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The neuroscience of movement, time and space : an arts educational study of the embodied brain LaMonde, Anne-Marie R. 2011-04-26

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  THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MOVEMENT, TIME AND SPACE: AN ARTS EDUCATIONAL STUDY OF THE BODIED BRAIN   by  ANE-MARIE R. LAMONDE  B.P.E., The University of Calgary, 1990 B.Ed., The University of Calgary, 1991 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 2002     A THESIS SUBMITED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGRE OF   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   in   THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  (Curriculum Studies)    THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)     April 2011   © Ane-Marie R. LaMonde, 201   i ABSTRACT This thesis is an exploration of the contributions of contemporary theories in film and literacy with the purpose of understanding how those theories inform an arts-based researcher in education. Additionaly, further insights are drawn from cognitive, social, and neurosciences with the purpose of broadening the scope of understanding that stretches across multiple disciplines wherein film and literacy education is found. By engaging in a wide exploration across multiple fields of knowledge, this thesis shows the extent to which the general belief of the incommensurability betwen the arts, philosophy, cognitive, social and neurosciences has impacted negatively on education. It is believed, however, that knowledge gained through the study of contemporary theories in film and literacy, which is founded upon the philosophical, psychological, and sociological, may achieve greater clarity and insight when framed within the scope of advanced studies in neurosciences. With the interweaving of autobiographical acounts, explorations in the theoretical and experimental lead to a renewed understanding of film, arts, and literacy pedagogy. Finaly, it is believed that understanding the convergence of the brain’s cognitive, emotional, and sensorimotor functions and the primacy of movement, is pivotal to understanding the complex isues of brain-body-mind that range from consciousnes to learning.     ii TABLE OF CONTENTS  Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………ii     Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………ii   List of Figures ……….……..…………………………………………………………v  Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………   CHAPTER ONE  Introduction and overview...……………………………………1  1.1 Overture: A prologue to the themes………………………………………1 1.2 Investigative prelude…………………………………………………….13  CHAPTER TWO  Literature review and discussion ……………………………….33   2.1 Situating the purpose, research questions and concerns .………………33  2.2 A deeper look into the school’s philosophy …………………………….37   2.3 A surprising find: the puzzling field of film literacy ……………………39  2.4 Surveying the situation in education…………………………………….50  2.5 Motion pictures: the event that changed the world……………………..56  2.6 Graduate researchers and the emergence of a collective ………………..61  2.7 Film arts as literacy, communications, and technology…………………66  2.8 The rise of film research in education: in search of the expert………….72  2.9 The dizying efects of revolution ………………………………………84  2.10 Searching for a new direction ………………………………………..91  2.11 Reflecting on the urgent cal to action …………………………………94  2.12 The knowledge digital ethnographic experts presently offer ………….96  2.13 The knowledge communication experts presently offer..……………100  2.14 Questions and concerns that continue to haunt arts educators ………107     CHAPTER THRE  Methodology………….……………………………………112    3.1 Modes of inquiry ………………………………………………………112      3.2 A deeper look into brain research .……………………………………..118       3.3 Consciousnes and the flow of images ..………………………………122  3.4 Another perspective on the idea of image ……………………………..124  3.5 The brain, images, and film ……………………………………………126  3.6 The flow of movement and arts-based education ……………………..131  3.7 Sensory dispositions and image formation …………………………….134  3.8 The somatic marker hypothesis ………………………………………..136  3.9 Darwin’s insight into art ……………………………………………….141  3.10 The arts as concrete and symbolic inventory…………………………146  3.11 Understanding film in education ……………………………………..154  3.12 The convergence of specialists and generalists ………………………156  3.13 Dismantling the mirored disention …………………………………166  iv  3.14 Nature and nurture: The struggle continues…………………………..169  3.15 Language as gramar, syntax and semantics ………………………..172  3.16 Near and far: the spatial side of the part-whole dichotomy…………..178  3.17 Spatial reasoning: its impact on research methodologies …………….190  3.18 Emotions and cognition: the importance of things felt and the      mater-of-fact …………………………………………………………192                    CHAPTER FOUR Analysis ………………………………………………………199   4.1 In search of meaning: cognition, perception and language ……………199  4.2 Language and thought as equal, independent, or deterministic ………..207   4.3 Observations of a Deaf student negotiating music concepts …………..214   4.4 Is there such a thing as semantics in music? …………………………..224   4.5 The impact of language and cognition theories on pedagogy …………229  4.6 A cognitive music theory: neither language nor transcendent…………231   4.7 Rethinking imitation, meaning and understanding …………………….236    4.8 Creative reasoning: a cognitive-perceptive act of logic .………………242    4.9 Universals as determining language and cognition ……………………245    4.10 A cognitive and emotional register …………………………………252  4.11 The semantic brain: in search of the language of thought ……………254  4.12 The flip side: miror neurons …………………………………………259  4.13 The discovery of miror neurons shifts perception studies …………..261  4.14 Hypothesizing the function of miror neurons ……………………….266  4.15 Miror neurons beyond imitation: learning new action paterns ……..272  4.16 Hypothesizing the relationship betwen miror neurons and      conceptual semantics …………………………………………………273  4.17 Fussy verbs prove to be connected to reality…………………………278  4.18 Miror neurons in action………………………………………………285   CHAPTER FIVE  Synthesis ………………………………………………………291   5.1. Ethical chasm: an experiment in film pedagogy and research         methodology .…………………………………………………………291  5.2 The gramar of film: a temporal-spatial logic ………………………..298   5.3 Test audiences: film reception and interpretation ……………………..304  5.4 The experiment proves to be both a succes and failure ………………306   5.5 Experiences not abstracted from our sensory experiences …………….316  5.6 Building capacity: the brain that changes through pedagogy ………….317   REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………326          v     LIST OF FIGURES  Figure 1. Palindrome set-up………………………………………………………..288  vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   My deepest gratitude goes to my thesis supervisor Dr. Peter Gouzouasis for the many years of intelectual and artistic exchange, as wel as his continuous support throughout. His confidence in my investigative proces gave me the much appreciated space and time to alow me to plunge into the unknown and bring to the surface treasures from the deep. Also, I am deeply indebted to my two quintesential commite advisors, Dr. Carl Leggo and Dr. Sheley Hymel. Without their support, insights, chalenges, encouragement, artistry, and dedication, I would not have been able to se this project through. I would also like to thank Dr. Joy Butler, Dr. Janet Jamieson, and Dr. Celeste Snowber for their probing questions and incisive anecdotes that set the tone during the examination period, which wil continue to reverberate in me as an opennes toward multi-disciplinary research. I am also grateful for the financial support, along with the support of the faculty and staf from the Department of Curriculum Studies at UBC. The department’s commitment to graduate students has been outstanding.  To my children, Natalie, Marci, and Gregory, I thank them each for their inteligence, their penetrating views, and marvelous contributions to my work and studies. I deeply appreciate my parents, John and Paulete, for their unconditional love, support, and encouragement throughout the years, which has been a constant guide and motivational force.   There are numerous students and friends who have been fundamental to my personal and profesional growth. I wil be forever grateful for their unbounded creativity and the stories they shared. Though there have been too many over the years to name them al, yet they wil remain unforgetable; their presence wil be as a thread of continuity to my life. Finaly, to Marc Retaileau, whose companionship, love, faith, artistry, and uncompromising proces toward a higher purpose and consciousnes watered the seds of knowledge and presed me forward to finding my voice. 1  CHAPTER ONE Reasoning and education, though we are wiling to put our trust in them, can hardly be powerful enough to lead us to action, unles besides we exercise and form our soul by experience to the way we want it to go; otherwise, when it comes to the time for action, it wil undoubtedly find itself at a loss (Montaigne, 1958, p. 267).  Overture: A prologue to the themes To give a sense of the work herein, I consider the importance of the title of this thesis: The neuroscience of movement, time and space: An arts educational study of the embodied brain. Carefully chosen for its ambiguities, implications, denotations, connotations and context, the title may mean everything and nothing. As a colleague of mine said jokingly when she first heard it, “You lost me at neuroscience.” Seting humor aside, her response was not surprising. At first glance, the term neuroscience caries an aura of scientific complexity and appears steped in reductionism far removed from the demands of clasroom practice or the kind of research that has been the halmark of education, which for good reason has been rooted in philosophy, psychology, social sciences, and the arts. Though I gratefully acknowledge those areas of research, which continue to bring the human condition to light, my choice to devote time to the neurosciences semed to be logical given our collective need to understand perception, cognition and emotion. Moreover, the discoveries in neuroscience appeared as a new means to confront dualistic thinking since the time of the Greks. With a span of over hundred years of observation and study, the field of neuroscience has led me to chalenging and astonishing new insights into the embodied brain. It is without question that research is dependent upon lived experiences that lead us to deeper investigations, though more precisely the objects of our fascination, for as Walt Whitman (2006) once wrote,  2 There was a child went forth everyday; and the first object he looked upon, that object he became; and that object became part of him for the day, or a certain part of the day, or for many years or stretching cycles of years.  To those who know me wel, it is clear that movement has been my object of fascination since childhood, wherein I trained and practiced in dance, gymnastics, sports, music, acting, speech arts, and filmaking. Through flights of fancy, through applied skils, through composition, teaching, and study, my lifelong practice in the movement arts made the object of movement a part of me for many years and stretching cycles of years. Over the past five years, as my awarenes grew ith respect to the pivotal nature of movement in my collective experiences, I became increasingly frustrated with theories I encountered in philosophy, psychology, social sciences, and the arts, which submited captivating descriptions but failed to ofer adequate explanations. My recourse to brain research was a leap of faith that beyond descriptions I would find the explanatory. Indeed, through neuroscience I discovered the primacy of movement in the proceses of perception, cognition and emotion as wel as the arts. And with great delight, the cognitive sciences offered convincing theories on the primacy of movement in language and cognition. My interest in the study of the brain and body, in efect, began over twenty-five years ago while studying dance education. However, it was while apprenticing to become a teacher that I happened upon a collection of case histories recounted by humanist and neurologist Oliver Sacks, which awakened my pasion. As the brain’s peculiar make up was described through teltale stories of neurological disorder, I could not help but be struck by wonder.  3 Yet it was but a few years ago that I learned about the brain’s holistic flow in creating what neurologist Alexander Luria (1972) caled, kinetic melodies. First, by the interconnected and integrative nature of the brain, which coordination resembles an orchestral and movement ensemble and, second, by its extraordinary plasticity, which veritably mirors the creative and flexible nature of linguistic and artistic expresions. As I gained knowledge of the brain’s complex neural communication networks, which creates mind through image spaces and dispositions that enable both a core and extended consciousnes, I was driven to retrace dualisms in search of theories that hold the halves inseparable and whole. As an artist and arts educator, I have felt that the debates betwen nature/nurture, perception/cognition, reason/emotion, and, of course, mind/body, as mostly disingenuous. I imagine many academics and researchers have experienced batle fatigue over the debates that have formed in our collective Western minds to describe and explain the world in part. But having held faith in the corollary betwen arts and sciences, I readily leapt into the unknown, believing that if not now, one day the study of the brain may reveal the whole we al sek. In addition, I felt a certain kinship with neuroscience, which has up until recently remained on the fringes of knowledge for several hundred years, quietly operating through the observation and intuition of artists and scientists. Advances in technology over several centuries, which alowed biology, physics, and chemistry to make important discoveries were not yet available for the neurosciences. Up until fiften years ago, we had not yet found adequate means to peer into the living brain. But with the invention of photography and the development of over hundred years of filmic images that soon led to the invention of magnetic and digital imaging, it has only been a mater of time that the neurosciences would leap into the fore.  4 Nonetheles, what began as a pastime to read the ken and sensitive portrayals of unique individuals, Oliver Sacks led me down the rabbit hole into the wonderland of neurology. Sacks introduced me to Russian neurologist and linguist Alexander Luria (1972), whose incisive acount of a wounded soldier in, Man with a shattered world, influenced many generations of neuroscientists to follow. Hence, this thesis draws insights and theories from the recent generation of neuroscientists, namely, Antonio Damasio, V.S. Ramachandran, Rizolati and Sinigaglia, and Milner and Goodale to name a few. I also lean on the insights of cognitive linguists whose collaboration with neuroscience began long ago with Wernicke and Broca’s discoveries of the brain’s speech centers upon studying stroke victims in the late 1800s (Pinker, 2008). In any case, apart from neuroscience, it is the word movement, which holds utmost importance. As such, I include in the title the two interelated and indivisible contexts within which movement flows, namely, time and space. Time and space are infinitely whole, flowing, and continuous. And though our human intelect can imagine and expres infinity in poetic and rational ways, our lived experience tels us that our finite inteligence understands time and space best when they are divided, discontinuous, and examined in part. We understand and expres time and space as finite instances that appear in the memorable past, the phenomenal present, and imagined future. Time and space are then and now, near and far, sudden and sustained, fast and slow, bounded and unbounded. Time and space being directional and containing shape, mas, and weight, position us by providing the figure and ground upon which we are able to interact in a finite reality. This interaction ensures our ability to adapt to the present by drawing from the past. By observing causal paterns in order to infer, predict, plan and create artifacts  5 for the future. And to bring to pas what Alfred N. Whitehead (1938) described as the ‘importance of things felt’ and ‘the mater-of-fact.’ None of which we would be able to do without movement, for it is by the flow of movement that we atend to and recal the objects of our existence. If this view of movement appears confusing, one may find clarity in reflecting that it is by the flow of movement that our brain takes note of a before and after, wherein we sense that some thing has moved from here to there or from then to now. It is by movement that we are able to reconstruct the worlds we sense within and without our bodies to atend to and retain in memory our lived reality, and by movement that we reach toward or pull away from what is iminently in our best interest. It is through movement, through the flow of electrical impulses and chemistry in the brain, which flow moves frely in and out of the cortical and sub-cortical systems, perceiving and deploying vital information to our bodies and to our emotional and cognitive centers whereby the human mind is created. It is this continuous flow that is ‘the stuff of our universe.’ The rest of the title speaks to the fact that far from being an expert in neurology, I am an artist and arts educator desiring to participate in a world where language and reason holds political and economic primacy. Methodologicaly, I was encouraged to follow in the footsteps of neurologists whose use of autobiographies (what neurologist V.S. Ramachandran cals, ‘the n of 1’) is crucial to our understanding of the embodied brain. Beyond the importance of the autobiographical as method, to truly understand the self, as Socrates once declared, positions us to beter understand what lies outside of us. It is upon film and language that I chose to focus my research because of their structural semblance in gramar, syntax, and semantics. Since film and language are also profoundly acoustic and kinetic, I was able to draw from my years of experience in music and dance as  6 complimentary arts. Because dance respects a very specific form and style of movement, I chose to generalize elements of movement through the work of Rudolf Von Laban, who clasified esential aspects across a spectrum of motion from the pedestrian and occupational to the highly skiled forms of artistry. Likewise, music is analyzed for its structure and developmental learning theories, rather than its emotional valence in filmed works. My film understanding, which began in childhood as a means to learn a second language, spans my experiences as a student in cinematic studies and film theory, as filmaker, and film educator. The data for analysis includes a short film, which I produced for an educational conference to delineate the concept of near/far through the subject of a dancer, along with a short film produced by an undergraduate student whose playful elements of visual and acoustic time and space were made inteligible through examining the theory of spatial reasoning, such as near/far, put forward by neuroscientists Rizolati and Sinigaglia (2008). I also analyze a choreography, entitled Palindrome, which demonstrates the theory of “action understanding,” as also put forward by neurologists Rizolati and Sinigaglia (2008), and expounded upon by Milner and Goodale (2006), in relation to the manner by which the sensorimotor systems operate conjointly to interpret transitive and intransitive gestures for the purpose of imitating, deciding, planning and taking action. The theory of “action understanding” was aided by the discovery of miror neurons, which was put forward by V.S. Ramachandran and asociates (1998). Temporal/spatial reasoning, action understanding and miror neurons are just a few of the several areas I draw from the neurosciences to beter understand the proceses and products of film, language, music, and dance. By drawing on the strengths and shortcomings of theories in the cognitive sciences and developmental psychology, I also analyze my experience in teaching a Deaf student in a music  7 context. By turning to cognitive and neurosciences, I atempt to explain the extraordinary capacities of a brain to understand music irespective of possesing a sense of hearing. One key piece of evidence I chose from which to analyze and draw final conclusions, to which I dedicate the last chapter, was a short film I produced for my faculty’s former dean, Dr. Robert J. Tierney (2008). Though the film appeared unrelated to my thesis at its initial undertaking, its experimental nature was the impetus that changed the course of this thesis. It is upon this final analysis that I have concluded on the importance of film as research methodology and clasroom practice. The making of the film commisioned by Tierney (2001-2001), was based on an article he published in the Journal of Adolescent Literacy, originaly entitled: An ethical chasm: Jurisprudence, jurisdiction and the literacy profesion. Writen principaly to identify the political and legal forces behind literacy education, it speaks to the primacy of literacy education to foster the ability to reason, most often termed ‘critical thinking.’ What arose in my mind as I pondered Tierney’s text was, what type of reasoning would afect behaviors and atitudes we are desperate to foster in schools—such as fairnes, empathy, aceptance, and cooperation—and do literacy approaches, as those are implemented today in our schools, target that kind of reasoning? Tierney’s initial writing for the article took poetic license from a literary work, namely a courtroom drama depicted in David Guterson’s (1995), novel Snow falling on cedars, which set in motion his intent to expres complex terms through a literary lens—one could say an experiment in its own right. He then re-contextualized the article as a Reader’s Theatre piece for educational audiences, followed by the production of a short film drama, which I directed, edited, and scored. Since my sensibilities, as an arts educator, has been to foster fredom of thought, agency and democracy—tenets upheld by the artistic cred—it was serendipitous that Tierney’s article  8 was founded upon those principles through a literacy lens. Unquestionably, I was drawn to this experiment both rationaly and pasionately because of its consciousnes-raising medium and mesage—for instance, as a work of art revealing the world of literacy education, which world utilizes the arts for expresion. Clearly, as McLuhan (1963) once noted, within a medium lies another medium. To identify my research questions, I was mindful of knowledge areas that today demand special atention in education, namely, (1) film and video, by virtue of an unprecedented era that is flooded with digital images, (2) literacy, by virtue of its perceived primacy in educational and political spheres, and (3) neuroscience, by virtue of a perceived incommensurability with clasroom practice. I sought to know, therefore, how contemporary theories in film and literacy inform an arts-based researcher in education. I wondered what further insight is drawn from studies in the cognitive, social, and neurosciences. And whether the knowledge gained from those preceding questions, can enhance our understanding of arts and literacy so that change is positively afected in clasroom pedagogy. In my review of literacy, I note its political and economic valence. Literacy is a weighty word, which was coined in 1883 and first used politicaly to raise funds in 1886 to addres the appaling human conditions believed were caused by low literacy rates in the state of Louisiana. I note also the shift in the definition of and advocacy for literacy as digital media gained momentum. By 1996, The New London Group, an international group of literacy researchers, began to redefine and advocate for the kinds of literacy arising in a new digital economy beyond the printed word. I note also the various intentions behind research in new media as films progresed through its various forms. Media literacy sprang from a concern with the shaping of young minds, influenced by images rooted in political and economic agendas. Whilst media arts, by  9 contrast, sprang from an advocacy for the uses of new forms of communication and technology in schools, not the least of which include filmaking and video production. Notably, the introduction of filmaking in the clasroom, as early as 1939, was by a group of English teachers. Prior to this new form of literacy, as it was caled, studies were conducted on film’s so-caled deleterious efects in the lives of children and youth Those studies were published as early as 1928 through the Payne Fund, and 1929 through the extensive qualitative study of behaviorist Alice Miler Mitchel. In terms of entering the school curriculum, filmaking has a sketchy past. Over a period of more than hundred years, it has appeared and disappeared from clasrooms approximately every forty years, an indication that despite some initial interest, whenever new technologies were invented to facilitate production, the making of films never developed a convincing rationale to remain a permanent fixture in schools. I note that as early as 1928 to our present day, an esential rhetoric on film in education has remained the purview of media, literacy, communications and film experts whose agenda is to direct film viewing and production for the purpose of stering an undiscerning public toward good citizenry, which the New London Group (1996) deemed to promote the good life and an equitable society. Whereas film studies stayed clear of directing film viewing or production, its specialization has chalenged superficial viewing and proceses by amateurs, including those in education. Those historical movements were founded on the perceived urgency of the times and a positioning of a new bred of experts. What is clear is that with each new consumer trend, educators and film experts resist or embrace the changing times out of sense of urgency or a feling that something must be done to either stop the flow or ride the wave.  10 Notably, film theory and studies, which sprang from a pasion for the cinema since the Lumière brothers’ invention of the movie camera in 1889, aligned itself with twentieth century research and theoretical paradigms. Beginning as a phenomenological enterprise among amateur film enthusiasts, who exchanged the ontological and epistemological virtues of the film image in new film journals, its study and theory arose as an expert field in academia by the 1950’s. Film studies have leaned heavily on the theories prevalent in philosophy, structural linguistics, psychology, semiotics, cognitive linguistics and the social sciences. Each enterprise has appeared like Russian nesting dolls, applying twentieth century grand theories to their particular object of study in film. In reviewing the whole of the literature, it became increasingly apparent that a vital piece of knowledge was mising, namely, understanding the image and how the human mind interprets the world through what Damasio (1999) termed “movies-in-the-brain.” Despite the availability of hundreds of theories describing the image, an adequate explanation of how the image forms in the brain and for what purpose it forms, has eluded educational researchers and film theorists. Neuroscience explains that it is our sensory-somatic system, which ‘translates’ incoming signals into images, the purpose for which appears to regulate a ‘mindful’ relationship with the world. Yet what connects images to judging and valuing the world? Damasio (1999) offers a teling proposal. Emotions of al shades eventualy help connect homeostatic regulation and survival ‘values’ to numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience. Emotions are inseparable from the idea of reward or punishment, of pleasure or pain, of approach or withdrawal, of personal advantage or disadvantage. Inevitably, emotions are inseparable from the idea of good and evil (pp. 54-55).  It is thus a constant flow of images, which give rise to “the sense of self in the act of knowing,” and ultimately constitutes the seat of consciousnes (p. 19).  11 Through my analysis of the short film experiment, namely Ethical Chasm, I conclude that it is both a failure and a succes. Its succes was in driving a pasionate relationship with the making of the film and its content, which led me to the discovery of vital information for education. The failure of the film experiment, which I sensed and felt before I could analyze it, was brought to the fore once I understood the orchestration of the brain’s integrative systems. Neuroscience, which is just beginning to unpack how the brain-body creates mind, and how the mind subsequently constructs meaning in language, film, music and al other manner of human expresion, is now unequivocaly proving the intimacy betwen subject/object and betwen nature/nurture. Film and language are technologies that extend our bodies and senses. Film and language are constructed to miror or give semblance to the perceptual, cognitive, and emotional fabric of our lived realities, which are indubitably rooted in movement, time and space. Every nuance of movement, as noted by expert and novice alike, wil be procesed by the brain and given value in our minds, which value must acord with our surroundings. Human development and the artifacts we produce, therefore are the proceses of nature and nurture, subject and object, which retrieve from simple, finite elements, as Chomsky so noted, to create infinite expresions. As a script, Ethical Chasm is dependent upon complex dialogue to clearly delineate the isues founded in literacy education, but its mesage becomes lost in the medium of motion photography and sound. Without special atention to neurological principles, for instance, “action understanding,” which ability to perceive and atend to movement, helps to identify motives and intent that lead to deciding on a plan of action, the visual/aural medium portrays litle more than the feling one is watching a lot of hand waving—the importance of which can be guesed at through location, namely a courtroom, and facial expresions without the details. But the vital  12 mesage is lost in translation, precisely because film is not at its best when it depends on language to expres meaning. It would have been best to leave it as a Reader’s Theatre or even a radio play. For the film to convey its mesage, many more images and actions would have had to be shot and edited. Nonetheles, the succes in experimenting with film in research and pedagogy offers one a unique opportunity to study images that form within and without the brain, to engage in the autobiographical, and to participate in the shaping of consciousnes, which many literacy educators cal “critical thinking.” In an era, which heretofore had never provided novices and experts alike with the means to produce and distribute films worldwide, educators may come to view film as vital to raising consciousnes. Art, which meaning is ‘to fit together,’ is indeed the most salient means to bridging the perceptual, cognitive, and emotional coherence of the brain. Because Literacy education’s current tenets lay beyond the boundaries of the printed word, it may deliver its promises to emancipate the learner if the movement arts are valued as vital, unique and equal in the quest to foster the development of the child. To what end do film arts and arts generaly lead us? First, by experimenting with film and the arts beyond merely acommodating cognitive deficits or enhancing interests, we may begin to re-evaluate non-verbal reasoning, which expresion is inevitably entwined with higher order thinking. Second, by experimenting with the arts, which emotional quality is inextricable from our ability to interpret, predict, and plan our actions, educators may be entreated to carefully atend to the pedagogy of emotion alongside cognition. Finaly, judging from the narative and experimental videos my elementary, secondary, and undergraduate learners have produced over the years through my instruction, I am convinced that filmic images and sound offer one of the most acesible means for constructing the  13 autobiographical and for changing cognitive and emotional neural paterns that may lead future generations toward higher consciousnes. Investigative prelude  Over fiften years ago, while working predominantly as an arts educator with a music emphasis in the public school system, I ventured into the clasroom with a strong desire to undertake the art of filmaking. There had been plenty of educational reasons for taking up such a project. The first had centered on the ‘images’ of democracy and agency that had arose in my mind while working with inner-city youth who I imagined would be able to tel their stories through documentary film. A few years later, those reasons had centered on the ‘image’ of our time that postulated a ‘new knowledge society.’ There was, of course, the publication of the ‘manifesto’ on new literacies by The New London Group (1996), which collective of educators in literacy education strongly upheld the tenets of democracy and personal agency. But it was a description by Linda Darling-Hamond (1997), which I clearly remember gave importance to the times in which I had entered as an educator. The new basics demanded by today’s knowledge society require that al students be able to met requirements previously reserved for only the ‘talented tenth.’ They must learn to: understand and use complex materials; communicate clearly and persuasively; plan and organize their own work; aces and use resources; solve sophisticated mathematical and scientific problems; create new ideas and products, and use new technologies in al of these pursuits (p. 5).  Generaly speaking, images are not fully understood. The manner in which they arise as ‘artifacts’ in the mind, the fact that images are not solely visual, the manner in which they are stored in memory, recaled, and later ‘represented’ or expresed through varied modalities. Moreover, it is not fully understood why images often sem to return full circle, which phenomenon resembles what Nietzsche caled, the eternal return. Darling-Hamond could have been speaking of another generation, in a time when ‘technologies’ or ‘machines’ were pushing the limits of our expectations of mental proceses.  14  For instance, in a 1950 speech to the American Psychological Asociation (APA), J.P. Guilford’s (1987) urgent plea for cognitive scientists to devote their energies to studying creativity was based on two powerful images. With the advancement of computers or what Guilford caled “thinking machines,” which he “expected to make man’s brain relatively useles,” he imaged “an industrial revolution that wil pale into insignificance the first industrial revolution” (p. 36). Out of necesity, therefore, there was a growing need to “develop an economic order in which sufficient employment and wage would stil be available, which would require creative thinking of an unusual order and speed” (p. 36). The second image was much darker in mood, namely, that “the only economic value of brains left would be in the creative thinking of which they are capable. Presumably, there would stil be need for human brains to operate the machines and to invent beter ones” (p. 36).  I have no reason to doubt that Guilford’s addres to the American Psychological Asociation was an echo of an image that rippled throughout society. Certainly Darling-Hamond (1997) was echoing an image already rendered by The New London Group (1996) who began their manifesto by reporting on a diferent kind of learner. As if to confirm Guilford’s prophetic view of a future generation, new definitive pronouncements were made such as one by Gayle Long (1997), “Teachers today are seing a new kind of student enter their clasrooms. Many children sat at a computer for the first time shortly after they received their first pair of shoes. They’re the Nintendo generation or the screnagers—the first to grow up with personal computers, video games and the Internet. They expect material to be presented to them in a creative and chalenging way and are eager to experiment with innovations in technology” (p. 17). Nothing could have been more motivating to consider presenting film arts than the image of experimenting with innovations in technology.  