the number of NHAs was 298,488, and the number actually decreased to 296,770 in 2002 (Hashimoto 2007). The level of participation and activities may not necessarily have declined parallel with the decrease in the number of NHAs, however. Whether every member is an active participant is debatable. Nevertheless, the general level of participation in NHAs has been remarkably high. It is still believed that roughly 90% of the population in Japan are members of NHAs, though the actual participation rates in various neighbourhood events are   79not always high (Hashimoto 2007; Pekkanen 2004). As the Japanese population becomes older, a higher number of the members are becoming inactive participants. Moreover, it is almost mandatory to accept an appointment as board member, which requires intense time and energy commitment. Such high expectations have become a huge burden for many households as life styles and preferences in modern Japan have changed. Community life in many areas has consequently gone through major transitions8 (Hashimoto 2007; Hendry 2003).  The NHAs take care of the full range of community events such as funerals, weddings, cleaning of rivers and streams, and even prevention of crime and disasters to some degree. Other local groups, whose membership overlaps with that of the NHAs, for instance, children?s groups, women?s groups, elderly or youth clubs, are established with different rules, duties and meetings in order to pursue their different interests and needs. In this regard, community life in Japan is quite busy with many activities and events to participate in, such as seasonal events (new year and summer festivals and sports events), monthly cleaning of community centers and parks, weeding grass and trimming trees in the parks, helping at funeral ceremonies, visiting public clinics for health check-ups, crime-prevention walks at night, lunch or tea services for the senior members in their neighbourhood, distribution of government notices, collection and payment of association fees, and some weekend trips for individuals to get to know each other.                                                   8 In my old neighbourhood in Kyoto, the participation by the residents has become lower these days due to the high ratio of the elderly population to younger people. If you are over 70 years old, you are exempted from becoming a board member in most neighbourhood associations. There are also more people who have decided not to become members of NHAs or who have decided to leave their NHAs because they see community involvement as a burden or feel they have better things to do than cleaning parks and chatting with their neighbours.    80Besides these activities, if the residents are members of other community organizations they also participate in activities such as baseball games, golf, tea parties, flower arrangement, bonsai arrangement, computer lessons, art classes, and so on (Table 3.1).  Table 3.1: Functions of Japanese Neighbourhood Associations Activity (based on a survey conducted in a small city, Ueda in Nagano Prefecture) NHAs that do it (%)  NHAs that consider it a priority (%) Festivals 85.5 32.3 Athletic meets, sports events  79.0  21.7 Construction and maintenance of parks  39.5  6.5 Publishing newsletters  26.6  5.6 Building or maintaining a community center  83.9  13.7 Distribution of government notices  89.5  16.1 Cleaning of gutters, rivers and streams, roads  91.1  45.2 Preventing illegal dumping  81.5  28.2 Crime prevention, fire prevention  84.7  32.3 Traffic management, traffic safety  69.4  12.9 Travel 31.5 1.6 Funerals and weddings  54.0  3.2 Club activities  75.8  24.2 Study groups  39.5  0.8 Support for children?s groups  89.5  26.6 Support for elderly people?s groups  83.1  11.3 Support for women?s groups  51.6  0.0 Support for youth groups  24.2  3.2 Cooperating with government collections  87.1  10.5 Presenting petitions from residents to local government  84.7  31.5 Support for politicians  25.0  2.4 (Source: Pekkanen 2004: 233)9  After the Kobe earthquake in 1995, CBOs have added a new function and activities?disaster management related programs. Kobe City launched projects to encourage communities to participate in disaster management. In 2002, 182 communities in Kobe city signed up for Bosai Fukushi Komyuniti (Disaster Prevention and Welfare Community) organized by local fire departments in order to enhance networks among local communities, to practice disaster drills, and to increase communication among residents (Choi et al. 2004).                                                    9 The original data was published in 1985.   813.4. Conclusion?Community Development and Disaster Recovery in Japan In this chapter, community development and Japanese historical and urban development were broadly introduced. A review of Japanese urban development was provided in this chapter to establish the specific context of the two cases, Mikura and Mano communities. To summarise this chapter, Machizukuri refers to community planning in Japan that has strong influence from local government. Major challenges for Japanese state planning assisting Machizukuri were how to implement policies that reflect and foster citizen participation and decentralization. Japan?s widely extant neighbourhood associations and other community-based organizations (CBOs) are leading actors in strengthening the existing capacity of communities and enhancing the Machizukuri movement. Although the Kobe earthquake caused many communities to recognize the importance of developing community disaster plans and practice emergency preparedness activities, more studies are needed to identify CBOs? different roles and activities with regards to Machizukuri including disaster planning, especially after the Kobe earthquake. Although many studies have suggested that Japan?s state of civil society is not mature enough for the citizens to become active agents for social change, the Kobe earthquake experiences of some communities helped increase public awareness of the importance of residents? participation in community activities which may further enhance Japan?s civil society. The unique combination of Japan?s circumstances discussed in this chapter, such as economy-driven development, a top-down urban planning approach, weak civil society, government led (heavily involved) community-based organizations, inner-city problems, a long history of NHAs and the recent Machizukuri movement have all had a strong influence   82on community development practices for communities in Japan including the two case communities studied in this thesis. Although the two case studies?Mano and Mikura communities?have very different community development histories and practices, they share a similar economic, social and political environment. The process of how each community was developed is discussed in detail in each case study in Chapters 6 and 7. However, it is important to note here that this chapter introduced the overall circumstances of current Japanese community development that the Mano and Mikura communities have been influenced by and which result in many similarities. The discussions of the case studies focus on examining specific areas of community development practices that were introduced in Chapter 2 in order to identify their differences (e.g. regarding existing CBOs? conditions and practices, levels of residents? participation, the prevalence of community problem-solving approaches, and the extent and nature of networking practice with local government as well as with others outside of the community). Before exploring the two case studies, in the next chapter the event of the Kobe earthquake is examined and issues revealed in the recovery processes are introduced in order to provide the specific context of the research.      83CHAPTER 4  Overview of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 4.1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of what has happened over the ten years following the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake (thereafter the Kobe earthquake) in order to identify some of the issues that are critical for the research. The impacts of and recovery from the quake are introduced in order to provide ?the fact[s]? (Tierney et al. 2001: 22) of the event, such as the damage and losses; the short-term relief efforts; the disruption of the economy and of urban life and recovery planning. This chapter also discusses other issues relating to ?societal process? (Tierney et al. 2001: 22) that influenced the production of or reduction of vulnerability in Kobe, such as local land-use zoning, emergency policy, the condition of the housing, the population density and distribution, and the development of voluntary sectors, including CBOs. Through such discussion, some gaps in the existing literature and empirical data are identified in order to further clarify the research questions with respect to the case studies in the latter part of this thesis. Some Japanese scholars claim that the reason why this earthquake was so destructive is related to the way Japan was quickly reconstructed after World War II (Ishida 1996; Takayose 1999a). Rapid reconstruction led to poor development, especially the neglect of inner-city revitalization (e.g. revitalization of housing, public services and facilities, and updating of building codes and land use planning for the purpose of improving local community living conditions) in order to focus on public infrastructure, such as highways, transportation, and large scale projects for the purpose of economic development (Miyamoto   841996c). Some of these neglected inner-city areas had not been affected by World War II and were left as they were, becoming extremely vulnerable (Miyamoto 1996b; Wisner et al. 2004).   Critics argue that the Japanese political systems?seen as top-down, centralized, and bureaucratic?impeded emergency services and personnel from responding effectively (Miyamoto 1998; Tierney and Goltz 1997). The government?s decision-making process has often been inflexible and centralized. For instance, after any disaster the local government has to request emergency rescue assistance from the central government. The emergency rescue assistance would only be granted if local government could report the extent of the damage to prove the state of emergency. This process caused a critical delay in efforts to save scores of people trapped under crushed houses in Kobe in January 1995 (Yasui 1997). A government study suggested that 4,461 people (69% of the total death toll) died within the morning of the earthquake (Hyogo Prefecture 2002). The remaining deaths occurred in the next couple of days or so and could have been avoided if there had been faster emergency response systems (Nihon Jutaku Kaigi 1996).    While trying to find who and what to blame for the massive losses from the earthquake, researchers, practitioners, volunteers and survivors all still agree that local governments as well as neighbours, community-based organizations (CBOs) and volunteers played a crucial role in recovery efforts (Miyamoto 1998; Sazanami 1998b; Tatsuki 2002; Choi et al. 2004). Overall recovery efforts and accomplishments by the government have been remarkable. The national and local governments were able to restore most lifelines within six months, and took charge of debris management and other reconstruction projects at the public expense. This could be a prototype for developing future disaster plans (Niino   852006). However, some recovery issues still remained to be dealt with, especially at a community level in order for the affected communities to achieve further recovery from the earthquake.   