15 Yet there were other reasons for venturing on such an ambitious project. The fact is that teaching artistic proceses and products had always brought several conflicting isues to the fore. The first conflict was the isue of ensuring the right balance of ‘direct instruction’ for building skils with ‘open-ended’ compositional projects designed to foster creative proceses and products. Direct instruction in an arts program could be viewed as ‘imitative’ for the purpose of building sensory-somatic memory (i.e., motor skils and conceptual awarenes). But it could also be thought of as ‘image flooding,’ a useful notion to describe the numerous artistic activities or models to which learners are exposed. A thoughtfuly structured, developmentaly cognitive program of arts, which would ‘flood’ the learning with good modeling, had long been considered by artists and arts educators to foster creativity (H’Doubler, 1940; Orf & Walter, 1963). Along with ‘image flooding’ was the notion that young people create under the constraints of open-ended tasks, i.e., enabling constraints. As a performing artist, my improvisational and compositional skils in music, theatre, and dance were developed largely through frameworks that sufficiently constrained the magnitude of possibilities into a reasonable sphere of potentiality. Rather than beginning with a blank slate (i.e., tabula rasa), the arts educators I was fortunate to encounter as an apprentice encouraged playful investigations through an abundance of mental images framed by the limits of movement, time and space. Relying on my own apprenticeship as a means to creative thinking, I had already pursued this approach with learners long before entering the public school system and I wished to take more careful note of the results as a teacher-researcher. To my great surprise, I would later encounter a neuropsychological approach to enabling learning or relearning of disabled limbs or senses (e.g., stroke victims) whereby physical constraints are used, not unlike the constraints used in artistic contexts (Doidge, 2007). The esence of ‘learning’ may be understood as an innate evolutionary tendency for living organisms  16 to adapt to new environments. Notwithstanding, from a neuroscience perspective, higher order learning represents a creative proces inherent of higher order brains, such that primates and humans posses, which may be chalenged by new sensorimotor inputs (i.e., inputs to both motor and sensory areas of the brain). Quite literaly, the brain creates neural maps acording to sensorimotor inputs since birth and is capable of changing those maps with use or disuse (i.e., new inputs) until death (Doidge, 2007). But an understanding of the brain as possesing neural plasticity from birth to death has taken science more than a century to acept as a fact (Damasio, 1999; Doidge, 2007). As such, the Taub Therapy Clinic, which practices constraint-induced movement therapy (CI), is but one example of an enabling constraint in physical contexts. Taub’s therapy has unequivocaly demonstrated that the brain may be chalenged to overcome ‘learned behavior’ due to neural disuse (e.g., paralyzed limbs, phantom limb pain, loss of speech, etc.) by changing its neural maps (Doidge, 2007). Enabling constraints, therefore, are limits that ‘force’ the brain to sek alternate pathways and must be viewed as nothing les than enabling creativity or, esentialy, the ability to learn. The second conflicting isue was in balancing the evaluative proceses that were aimed not simply toward skil asesments but also creativity. Faced with the research that had been published on criterion-referenced asesments and rubric-based evaluations, I was more than curious. My view of asesment criteria and evaluation ‘rubrics’ came strictly from competitive arenas (e.g., music and speech festivals). I saw nothing wrong with preparing students for participation in festivals, any more than preparing students for science fairs (e.g., Odyssey of the Mind). I did, however, balk somewhat at the notion that an arts program would either lean more toward competition or try to fit creative proceses and products into a ‘competitive’ framework.   17 In al honesty, evaluating creativity had always been far from simple by virtue of the fact that creativity is yet to be fully explained whether by creators or researchers. This explanatory gap exists despite six decades of exhaustive research on creativity set off by J.P. Guilford’s seminal addres whereby he stated, “the neglect of this subject by psychologists is appaling” (Guilford, 1987, p. 34). The problem with creativity is not unlike other phenomena that take place in brain proceses, such as consciousnes, reason, emotion, thought, and images. The problem is exasperated by the fact that ‘the brain’ is literaly trying to peer into ‘the brain’ to find an answer to its existence. Fortunately, advanced technologies in the past several years have achieved a level of sophistication that can truly enable us to peer inside the human brain. Therein lies some hope that studies involving creativity wil be advanced. Of course, as with the birth of any pasionate endeavor in the clasroom, the real reason came down to the fact that there had been a succesion of personal experiences in film that had led up to my new motivation and drive. And subsequent to implementing film arts, there was a succesion of experiences that arose from the clasroom that raised my curiosity and desire to investigate the phenomena I observed. In an educational seting, where it is generaly acepted that learning is dependent on meaningful connections with the ‘objects’ upon which we come into contact, it may sem unnecesary to contemplate this experiential factor further. For clearly, there is nothing very remarkable about the fact that my artistic experiences prior to entering the clasroom and after implementing arts instruction was the impetus for this current study. Certainly it would not surprise an arts educator to learn that my experiences led me to wonder in what manner we interact with film as a creative motion art that paralels areas of learning for which I sought explanatory approaches, i.e., language, music, drama, and dance. Nor would it surprise an educator, faced with countles conflicted learning theories, that I would be excited at the prospect of an instructional area that was, so to speak, ‘virgin ground.’ This new  18 ‘technologicaly’ based curriculum semed to offer the opportunity to discover pedagogical principles not yet implemented or studied, unencumbered with instructional ‘best practices.’ Nonetheles, from an educational research standpoint, personal experiences would appear to merely serve to situate the study or position the researcher’s ‘subjectivity’ within an aceptable range of the scholarly.  This factor of experience, however, requires a far deeper contemplation if we are to penetrate the problem of brain-mind-body that currently plagues educators who posses a profound interest in removing bariers to learning through general practice. Notions of experience, in fact, are as relevant to the educator as it is to the neuroscientist, since each are faced with understanding both the general and particular manner by which individuals apprehend their world. In educational circles, a particular means of knowing has engendered the notion of ‘individualized learning,’ whereas ‘best practices’ are viewed as general approaches across populations. Nonetheles, since the subjective experience is relevant to both areas of study (i.e., how an individual experiences the world directly), one could go so far as to suggest that education and neuroscience are dependent on phenomenal encounters whereby the subjective experience poses the greatest chalenge to understanding the brain-body-mind complex. The subjective experience may be characterized as particular knowledge (i.e., images, thoughts and felings) gained directly through the sensorimotor, which is dificult to ases directly through objective means (e.g., observation and testing). And what is not easily tested is not easily generalized to a population. If such a chalenge were overcome, both fields would achieve their ultimate goal, namely, to aleviate suffering by helping individuals to reach personal fulfilment and happines. Both education and neuroscience and their practices are inexorably, if unwitingly, connected by virtue of their core fascination with the development of the brain: its capacity for  19 learning and memory, as wel as its relationship with mind, body, and the ‘objects’ with which the brain comes in contact. And paradoxicaly, both fields are faced by an insoluble gap that exists betwen the ‘objective’ and rational apprehension of phenomena (i.e., facts gained through testable means) and a purely subjective experience of knowing (i.e., the subject as knower). On the one hand, from the standpoint of ‘objectivity’ (earnestly sought after in science, philosophy, or education), experience tends to be equated with the purely ‘subjective,’ which presents itself as problematic. Daniel Dennet (1991) aserts that consciousnes as subjective experience posseses four properties that present an epistemological impase, namely, (1) the inefable, which cannot be communicated; (2) the intrinsic, which exists independent of any external facts; (3) the private, which has no interpersonal means of comparison; and (4) the directly apprehensible in consciousnes, which is that one knows they are doing the knowing. Understandably, the purely subjective experience, which in philosophical circles is caled qualia and describes the subjective quality of conscious experience, poses a considerable problem for those seking a comprehensive knowledge of phenomena in light of the particulars that prove to be dificult to explain by facts of a scientific, social, or cultural nature. It is possible, for instance, to describe the experience of an entire community as perceiving the world only in hues of black and white, as Oliver Sacks (1996) recounted in his book entitled, The island of the color blind. Other facts may be added, such as the dimensions of culture that arise from this perceptual anomaly or the scientific facts with respect to perception itself. One may begin to use a range of metaphors and simulations to try to imagine what it would be like to live in a world without color, as Gary Ross’s 1998 film Pleasantvile depicted. Yet this gap betwen fact and experience is ever present with no clear means to bridge the distance betwen knowing and being, or betwen core and extended consciousnes. For the  20 educator and neuroscientist, there continues to be what Vygotsky (1962) caled a dialectic leap that has yet to be bridged. By the same token, education, philosophy, psychology, and science paradoxicaly thrive on the endles peculiarities that draw one’s atention, while simultaneously seking universal principles that fit across diverse populations. When scrutinized further, this paradox appears pricklier in light of social and cultural objects that are shared and communicated betwen humans who posses vastly diferent experiences. Few researchers would deny that the ‘objects’ we encounter in this world act on the brain’s development, save for those who are staunchly positioned as extreme ‘nativists’ and, hence, view human nature as determined by genetic or innate factors. Conversely, save for those who are extreme ‘social constructionists,’ few ould deny innate factors also prevail on the brain’s development. New evidence in the neurosciences shows that innate factors are the only explanation for certain mental dispositions observed in pre-linguistic infants. This evidence has redefined what we believed to be pre-linguistic stages of reasoning, which were once explained in the past as arising solely from environmental factors over longer periods of maturation. Through cleverly designed studies, the belief that children’s value judgments and abstract reasoning arise by socialization has been subsequently chalenged (Hamlin et al., 2007; Newman et al., 2008; vanMarle & Wynn, 2005; Wynn, 2008). That chalenge is also being made to the causes of ‘mental ilnes’ or neurological disorders, such as disturbed body images (e.g., schizophrenia, phantom limb, anorexia, etc.). What was once believed to occur solely by virtue of traumatic experiences is being revisited through new studies. The example of the ‘phantom limb’ syndrome is a case in point. One would think logicaly that the ‘phantom’ felings would have been derived by having once had a limb and, while no longer sending signals to the brain, appears to remain mysteriously ‘in the mind.’  21 Yet neurologists have discovered that this same phenomenon exists among those born without limbs. Clearly, our ‘experience’ of possesing a body is in sharp contradiction with the network of neurons that are designated to receive bodily signals if persons born without limbs are able to ‘fel’ their limbs (Damasio, 1999). Thus, those who overlook what is universaly present at one’s birth, i.e., innate to humans, as esential to the interactivity of brain-body-mind are also prone to ignore innate structures that interact relationaly with social and cultural objects. The distinction betwen what we know to be ‘universal’ or ‘particular,’ the epistemological distance betwen knowing that is ‘experiential’ versus ‘theoretical’ compounds our confusion of determining ‘innate’ versus ‘learned’ factors. Knowledge that is just beginning to come to light ought to unite the research in science, arts, philosophy, psychology, and education.  As it stands, however, there appear to be many educators who view educational maters, which focus is principaly tied to the particular in social and cultural contexts, as incompatible with the neurosciences or any ‘reductive’ view that atempts to ‘generalize’ complex systems of learning (Varma, McCandlis & Shwartz, 2008). Acording to Varma et al., despite that the mind is of interest to both the educator and neuroscientist, what makes educational research at odds with neurological research is the strongly held view that, “neuroscience methods do not provide aces to important educational considerations such as context; localizing diferent aspects of cognition to diferent brain networks does not inform educational practice” and “reductionism is inappropriate” (p. 141). Educators, of course, have made many asumptions regarding cognitive science, which began in psychology from whence developmental theory was drawn, particularly conceptualized by Piaget. Acordingly, Loris Malaguzzi (1993a), founder of the Reggio Emilia early childhood programs in Italy, put these asumptions into perspective. With a simple-minded gred, we educators have tried too often to extract from Piaget’s psychology things that he did not consider at al usable in education. He  22 would wonder what use teachers could possibly have for his theories of stages, conservation of mater, and so on.  Now we can se clearly how Piaget’s constructivism isolates the child. As a result we look criticaly at these aspects: the undervaluation of the adult’s role in promoting cognitive development; the marginal atention to social interaction and to memory, as opposed to inference; the distance interposed betwen thought and language; the lock-step linearity of development in constructivism; the way that cognitive, afective, and moral development are treated as separate, paralel tracks; the overemphasis on structured stages, egocentrism, and clasificatory skils; the lack of recognition for partial competencies; the overwhelming importance given to logicomathematical thought; and the overuse of paradigms from the biological and physical sciences (p. 76).   Those educators who have ‘overused paradigms from the biological and physical sciences’ have subsequently underestimated the contributions of neuroscience. Literature dating back to the ninetenth century ilustrates that the cognitive sciences have drawn many insights from the neurosciences (Luria, 1972, 1976, 1982; Sacks, 1971, 1973; Vygotsky, 1962). Additionaly, the notion that cognitive science contextualizes educational concerns while neuroscience is far removed from educational contexts is ilusory. Malaguzzi (1993b) is clear on this point when he stated, “Piaget warned us that a decision must be made about whether to teach schemes and structures directly or to present the child with rich problem-solving situations in which the active child learns from them in the course of exploration. The objective of education is to increase possibilities for the child to invent and discover. Words should not be used as a shortcut to knowledge” (p. 77).  What is apparent is that social science research, upon which a vast number of educational theories have come to rely, has generaly held the view that experimentation removed from clasroom contexts is not as reliable as direct observation in field studies. Finaly, the view that neuroscience practices reductionism is an unfortunate image that is wide spread among educators, which most often is directed at al scientific endeavors. A categorical dismisal of ‘reductive’ logic ignores the medical, scientific, and technological advances that have been made  23 precisely because of our ability to examine the smalest parts from the whole and relate the parts to the whole. Abstract thinking, which reduces the whole to its component parts, has largely been responsible for much of human invention. Siegfried Kracauer (1960) spoke of a “relativistic reduction” in relation to the kind of theories that have risen from the social sciences and of postmodern philosophies. As he noted, the diferences betwen one kind of reduction and another are simple a mater of degres betwen them. Along with progresive social mobility, the large scale flow of information, so greatly facilitated by the media of mas communications, makes people realize that everything can be viewed from more than one angle and that theirs is not the only way of life which has a title to recognition (p. 293).  The confusion as to what constitutes reduction from a theoretical standpoint in the social sciences is readily apparent. When one reads acounts regarding new theories in communication studies, for instance, the fundamental apprehension of what either the terms abstraction or theory sems lacking. Henry Jenkins (1999) states, “In general, the need to create theory one can use, the merger of humanities and engineering approaches, is producing a diferent style of scholarship from the more abstract theories that have dominated media studies in recent decades” (p. 241). The idea that the concept of theory can be modified by the adjective “abstract,” demonstrates a lack of precision in thinking. In any case, I could easily atribute the interest I suddenly acquired to bringing film arts into the clasroom as ariving purely by cultural and social influences, the kind articulated by countles social science theorists. I could dismis innate and universal contributions to my early atention to moving images or the manner in which my working memory was of importance to interpreting images in general. I could postulate that the birth of those experiences was solely rooted in my family’s pasion for the cinema. And that it was this pasion, which had efectively  24 provided the ground for felings of deep respect and admiration, perhaps even obsesion, for moving images at an early age. But that is not the direction I wil choose in the present thesis. Certainly neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1999) was clear in stating with respect to inducers of emotion, “regardles of the degre of biological preseting of the emotional machinery, development and culture have much to say regarding the final product” (p. 57). The cinema had been my family’s first and most important portal to North American culture and the English language upon imigrating to the Canadian West. And in efect, I am able to provide historical precedents for laying the foundation of a purely socio-cultural phenomenon that impacted my subjective, emotional viewpoint toward the cinema. Again Damasio clearly points out that these socio-cultural phenomena shape “what constitutes an adequate inducer of a given emotion” along with “aspects of the expresion of emotion” and, finaly, “the cognition and behavior which follows the deployment of emotion” (p. 57). Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, while France had a reputable and prodigious cinematic tradition of its own, the ban of American films during the war years left the French with nothing more than war propaganda films. Left also with the poorly made Hollywood imitations from Germany, there were a mere few hundred German approved French films. Al such cinematic constraints had left a gaping cultural need. Nedles to say, five years of restriction meant that the French appetite for film was primed for new images. Not able to compete with the release of hundreds of Hollywood films during the post-war years, the American cinema turned into a fevered pastime across the nation, not the least of which had afected my mother. By the time my parents had made the decision to emigrate, possibly influenced by so many images, my brothers and I had developed our palate for American images, not the least of which was due to private screnings of Hollywood films that my grandfather had obtained.  25 In terms of style and form, Hollywood films contrasted sharply with the French New Wave cinema that had risen in the wake of political and social upheaval in a post-war Europe—those ‘foreign’ films I was only able to discover as a young adult. During this period of re-growth, a critical division arose betwen those whose concern with the political standpoint of film came to view the cinema as commercialy-produced studio entertainment and those whose belief in the “camera as pen” came to view film as an auteur art. The later staunchly defended the director’s artistic vision as it was first articulated by Andre Bazin and Alexandre Astruc, encouraged through Henri Langlois’ Cinemateque Française, and later articulated in the Cahiers du Cinema by the wave of new cinephiles. As the exuberant young critics ventured into filmaking, their productions atempted to counter film’s clasic forms and manifestly shun the typical Hollywood formula. Avant-garde films by François Trufaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Éric Rohmer, Claude Chabrol, and Jacques Rivete, however, were certainly not the kind of movies my parents found aceptable for children. Despite that my mother was a true cinephile in every sense, her strict Catholic upbringing found the ‘grotesque’ realism and confusing narative highly objectionable and contrary to her core values. Additionaly, my mother had been raised on clasic cinema and after five years of wartime privation and degradation, nothing in the New Wave corresponded with her intense need to dream of ‘beter living.’ Since Disney films, alongside the Western, Comedy, Suspense, Epic, or Musical fit within clasic cinema, having then setled in Canada, my parents encouraged our wekly movie atendance. This often meant watching as many as thre to four films per wek, including at least one evening spent as a family bundled up in the car to watch double-biled movies at the local Drive-In. As a family, we were relentles in our pursuit of acquiring the language, values, and culture of our adopted nation. While the films we watched were predominantly made by  26 Hollywood, we were undisturbed by diferences that may have existed betwen the two nations. A distinction was surely present, which we began to note as an economic and political gap. But in the end, that distinction did not deter us from our cultural and linguistic mision for, in any case, it semed to us that the films closely paraleled the culture, values, and language of life in the Alberta prairies. At a young age, I was not conscious of the complexity involved in grasping the ‘foreign’ films that, naturaly enough, were shown without subtitles once we were in Canada. Many years later, however, I made a rather startling discovery regarding the complexity of filmic ‘language’ while living abroad in Costa Rica and learning to speak Spanish as an adult. Although I wil return to this discovery in more detail later in the present thesis, suffice it to say that of al the contexts in which I found myself atentive to native Spanish speakers—many in which I was proficient in understanding, including conversations, newspapers, magazines, books, television shows, and radio broadcasts—it was only in the context of films that the Spanish language eluded me entirely. Yet, an inability to apprehend the dialogue did not apparently diminish my interest in the films I watched. I was led to the thought that the ‘wordles’ naratives of those early film-going years remain so vivid in my mind, as a child I was semingly able to interpret the images sufficiently to create meaning for myself. Without question, this disparity betwen then and now has led me to wonder how my brain interpreted the images that flooded my visual and aural senses. What exactly was interpreted through the cinematic image and how did this interpretation come about? As this pasion for the cinema grew, I pursued ‘artistic’ experiences throughout my childhood and adolescence by engaging in movement and narative arts. With great pleasure, I devoted long hours to the study of dance, music, speech and theatre arts. While al of those activities may be viewed in terms of what Susanne Langer (1953) expresed as “swalowed up”  27 by film arts (p. 412), the corollary betwen movement and images did not reach understanding until many years later. In fact, this corollary did not become apparent even during my next foray into the cinema, which was largely theoretical and undertaken as a first year undergraduate enrolled in a program of Theatre and Cinematic Arts. Therein rests the distinction betwen theory and practice, it took many more years of practice as an artist to make any real sense of the theory. Of the many film and theatre courses I was enrolled in, one entailed the viewing and critiquing of a series of clasic and experimental films produced in the first half of cinematic history. Naturaly enough, those images made an indelible impresion and our discussions in clas also heightened my pleasure of watching ‘experimental’ and ‘foreign’ movies. The carefully selected films from countries around the world, writen and directed by pioneering film artists, formed the premise of our philosophical discussions and esays. I recal feling very worldly and smart, especialy when the films were in French—which always invited deeper discussions that went beyond the subtitles and visual images. Additionaly, that experience proved useful several years later in my bid for a regular FM radio spot as a film critic. In those days, I gratefuly used my radio pres pas thre to four times a wek to atend feature films without having to purchase a box office ticket. In the darkened theatre, I would blindly scribble down notes, which I would then write up as a review in the form of a radio script. The ‘script’ alowed me to expres my point of view in an inteligent manner while maintaining a conversational tone that appeared ‘ad lib.’ I was rather pleased that al those years of studying speech arts, watching movies, and thinking analyticaly on popular maters was providing a pleasurable and heady hobby (if not a future carer). Fortunately, my pathway took a diferent turn in light of the ‘impractical’ nature of being a ‘film critic’ at a time when movie critics, such as, Roger Ebert and Gene Siskel, were  28 popularizing film criticism. Recently graduated with a degre in Dance Education, I sensibly pursued further studies in the field of education that stil favored my artistic interests, al the while stil engaged in personal artistic and film outlets. Hence, upon graduating with my second degre, having stepped into the clasroom first as a kindergarten and elementary arts educator with a focus in music, then a secondary language, technology, and music educator, it was practicaly inevitable that I would take up several more film-based ventures. The first was producing and hosting a television talk show on a Calgary local cable network (1992-94), and the other was joining the Calgary Society of Independent Filmakers. While the former gave me a whole new perspective on the production of the television image and its multi-camera form, the later alowed me to explore my own filmaking interests as a director and editor, along with my acting interests, which led to being cast as lead and principal actor on several Canadian Feature films (i.e., The Unspoken, 1995; Tearful, Fearful, 1996). Both experiences inspired me to bring filmic experiences into the clasroom to develop skils in storyteling, as wel as learning to manipulate visual and sound images and symbols—al of which I reasoned were legitimate ‘educational’ ventures. Clearly, I was socialized into a filmic context from a very early age. But what was it that solicited my atention toward moving images? Was it merely the pasion of learning a new language, exposure to filmic works, the study and further pursuits of music, dance, and drama? Or was there something about moving images or images, for that mater, that primes what is uniquely human in quality and capacity? Today, I have become keenly aware of the role that movement—weight, flow, time, and space—plays in the manner in which my brain senses the world, interprets the stimuli, and reacts to sensory images. In so doing, I have become keenly aware of the importance of the movement arts acros al domains of thought. It is also clear that  29 the manner whereby images are expresed in space and time through harmonized proceses of memory, atention, and emotion, are necesary for the rise of an autobiographical self.  Acording to Damasio (1999), it is without question that “memory, inteligent inferences, and language are critical to the generation of an autobiographical self and the proces of extended consciousnes” (p. 18). As part of higher order cognition, the autobiographical self is linked traditionaly to the “idea of identity and corresponds to a nontransient collection of unique facts and ways of being which characterize a person” (p. 17). An autobiographical self, as anyone who is close to someone who suffers from a mental ilnes wil atest, is fundamental to one’s sense of welbeing. The overwhelming evidence in the neurosciences, as wel as in my own personal life, leads me to believe that our primary goal as educators is to understand and utilize every means available that help foster a healthy autobiographical self, which is also the seat of consciousnes. Nonetheles, it is not in higher order cognition wherein core consciousnes and the emergent sense of the core self is found. Rather the core self, which is a “transient entity, ceaselesly recreated for each and every object with which the brain interacts” (Damasio, 1999, p. 17) begins with the “unvarnished sense of our individual organism in the act of knowing” (p. 125). Core consciousnes, which is not unique to humans alone, “provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment—now—and about one place—here. The scope of core consciousnes is the here and now” (p. 16). Time, space, and movement are critical to core consciousnes or the sense of the core self, which in turn is critical to the emergence of both the autobiographical self and the proceses of extended consciousnes. Extended consciousnes wholly depends on images and felings as they arise over time, space and movement, which could never be arived at without core consciousnes or the innate, universal emotions (Damasio, 1999).  30 As increasing numbers of scientists, social scientists, and philosophers sek to understand consciousnes, many in the neurosciences are finding evidence of a complex brain-body-mind connection, whereby the autobiographical self, which emerges from core consciousnes, necesarily does so because of the somatic-sensory images (e.g., visual, auditory, olfactory, neural, visceral, etc.) atended to in the mind and stored in memory. While core consciousnes “is separable from other cognitive proceses,” nevertheles it exercises considerable “influence” on cognition. Remove al image-making capabilities and consciousnes would be efectively abolished “because consciousnes operates on images” (Damasio, 1999, p. 123). From this viewpoint, we may wonder how we “have a sense of self in the act of knowing” (p. 168). Damasio expounds further by submiting the following hypothesis. Core consciousnes occurs when the brain’s representation devices generate an imaged, nonverbal acount of how the organism’s own state is afected by the organism’s procesing of an object, and when this proces enhances the image of the causative object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context. The hypothesis outlines two component mechanisms: the generation of the imaged nonverbal acount of the object-organism relationship—which is the source of the sense of self in the act of knowing—and the enhancement of the images of an object (p. 169).  This framework would thus place my engagement in the movement arts, richly endowed with images, as having been instrumental in developing an autobiographical self, which in turn was key to gaining deeper insight into notions of what is an image. Clearly, the study herein, which relies heavily on the subjective and experiential, faces scholarly refutation on the basis that any personal insight wil remain particular, and lacking repeated trials, must therefore remain unconfirmed. Yet, as the widely respected neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran (2006) claimed during an interview ith Roger Bingham on The science studio, both the subjective and experiential is critical to understanding the brain-mind-body problem. Moreover, the ‘n’ of one, that is to say the analysis of ‘data’ arising from a single case, even that of an ‘autobiographical’  31 case, is inevitable in light of perplexing phenomena that have yet to be studied under repeated trials. Hence, to further understand what constitutes an image and its role in the brain-mind-body complex, it has been through the subsequent application of what I learned while teaching in a clasroom context whereby I gained important insights. Moreover, as the ground of clasroom experimentation, my own continued endeavors in filmic activities, juxtaposed with the study of science, philosophy, cognitive linguistics, cultural and film theories, to name a few, became part of the equation to arive at the sum of knowledge regarding moving images. That is to say, the knowledge of what constitutes an image ran paralel to my experiences both in and out of the clasroom, and thus became possible to theorize. Any further confirmation would naturaly depend on continued studies. Notwithstanding, I am buoyed by the startling fact that scientific discoveries have often been historicaly reliant on the ‘n’ of one, namely a single case, including that which is autobiographical (Ramachandran, 2006). In sum, my desire for consonance with subjectivity, pedagogy, and theory sent me in search of a resonant idea. This is not to say that I ventured inductively from the particular to the general, rather that the particular was analyzed by searching a wide body of knowledge and overlaying models of inferences that appeared to fit observations. The idea I was most interested in was one that would resound with my autobiography, which is a body of evidence derived from proceses and products (i.e., events and objects). This resonant idea had to be empiricaly anchored and theoreticaly balanced on the isue of both human nature and nurture relative to knowledge; to emotion, perception, and cognition; and to symbol systems, such as language, film and music. Alarmingly at first, as I examined the branches of knowledge on my way through the forest of disciplines that dotted the landscape filed with notions on film, music, language,  32 technology, and literacy education, I became overwhelmed by the tangle of competing theories. It was disconcerting that my experiences as an artist, educator, and researcher found no theoretical agrement betwen the social sciences, sciences, and arts, despite that I could sense this congruency, this harmony, in myself. For that mater, despite a metaphoric aliance and obvious connection betwen artistic modalities, there was litle cohesion betwen the arts, which also perturbed my sense of unity as a multi-disciplinary artist. It was of great relief, therefore, to eventualy come upon a body of knowledge that does not privilege nature or nurture, which resonates with my experiences and holds great potential for building a foundational rapport betwen al the areas so frequently kept separate by specialization. While there remain many unsolved riddles with respect to the nature of being human, the scientific studies that have led to hypothesizing on the brain-body-mind problem have aforded me a new perspective into my artistic and educational concerns. Embarking on this journey of knowledge and understanding, therefore, I have posed the folowing research questions. 1. How do contemporary theories in film and literacy inform an arts-based researcher in education? 2. What further insight is drawn from studies in the cognitive, social, and neurosciences?  3. How can the knowledge gained from the preceding exploration in research questions one and two, enhance our understanding of arts and literacy so that change is positively affected in classroom pedagogy?      33 CHAPTER TWO  Consciousnes begins when brains acquire the power, the simple power I must add, of teling a story without words, the story that there is a life ticking away in an organism, and that the states of the living organism, within body bounds, are continuously being altered by encounters with objects or events in its environment, or, for that matter, by thoughts and by internal adjustments of the life proces. Consciousnes emerges when this primordial story—the story of an object causally changing the state of the body—can be told using universal nonverbal vocabulary of body signals (Damasio, 1999, p. 31).  