4.2. The Impacts of the Earthquake  4.2.1. General Background The Great Hanshin Earthquake, measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale, hit the Hanshin area, a major industrial district in Japan, at 5:46 am on January 17, 1995 (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).  Figure 4.1: Area of Magnitude and Epicentre  (Source: Kyodo News: 02/08/199510)                                                  10 http://www.city.kobe.jp/cityoffice/15/020/quake/saiken/uk/sub1-1.html   86Figure 4.2: Map of Japan    As a result of the earthquake, 6,434 people were killed, three people were reported missing, and 43,792 people were injured (as of 05/19/2006) (Fire and Disaster Management Agency 2007). As many as 320,000 people were left homeless. More than 245,000 houses were either completely or partly destroyed. Material damage was estimated at around 10 Hyogo Prefecture (Kobe City)Tokyo 0       100        200        300km Osaka Awaji Island Epicentre of Earthquake Kyoto N   87trillion Yen (roughly 83.4 billion US dollars)11 (Miyamoto 1996b: 7-8)12. The Kobe Earthquake is considered to be the worst natural disaster in Japan since the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake (mag. 7.9), which killed 140,000 people in Tokyo and Yokohama. At the same time, the Kobe earthquake was ?one of the most expensive natural disasters in history? in the world (New York Times 1/22/95: S1-1).  This great earthquake mainly affected the Hanshin area, which consists of Hyogo-ken, Osaka-fu, and Kyoto-fu13 (see Figure 4.2). As one of the major urban centers of Japan, it has a total population of 14 million people (Statistics Bureau 1995: 40). Hyogo prefecture is located about 450 km southwest of Tokyo and had a population of 5,520,397 (as of 10/01/1994) at the time of disaster. This prefecture consists of Kobe, a major urban center in Japan with a population of 1.48 million, Nishinomiya, Ashiya, Amagasaki and 17 other cities, and 70 towns and villages. It was in Hyogo that 99% of the fatalities occurred (National Land Agency 1996: 5). The analysis of this earthquake for this thesis therefore focuses on Hyogo Prefecture, particularly on Kobe City (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). Table 4.1 shows the scale and damage of the earthquake.                                                   11 US$1 = 118.62 Yen (as of 07/30/2007) 12 Hyogo Prefecture estimated the damage in Hyogo prefecture at 9,926,800,000,000Yen (Hyogo Prefecture 2002). 13 -Ken and -fu refer to prefectures similar to provinces or states in other countries.     88Table 4.1: Scale and Damage of the Great Hanshin Earthquake Occurrence time  5:46:52.0 17 January 1995 (local time) 20:46:52.0 16 January 1995 (GMT) Magnitude  7.3 (Richter scale).  VII (Japan Meteorological Agency [JMA] scale) Epicentre  34? 36.4? N, 135? 2.6? E (about 15 km to the southwest of Kobe City) Focal Depth  14.3 kilometres Stricken Areas  Cities of Kobe, Amagasaki, Akashi, Nishinomiya, Sumoto, Ashiya, Itami, Takarazuka, Miki, Kawanishi and towns of Tsuna, Awaji, Hokutan, Ichinomiya, Goshiki, Higashiura, Midori, Nishitan, Mihara and Nantan in Hyogo Prefecture, and other areas of Hanshin region (Osaka city, Kyoto city, and Hikone city). Deaths *  6,336, with 83.3% from crushing, suffocation, and sudden shock; 12.8% from fire. 3.9% died of other related illness. Eight were confirmed quake-related suicides (as of the end of 1995). On May 19, 2006, Fire and Disaster Management Agency updated the death toll to 6,434. Injured 43,177 Missing  3 (as of May 19, 2006) (Fire and Disaster Management Agency) Homeless  300,000 (at the peak) Total Damage   About 10 trillion Yen (US$ 83.4 billion) (as of 1996 estimate)  Buildings  215,000 homes and other buildings destroyed or badly damaged; 4,700 less severely damaged. Highways  Hanshin Expressway, the major artery between Osaka and Kobe, collapsed in five places. Bay Coast Highway in Osaka collapsed for 600 meters of its length.  Railroads  Lines for high-speed bullet trains damaged in 36 places in 90-kilometer stretch. Port  Quake threw cargo containers into sea and toppled giant cranes.   Utilities  1.3 million households lost water, 860,000 lost gas, 2.6 million lost electricity.  Quake cut 300,000 telephone lines.  * The number of deaths has changed over time. It has become more and more difficult to determine the direct cause of death. Although it depends on the source, most sources consider 5,502 deaths to have been directly caused by the great earthquake. About 800 deaths are considered to have been ?related deaths.? (Source: UNCRD 1995: 15; Miyamoto 1996c; Fire and Disaster Management Agency 2001 and 2006; Hyogo Prefecture 2007: 1)  4.2.2. Economic Impact ?The present concentration of business, housing and economic functions in Kobe is the main reason that damage was so enormous? (UNCRD 1995: 193). The cost of damage in the Great Hanshin Earthquake was estimated at about 10 trillion Yen (as of 1996) (US$83.4 billion)14 (Table 4.2).                                                   14 US$1 = 118.62 Yen (as of 07/30/2007)   89Table 4.2: Assessment of Earthquake Damage and Distribution  (100 million Yen) Hyogo Prefecture Outside Hyogo Prefecture Total   % 1. Life System  57,149  1,114  58,311  58.3 Houses 20,056 988 21,044 21.0 Household Effects  2,552  126  2,678  2.7 Public Educational Facilities  2,612    2,612  2.6 Public Works Facilities 2,165  2,165 2.2 Matters Related to Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries  975  975 1.0 Life Line  4,796    4,796  4.8 Sewage Treatment Facilities  41    41  0.0 Matters Related to Commerce & Industry  24,000    24,000  24.0 2. Industrial System  41,668  86  41,754  41.7 Non-Housing Buildings  20,244    20,244  20.2 Harbour Facilities  10,400  10,400 10.4 Freeways 6,000  6,000 6.0 Railroads 3,444 86 3,530 3.5 Communication Facilities  440    440  0.4 Reclaimed Land  64    64  0.1 Public Works Facilities (Road) 1,076  1,076 1.1 Total (100 million Yen)  98,865  1,200  100,065  100.0 (Source: Miyamoto 1996c: 32)  Financial losses were actually greater than this 10 trillion Yen (US$83.4 billion) estimate because the ?indirect impact of an economically paralyzed Hanshin region through disruption of distribution and the like would further add countless billions to the damage bill? (UNCRD 1995: 194). The estimated cost of the ten-year reconstruction plan was calculated at approximately 17 trillion Yen (Miyamoto 1996c: 32). Most of this cost was covered through national and local debts and loans from the banking agencies which no doubt tightened Kobe?s financial situation (Hyogo Prefecture 2006b).  The Port of Kobe was one of the major port towns in Japan until the earthquake severely damaged the port facilities. Chang (2000) argues that even though the physical damage to the port was repaired relatively quickly, the Port of Kobe lost much of its global market share as well as domestic competitiveness to other ports in Japan. This market share and competitiveness has been very difficult to regain. The long-term consequences for the   90Port of Kobe could be very serious and it may never be able to regain its pre-disaster level of activity. Chang asserts that ?Kobe demonstrated that pre-disaster mitigation or preventive action provides the best option for dealing with seismic risk? (2000: 63).   Large corporations and businesses have enough stock to recover by themselves in a relatively short time frame; however, damaged local small businesses have been threatened with bankruptcy. Prior to the earthquake, Kobe city was one of the major production sites for rubber shoes. This industry consisted of more than 500 small factories in Kobe city. After the earthquake, 90% of these factories were partially or completely destroyed, and 80% of the small factories in Kobe could not continue in business after the quake (Fukui 1996: 283). The estimated damage for the Kobe rubber industry amounted to about 300 billion Yen. The total number of employees from this shoe industry was estimated at about 50,000, which means most of them lost their jobs from this disaster. Sake brewing, which is another major local industry in Kobe, also suffered severe damage, estimated at over 100 billion Yen. Many of these shoe and sake factories had to go out of business because of the severe damage. The number of business owners in Hyogo prefecture who decided to close their businesses in 1996 was twice as high as the number for the rest of the nation (Hyogo Prefecture 2006b).   The Japan Ministry of Labour reported employment conditions one month after the earthquake. In total, 12,371 people in Kobe received unemployment allowance, which was twice as high as the previous year (Statistics Bureau 1996). Those people who lost their jobs were often part-time employees because for most companies, keeping on full-time workers was all they could afford. Wage-workers, who worked for companies that were too small to afford to make payments into the national welfare system, experienced the toughest situation since they could not even receive unemployment allowances (Fukui 1996). Overall, the   91economic impact of this earthquake on the disaster affected regions was severe, and most affected areas of the economy have not yet returned to their pre-disaster levels as of 2005 (Hyogo Prefecture 2006b).   4.2.3. Damage: Fragile Urban Infrastructure After the quake, 104,004 homes were completely destroyed (182,751 households), and 136,952 were partially destroyed (256,857 households). About 7,035 of these homes were completely burnt down and 89 of these homes were partially burnt (Hyogo Prefecture 2007: 1). As many as 13 major public and private transportation lines were interrupted. Most of them took more than two months to be restored. Roads and highways were in rubble (Figure 4.3), and their reconstruction has still not been completed. About 1,230,000 households had to live without water until the end of February, 1995.  Figure 4 3: Hanshin Highway (600 meters of highway collapsed)   (Photo by Asahi Shinbun)   92 Eight sewage treatment facilities, which serviced more than 1 million people per day, were unable to function. It was not until the beginning of June, 1996, 19 months after the quake that most of the facilities were operational again (Hyogo Prefecture 2007).  Following the quake, the electric power system was interrupted. The black-out affected around 2,600,000 households. On the sixth day after the quake, electricity was finally restored. Another serious consequence was broken gas lines. About 850,000 households could not use gas for heating and cooking until the beginning of April, 1996. Also, almost 290,000 phone lines were cut off on the day of the earthquake (National Land Agency 1996: 8-27). These lifelines?water, sewage, electricity, gas and phone facilities, public and private transportation, roads, and highways?are basic necessities of urban life. In the immediate aftermath of the quake, due to the destruction of lifelines, many survivors had to evacuate from their homes even though their homes were intact and safe to live in. It was a lesson for most people that without these urban systems they could not sustain their daily activities, and once these systems collapsed, they were helpless. After this earthquake, the word ?lifeline? became a very familiar one for most people in Japan.  Because the earthquake struck in the early morning, most people were still in bed or at least at home. It can be said that more than 90% of the people who died were at home. Ironically, ?home,? where people were supposed to be surrounded by a secure and peaceful environment, turned out to be the place where most of the people died (Hayakawa 1996: 14-15). One of the reasons was that many of the homes were prone to collapse. This was in part due to the fact that since the Hanshin area has been more often exposed to typhoons or tsunamis, the disaster prevention plan had focused more on water-related disasters. The   93structural design for housing therefore, was meant to ?withstand not earthquakes but typhoons? (The Economist 4/22/95: 7).   Both the Northridge and the Kobe earthquakes happened in the early hours of the morning when most people were asleep. In California, where houses have stiff wooden frames braced with sheets of plywood and topped with light wooden roofs, the safest place for people during the earthquake was in bed. In Kobe, that was just about the most dangerous place to be. (The Economist 4/22/95: 7) Figure 4.4: Massive Destruction of Kobe Urban Area  (Photo by Kobe City)  The death rate was correlated not only with distance from the epicentre, but also with potential risks and vulnerability of existing infrastructure, buildings and specific locations which became dangerous over time. Table 4.3 shows the numbers of old houses (built before W.W.II) that existed in the pre-disaster period in Kobe city.    94Table 4.3: Number of Wooden Housing Units Built in Pre-W.W.II in Kobe City as of 1993   Kobe City Wards   Kobe City  Higashi Nada Nada Hyogo Nagata Suma Tarumi Kita  Chuo Nishi Total Housing  540,200 74,110 52,100 49,350 50,660 61,370 83,840 63,320 49,910 55,550% of Kobe Total  100% 13.7% 9.6% 9.1% 9.4% 11.4% 15.5% 11.7% 9.2% 10.3%Wooden Structure Built Pre-W.W.II 18,110 1,160 2,640 3,780 5,000 1,040 1,150 1,280 1,000 1,050% of Kobe Total  100% 6.4% 14.6% 20.9% 27.6% 5.7% 6.4% 7.1% 5.5% 5.8%% of Total Wooden Structure Housing to City and Wards 3.4% 1.6% 5.1% 7.7% 9.9% 1.7% 1.4% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9%(Source: Statistics Bureau 1993: 198-199) Although Kobe City as a whole was not necessarily considered an area of high concentration of old dwellings (3.4%) compared to Hyogo Prefecture (5.6% of the housing was built pre-W.W.II period) (Statistics Bureau 1993), a number of old wooden housing units existed there and were at potential risks in earthquakes. Some studies after the Kobe earthquake concluded that the older the wooden structured houses were, the higher the chance of severe damage or complete destruction (Nihon Jutaku Kaigi 1996; Hirohara 1996). Also these old buildings were distributed unevenly. 5,000 housing in Nagata ward housing was built before W.W.II. Almost 10% of the existing Nagata housing was considered as old and fragile which was much higher than the average ratio of Kobe city (3.4%). This uneven distribution of older wooden structures versus more modern well-designed houses was one of factors that caused specific areas and communities to become more vulnerable to this large physical event.     954.2.4. Vulnerable People and Communities This earthquake clearly showed that disaster risks were disproportionally distributed. Elderly and low-income populations were most adversely affected by the earthquake. 53% of those who died in the earthquake were over 60 years old (Miyamoto 1998). Among the elderly population killed in the quake, 65% of the people who died were female. People who were on welfare had a death rate five times greater than people who were not (Mugikura 1996). The disabled, the poor, foreigners, children, and other marginalized groups were particularly vulnerable during and in the aftermath of the disaster. Approximately 70% of households that lived in the temporary housing after the earthquake were low-income households (annual income less than 3,000,000 Yen/yr)15 (Miyamoto 1998: 46).  Because the earthquake hit the region in the early morning, people were at home. Survival was determined by how well homes withstood the quake since 80% of deaths were caused by crushing or suffocation (UNCRD 1995: 15). Those living in poorly structured wooden houses had little chance of surviving the earthquake. Most of the structurally weak, poorly maintained, old wooden houses predated World War II and were located in the inner-city of Kobe. Consequently, the damage was more severe than other areas and the death toll was higher (Nihon Jutaku Kaigi 1996; Hirohara 1996). The characteristics of the most severely damaged areas (see Figure 4.1) were: overcrowding, high density of fragile old wooden houses, and concentration of low-income households and the elderly. In those areas, 3,892 people died (70% of the total deaths from                                                   15 The average annual income for worker?s households in 1995 was 6,849,000 Yen (source: Statistics Bureau & Statistics Center/ http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/c12cont.htm.  June 3, 2002).   96the disaster) (Sazanami 1998a; Miyamoto 1996a). Disparities in recovery among communities have become clearer and greater as time has gone by since the earthquake. In some inner-city areas such as Nagata Ward, only 60% of the population returned (Kobe City 2000a). 4.2.5. The Poor Practices of Disaster Management In the Hanshin region, regional emergency policy was not adequately designed for large scale earthquakes. The western side of Japan has traditionally been considered an earthquake-free area by most people. In 1596, an earthquake did hit near the same area. Since then, there have been other earthquake reports, but the area has never been seriously damaged (Arakawa 1964). Rather than being prepared for earthquakes, most houses in the Hanshin area were built to withstand typhoons as mentioned in the previous section. Local disaster prevention was designed for water-related disasters. Disaster relief systems were not designed for this type and scale of disaster. There were no emergency shelters which could take care of the 150,000 residents in Kobe. When Kobe developed its local disaster prevention plan in 1986, it proposed to establish special emergency shelters which were supposed to be more than 100,000 m? and have water tanks with a capacity of 100 tons. The city had planned to prepare seven such places, but this plan never became a reality. Instead, Kobe merely assigned 364 public schools as places for disaster shelters (UNCRD 1995: 166).  This lack of preparation contrasts with other major cities in Japan, such as Yokohama city, which created 112 special emergency shelters (Kumano 1996: 45). Kobe, one of the model cities in the country in terms of its economic success, was actually one of the poorer cities in terms of disaster prevention. The failure to build specifically assigned emergency shelters in Kobe had tragic results in the aftermath of the earthquake. After the earthquake,   97more than 320,000 people were left homeless, and 1,274 places had to be used as emergency shelters. Over 500 public schools were used by the dislocated. Others without homes stayed at temporarily constructed camps in parks, stayed in their half-collapsed houses, or moved in with their relatives and friends. Others even stayed in the aisles of city halls. ?Officially, there are 12 square meters of park area per person in Kobe. But in the center of Kobe, there are only two square meters per person? (Miyamoto 1996b: 11-12). When unexpected events occur, public parks are supposed to function as emergency shelters. But two square meters is only enough space for an adult to lie down in. If the person has any belongings, or needs other facilities (such as a kitchen, bathroom, and so on), two square meters is far too little. But that was the allotted living space for individuals in the temporary shelters after the great earthquake.  Furthermore, the Self-Defence Forces needed a request from the Hyogo Prefectural Governor to dispatch rescue crews. Due to congested telephone lines and the interruption of emergency radio systems, the Hyogo Prefecture Governor could not contact them until 10 a.m. on January 17, 1995?more than four hours after the earthquake. The Self-Defence Forces first officially arrived at around 1 p.m., more than seven hours after the quake16.                                                   16 Some of the Self-Defence Forces had been sent to rescue people a couple of hours after the earthquake. They were sent without the request from the Hyogo Prefectural Governor because there was an exception to the general rule; when the situation is considered to be critical, the Self-Defence Forces can make an independent decision to dispatch as soon as possible (Furumori 1996: 318-319).     98The worst disaster in postwar Japanese history caused every urban function to be disabled. Hyogo Prefecture was in crisis and key people there could not make quick decisions. Their requests for help were delayed; their requests for help were inadequate. Not only the relief goods, but also rescue troops took a long time to get to the location of the crisis as a result of the traffic jams caused by the quake. The Self-Defence Forces arrived at the most devastated area almost a half day after the earthquake due to this disruption of traffic flow (Fukumori 1996; Nakamura 2000)  4.2.6. A Key to Survival?Neighbours and Communities The town nearest the epicentre of the earthquake, Hokudan in Awaji Island, did not suffer as much from the earthquake compared to other cities. Only 38 people died from the earthquake there, and only one third of the homes were destroyed, relatively minor damage considering the town was so close to the epicentre. Only three people per 10,000 people were killed by the quake in Hokudan town (population of 11,248), while 97 people per 10,000 people died in Kobe (population of 1,456,780) (Nishibori 1996). Hokudan is located on a small island, Awaji Island, in Hyogo Prefecture. Because most islanders were familiar with each other, they knew who lived in which house, and even knew who slept in which room and where. It was therefore not as difficult for neighbours to locate people who were buried under the houses. Also, Hokudan was a rural area where most of the residents were associated with farming which required them to have some tools and equipment. Because most houses were wooden in Hokudan, people could use saws, chain saws and other farming machinery and equipment to remove rubble to rescue the people from their houses. Additionally, most households had wells. Residents were able to get water right   99after the quake. Furthermore, only 30% of the households had flush toilets, so most of them did not suffer as greatly as in other areas from the problems and risks associated with the damaged sewage system. Recovery from the quake on Awaji Island could proceed relatively quickly and smoothly because life in such a rural area did not depend on public facilities as much as that of people in urban areas (Miyamoto 1996a and 1996b; Nishibori 1996). Strong community solidarity also contributed to the comparative lack of negative impact of the quake on the island. In the midst of a harsh and chaotic situation, more than 280 elderly people died in the first two years after the quake in the area affected by the quake (Cabinet Office of Japan 2003b). People call it Kodoku-shi or lonely death, because those people died alone (Sato, Yamada, and Ishikawa 1996: 64-65). Relocated disaster survivors had to live in a new environment where they did not have relatives, friends, and previous neighbours to visit them. Nobody knows what really happened to those who died alone. However, Nukata Isao (1999), a doctor who worked at a medical clinic for disaster survivors, suggests that loss of hope was the major cause of death. The absence of community also contributed to ?lonely deaths.? Moreover, some studies suggest that many of the people who died alone were over 65 years old. These vulnerable people, who lost homes in the quake, were relocated to emergency shelters constructed in remote areas where they had no one to look after them (Nihon Jutaku Kaigi 1996; Sazanami 1998a).  