Situating the purpose, research questions, and concerns  It was near the end of a hot dry summer in the mid nineten-nineties when I had discovered that schools are wonderful repositories for historical artifacts. With just a few days before the commencement of another year of creative arts projects in a smal elementary school in Calgary, I had been rooting around in neglected storage spaces looking for a rel-to-rel film projector and audio deck. There were several notions I had hoped to put into action. First, having in my possesion several film and audio rels, I wanted to give the students an opportunity to play with and compare analogue technologies, which were near relics, with the latest image and sound digital technologies. My purpose was meant to shed light on the relationship betwen the medium and the mesage.  Before embarking on a series of projects involving new technologies, I felt I needed to connect media betwen then and now, demonstrating continuity betwen creative expresions through the use of technologies. In other words, I favored Marshal McLuhan’s view (1963) that technologies are extensions of mental proceses. In other words, their relational position with the brain-mind-body meant that al media depend on human actions dependent on mental proceses. I wanted to begin with something visibly transformed, yet familiar in its ‘objective’ (i.e., to produce images and sound). Within the range of ‘objects’ used by artists to create visual and sound images, I had wanted to draw out the relationship betwen artist and object, e.g., musician and instrument, filmaker and camera, dancer and body, etc. Without fully being able to  34 articulate my plan, looking back, it is clear that my overal objective was to observe what Damasio (1999) deemed as the “unified mental patern that brings together the object and the self” (p. 11).  Second, I wanted to explore the constructivist frameworks our school had been promoting beyond what I had done the previous year. From a pragmatic viewpoint conceived by John Dewey (1958), constructivism was viewed in our school as a student-centered, self-discovery, and direct-experience approach. While constructivism has often been asociated with social-constructivism insofar as most experiences take place in a ‘social’ sphere, we were principaly interested in the cognitive construction of meaning. We were convinced that we could isolate the ‘object’ and individual from social factors in order to gain a conceptual view of the acquisition of knowledge and skils.  The year before, I had borrowed the idea of building ‘atelier-based’ centers of learning, which are the halmark of the Reggio Emilia schools in Italy. Founded by Loris Malaguzzi, Reggio Emilia schools practice constructivist and transformative learning (Edwards, Gandini, & Forman, 1993). Not easy to define or explain fully, those terms were in proces of being unpacked in our school through dialogue and practice, such as the outcome of a succesfully implemented series of ‘ateliers’ for children aged 6 to 12. The ateliers were in-clas activities that were partly self-directed and partly apprenticed. They included, to name a few: painting and sculpting; performance and composition in music, dance, and drama; animation and creative writing; theatre construction; and puppetry. The activities ranged from ‘low tech’ (e.g., pop up books, dramatic sketches, and dioramas) to ‘high tech’ (e.g., video stop action and digital animation through the use of hypertext programs). Examples of the animation programs included, Hypercard Studio and turtle vector graphics, i.e., LOGO, originaly designed by Seymour Papert (1980).  35  Oficialy as the school music teacher, I was kept busy with school concerts, asemblies, and performances for the first half of the year. Nonetheles, I was part of a school that valued creative means for “building learner capacity, knowledge, relationships, and community,” which defined our school mision statement. As the school was filed with gifted children, knowledgeable teachers, and profesional parents ranging from sciences to arts, I had envisioned the ateliers as the ideal ‘living’ laboratory for observing an ensemble of artistic and intelectual practices operating on multiple levels of abilities and interests. The ateliers were succesful and although I was able to document much of the proces, I was far from understanding how to analyze the disparate ‘data,’ much les synthesize the work that had transpired. For as Alfred North Whitehead (1938) expresed, “We experience more than we can analyze. For we experience the universe, and we analyze in our consciousnes a minute selection of its details” (p. 121). Nonetheles, the ‘laboratory’ laid the foundation for another project that appeared to me to hold a more ‘unifying’ objective among participants, namely, the art of film production.   Teaching film arts in the clasroom was not unfamiliar to me, as I had previously introduced a documentary film odule to inner-city youth in a middle school. In large part due to being an active member of The Calgary Society of Independent Filmakers (CSIF) and the age of my students, I had been able to borrow sophisticated equipment from the generous support of CSIF for a short lapse of time. The situation difered at University Elementary School (renamed University School in 2007). The school had purchased sufficient equipment for geting a ‘film’ project off the ground. This included: thre S-VHS cameras and tripods, a bank of Macintosh computers with arts-based software programs (Avid Cinema and Adobe Premier), a piano synthesizer that connected via MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) and computer music software, along with the latest in digital photography. With the school so equipped, it was plain that I had ample technologies to engage upper elementary students betwen the ages of 9  36 and 12. Having already managed such a complex multidisciplinary setup the previous year, I could already envision grouping the children into film teams that would alow me to addres diferences in learning by staggering the stages of activities. This was because filmaking naturaly lends itself to multi-stage learning due to the interdisciplinary and independent needs of production.  Importantly, we plunged into a ‘new knowledge economy’ implementing al of the latest technologies with our school’s entry into virtual learning (i.e., the Internet), following Tim Berners-Le’s invention of HTP (hypertext transfer protocol), HTML (hypertext mark-up language) and WW (World Wide Web). To situate the school in this new economy further, the new project I had envisioned came merely two years after the development of some major on-line innovations. For instance, in 1995 web pages were dynamicaly represented with font, type, and layout styles (i.e., CS or cascading style sheets), which included graphics and icons. The web design language HTML 2.0, as it was caled, merged with photo protocols set out by the Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG), which being part of the ISO (International Standards Organization) enabled photographs to be imbedded into web pages.  The upshot of al those changes to the Internet was that web pages could now support full-blown JPEG images. This new event had us staring with delight and anticipation at the computer scren as colorful photographic images slowly crept into view. It gave us the feling of watching an image emerge from its chemical bath or Polaroid sensitive paper as the image arose from blured pixilated squares to a focused and clear representation, which semed to ‘materialize’ from a ghostly realm into the tangible. The new digital photographic images were more colorful and ‘sophisticated’ in imagery than the ‘geometric’ vector graphics inherent of computer programs to date. Moreover, the photographs could also be printed (albeit with poorer quality than when printed from film negatives due to the low quality printers and papers), which  37 made the whole set-up sem like a veritable ‘do-it-yourself’ photo print shop. Despite that we stil did not posses digital video cameras, the change that most afected us was the fact that moving images could be transfered from analogue to digital and back again. We were also on our way to ‘do-it-yourself’ film production and distribution. A deeper look into the school’s philosophy and the questions it raised  The administration and teaching staf at University (Elementary) School were part of a historical visionary educational project (the school having been inaugurated in 1968 as a ‘laboratory’ of learning for pre-service teachers and postgraduate researchers). For this reason, most of the teachers were in possesion of a postgraduate degre and actively involved in research. The driving philosophies of our school were mostly gleaned from learning theories in the cognitive sciences, such as the stage theories of Piaget, multiple inteligence theory from the work of Howard Gardner (1983), but also postmodern curriculum theories as proposed by Wiliam Doll (1993). By and large, these theories were rooted in the cognitive and aimed toward pushing intelectual boundaries. The only theories I recal that were mising from our staf discussions were social and cultural theories, e.g., critical theory, gender and feminist theories, etc.  Thus, curriculum and pedagogy was made up of a system of complex concepts arising from the latest findings in educational research. The practical realization of some of the theoretical frameworks included multi-aged groupings, i.e., placing students in family groupings combining thre grades into one clas; team teaching; creative arts applications across multiple subject areas; and collaborative, negotiated, and generative curriculum. The later invited students and parents to participate in curriculum development through large town hal metings. There was also a focus on what we believed to be transformative learning, which included many concepts drawn from postmodern curriculum theory (Doll, 1989; Pinar, 1995), some of which  38 had been gleaned from mathematics and physics, such as theories of chaos and complexity. In addition, our administrators brought forward studies in brain research that gave us a ‘picture’ of the mental operations of the cerebral cortices, i.e., ‘higher order thinking.’ In esence, the school was awash in some of the most curent educational theories in an established laboratory seting that looked principaly at cognition.  In preparation for the six-month unit of study, therefore, I was eager to test some of the many theories that drove our discussions. With transformative and constructivist learning in mind, the objective was first to explore and play with the new technologies, to view and critique many video images, to deliberate on varied film techniques and then to create short naratives that explored a topic students were studying in other subject areas. With a dedicated view of cognitive sciences, the teaching staf placed a strong focus on the conceptual and high-order thinking (i.e., the analytical, synthetic and evaluative). General concepts, we euphemisticaly caled ‘big ideas,’ were viewed as ‘mind-expanding’ tools that alowed one to build intelectual capacity because of the factor of connectivity with diverse notions, topics, subjects, and ideas. The transformational learning would come through multi-disciplinary activities infused with creative applications that brought individual and ‘objects’ into close encounters.  By bringing universal concepts and particular ‘objects’ together, we hypothesized that learners would bridge knowledge and skils that would bring rational meaning to the whole. By rational I am refering solely to conceptual proceses because nowhere in our discussions did we center on emotional and social aspects directly. Instead, the two were viewed as ‘by-products’ of a richly endowed intelectual environment with ‘social’ frameworks. Naturaly, the ‘mising’ discourse prevented us from probing deeper into socio-cultural or emotional aspects on the whole. Notwithstanding, given some of the deep emotionaly laden conflicts that arose betwen staf members and also betwen staf members and parents in relation to the implementation of  39 some approaches, the question was raised whether it was sufficient to focus entirely on cognitive development. The concerns that were heatedly expresed inevitably forced me to ponder on such maters. A surprising find: The puzling field of film literacy After some time rummaging in the school’s storage spaces, I finaly found a 16mm rel-to-rel film projector and, to my surprise, a box of old newspaper clippings, several 35mm film rels, and a folder of teacher notes. The yelowed clippings were from the mid-seventies and informed me that a teacher had once boldly introduced our school to cinematic arts. I was impresed, to say the least. While I had found a hobby out of making short films with a Super 8 camera or video whenever summer rolled around, 35mm film projects semed that much more sophisticated (not to mention expensive to operate, purchase, and print). Moreover, one of the articles applauded the educational initiative taken to introduce Alberta students to a new film curriculum, joining the active British Columbia school districts. It was not surprising that BC had already launched a film curriculum in schools since it was third in line as film Meca in the Canadian film industry (behind Ontario and Quebec). Encouraged by the teacher’s mention of several useful filmaking books (including several from BC), I was fortunate to track these down in our school library, where they had been tucked away under communication arts. The books gave a general overview of filmaking and, in themselves, were historicaly interestingly. Mostly, they contained the techniques and approaches to filming, lighting, editing, and sound, as wel as photographic setings, film handling, printing, and projection, not unlike the commercial and highly technical step-by-step video production books then in curent use. As the later texts would become (now having been updated to acommodate ‘digital’ video production and projection), the former technical concepts outlined in the film texts were generaly outmoded by our latest technologies—as were the ‘teaching’ approaches that  40 acompanied the concepts and techniques. In truth, they were not manuals or even textbooks so much as dictionaries filed with terms and definitions. Several books were of particular interest as these were writen for children and contained a few photographic principles that had been a staple throughout cinematic history—and likely to remain (Listone & McIntosh, 1970; Lowndes, 1968). Such things as camera angles, panning and zooming, lighting for mood, and other types of comon film elements were explained with ilustrations. Sound engineering also had a role, which was useful to me since I wished to continue activities using MIDI in my music clasroom. Naturaly enough, like most instructional texts on the arts (as Aristotle famously showed), the children’s books were focused on the technical and practical, giving litle notion of the poetics of film arts. Heartened by the fact that there was some mention of the artistic connections to traditional art expresions the children already had experienced, especialy photography, I seized the opportunity for designing integrated learning. Connections to traditional forms of expresion were of particular significance to me, first because it fit with our school mision statement: collaborative learning that is interconnected, interdependent and generative. But more importantly, as a multi-disciplinary artist, the framework fit with my personal experiences in the arts. Finaly, some books mentioned the “above-the-line” specialties in film—actor, director, photographer, and editor—which glamour inevitably outweighed the “below-the-line” specialties (such as, lighting and sound engineers, set design and decorators, costumers, continuity person, script manager, etc.). I remember feling that this view tends to skew filmaking as the providence of a talented few rather than the intentioned, thoughtful eforts of many. In this sense, I was prepared to broaden the bias toward ‘artistry’ in general. Not only would filmaking exemplify collaborative work, but also demonstrate the capacity to bring together a shared  41 vision, diverse abilities, and purpose in a community of teaching and learning. Moreover, tucked in the back of my mind, I had retained the notion that filmaking was an auteur art (not unlike creative writing). This notion was based more on my filmaking experiences than film theories that would later cross my path. In the majority of instances, since the films I had produced I had also writen, directed and edited, I was biased toward seing myself as having authored the works. Despite the limitations of the teaching aids and scant notes that acompanied the film texts, I was humbled to learn that my “innovative” filmaking venture (as it was later acknowledged by the Canadian Teacher’s Federation) had an enterprising teacher pioneer design a unit of film study some twenty years before me in the same space. I remember thinking, “What coincidence! Could he have been a kindred spirit?” I also remember thinking how enjoyable it would be to interview him, or any students, now adults, to cull their memory of such a unique experience. Undertaking my film project had appeared to me as a new ay of learning, of seing the world, of generating and constructing one’s own knowledge, of understanding self and the world. I realized, however, that those images had simply come ful circle some twenty years later. I also realized that this intrepid teacher and his students had felt the spark of creativity not unlike the “Langley Schools Music Project” (1976-77). I imagined that those educators viewed their projects as giving birth to a new curriculum and pedagogy. Though I was unable to locate him, his phantom presence prodded my nascent film curriculum. What I have slowly come to understand fiften years later is that phantoms had been haunting our school long before the twenty-year gap betwen our two units of study began. Some of those phantoms had been partly responsible for a short-lived film curiculum that had been introduced in our school, despite that the news article had lauded it as being a step toward a ‘new literacy.’ This idea of a new literacy (though I was not clear what that meant precisely) was my  42 general intent toward constructing such a project in the first place. Naturaly, I was surprised to se that betwen then and now, its presence had vanished for such a long period of time. For a brief instant, that vanishing made me hesitate. As an artist, tucked in the back of my mind lived the notion of ‘legacy.’ A sense that what we as artists do wil leave a lasting footprint on culture and society, not necesarily out of a sense of achieving ‘imortality’ (even if this factors for many) but out of a sense of causing an ‘evolution’ of thought that would shift society ever closer to ‘higher consciousnes.’ Generaly speaking, it is safe to say that al educators think of their work as a form of legacy to the next generation. And as an arts educator, therefore, my notion of ‘legacy’ was founded in the ‘transformational’ outcome of learning in and through the arts. I held firmly to the feling that arts education as a form of ‘literacy education’ was an emancipation project, which I had interpreted as a means of knowing acquired so thoroughly as to be a way of knowing that would alow one to counter ‘dominant’ voices in whatever form they arose. For me, the arts were another kind of ‘language’ that certainly required an ability to ‘decode’ and ‘encode’ artistic works (i.e., knowledge and skils). By its thorough learning and application, the arts gave one the liberty to choose a way of thought or action no les than by the writen language.  This view of arts education was heavily influenced by my discovery of the philosophical writings of Eliot Eisner (1997), Maxine Gren (1995), and Langer (1942). But their philosophical views on arts education would not have resonated quite as strongly if I had not been struck from an early age with literature that impacted on my understanding of social justice, such as the writing of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry and works by Dickens, Dostoevsky, Molière, Soljenitsin, Steinbeck and Shakespeare. In addition to literature, I was also drawn to artists who had pionered an art form in an act directed against the tyranny of social or academic views, such as Bethoven, Isadora Duncan (pioneer of American modern dance), Charles Chaplin, and  43 Stanislavski. It is dificult to pinpoint where my felings toward the arts as an artist and arts educator began and ended as the two were embroiled in a common sentiment. I was thus faced with a dilema with respect to the ‘legacy’ I imagined could ensue from such a project. My experience in teaching music, drama, and dance in the schooling system had led me to sense that as far as ‘literacy’ was understood, it was drama that held a position of merit among language educators. It is not hard to understand this place of privilege since writen and spoken language go hand in hand with clasic theatre. And while ‘notation’ has held importance in music, this form of ‘literacy’ was easily confused with a mathematical symbol system, a subject that came second to language. Dance, of course, is the most ephemeral of the thre since its form is ‘mute’ and without notation (save for the short-lived Laban notation, film has been the only means of preserving and archiving dance). For these reasons, I focused on creative drama to beter articulate with notions of literacy being explored in schools. Hence, student projects tended toward combining drama and music or drama and dance. The fact that drama and language arts education were thoroughly entwined, as my own Canadian schooling experience told me, it semed natural that drama was a pivotal art form for arts educators interested in isues of literacy. As far as I was concerned, film and drama were so closely afiliated through language that I saw no reason why film education would not become a subject as thoroughly entrenched as drama. Naturaly, my thought was that I could ‘bootstrap’ music and dance as part of the ‘package’ of arts employed in film. But evidently that was not the case. With only a subjective experience as my means of measurement, I had no theoretical means by which to bring music and dance into the discourse on language and literacy education any more than film arts. Dance, music, or physical education, for al intents and purpose, were fleting ‘movement-time’ arts, unable to match the conceptual sophistication of thought that comes from language itself in the  44 act of reading and writing. That said, film appeared to have al the elements of a ‘writen text,’ and semed the likeliest to enter the realm of the conceptual sophistication of thought. Why had film not reached this status in an educational seting?  This nagging question semed to bring up the worry of offering a subject that caried no lasting societal value. With a hollow feling, arts education semed to echo the fleting, ephemeral traces of art proceses that momentarily brightens the lives of the indiferent, the bored, or the down and out (i.e., art therapy). Worse stil, following a backlash on the politicization of the arts as cultural transmiter or form of ‘critical pedagogy,’ many arts educators resorted to saying, “Enough! Let’s do arts for arts sake.” As sympathetic as I have been to art therapies or the cry of “arts for arts sake,” those avenues did not open the door to intelectual participation in a literacy movement that we al felt gaining momentum since the word “literacy” was first coined in 1883, acording to the Oxford English Dictionary. Having just crawled out from under Reagan’s educational “Back to Basics” policies, which afected us in Canada as much as in the United States, I longed for a new theoretical foundation of artistic experiences. To some, it would appear that the arts in education are of nature aesthetic, cultural, and social, operating wholly within a semiotic framework. As important as that framework may be to understand a part of the arts, a semiotic framework is said to operate at odds with cognitive and neuroscience theoretical frameworks (Petric, 2001). In the tension, therefore, betwen semiotics and cognitive science, we end up with an ongoing nature versus nurture argument that may not advance our understanding of the whole of arts, why we do art, or how the arts are equaly important to language as “alternate forms of representation” (Eisner, 1997). For my own sense of self-worth, the answer to those questions was an imperative. My entire concept of self was wrapped up in a lifetime invested in the study of performing arts, which deeply connected to my  45 conceptual understandings of multiple subject areas, alongside agency and democracy. Any theoretical gap distanced the ‘importance of things felt’ from ‘the mater-of-fact.’ I had no desire to follow schools of thought in music or dance that tried to force a pre-de Saussurean semantic view of sound and movement that fit into a linguistic paradigm “concerned with the diachronic study of the signified” (Colin, 1995, p. 103). That is to say, the meaning of language was dependent entirely on temporal contexts. On the other hand, I was not quite ready to embrace de Saussurean semiotics either, i.e., language as a formal system independent of the temporal-spatial production and comprehension. No mater what my mental proceses consisted of, I was not ready to acept that a mode or a gesture had conceptual and definitional meaning any more than a color or ink blot; neither was I ready to acept that sound and gesture are mere social signifiers that ‘point’ us toward meanings that are purely contextual. In search of more than socio-cultural meanings, it was natural to want to turn to cognitive sciences. Of course, the desire or need to tap into the cognitive aspect of the arts, flies directly into a wal of defense as an atack on the aesthetic or the ephemeral. As a dancer, I would be disingenuous if I pretended to dance to enrich my mind. I dance for joy and as far as I can tel, Whitehead (1938) was one of the rare philosophers who counted “joy” as having importance and an end onto itself. Joy is diferent from pleasure—I fel that too when I dance as I also fel my muscles aching and burning, which has often placed dancers, especialy balet dancers, in the strange realm of enjoying ‘pain’. Joy is a feling of elation that lingers for many days or years without regret. If there were ever a perfectly good reason to exist, I believe it would be to fel joy. And as someone whose first object in life was to dance, it is possible that this lasting feling of joy that I have felt my entire life when dancing (especialy balet) may have come partly as a result of the nature of movement and partly as a result of a fascination with movement. Now the question raised was: what is movement?  46 The fact remains that the arts have only tended toward explorations of aesthetic, cultural, psychological, sociological, pragmatic, and semiotic, whereby the arts are deconstructed through isolating their parts into single frames in order to render meaning from a rational viewpoint. That is to say, the whole is rarely taken into consideration particularly with regard to movement, which plays an esential role in film, dance, and music. The study of movement is complex due to the corollary of changes in time and space, which change necesitates a comprehension of forces (as motives and intent) and the ensuing efects. And although the study of society and culture also undertakes the study of historical movements, given our short life span, we are continuously reduced to looking at ‘moments in time and space.’ In a film context, analysis consists of looking at stil frames rather than the psychic integrity of movement. There is absolutely nothing wrong with studying the arts as moments in time and space, just as there is nothing inherently wrong with studying the arts from rational frameworks. But it is clear that al such views are partial. To move toward a fuller understanding, the arts must be examined beyond rational theories and must include the study of emotions without solely relying on cognitive, social, and psychological theories that have tended toward ‘rational’ acounts of emotional phenomena (Damasio, 1999; Kivy, 1997; Plantinga & Smith, 1999; Smith, 2003). Esentialy, in our preoccupations with mind, we had been primarily focused on the media that alow analyses and critical capacity (i.e., clarity of thought). Thus we had acknowledged the media of language, technology, and arts, but each with their own particular means. We were able to describe, define, categorize, order and identify systemic rules of varied media. We could compare the mind’s proceses to machines and information procesing (i.e., input, output, storage, and logic). Thus we are able to mechanize systems that are the ‘medium’ of thought, as easily as we have mechanized the system that is thought, as Descartes did so efortlesly.  47 But to understand the medium that is thought, not as machine but as an organism, which is also separate from language, technology and arts, is as dificult to tease away from the later as it is to tease brain from body or body from mind. What was mising is what Whitehead (1938) eloquently expresed, “There is no such independent item in actuality as ‘mere concept.’ The concept is always clothed with emotion, that is to say, with hope or fear, or with hatred, or with eager aspiration, or with the pleasure of analysis” (p. 167). Poetry, of course, demands that we consider humans holisticaly and that we do not tease such things apart, as can be noted in the words of Wiliam Butler Yeats. Labour is blossoming or dancing where The body is not bruised to pleasure soul. Nor beauty born out of its own despair, Nor blear-eyed wisdom out of midnight oil. O chestnut-tre, great-rooted blossomer, Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole? O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, How can we know the dancer from the dance?   Indeed, as a dancer I want to imerse, nay lose myself, in the emotional content of movement filed with joy, fear, anger, sadnes, and surprise. It sems like a mean and picky thing to anyone with a deep devotion and sensitivity to aesthetics or to the emotional content of the arts, to try to tease apart the poetics of art from the artist. But herein are we at a loss as arts educators to explain what we know in body and soul. Yet, it semed to me that to understand artistry, as a measure of both thought and emotion, clarity must be sought after. As I pondered semiotics, for instance, I wondered how one could speak of signification that is aesthetic, psychological, social, cultural, and pragmatic—al of which is atached to emotion—without giving some atention to the brain that is the medium that leads to thought or rather, as Damasio (1999) points out, to images. It could very wel be that images, upon which we create meaning, are deeply connected to emotions, which meaning is ‘motion outward,’ in the same manner as language (Pinker, 2008).  48 Borrowing David Rodowick’s (2008) thoughts on the study of film and cinema, the movement arts (i.e., dance, film, music) have suffered from particular investigations as “a rather vulgar philosophical empiricism,” and whatever was gained, “in their signifying proceses and in their social and historical contexts…lost a possible knowledge of a generalizable theory” (p. 388). Then again “in an efort to become more scientific, theory risks, sadly, becoming more conservative and reductionist” (p. 389). From the preceding perspective on film theory, it is dificult to not fel a win-loss polemic. But I did not believe that the root of the problem to understanding movement arts (especialy film) was due to competing theories. I saw the root of the problem beginning with the limited manner in which movement arts are studied as stil and lifeles structures, with parts possesing so many ‘signifiers’ that the whole could be thought to be understood solely by its parts. This clas of signifiers, by Rodowick’s (2008) acount, is a “codified system that nonetheles escapes notation” and are thus aligned with Metz’ description of film, namely, “an imaginary signifier.” Since on a philosophical level, the notation of any movement art is more or les ‘imaginary’ (including music), it is the “experience of the imaginary signifier [that] is something of a psychological constant” (p. 389). Put another way, the movement arts (which include spoken word) are thought to difer from writen language by virtue of their ‘ephemeral’ qualities and must be experienced to be known, that is to say experienced in time and space to be felt as ‘real.’ It is the quality of ‘uterances’ as ‘images’ in sound, film, and dance forms, which we can speak of as qualia, a term philosophers use to describe the purely subjective experience of a thing (e.g., the rednes of red). Confusingly, the arts also alow some codification and standardization that continualy bumps up against the problem of knowing a priori solely by  49 notational or representational means. This is especialy true of language, but is also true of al the arts. How does one explain a purely subjective experience to one who claims to know by means of rational thought? Short of finding a means to resolve this paradox, one has a feling that a view of film as the ‘imaginary signifier’ suffers from a fullnes of understanding of what constitutes an image, whether sound, visual, kinetic, haptic (i.e., touch), or visceral. However one chooses to understand what is an ‘image,’ we are also faced with the problem of understanding ‘representation,’ and ontologicaly speaking that ultimately leads us back to the problem of ’Reality.’ While many images drifted through my mind as I pondered film education, I could not help but sense the phantoms that haunted my elementary school—and more precisely haunt the hals of al institutions of learning. Their traces remain as the memories of those who lived and experienced, observed and thought, invented and experimented and, finaly, wrote and imortalized. We appear haunted by so many images that arise by poetic means, yet most often imortalized by words. Artistic artifacts that remain (the film rel left behind by the teacher, which I was never able to view since I lacked a 35m film projector) are mostly made ‘meaningful’ by the writen word that ‘fils in’ what has gone mising (the time, the culture, the artist’s intent). Without words to acompany the presence of artistic artifacts, it is al too easy for those images to simply vanish from insight. Of course, one could say as much about literature. What would remain of literature without the endles writen reviews, musings, and critiques? What of film, I wondered. Does it not also posses al the qualities of imortalizing ideas? Finaly, why has education conflated al digital activity as the seat of learning in such a short historical period of time whereas film and arts education broadly speaking, despite their longevity, have not enjoyed such a seat at the table of educational basics? Why has educational research focused so  50 much atention on the one but not the other? The only way I could begin to unravel those mysteries was to take stock of education’s film history. Surveying the situation in education When surveying film in education, what became clear from the outset was the fact that there were complex histories of film research that emerged from diverse disciplines of thought. First, because of a lack of specialization in film curiculum and pedagogy, educational film research has periodicaly risen in domains with interest in language, literacy, communication, media, sociology, psychology and policy. This aspect of cross-disciplinary action in film educational research has blurred the boundaries of the study of film as a whole. In other words, there has been no central framework that would be considered the hub of research activity on film in schools of education (i.e., Faculties of Education). Second, independent of the schools of education, which focus has been principaly directed toward public education at large, there exists a complex history of film studies within universities. Some of the research has been and continues to be centralized in Faculties of Film, and others are found under the broader umbrela of Liberal Arts or Communication Studies (the later having the most influence in education). Film research, therefore, is as widely distributed across multi-disciplinary areas in the whole of universities as educational film research is distributed across faculties of education. Interestingly, there have been many more educational researchers who have embraced some of the field theories and methods established in the disciplines of film studies rather than the other way around. While it is possible there are some who have penetrated this barier, I did not come across educational film theorists, cited or otherwise, within a large body of research situated solely in academic film journals. Third, both educational film research and contemporary film studies have drawn their theoretical and methodological frameworks from broader fields of study in philosophy,  51 linguistics, psychology, and sociology (Caseti, 1999). Thus it was clear from the start that a rather daunting task laid before me with respect to reviewing salient literature and drawing out a cogent critique that has impact within arts educational concerns. As the worlds of research unfolded like Russian nesting dolls, each one profoundly miroring the other, the entire universe began to look like Charlie Kaufman’s 2008 film Synecdoche – a film that visualy portrayed a smal theatre, within a larger theatre, within the theatre of life. The film tried to render a view of chaos and complexity but its mirored portraits is perhaps why it was not entirely succesful among al critics. I discovered, however, a useful metaphor to help ilustrate this chaotic and complex network of research activities. A pithy explanation of the emergence and evolution of the field of film scholarship by scholar Francesco Caseti (1999) has broad applications. From amateur interest to specialization to internationalization, Caseti’s description of film study from start to present is exceptionaly useful to explain the emergence and evolution of any new field of study. Generaly speaking, at the beginning of emergent fields of research, borowing an idea from Bakhtin (1981), we find a “carnival” of people engaged in the discovery of new onders after a point of rupture from an ‘ordered’ world “marking the entry into the field of a new paradigm,” (Caseti, 1999, p. 55). Furthermore, with respect to this cinematic ‘carnival,’ Caseti points out, “the debate about the new medium appeared to be open to anyone” (p. 8). True to form, a review of early film literature reveals that contributors to the ‘new’ field of film came from diverse backgrounds. From journalists to artists, from social critics to philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and scientists, contributions to film ‘theory’ included such luminaries as Freud, Bergson, Adorno, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Barthes, Hugo Münsterberg, Rudolf Arnheim (who coined the term, 7th art), Béla Belázs (libretist for musician Zoltán Kodály), and Siegfried Kracauer (who worked alongside Walter Benjamin).  