In 2001, the Kobe earthquake survivor, Mr. Nakazono Shoichi, whose restaurant and home were destroyed in the earthquake, submitted 1,942 pages of survey results to Hyogo Prefecture and the City of Kobe. For two years, he visited over 10,000 households in public housing units built for survivors (most of them were low-income elderly people) to ask about  100their recovery situations. With his survey results, he requested that the government continue to support the victims since there was still a great need for socially disadvantaged populations to receive support to restore their lives after the disaster. Participants told Mr. Nakazono that they wanted public phones, bus stops, police patrol services, clinics, and small stores in their housing complexes or near their homes (Mainichi Newspaper 01/17/2001: 27). These demands are considered basic necessities in any community yet the survivors living in emergency housing units that government built had to cope without such basic community infrastructure for years. Housing reconstruction plans were completed with remarkable speed and efficiency. However, there seems to have been a lack of understanding of the importance of providing basic facilities at a community level.   4.3. Recovery Activities in the Affected Areas 4.3.1. Overview of the Ten Years since the Quake Table 4.4 below shows a summary of events and government activities over the last ten years following the earthquake in 1995. Table 4.4: Seven Years of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Y M D  Events  Government Activities 1995  Jan  17 5:46 a.m. a large-scale earthquake hit the Hanshin-Awaji region, 7.2 on the Richter scale.  At 7 am, the emergency response center was set up in Hyogo prefecture.  At 10:04 a.m. the central government declared an emergency.         Around 10 a.m. Hyogo prefectural governor Kaibara requested aid from the Self-Defence Force.       Water (1,270,000 households), gas (845,000 households), electricity (2,600,000 households), telephone (193,000 households), major public transportation, roads, highways, and hospitals and clinics were out of service.      18   The emergency response headquarters was established in Hyogo prefecture (effective until March 31, 2005).  101Y M D  Events  Government Activities     23 Electricity service was restored.       24 307,000 people were living in emergency shelters (the peak).        31 Telephone lines were restored.     Feb  14 The name was changed from the Great Hanshin Earthquake to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.       15   The Hanshin Awaji Reconstruction Committee was established in the central government (effective until February 14, 1996).       2,103 households moved into the temporary housing in Kobe city.    Mar 15   The Hanshin Awaji Reconstruction Headquarters was established in Hyogo prefecture (effective until March 31, 2005).     16   Hyogo Prefecture announced a new urban development plan.     31 The emergency response headquarters was closed.    Apr  11 Gas service was restored.       17 Water service was restored.     Jul      Hyogo Prefecture announced the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plan, the so called ?Hyogo Phoenix Plan.?   Aug      Hyogo Prefecture announced the ?3 Year Emergency Reconstruction Plan? specifically focused on housing and industries (until the end of March 1999).   Aug 20   Kobe City announced the closure of emergency shelters (public schools, city halls, community centers, and parks) where 6,672 people had been living in 194 sites.       All railroads were repaired.     Sept    Most roads and highways had been repaired (except Hanshin Highway, Kobe line: September 1996 completed).      Nov      Hyogo Prefecture announced the ?3 Year Emergency Reconstruction Plan? specifically focused on infrastructure (until the end of March 1999). 1996 Mar 31 Most programs for survivors discontinued (tokureisochi uchikiri).   1997 Mar 26 The Port of Kobe was reopened.     Aug  1    The Cabinet Office of Japan announced a new policy to assist disaster survivors. "Life support reconstruction funds" started providing assistance to the people who need financial support (seikatsufukkoushikin). 1998 May 15   The "Victim Self-Help Fund" Law was established (hisaishasaikenshienhou) to assist individuals who were in special need.  102Y M D  Events  Government Activities 1999 Mar 31 The end of the term for using temporary shelters and housing (Kasetsu) constructed at numerous locations in Kobe city (2,700 households remained).    Jun  30 The end of the transition periods for people to move out of the temporary housing (Kasetsu) (700 households remained).    Jul  21 The earthquake fund committee was closed.   2000  Jan  11 The death toll was calculated at 6,432.       14 The last household left the temporary housing.    Mar 29 All the temporary housing (Kasetsu) was closed and dismantled.    Nov      Hyogo Prefecture developed ?the Next 5 years Reconstruction Promotion Program? (until the end of March 2005).   Dec  11 The first case of Disaster Restoration Land Readjustment project was completed. Kitaku-Fukkou Kukakuseiri Jigyou (Shinzen-cho Block 2 North, Nada-ku, Kobe). (Table 4.5)  2001 Apr  23 The Metrological Agency revised the size of the earthquake from M 7.2 to M 7.3.    Nov    The population of Hyogo Prefecture finally increased above the pre-earthquake level.  2004 Nov    The population of Kobe City increased above the pre-earthquake level.  2005 Mar 31   The emergency response headquarters and Hanshin Awaji Reconstruction Headquarters in Hyogo prefecture were closed.   Apr  1    The Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Promotion Council was established in Hyogo prefecture in order to take over the remaining projects of Hanshin Awaji Reconstruction Headquarters, including completion of a 10 year disaster recovery report (Fukkou 10 nen Sokatsu Kensho/ Teigen Hokoku).  (Source: Hyogo Prefecture 2006a and 2007).  4.3.2. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plans In the post disaster period, Hyogo Prefecture developed a ?Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plan? (Hyogo Phoenix Plan) in July 1995. Soon after this plan, Hyogo Prefecture announced a ?3 Year Emergency Reconstruction Plan? for housing, industry and infrastructure, in order to repair the physical damage from the quake. The  103Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Committee had a 10 year reconstruction period in mind which they divided into roughly three phases.  1.  The recovery and reconstruction starting phase (1995 to 03/31/1998): For the first three years of creating and development reconstruction plans and implementing housing, industry and infrastructure reconstruction plans. 2.  The early restoration phase (04/01/1998 to 03/31/2000): For implementing the 3 Year Emergency Reconstruction Plan and completing the first five years of reconstruction efforts after the earthquake. 3.  The reconstruction phase (04/01/2000 to 03/31/2006): For completing the last five years of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plan. (Hyogo Prefecture 2006a: 155)  At the end of the 2006 fiscal year (March 31), the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Promotion Council was established in Hyogo prefecture in order to continue assisting with the recovery process, including such activities as creating a system to help the disaster survivors, especially the elderly, to develop their independence; promoting re-building of communities; supporting small businesses and industries; and providing further financial support (Hyogo Prefecture 2006a: 5).   4.3.3. Hyogo Phoenix Plan Six months after the disaster, Hyogo Prefecture announced a restoration plan (the Hyogo Phoenix Plan). It created 660 projects that would need a budget of 17 trillion Yen (US$143 billion)17 (see table 4.5) by 2005, including symbol projects by the City of Kobe to boost Kobe?s declining economy.                                                    17 US$1 = 118.62 Yen (as of 07/30/2007).  104Table 4.5: The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plan Budgets Basic Plan  Budget (100 million Yen) 1. 21st century welfare based Machizukuri 27,300 2. Building globally and culturally rich communities  4,200 3. Enhancing existing small industries for future sustainability  29,800 4. Creating disaster resistant cities  3,900 5. Developing a multi- metropolitan network system   104,800 Total 170,000 (Hyogo Prefecture 2006a: 158) A large portion of the budget was spent completing some of the following symbol projects. The Shanghai-Yangtze Valley Trade Promotion Project (China-Asia Exchange Zone/Port Island Second Stage, and New China Town);   1)  The Kobe International Airport;   2)  The Health Care Park Project; 3)  The Hyogo Prefectural Emergency Medical Center; 4)  The WHO Kobe Centre;  5)  The Volunteer Activities Support Center; 6)  Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Projects including the Super Convention Center, the Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Research Center of the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (Miki City), the Asia Disaster Reduction Center (Kobe City), and the United Nations Center for Regional Development Disaster Mitigation Planning Hyogo Office; and    7)  The New Industrial Structure Formation Project including the World Pearl Center Project, the Kobe International Communication Hub Development Project, She Town Nagata, the Kobe Enterprise Zone, and the Kobe Medical Industry Development Project  (Hyogo Prefecture 1999; Kobe City 2000a).  These large projects are essentially long term projects, typically requiring a minimum of ten years for completion. Takayose (1999b) argues these large projects would not contribute to local industry and small business recovery from the disaster (ibid: 164). For the reconstruction plan, Takayose continues, Kobe should have developed medium sized projects that could have directly involved local businesses in order to stimulate the local economy. Miyamoto (1996c) and Takayose (1999b) both claim that Japan had adequate financial resources to cover the cost of dealing with the disaster damage, since the direct cost of the  105damage was estimated at 10 trillion Yen, which is only 2% of the nation?s GDP. They question whether creating these large projects would really contribute to recovery of the affected regions. An evaluation study conducted by Hyogo Prefecture in 2006 shows some correlation between project completion and the contributions to some areas, such as overall economy and jobs in the affected region. According to this report, international and multilateral institutions (e.g. JICA, UNCRD, OCHA18, and Asian Disaster Reduction Center) located their offices in Hyogo prefecture. Ten years since the earthquake, 65 foreign business enterprises moved into Kobe city to participate in the Kobe International Communication Hub Development Project. The New Industrial Structure Formation Project created a total of 793 jobs (as of 2002). Two hundred and thirty businesses started in various locations in Hyogo prefecture (Hyogo Prefecture 2004).  4.3.4. The Disaster Restoration Land Readjustment Plan (Fukkou Tochi Kukaku Seiri Jigyo) In March 1995, two months after the earthquake, Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City announced the Disaster Restoration Land Readjustment Plan to designate the most severely affected communities and to re-develop and renew the areas for the purpose of achieving disaster recovery. In total, 19 projects were created. Among these 19 projects, 13 projects (total area of 255.9ha) were land re-zoning projects and 6 projects (total area of 33.4ha) were urban renewal projects (Hyogo Prefecture 2007). Please refer to the details of the projects listed in the Appendix A.                                                  18 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD); UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).   106In March 2007 there were 5 areas for land re-zoning projects which remained uncompleted at time of writing and there were 7 areas for urban renewal projects which remained uncompleted. The Mano community, one of the case studies of this thesis, was not designated for the land readjustment project, while the Mikura community, the other case study community, was designated as a part of Misuga Nishi District Disaster Restoration Land Re-Zoning Project. The Misuga Nishi District project was completed in March 2005 (ibid).  4.3.5. Population Recovery According to a Hyogo Prefecture study, 146,000 people left the stricken area as of October, 1995 (Hyogo Prefecture 2002: 5). In November 2001, Hyogo Prefecture announced that the population had recovered to the pre-disaster level. Kobe City government also announced that Kobe city?s population had reached its pre-disaster level in November 2004. Although the overall population increased to levels higher than those of the pre-disaster period, disparities in population recovery between wards in Kobe city soon became evident and these disparities still persist to this day (see Table 4.6). In Nagata ward, the population had recovered to only 79.4% of its pre-quake population as of February 2007 (Table 4.6). The two case studies in this research are both in Nagata ward where communities have suffered slow population recovery.  107 Table 4.6: Kobe City and Wards Population Change Wards in Kobe City (9 wards)  Kobe City Higashi Nada Nada Chuo Hyogo Kita Nagata Suma Tarumi Nishi Pre-disaster Population (01/01/1995)  1,520,365 191,716 124,538 111,195 117,558 217,166 129,978 188,949 237,735 201,530Population (10/01/1995)  1,423,792 157,599 97,473 103,711 98,856 230,473 96,807 176,507 240,203 222,163% of pre disaster population  94%  82.2% 78% 93.3% 84% 106.1% 74%  93.4%  101% 110.2%Population (10/01/2000)  1,493,398 191,309 120,518 107,982 106,897 225,184 105,464 174,056 226,230 235,758% of pre disaster population  98%  99.8% 97% 97.1% 91% 103.7% 81%  92.1%  95% 117.0%Population (as of 10/01/2003)  1,516,155 201,045 125,994 113,087 107,957 224,847 104,490 173,164 224,873 240,698% of pre disaster population  99.7%  104.9% 101.2 % 101.7% 91.8% 103.5% 80.4%  91.6%  94.6% 119.4%Population (as of 11/01/2004)*  1,520,581 203,550 127,039 114,736 107,414 225,644 104,077 172,115 223,584 242,422% of pre disaster population  100.0%  106.2% 102.0% 103.2% 91.4% 103.9% 80.1%  91.1%  94.0% 120.3%Population (10/01/2005)  1,525,393 206,037 128,050 116,591 106,985 225,945 103,791 171,628 222,729 243,637% of pre disaster population  100.3%  107.5% 102.8% 104.9% 91.0% 104.0% 79.9%  90.8%  93.7% 120.9%Population (01/01/2007)  1,529,867 207,378 128,830 119,171 107,258 226,541 103,215 169,730 221,096 246,648% of pre disaster population  100.6%  108.2% 103.4% 107.2% 91.2% 104.3% 79.4%  89.8%  93.0% 122.4%* Kobe City announced that Kobe city population reached to its pre-disaster period in November 2004. (Source: Kobe City 1997, 2003, 2004a, and 2007b)  The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck the region when the economy had already begun to stagnate. The earthquake caused 134,000 people (about 56,000 households) to move out of the Kobe area, contributing to a substantial loss in consumer spending for Hyogo Prefecture. According to Inada (1999: 10-11), 50,000 households represents an annual consumer spending of 200 billion Yen. Loss of population means a loss of customers. Inada argues that the decline in consumer spending directly lowered demand for local production  108such as foods and garments. Moreover, falling population meant not only a diminishing amount of production, but also fewer job opportunities, and decreased income for individual households (Inada 1999: 11). If the population had rebounded to pre-disaster levels within the first two or three years, it could have made a significant difference in individual household incomes (ibid).  More importantly, rapid population restoration could have helped many small and locally owned businesses to recover from disaster damage (Takayose 1999b: 164). In actual fact, it took six and half years for the population to recover in the stricken area. Small businesses and industries have lost profits since the earthquake and are still suffering or have already gone bankrupt. Hyogo Prefecture did offer financial support for small businesses. Unfortunately, however, many business owners have taken on more loans than they can repay (Takayose 1999b).   In 1997, Hyogo Prefecture analyzed its population loss by comparing the national census of 1994 (October 1) and 1995 (October 1). The analysis revealed that the younger generations (aged 15 to 24) left the stricken areas at a greater rate than other age groups, and accounted for half of the population loss. Furthermore, many of the individuals who had not returned to their homes since the event were tenants of apartments or rental houses. Some of these renters could not return because their landlords did not rebuild the housing whereas others did not return because they could not afford the increased rent of the newly constructed rental units. Many of those were elderly people who lived on their pension income. Additionally, some people left because their work places had relocated outside the stricken areas (Hyogo Prefecture 2001). The two case study communities of Mano and Mikura are representative of these sorts of demographic conditions. Not only have the  109populations in the two communities not recovered to pre-disaster levels, but these populations are composed of a high proportion of elderly and low-income residents.  4.3.6. Housing Problems Over 250,000 houses were completely or partially destroyed. As a result, roughly 170,000 houses became uninhabitable (Takada 1998: 157). Survivors who lost their homes had to find safe places to live.  The biggest task for the government was to provide them with new or safer homes as soon as possible. The Kobe earthquake experience illustrates that there are a number of housing issues that need to be dealt with in order to improve the existing housing situation and to better prepare for the future disaster recovery (Hirayama 1996; Comerio 1998; Takada 2006).   Quarantelli (1982) investigated the housing issues in emergency situations and concluded that there were roughly four housing phases: 1) emergency sheltering, 2) temporary sheltering, 3) temporary housing, and 4) permanent housing. As with many categorizations, there is some overlap between phases, and one phase can be longer than another depending on individual household conditions. Regardless, it is clear that emergency survivors eventually need to find permanent housing to settle down in. In past disaster situations this has not always happened. In fact, temporary housing simply became permanent housing for some survivors (ibid.). Housing recovery in the case of the Kobe earthquake was also divided into three or four phases (emergency and temporary sheltering, temporary housing, and permanent housing). The housing recovery plan was designed to provide adequate houses through mass construction of public housing (Takada 2006). Because the government viewed these phases as sequential and expected every survivor to  110eventually move into permanent housing, some survivors were forced to leave temporary housing contrary to their readiness to move.  Hyogo Prefecture had to provide temporary shelter or housing for the survivors within the first 3 or 4 months. It was very difficult for the government to calculate how many homes were needed soon after the earthquake. At its peak the number of evacuees was about 300,000 (roughly 100,000 households). City officers asked individual evacuees if they required temporary housing. Through this process, the government estimated it needed to provide 60,000 homes. About 30,000 public homes, including some outside of Hyogo Prefecture, were vacant at that time. The government projected an additional 30,000 newly constructed homes would sufficiently fill demands for safe homes. Later, the government realized the demands for housing significantly exceeded this estimate. Eventually, a total of 48,000 temporary homes were constructed (Sazanami 1996b: 139-141).   Due to time and space limitations, the government had to build some housing in the suburbs. Some of this suburban housing involved large scale housing complexes (400 housing units at 16 locations and 1,000 housing units at two locations?Nishi and Kita Wards, for example) (ibid). These unfamiliar environments were very difficult for the elderly or disabled. In such new sites, stores and other basic services were not located within walking distance. It was also difficult for survivors to develop a sense of community when the housing complexes were so massive. Most of all, the government prioritized people who had special needs (elderly, disabled, or single parents), so that housing complexes filled up with vulnerable populations. Some studies suggest that 62.5% of people who lived in the temporary housing in the suburbs were over 60 years of age (Sazanami 1998b: 148). Moreover inconveniences and unfamiliar locations discouraged survivors from moving in,  111and as a result, there were actually 2,300 empty units in these housing complexes (Sazanami 1998b: 141). Three years after the earthquake, about half of the households (23,000) were still living in temporary housing, even though the government provided housing for them to live in for a maximum of two years. Essentially, these people had nowhere else to go. They did not leave voluntarily, but were forced to leave temporary housing.  