52 From those early strivings to explain film, one can begin to surmise what set of the ‘carnival’ of thought. The rupture of the ordered and ‘flawles’ transition betwen what was then and what is now, as McLuhan (1963, 1967) tried to explain, comes about when an artifact shifts from the ‘background’ to the ‘foreground’ of atention (e.g., motion photography). This change of focus renders a feling of rupture in continuous space-time. When introduced into society, an ‘object’ or artifact that alters the flow of movement that has, up to that point, been sensed as a constant wil inevitably dramaticaly alter the way people fel and think. This phenomenon is most often experienced in a music context. In the case of motion photography, a new ‘miror’ on the world shifted the images that are were mere “movies-in-the brain,” as Damasio (1999) described the workings of the mind to a visibly external ‘reality.’ In other words, when moving ‘images’ past and present are split apart, largely due to the introduction of a new medium, a subjective sense of continuity is no longer sewed together seamlesly. As a phenomenon shifts from novelty to a cultural staple (in the case of cinema, widely acepted as an art form), “theory was no longer produced by private clubs, animated by enthusiastic amateurs, but research groups and presure groups that became the meting point of profesionals working in the field…there were no longer only film schools, but universities” (p. 8). As the ‘products’ of innovation gain momentum, new governing agents begin to shape policies and economies. This rite of pasage is apparent in the histories of arts and sciences in general. In the case of film arts, governing sectors evolved to overse artists, production, and distribution of ‘goods and services’ (e.g., studio systems and national film boards). In film studies, those who gained theoretical authority included university film faculties, a few exceptional film centers of high repute, and various journals or film agazines that regularly published scholarly works. The political and economic developments involving film works,  53 while appearing tangential to the intelectual forces, are critical, yet often overlooked by those unfamiliar with the terain. Although this particular aspect of film arts merits greater atention in light of the impact of political and economic forces on consumers, researchers, and the artists themselves, there is not enough space to provide a detailed acount herein. At any rate, betwen widespread aceptance and the rite of pasage from carnival to academy, there is a move toward specialization. Specialization, acording to Caseti (1999), operates on “thre diferent levels” (p. 8). First, there is the “separation betwen theoretical and ordinary language,” which, for the most part creates a necesary step betwen ‘amateur’ and ‘expert.’ Caseti elaborates that in film study, “We moved from a common lexicon, scarcely marked by any technical terms, to a real jargon, full of words that defy imediate decoding, at least some of which were borowed from other fields” (p. 8). In the new scholarship of film study, lingo was necesary to distinguish the new discipline of “filmology,” acording to Caseti, by “explicitly proposing a new vocabulary (filmofanic, profilmic, diegetic, etc.), just as semiotics and psychoanalysis would become exemplary in the 1960s and 1970s by tending toward private lexemes (syntamagtic, icon, suture, etc.)” (p. 9). As with any field (academic or otherwise), either in its initial stage of development or in its projects of renewal (which we also cal ‘reforms’), a new lexicon is very nearly a rite of pasage. As many who enter the field of education have discovered, learning educational jargon is the dificult first step in becoming a bona fide teacher or educational researcher. Next, there is “a separation betwen theory and criticism” (Caseti, 1999, p. 9). Betwen those who systematize and those who interpret and, rather than “a mutualy enriching interchange that makes theory into a sort of conscience of criticism, we observe an increasing mutual indiference. The categories by one group do not rely imediately on the discourse by the other” (p. 9). In fact, this systemization was discussed at length in the works of Whitehead  54 (1938) in relation to philosophy, mathematics, and science. Thus, much as it has occurred throughout the history of intelectual works, the debate that ought to lead to a “conscience of criticism,” merely entreats a debacle emphasizing the distance betwen experts rather than the proximity of a “mutualy enriching interchange” (Caseti, 1999, p. 9). And finaly arives the moment al practitioners, from one end of the knowledge spectrum to the other, are made sharply and painfully aware, “there is a separation betwen theory and practice” (p. 9).  Whether in the fields of arts or education, the mutuality of practitioner-scholar disappears. Even arts based researchers are forced to disown the very art proceses and products that led them to the academy in the first place (except when those are dresed up as scholarly). To use Caseti’s words in comparing film arts to pedagogical arts, “the critic” (i.e., scholar) is “both a mentor and a prophet,” while “the filmaker” (i.e., practitioner) is “in the guise of a witnes and explorer” (p. 9). And just as it is so often the case betwen teacher-practitioner and educator-scholar, “in their place appears a theatre of incommunicability in which the theorists dream” of an educational system (i.e., cinema) that “does not exist, and yet continues to be proposed,” while the practitioners (i.e., filmakers) make the clasrooms (i.e., films) they “want or are able to make, not paying much heed to the suggestions they are given” (p. 9).  Making maters more complex, whereas prototypal forms created at a local level may be studied with confidence due to smal and undiluted concentrations (feling some control over the narow ‘influences’), as soon as local forms are acepted and specialized, they enter international teritories. In the 21st century, the speed of globalization (i.e., internationalization) has reached unprecedented velocities. Once internationalized, there is at a point of ‘saturation,’ when forms (old and new) become an indistinguishable blur as these begin to mingle, meld, blend, hybridize, merge, fuse, infuse, overlap, and mix. The study of subjects, be they music, film, education or otherwise, is open to a much, much larger field of specialized operation, which generaly invites  55 analytical and scientific methods that bring order from chaos. Yet, with so many fields of study now blanketing the world, one begins to wonder, just how many particulars can a limited world ponder and generate? More precisely, how many particulars are needed to find a patern of general understanding? As the preceding section demonstrates in its analogous and metaphoric description, one is able to survey the landscape due to dynamic images. In this case, it is the history of fields of knowledge (i.e., disciplines) that move from an ambiguity of practice (the amateur, the carnival) toward methods of description and explanation (the expert, the academy). Studies in cognitive science suggest that our linguistic faculty, which in addition to expresing events, action and states of being, saturates language with “implicit metaphors like events are objects and time is space,” which is linked to our conceptual faculty’s “ability to frame an event in alternative ways” (Pinker, 2007, p. 4, 6). So aside from depicting movements of history, Pinker also brings us face to face with a troubling question: “[If] language is supposed to give us a way to communicate who did what to whom, how can it ever do that if two people can look at the same event and make diferent asignments of the who, the what, and the whom?” (p. 52). Clearly my reading of Caseti’s historical acount of film studies presented itself as analogous to the fields of knowledge and practice with which I have been engaged, not the least of which is arts education. The capacity that we have as human beings to look at events (or objects) in diferent frameworks demonstrates a “cognitive flexibility,” which acording to Pinker, “is in many ways a blesing.” Nonetheles, Pinker also points out that “in figuring out how language works, it is something of a curse” (p. 52). The same ‘curse’ may be said of film arts. Profesor James R. Elkin, from the College of Law at West Virginia University, who teaches a course on the interpretation and critique of ‘lawyer films’ posted on his course website, under a section on film theory, an esay by PhD candidate, Stephen Rowley (2008) entitled, Is  56 film theory bullshit? The esay starts by positing a dilema frequently encountered with al beginning undergraduates critiquing films, namely, how to respond to those who view the ‘interpretation’ of films as a type of ‘fre-for-al’ whereby films may be made to “mean anything.” In my view, the answer to this dilema does not rest upon the curse of cognitive flexibility as Pinker (2007) eloquently describes. Rather the solution rests in examining the cause of cognitive flexibility. To know that we are capable of “flipping the frame,” as Pinker suggests, such as shifting from seing the ‘old lady or young lady’ in this and other famous dual-perceptual images, is one thing. To understand why we are able to flip the frame, why we are able to ‘se’ things in multiple perspectives, is another. To bring further insight into our human capacity for cognitive flexibility, therefore, one may begin with an acount of historical events. In the reteling of such histories, a patern emerges that points toward a human capacity not yet fully explained in cognitive and social sciences. In other words, the following, which traces the historical acounts of contemporary theories in film and literacy education, brings us closer to understanding the events and wil demonstrate upon inspection that they are rife with contradictory theories. Motion pictures: The event that changed the world It would thus appear to have been seventy-five years after its invention that film production had veritably burst into school curriculum (Listone & McIntosh, 1970). Geler and Kula (1969), for instance, who cited a survey conducted by the American Film Institute (AFI), explained that “the incredible growth of film is sen not only on the university level” where it was “discovered that 5,300 students are now preparing for a carer in film production, film scholarship, or film teaching” but also “within some 22,000 U.S. secondary and elementary  57 school systems” where “there is an increasing interest and activity centered on film that literaly boggles the mind” (p. 98).  To which the authors adjoin, “the stacks of mail ariving at AFI daily announcing new film programs and requesting film aterials and recommendations lend additional proof, if any is needed, that film is in” (p. 98). Notwithstanding Geler & Kula’s exuberance, as English teacher Eleanor Child (1939) atested, it was as early as 1937 whereby an NCTE (National Council of Teachers of English) survey showed that making films had become a means of “making school work more vital, practical, and appealing” (p. 706). And in her article, Child went on to explain the practicalities for beginning a production program in the school. Nedles to say, discovering there had been pioneers involved in school film production as early as the 1930’s has not yet ceased to amaze me. Clearly, some forty years after film’s invention, a group of English teachers had been busily engaged in film production; another thirty-some years elapsed before there was a new ave of production initiated by arts educators and non-profit arts organizations, and an additional thirty-six years have gone by before film production would enjoy the ubiquitous, sweping, and unprecedented position it holds today in schools and community projects worldwide. A mere one hundred and fiften years since the introduction of film in society to alow the average individual to produce, publish and distribute a film worldwide—a feat that has outdone mas print technologies, which took over five-hundred years to acomplish! This historical perspective leaves much to ponder. Thus film production had found its way into North American schools as early as the 1930s in large part through the use of standard 8mm film cameras, which had just been invented. Another wave of film production in the 1970s came about with the introduction of Super 8 cameras, which apparently, as I had discovered in my school archives, went so far as teachers using traditional 16mm or 35mm film cameras (a project undoubtedly financed by my school’s  58 wealthy community). Then, into the 1980s, video production became widely introduced in schools when video-8 and Hi-8 video formats became commercialy available. While film viewing for educational purposes and critiquing (i.e., media literacy) has been education’s main staple—rising further in popularity by 1984, when large quantities of films were transfered to analogue video rendering them economical and practical for teachers (Cox, 1984)—it would appear that with each new development in camera technologies, film production also semed to increase (Buckingham, 1990). This has evidently been due to the fact that with each camera innovation, filming became more cost efective and required les technological know-how. Additionaly, as far as producing, viewing or critiquing film, video made the costly and cumbersome use of rel-to-rel projectors unnecesary. Though in principle, film critiquing also benefited from technological shifts, as was evident when media literacy took of in the Eighties once films were transfered to video, making it possible to rapidly rewind and review a segment several times over. Notably, the ‘freze frame’ technique for film analysis commonly used by Jacques Aumont (1996) was not yet available on video format, as analogue video did not hold the image clearly. Since the projector did not hold a frame at al (stopping a projector on an image was not possible without melting the film), film analysis only benefited from ultiple viewings in analogue video (rewind/fast forward). To analyze a single frame, therefore, it was necesary to put the film through a manual editor such as the Moviola or a flatbed that resembles a rel-to-rel audio editing device. To this day, the freze frame technique for analysis, which Aumont (1996) suggested paraleled the analysis of writen texts (where one may pause on a phrase), is one that is questioned since moving pictures, unlike words, filmstrips and slides, are viewed in motion, making ‘motion’ an  59 important component of understanding film (Caseti, 1999). Once again, film critique entered the realm of rational, reductionist thought by studying stil images as parts of the moving whole. At any rate, the principle of innovation holds today, but at an increasing speed and by quantum strides. I suspect that the focus on production at the turn of the 21st century, which has changed educational interest from mere ‘viewing’ to ‘creating’ knowledge with images and sound, as Buckingham (2007) and others have noted, came about through the introduction of digital cameras along with digital post-production technologies that take filmakers beyond merely capturing film (i.e., on digital 8 or mini-DV) toward non-linear editing, archiving, and distributing (i.e., sharing on the Internet). What we now have in our power that difers from al the other time periods in camera or film format innovation since cinema’s invention, is the capacity to fully create using images and sound, which is not merely having shifted from linear to non-linear editing (like the evolution of editing on a typewriter to a word procesor). From concept to photography, from photography to editing, and from editing to distributing or sharing, the average individual now can be a full-fledged producer and distributor. Thus, today’s filmaker, as filmaker Rodriguez (1998, 2004) epitomized, is a self-contained, self-taught, self-mastered, self-distributing production studio with aces to al the necesary elements—including fully orchestrated sounds in the public domain, that can be re-mastered for creating a high quality soundtrack, with a fre distribution center that takes minutes to upload and share (e.g., YouTube, Vimeo). And even if there are hundreds of thousands of images that are not much to look at and subjects that are just as banal, this new age of sharing images globaly was made possible by the invention of YouTube (2005). In many ways, that new age paralels the ‘age of Daguere,’ beginning in the ninetenth century, whose photographic  60 invention in turn began the ‘age of the Lumières,’ whose filmic invention sparked the twentieth century filed with motion pictures. In any case, one can easily se why a film production curriculum, as an artful proces, had a tendency to just fade away in education until the 21st century. If a young filmaker could not edit, orchestrate, or distribute, the film experience would remain as a wonderful and unforgetable proces, but to the teacher, it would be an unfinished work not easily evaluated or defended in an age of acountability where the objectivity of criterion-referenced asesments and standardized evaluations are given education’s highest value. Despite the importance that proces plays in a learning environment, educators continue to be firmly anchored to a productive end largely due to the acountability factor, al the more realizable in today’s digital context. This is not to say that film or video has faded away in education—on the contrary, viewing films and videos continue to be plentiful in various subject areas as part of the learning proces (e.g., to clarify and ilustrate meanings). I am specifying, however, that viewing and making are two separate cognitive functions, which is precisely what we know of reading and writing (se footnote).1 Put another way, it is almost impossible to objectively determine the emotional and mental growth, intelectual capacity, and cognitive achievement of a learner without rational evidence. And despite the importance of filmic texts, which specialists across multiple disciplines have intuited since film’s inception, school film viewing and production had been left in a status of novelty or an enriching pastime that made school more palatable, yet easily shelved and forgotten when more presing ideas would take hold—until such time as technology changed the nature of viewing and production.                                                 