Kobe City planned to build about 72,000 housing units within three years, and the city was actually able to build more units than they had originally planned. The city built 139,279 housing unit by May 1999 (Kobe City 2000b). These houses were for people who were in temporary housing as well as those who had left the area temporarily (about 140,000 people, three years after the event) (Takada 1998: 157). Because this permanent housing was built where lands were available, most of it was located in the suburbs (see Figure 4.8 and Table 4.7), typically in high-rise buildings. People who used to live in an inner-city area had to relocate, due to the lack of housing in the inner city areas, while people who used to live in a suburb could find new housing close to where they used to live. In the inner-city ward of Nagata, 20,280 houses and apartments were destroyed and only 12,359 were rebuilt. In this ward, 1,393 publicly owned apartments were offered for which 15,103 households applied (Takayose 1999a: 128-129). On the other hand, in the suburban Kita Ward, 714 houses and apartments were destroyed and as many as 21,916 were rebuilt (Takayose 1999a: 128). In some areas, there were adequate amounts of housing available for disaster survivors, while there was a lack of housing in other areas. Such disparities influenced survivors? abilities to return to their pre-disaster location and are reflected in the recovery of population and overall community reconstruction which will be discussed in the two case studies.  1124.3.7. Different Impacts and Different Levels of Recovery of Wards in Kobe City Table 4.7 shows ward levels of impacts from the earthquake and changes after the event. This table illustrates how the different ranges of impacts (deaths, housing collapse, and fire damage) affected the nine wards in Kobe city. The wards such as Higashinada, Nada, Hyogo, Chuo, Nagata, and Suma ward, where the death tolls were relatively high, were the areas with magnitude 7.0 closer to the epicentre which felt the full effect of an earthquake with magnitude 7.3 (Figure 4.1). The total population of Kobe city has increased since the earthquake; however there are still some wards, such as Nagata and Suma for which population recovery has been lower than other wards. Higashinada, Nada and Nagata wards were severely affected by the earthquake; however, in most cases, Higashinada has been able to return to or exceed pre-disaster levels better than Kobe City and the rest of the wards. This is surprising considering the massive scale of the damage experienced in this ward. Overall, the post disaster number of housing units has now exceeded the pre-disaster level everywhere except in Nagata ward. Although some wards , such as Kita and Nishi wards, made a large increase in their value of manufactured goods shipped in the post-disaster period many other wards are struggling to achieve pre-disaster levels in this respect. According to Kobe City, the large increases in Kita and Nishi wards were due to the fact that many industries moved to the suburbs of Kobe city where Kita and Nishi wards were located (Kobe City 2007a). In Kobe city in general, retail sales have been in decline.    113Table 4.7: Comparisons in Kobe City and Wards Pre- and Post-Disaster Period Wards in Kobe City  Kobe City Higashi nada Nada Chuo Hyogo Kita Nagata Suma Tarumi Nishi Area (km2)  550.53 30.36 32.4 26.31 14.52 240.71 11.48 28.91 28.02 137.82Population (01/01/1995)  1,520,365 191,716 124,538 111,195 117,558 217,166 129,978 188,949 237,735 201,530Deaths in the Quake  4,571  1,471 933 244 555 12 919 401 25 11Completely Destroyed Housing  74,386 14,014 13,222 6,409 10,473 272 20,280 8,103 1,177 436Partially Destroyed Housing 55,225 2,5775,6776,6588,1243,1408,295 5,617 8,892 3,262Housing Destroyed by Fires  6,965  327 465 65 940 1 4,759 407  1 0Population Change20  99.7 104.8 100.9 101.7 91.8 103.6 80.4 91.6 94.6 119.5Number of Housing Change21 116.2 113.1115.8120.8101.3125.591.0 114.9 112.2 153.4Manufacture Goods Shipment Value Change22 75.2 85.240.752.465.9283.247.6 34.2 38.9 112.7Retail Sales Change23 85.8 104.785.374.479.495.362.8 85.8 112.5 99.9Number of Establishments Change24 82.1 93.173.186.170.2101.461.9 75.6 91.8 110.1Number of Employees Change25 82.2 97.2 70.8 76.7 71.8 112.0 58.1 74.6 99.2 119.1Changes19 Number of Welfare Recipients Change26 165.7 173.1 132.1 159.2 160.1 205.6 111.6 199.6 233.2 308.7No of Welfare Recipients in 1994  22,560  1,150 1,695 3,341 3,854 1,817 5,735 2,039 1,908 954 No of Welfare Recipients in 2003  37,389  1,991 2,239 5,320 6,172 3,735 6,398 4,070 4,450 2,945(Source: Statistics Bureau 1996; Kobe City 1997, 2003, 2004a, 2005, and 2007b, Hyogo Prefecture 2004; Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1995 and 1998; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2004)                                                   19 Comparing pre-disaster level with post disaster level. Pre-disaster level=100. 20 Population change between 01/01/1995 and 10/01/2003. 21 Number of housing change between 10/01/1993 and 10/01/2003. Housing includes existing buildings for housing. 22 Value of manufacture goods shipment change between 1993 and 2003. 23 Retail sale change between 1994 and 2004. 24 Number of establishments change between 1991 and 2004. 25 Number of employees change between 1991 and 2004. 26 Number of employees change between 1994 and 2003.  114 Figure 4.5: Map of Hyogo Prefecture, Kobe City and Wards    Hyogo Prefecture explained that due to the 1998 completion of the Akashi Kaikyo Bridge27 connecting Kobe and Awaji Island, Tarumi ward benefited from an increase in tourists and business related activities. As mentioned, Kita and Nishi wards?suburbs of Kobe city (Figure 4.5)?experienced an increase in the number of businesses and industries in the post-disaster period, which led to an increase in the number of establishments and                                                  27 The Akashi Kaikyo Bridge connecting Kobe and Awaji Island was completed in April 1998. It is the world?s longest suspension bridge (http://www.jb-honshi.co.jp/english/information/akashi.html) (access date: 05/28/2007).  Hyogo Higashinada Nada Chuo Nagata Tarumi Suma 0 20km Nishi Kobe CityHyogo PrefectureKita  Awaji Island  115employees. While most wards saw the return of some of these indicators to pre-disaster levels or higher, Nagata ward?s recovery levels in these indicators were lower than pre-disaster levels in that ward as well as lower than the rest of Kobe City. Nagata ward, where the two case studies were located, had a high number of welfare recipients in both the pre- and post-disaster periods (Table 4.7). In Nagata ward, there was a high proportion of low-income households both before and after the quake and this has been a factor leading to a high level of social vulnerability.    4.3.8. Volunteers and NPOs and CBOs?Filling the Gaps between Government Services and People?s Needs The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake awakened a spirit of volunteerism in Kobe and Japan as a whole, creating a renaissance of volunteerism in Japan (Tatsuki 1998). Although people had voluntarily helped victims of previous natural disasters, volunteer efforts were not systematically organized. Moreover, there are some differences in the way these volunteers participate in certain activities. As Arnstein (1969) claims, some people participate in an activity to serve their own interest, while others do so to have some impact on society for change. However, the nature of voluntarism in Japan seems to be more of a complement to local government activities than a charitable contribution, pursuit of purely individual interests, or collective action to gain autonomy (Honda 1993). Although there was some emerging citizen-led approaches to participate in volunteer activities in Japan, traditional participation?complement to local government?was more apparent in the pre-disaster period.    116Many scholars recognize the potential of volunteer roles and at the same time argue that it is critical to create organizations (NGOs or NPOs) that can link or close the gaps between government and citizens (Sazanami 1998a; Takayose 1999a; Tatsuki 2002). These scholars were slowly developing ideas on how to better organize emerging voluntary organizations to enhance Japan?s civil society even before the Kobe earthquake (Osborne 2003). A committee to create a better environment for non-profit organizations was just about to issue a law for NPOs, when the earthquake hit the Kobe areas. The committee was further convinced by the contributions of volunteers in the stricken areas of Kobe, and in 1998 the NPO Law was issued (Hayashi and Imada 2000; Osborne 2003).     Before the Kobe earthquake, many people went to stricken areas to help the victims without being asked. When Kobe was hit by the earthquake, the city of Kobe quickly sent out a message requesting volunteers through newspapers and T.V. This widespread call for volunteers and the overwhelming response to it challenged the local government who lacked experience in coordinating volunteer relief efforts. The local government and many NGOs attempted to coordinate massive numbers of volunteers coming from all over Japan and the world (Takayose 1999a; Hashimoto 2000).  In the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, over 1.2 million volunteers conducted a variety of relief activities within the first three months (Sazanami 1998a: 337). After the Kobe earthquake, the committee responsible for developing the law to organize the voluntary sector tried to provide a better environment to enable volunteers to play a constructive role in society (Yamashita and Suga 2002). For instance, the government passed a law that individuals who wanted to voluntarily participate in public service, could take a paid holiday in order to contribute. Yet, volunteerism at this scale is still in the embryonic stage, and  117Sazanami argues that the next challenge is to better organize these volunteer groups (Sazanami 1998a: 337). Takayose suggests that it is important to establish organizations that can coordinate people?s different needs and volunteers? capabilities to serve these needs (1999b).  Several NGOs and community-based-organizations (CBOs) established before the Kobe earthquake contributed to the local community?s recovery, and supported victims? life-recoveries. These organizations played an important role in facilitating individuals? specific needs, particularly for senior residents, such as helping seniors to take a bath, going with them to doctor?s appointments, doing grocery shopping for them, visiting them, and providing them with information. Only a few groups became politically active, advocating for the survivors and lobbying the government. These groups have claimed rights for the victims in an effort to procure fair and adequate government funding for the victims.   4.3.9. Roles of CBOs in Another Context In the case of the Northridge Earthquake (CA., January 17, 1994), many non-profit agencies became very active in assisting low income households and marginalized populations who were not eligible for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance or not adequately provided for (Bolin and Stanford 1998). As shortcomings in assistance programs became apparent in the first few months of the federal operation, the Unmet Needs Committee began regular meetings to review cases and match people with alternative resources. While some unmet needs cases were referred back into the federal system, more commonly, cases would be referred to one of the participating CBOs that had available resources in the area of need (Bolin and Stanford 1998: 150). Although these two  118earthquakes are quite different in terms of the scale of damage, there are similarities in that there were populations that needed special assistance to meet their needs that had not been provided for by government assistance. In the Kobe case, such kinds of services and organizations are not yet well developed; therefore the actual demand for the services is still unknown. But in the Northridge case, Bolin and Stanford (1998) estimated that roughly 2,000 cases in one year were reviewed by the Unmet Needs Committee (ibid: 150). This suggests that a huge demand may have existed if such services had been available in Kobe. A massive number of volunteers were spread out all over the stricken communities after the Kobe earthquake, and the Mano and Mikura communities both received help from those volunteers. For the Mikura community, a CBO was even established as a result of the volunteer efforts, while the Mano community was able to manage themselves using their existing resources. The different community settings and different impacts from disasters are important factors for disaster recovery.    4.4 Conclusion?Lessons Learnt from the Kobe Earthquake This chapter outlined the impacts of the Kobe earthquake and introduced the reconstruction efforts taken by local government, such as land-use planning projects and housing. The Disaster Preparedness White Paper in 2000 suggested that the limits of government response were due to its lack of awareness of the complexity of today?s disasters. In addition, for the first time in disaster management practices in Japan, rehabilitation of individuals or communities has become an essential issue in truly achieving successful recovery along with effective infrastructure reconstruction. The challenges that the government faces need to be dealt with through understanding the affected communities?  119current situations of housing, population, community planning, and socioeconomic development.  Although criticized heavily at the beginning, the central government contributed a tremendous amount to achieve recovery. Machizukuri (Japanese community planning) became a popular activity in Japan which benefited both local government and communities by enabling them to increase disaster resistance as well as to create community disaster plans for future disasters. Since the Kobe earthquake, Machizukuri (community planning) has become one of the key words in disaster mitigation approaches. Suddenly Bosai-Machizukuri (literally, disaster prevention-community planning) became a familiar word for local governments and community organizers who strove to encourage active participation from the residents. In Kobe City, 28 Machizukuri Kyogikai (Town-Building Councils) existed before the disaster and 70 new ones were established following the quake in recognition of how important community involvement had become. In total, nearly 400 community professionals and experts were asked to assist in community development between July 1995 and September 1996 (Takayose 1999a: 138). Through reconstruction efforts, both local governments and communities work together to complement their strengths and weaknesses in order to achieve recovery. The Kobe earthquake showed the importance of preparing disaster management for future disasters, and more specifically, developing a community recovery plan for the purpose of meeting the diverse interests and needs of each community in the affected regions to achieve effective community recovery. To implement such tasks, communities? pre-disaster period conditions, such as community development practices?community organizing and community capacity building?become crucial elements to be integrated  120within the disaster planning and practices. As discussed in Chapter 2, successful disaster recovery involves vulnerability reduction; communities need to be aware of their vulnerability as well as identify ways to influence existing vulnerability in order to minimize its impact. Community vulnerability in the case of the Kobe earthquake was identified in this chapter as unevenly distributed and for some communities, both physical and social vulnerability were high due to the presence of old wooden housing, low-income households, an aging population, and inner-city development issues creating high building density, narrow streets, and mixed land use zoning which were discussed as issues in Japan?s urban development in Chapter 3. To develop a context for these case studies, Chapter 4 provided the empirical analysis of how Japanese governments and communities responded to the earthquake. It also identified the important roles of local government, Machizukuri practices, volunteers, and community involvement. To further improve current approaches to local development at the community level, the two case studies in this thesis provide an increasingly detailed understanding of community recovery from disasters.     121CHAPTER 5  Research Framework and Methods 5.1. Introduction In this chapter, I discuss how to address the research questions that were proposed in Chapter 1. In doing so, I develop a theoretical framework to locate my study. This theoretical framework draws on relevant theories and empirical studies, specifically vulnerability, capacity, disaster recovery, and community development theories, and the studies of Japan and the Kobe earthquake. The literature relating to these topics provides the basis for approaching the case studies that come in the following two chapters. After explaining my conceptual framework, I outline the research methods that I employ in addressing my research questions. I then explain why I chose the case study approach and justify the selection of the cases in question. I also discuss ethical issues involved in my research as well as issues of validity. At the end of the chapter, I briefly discuss how my research data are analyzed. From reviewing the literature, it is clear that vulnerability reduction is considered one of the important goals of community recovery from disasters. However, reducing vulnerability is a complex task as the nature of vulnerability is inherently difficult to grasp and takes many different forms. In order to achieve a better understanding of the nature of vulnerability, I limit my study in three ways. First, the study focuses on local community vulnerability. Second, the idea of ?capacity? is introduced as an alternative way of understanding vulnerability. Third, the term ?community capacity? is used to refer to collective efforts to deal with community recovery from disasters. Thus, in these and other ways, this study is exploratory in nature.  122Before developing the research framework, the research questions proposed in Chapter 1 are restated.  This research explores the following overarching question: How do community vulnerability and capacity interact in influencing post-disaster recovery at the small scale local level? The interaction between community vulnerability and capacity and recovery can be explored by examining a series of more specific sub-questions: 1.  Within a particular community, what were the conditions of community vulnerability and capacity before and after the disaster? (How can vulnerability and capacity be measured? What are appropriate indicators of vulnerability and capacity? How were the conditions of vulnerability and capacity changed or improved?) 2.  If vulnerability was reduced through the recovery process, what were the influential factors that resulted in this reduction during the recovery period? (Who were the key actors and what were the key activities influencing the reduction of vulnerability? Why were the factors influential in reducing vulnerability through the recovery activities?) 3.  If the capacity was enhanced, what were the influential factors that resulted in this enhancement through the recovery activities? (Who were the key actors and what were the key activities influencing the enhancement of capacity? Why were the factors influential in enhancing capacity?) 4.  If community development was well implemented in a community before the disaster, did the community have a better chance of an effective recovery? (Can good community development practices contribute to long term recovery processes? How  123and why did a long-standing history of community development contribute to achieving recovery? How did community development influence the outcomes of disaster recovery? How did a community with poor community development practices achieve recovery? )  5.2. The Theoretical Context   5.2.1. Vulnerability in the Context of Japan?Adaptation and Application of Blaikie et al.?s Vulnerability Analysis Model As discussed in Chapter 2, Blaikie et al.?s Pressure and Release Model (1994 and 2004) is one way of understanding a community?s existing vulnerability to disasters. To develop the specific context in relation to vulnerability to disasters, their model is adopted and adapted here to examine pre- and post-disaster vulnerability conditions in the Mano and Mikura communities. Blaikie et al.?s model was designed to analyze the processes whereby vulnerability is generated. They defined three major factors, root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions as basically the processes leading to vulnerability (Wisner et al. 2004: 51-54). According to them, the model serves to illustrate ?the ways in which these ?dynamic pressures? operate to channel ?root causes? into ?unsafe conditions?? (Wisner et al. 2004: 54). In other words, in their analysis, vulnerability is generated from ?root causes,? results in ?dynamic pressures,? which in turn create ?unsafe conditions.?  In their second edition of the book ?At Risk,? Wisner et al. (2004) selected the Kobe earthquake as one of their earthquake case studies. In their analysis, although it was brief, they discussed the social vulnerability of a minority group, Burakumin (untouchables), fragile wooden dwellings creating physical vulnerability in the region, the failure of disaster  124preparedness measures, community resilience, and volunteer contributions (ibid 2004: 293-300). Their analysis was sound, however, because Wisner et al. had to introduce an overview of the Kobe earthquake, their vulnerability analysis tended to be rather broad, and difficult to apply for a specific small scale community such as a neighbourhood.    To apply Blaikie et al.?s model for my study, the model is used in a slightly different manner in order to focus on identifying the characteristics of small scale community level vulnerability. I use these three large categories (root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions) characterized in Blaikie et al.?s model differently to examine a set of factors influencing three different levels and dimensions of vulnerability (state/political level of vulnerability; local/community level of vulnerability; physical/technical level of vulnerability) in my adapted model. Figure 5.1 illustrates how I adopt and adapt Blaikie et al.?s model. ?Root Causes? represent factors at the macro level of state and political vulnerability conditions in Japan. The relationship between state and civil society can have a critical influence on creating root causes of vulnerability as discussed in Chapter 3, for the Japanese government often holds most of the power to make decisions regarding national policies, and the capitalist economy orientation tends to undermine local and small scale economic activities (Miyamoto 1998; Takayose 1999a). As a consequence, a power imbalance between central and local governments and local communities can occur throughout development practices. The conditions of ?strong state and weak civil society? have been favourable to the Japanese government in regards to achieving its goals in general and it is one effective way to accomplish some aspects of disaster recovery, in particular with regard to reconstruction of infrastructure and lifelines (Drabek and McEntire 2003). However, in terms of achieving community autonomy and independence, conditions of  125?strong state and weak civil society? (Johnson 1995) are factors that might negatively affect the recovery outcomes required to meet community needs and concerns. In other words, reducing community vulnerability may be difficult if the government uses its authority to make all decisions because vulnerability reduction is often better considered as a community issue to be implemented by the community.  Figure 5.1: Japan?s Vulnerability Pressure and Release Model (Adapted from Blaikie et al. 1994: 23 and Wisner et al. 2004: 51)    JAPAN?S PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY IN PRE-DISASTER PERIOD               1               2                3         ROOT      DYNAMIC     UNSAFE            DISASTER     HAZARDS        CAUSES     PRESSURES            CONDITIONS                          RISK = Hazard ?  Vulnerability  R = H? V State/Political/ Levels of Vulnerability  ?  Highly centralized government systems and top-down, bureaucratic approaches limiting decision making process and problem-solving practices, ?  Democracy is ideologically appreciated, but a hierarchical approach still remains  ?  Strong focus on economic development, overriding social and community development ?  Local economy suffers due to a collapse of bubble economy. Local/Community Levels of Vulnerability  ?  Land use planning often involves government led activities and little public involvement, limit to community resources,  ?  Insufficient of human asset for emergency event (volunteer activities were not popular before 1995), ?  Inactive neighbour-hood associations in some areas. ?  Rapid demographic change,  ?  Special groups at risk (elderly, women, children, foreigners, outcasts, low income house-holds, disabled, etc.) in inner-city areas. Physical/Technical Levels of Vulnerability  ?  Unprotected buildings and infrastructure (old wooden houses)  ?  High concentration of low income households in inner-cities.  ?  Lack of disaster preparedness especially for an earthquake in Hanshin region.  ?  Inner-city of Kobe city creating physical risks (high density, narrow streets, few open spaces, complex tenancy).  ?  Lack of recovery plans prior to disasters  Earthquake  High winds (cyclone/ hurricane/ typhoon)  Flooding  Volcanic eruption  Landslides Future Potential Hazards  126In my framework, ?Dynamic Pressures? are viewed as more directly connected to the processes of the local and community development practices and are therefore considered to be factors influencing local/community vulnerability. Recent demographic trends and existing prejudices towards ethnic minorities and social groups further intensify the vulnerability of special groups at higher risk in communities (Kadooka 1996; Women?s Net Kobe 1996; Yano 1996; Ishikawa 2001; Chan-Tiberghen 2004). In these situations there may have been insufficient human capital for emergency events (emergency volunteer activities were not popular in the pre-disaster period, for instance) and some neighbourhoods were becoming fragmented and disorganized.  ?Unsafe Conditions? are defined here as Japan?s physical and geological conditions or technical and management issues that result in increased physical vulnerability in Japan. Poorly maintained buildings and houses are a good example of unsafe conditions. A lack of disaster management or planning can intensify physical vulnerability as well. Poor building construction practices and evaluation which result in fragile infrastructure are also considered as part of these unsafe conditions. Because I am interested in identifying vulnerable conditions of a community and how they can be reduced, instead of finding the causes and ways in which vulnerability is created, I focus on factors that can help identify community vulnerability and its reduction. In my version of this model, these three factors (state/political; local/community; and physical/technical levels of vulnerability) are considered as acting in an accumulative process to influence conditions of community vulnerability.   Table 5.1 below shows examples of vulnerability indicators that can be used in examining factors and conditions of community vulnerability. Table 5.1 is created in order to  127provide a tangible sense of how community vulnerability is assessed in this study. The factors and examples of indicators for each of the factors are drawn from the literatures cited in the previous chapters.       By applying this table, I identify the vulnerability conditions in my two case studies. For example, the demographic trend is one of the vulnerability factors and if there is any population composition change after the disaster, or if there is a change that is making particular groups more vulnerable, then this is an indicator that needs to be included in a refined list in the box titled ?Local/Community Levels of Vulnerability? in Figure 5.1 when produced to illustrate the result of the case studies.     Table 5.1: Factors and Potential Indicators of Community Vulnerability Vulnerability Factors  Community Vulnerability Indicators Demographic Trend  Presence of high ratio of vulnerable groups (elderly, children, disabled, women, ethnic minorities, foreigners, etc.); negative population growth; rapid population change; etc. Resource Accessibility  Poor relationship with government or power imbalance limiting community access to resources; community plans not reflecting community needs and interests; lack of skills and knowledge; etc.   Community Autonomy and Social Integration  Ineffectiveness of community development practices (Machizukuri); lack of community services; fragmented and fewer CBOs; lack of awareness of minority groups; etc. Socioeconomic Conditions  high rate of welfare programs accessed; high tenancy rate; decline in retail sales and manufacture output; etc. Physical Conditions and Management or Planning to Improve Infrastructure Narrow streets; high density of population; fewer open spaces; high level of environmental degradation; old and fragile buildings and houses; failure to upgrade building standards and codes; lack of community land use planning and disaster recovery plans; etc.  These lists of indicators are not exclusive to any particular community. They are some basic examples drawn from varied studies in the literature to apply to any community setting and in this study. I apply this table specifically to the two communities in Kobe city to understand in detail the conditions of community vulnerability.    1285.2.2. Building Community Capacity?An Alternative Approach The application and adaptation of Blaikie et al.?s model to the Japanese context is valuable and meaningful as it helps in understanding what factors are influencing vulnerability and how those factors have accumulated in Kobe prior to 1995. A problem arises when vulnerability is addressed at an operational level, however. Thus, Wisner et al. (2004) argue that coping strategies for vulnerability reduction are ?people?s agency, ingenuity and abilities to help themselves individually and collectively? (ibid: 120). They develop a framework to conceptualize people?s abilities to cope with their vulnerability. They call it the ?access model? (Blaikie et al. 1994: 46-72; Wisner et al. 2004: 95-123). It is, in effect, a research framework to explain vulnerable conditions as a lack of accessibility to resources and it posits that gaining this access is ?the means of securing their livelihoods and maintaining their expectations in life? (Wisner et al. 2004: 112). This ?access model? is one way to understand how households are embedded in a socioeconomic system that may or may not obstruct a families? ability to access resources. However, their main concern for the development of the access model is to identify possible accessibility to resources in order to regain and obtain available resources and their focus is not on vulnerability reduction through the communities collective actions.   It is very important to recognize that vulnerable people are, to a degree, capable of taking care of their own vulnerability and such vulnerability needs to be managed by the vulnerable people themselves using their own capacity as much as possible. At the same time, it is also critical to acknowledge the fact that the vulnerable are not all capable of and also not responsible for solving every cause of their own vulnerability from a community recovery point of view. Collective approaches, therefore, are needed to supplement  129individual people?s ability to deal with their vulnerability. Other factors (i.e. economic trends, political conditions, previous experiences of disasters) and key actors (i.e. central and local government, CBOs, businesses) play critical roles in vulnerability reduction and that has to be taken into account in order to fully understand how to deal with vulnerability.  Community capacity, therefore, is considered as the collective efforts of the community, and, in this study, capacity is considered to play a critical role in minimizing existing vulnerability. The focus of this study is to understand how communities recover from disaster. Because recovery activities involve vulnerability reduction, in the two case studies I identify how communities have attempted to reduce vulnerability. Instead of identifying causes of vulnerability and finding ways to eradicate the causes, I apply a capacity approach to understand the conditions of vulnerability and how communities deal with vulnerability to further develop my theoretical framework.  In this thesis, capacity is defined as a community?s ability and resources that help its members deal with their common problems. Building capacity therefore includes building up a community?s skills and knowledge. These skills and knowledge can enhance the community?s resources, further increasing its capacity. Resources include natural, financial, organizational, and human assets that can contribute to helping solve problems. Different types of capital, such as social, cultural, human, financial and physical are also considered as capacity when they are used to positively influence community building (Putnam 1995; Buckland and Rahman 1999). Building capacity therefore, includes improving the local ability to assess availability of resources, to utilize existing resources, and to seek potential resources. Table 5.2 below shows an illustrative list of indicators of community capacity based on the studies that have been discussed above and in preceding chapters.  130 Table 5.2: Factors and Potential Indicators of Building Community Capacity Community Capacity Factors  Building Community Capacity Indicators Presence of CBOs  Long-standing efforts of CBOs; high numbers of CBOs in the community;a great diversity of CBOs, etc. Residents? Participation  Involvement of the residents in diverse types of CBOs; a high level of skills and knowledge they have; any other volunteer activities; strong and effective leadership; etc. Community Planning Approach and Accomplishment (Machizukuri) Relationships with governments and other influential institutions; activities of Town-Building Council; ways of problem-solving; community organizing processes; outcomes and accomplishment of planning, such as ne