1 Canadian author, Howard Engle (207), has writen a memoir, Man who forgot how to read, highlighting how a stroke had left him uterly unable to read despite that he could stil write, demonstrating what neurologists have come to see as two separate cognitive functions.  61 At any rate, until such time as society had been fully saturated with images, produced by children and youth, as wel as by activists, politicians, corporations, social pundits, religious organizations, and journalists, many educators could not predict the unfolding events atributed to film’s invention. Today, educators have sounded the cal for action, and the political motives span the range of individuals anxious to reign in what sems like a runaway phenomenon. A phenomenon that resembles a gigantic tidal wave set in motion by undercurrents of activity not wel understood is an event that demands explanation. Graduate researchers and the emergence of a collective  Thus far, this historical overview helped me to uncover the sense of ‘urgency’ that has motivated and driven educators to research new digital works comprised mainly of images (i.e., visual and auditory). But a more detailed historical view has helped me unearth many more important isues. As time progresed, a worrisome thought arose from out of my readings on historical film research within and without education. I wondered how I would join my experiences with broader theoretical understandings of film in an educational context. While I was located in the department of curiculum and pedagogy, as a multi-disciplinary educator and researcher, the first thing I sought was where to situate my investigation. The second pursuit was finding a means to transform y experiences into scholarship.  To cross the threshold of experience, from making films and teaching with new digital film technologies into film scholarship in an educational context required a meaningful goal. As the famous modal jaz piece by Miles Davis goes, I needed to find the ‘So What’ of my investigation. When I had embarked on my filmaking unit, fiften years earlier, I did so with an awarenes of many isues in education that menaced my sensibilities toward agency and creativity. As mentioned, that elementary school film experience had been my second foray into  62 educational filmaking. The first had been at a time when I was teaching various subjects in an ‘inner city school’ filed with youth chalenged by social and learning isues.  As it has been common in many school districts dealing with dificult behavioral concerns that often lead to tragic events, that inner city school was modeled on behavioral psychology. The result of such an approach in an educational context, while useful in managing behavior, left no door open to explore other les invasive and coercive approaches to learning. This impase conflicted with Maxine Gren’s words that haunted my mind, “A teacher in search of [his/her] own fredom may be the only kind of teacher who can arouse young persons to go in search of their own” (Gren, 1998; as cited in Ayers & Miler, 1998).  When I eventualy transfered to a school in a community that was economicaly wel off, I was surprised to discover that agency and creativity were the founding principles driving the school philosophy. The school’s administrative eforts to create a collaborative teaching and learning environment based on contemporary learning theories made a significant impact on me. First, by comparing the disparity betwen the two school environments, I was sensitive to maters pertaining to ‘acesibility’ (e.g., social, technological, and economic constraints).  Second, by comparing contemporary learning theories and practice to behavioral theories and practice, neither of which were fully satisfactory, I was left to wonder whether there were theories and practices not yet examined in light of the changing times in technological advancement. Those thoughts, which led me to return to complete graduate work on creativity and technology, opened the door to explore clasroom instruction in thre domains of expertise: music education, physical education, and literacy education. During my graduate studies and beyond (a period that stretches over a decade), I experimented with variant theoretical perspectives that underpin curriculum and pedagogy both in the context of instructing teacher candidates (i.e., pre-service teachers) and youth who have been part of several university-led  63 research projects on video production and literacy. Therein I sought to find purpose in theory and practice.  In part, my investigations began to take shape with an unexpected venture, which began when I was asked to videotape a Reader’s Theatre performance of a wel-known Broadway play and movie, The Laramie Project. The project, supported by the Dean of Education, was directed and performed by education research graduates and profesors. It was put into production following a public school district’s debacle over closing down a high school production of the play during rehearsals. Instead of embracing artistic works that could open positive debate around dificult social isues, it would appear that school districts facing social and political constraints are not yet ready to dismantle bariers for those working in the area of social justice and equity. Shortly after the theatre presentation, I became part of a group of research graduates keen on continuing ‘performance research.’ We formed a group that came to be known as The Collective and met regularly to discuss projects that would alow us to ply our various talents in music, theatre, dance, scripting, and other arts.  The play had motivated us to form a performance research group for several reasons. First, the play not only brought to the fore the tragic events around homophobia, it also, ironicaly, brought forward isues of censorship and prejudice that stil continue to plague our comunities of learning. The incident led to a distinct feling that the political and economic forces surrounding literacy were at the heart of educational concerns. In other words, isues of acesibility (harking back to my experiences with troubled youth), which are politicaly and economicaly motivated, went beyond mere ‘clasroom practice’ and we were suddenly buoyed  64 up with the emotional sensation of having landed squarely into the title, Pedagogy of the oppresed, of Brazilian literacy activist Paulo Freire’s (1970) seminal work.2  Second, inspired by the response to the Reader’s Theatre performed on campus by members of the faculty, forming a graduate research group, made up primarily of performing artists, offered us a chalenge to bring performance-based research to the fore. This form of research was finding new footing in our faculty in large part due to research eforts by various members of the faculty (e.g., Fels, 2002, 2004; Gouzouasis et al., 2007; Springgay et al., 2008; Sinner et al., 2007) and had had precedents set in faculty-sponsored conferences. Thus, not long after The Collective was formed, we were ofered a second Reader’s Theatre performance opportunity that coincided with the politics and policies underpinning adolescent literacy. The proposal made for an ideal experiment.  This time we were going to ‘perform’ the content of an article that had been writen by Dean R. J. Tierney (2001-2002), first published in the Journal of Adolescent Literacy, under the title: An ethical chasm: Jurisprudence, jurisdiction and the literacy profesion. The original article by Tierney was already one that had deviated from the usual journal offerings, insofar as it had been writen, in part, as a courtroom drama and was easily ‘performable.’ Having ben inspired by David Guterson’s (1995), novel Snow Falling on Cedars, Tierney had seized the opportunity to render a rather dry, technical article into a lively narative that would alow him to capture some of his experiences ‘behind closed doors’ as a language and literacy researcher.   Several members of The Collective condensed the dramatic courtroom sections of the article, considerably shortening the text into a script to be performed during Dean Tierney’s Keynote addres of the Simon Fraser University’s 40th Anniversary, March 4, 2006. A year                                                 2 Freire’s work centers on the idea that a pedagogy of opression is buried in the varied ‘texts’ writen and produced by a dominant culture and society (i.e., textboks, novels, television, works of art, and so on), which maintains and reinforces the segregation and inequality (i.e., opression) of minorities and the disadvantaged.  65 later, I revised the script into a ‘shooting script,’ upon being given the gren light to turn it into a movie. Casting most of the actors who had parts in the original Reader’s Theatre, save for those I had played, which I turned over to others in order to direct, I added a few more actors to fil the parts that had been doubled on stage.  With my afiliation to the film industry, I was able to secure two profesional film actors in a cast of thirten, and a cameraman who had worked on several television and film crews as a steady-cam operator (i.e., handheld camera). The film took thre full days to shoot and more than a year to complete the editing, with a second edit after its première with cast and crew. At any rate, once I had made the decision to embark on this filmaking chalenge, I entered a dimension of investigation that I had hardly expected given the genesis for this project. What I found myself engaged in is what Whitehead (1938) described as “the basis of democracy,” which “is the common fact of value-experience, as constituting the esential nature of each pulsation of actuality. Everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole” (p. 151).  While stil operating under the asumption that I was investigating performance-based research with an emphasis on the relationship betwen arts and literacy, which then shifted to film-based research (an intersection of film, arts, and literacy), I began to examine the body of work I had undertaken under the light of this politicaly charged world of ‘literacy education.’ Under which asumptions had I been entrusting theoretical constructs? The question that remained uppermost in my mind hinged on whether the theories founded in educational research on arts, language, and literacy held any cogency with those found in the discipline of film studies. And if those collective theories could explain the fundamental transformations that have occurred each time I undertook film arts in the clasroom or beyond. The purpose for my investigation, which had remained opaque, began to reveal itself in the course of sifting through the literature during the very proceses of teaching film arts, filming, and editing.  66 Film arts as literacy, communications, and technology  Initialy, film in education rose predominantly out of communication studies as the ‘modes of communication’ (i.e., radio, film and television) began to intensify and shift the way in which we understood the shaping of society (Smith, 2003). Thus, the study of ‘film literacy’ by the mid-nineten eighties setled within several curricular areas of interest, such as ‘media arts’ under the direction of arts educators; ‘media literacy,’ typicaly under the purview of sociologists and communication arts educators; and ‘multiple literacies’ as a component of language and literacy disciplines, which extends the research, teaching and learning of the writen word (Eisner, 2001; Jenkins, 2006; New London Group, 1996). However, long before the writing of the multiliteracies ‘manifesto’ by The New London Group (1996), which espoused virtues of a burgeoning new literacy in “multimedia technologies,” digital images and sound had entered technology studies, visual arts, and music curricula for several decades. This history has been explored by a number of researchers, such as, Ely, 1992; Madeja, 1993; Moore, 1991; Papert, 1980; Rheingold, 1985; Roland, 1990; Slawson, 1993. Despite that arts and technology have held a particular interest in film arts throughout history, it has been a collective concern with literacy that has driven research movements in recent times. As an arts educator, with interests that ranged from philosophy to cognitive science, it was necesary to survey what literacy implies and why it has become the guiding principle behind current educational policies, which were raised in Tierney’s (2001-2002) article. Acording to the New London Group (1996) the principle behind literacy “is to ensure that al students benefit from learning in ways that alow them to participate fully in public, community, and economic life” (p. 60). Turning to education journals, I traced some of the economic and  67 political forces behind isues of literacy as early as 1886 when the National Education Asociation reported the following on the low literacy rate in the State of Louisiana. President Wiliam Preston Johnson of Tulane University, Louisiana, in his paper on education in his own state, spoke of Louisiana as lowest in the scale of literacy, only forty-nine per cent of its population being able to read and write. He pleaded for the national aid proposed by the Blair bil. There was, however, in his paper, nothing to ofset the arguments that have been urged against the bil. It is hard for a close student to se how the mere lavish outlay of money is greatly to overcome conditions which money can only indirectly and remotely afect (p. 92).    Clearly, early advocates in literacy became inexorably tied to the political and economic forces of the time. Surveying today’s legislation on literacy in education—for instance, the policies introduced by the Clinton and Bush administrations—it is plain to se how far the forces of politics and economics reach. To this end, Tierney (2009) expresed, “The control of literacy caries enormous political clout as wel as economic advantage whether the profit be book sales, curriculum control or tenure” (p. 278). Additionaly, Tierney pointed out that this political clout and economic advantage is wrought by the “power of certain groups to lobby for legislation to ensure certain pedagogical approaches” (p. 280).  As I explored the body of literature published in education journals related to theories and practice of film or video, it therefore came as no surprise that the vast majority were writen with literacy in mind. It is dificult to disagre with the tenets of the New London Group (1996) who sought to emancipate students from a “literacy pedagogy [that] has traditionaly meant teaching and learning to read and write in page-bound, official, standard forms of the national language” (p. 60-61). Who best to put forward an argument of this kind than those whose profesional expertise begins with the teaching of reading and writing? In efect, by advocating for a new literacy, the tenets of democracy would be vigorously upheld, and the New London Group has been able to make a convincing plea for new comprehensive pedagogical directions.  68 Digital curriculum and pedagogy in education, which include film arts, grew from quantitative communication research (Currie, 1999; Smith, 2003). Ultimately this research was supported and sanctioned by proponents of literacy as an emancipation project. For as the two questions and stated concerns that follow demonstrate, the New London Group (1996) felt compeled in light of a changing society to re-conceptualize literacy. How do we ensure that diferences of culture, language and gender are not bariers to educational succes? And what are the implications of these diferences for literacy pedagogy (p. 61)?  The main areas of common or complementary concern included the pedagogical tension betwen imersion and explicit models of teaching; the chalenge of cultural and linguistic diversity; the newly prominent modes and technologies of communication; and the changing text usage in restructured workplaces. Our main concern was the question of life chances as it relates to the broader moral and cultural order of literacy pedagogy (p. 62).   By way of clarifying what is meant by pedagogy, there are several ways in which this term ay be employed. What the New London Group expresed as the tension betwen imersion and explicit models of teaching is frequently viewed as the diference betwen what educators refer to as experiential learning versus direct instruction (Dewey, 1958). The movement toward experiential or imersion learning led to constructivist pedagogies, with some theoretical frameworks drawn from social constructivism (Brooks & Brooks, 1993; Plantinga & Smith, 1999). Notably, pedagogy does not merely refer to teaching approaches and methods of instruction but also refers to ‘textual’ pedagogies whereby knowledge is drawn from cultural entities, such as arts, politics, and economics and their ‘texts’ (i.e., writen, aural, and visual artifacts). This view led the movement toward critical pedagogies, which method of ‘decoding’ textual meanings were intended to emancipate the learner through drawing awarenes of the implicit knowledge systems that shape positioning, subjectivity, and identity (Freire, 2005). The  69 New London Group addresed al thre kinds of pedagogies, adding a fourth perspective refered to as transformative pedagogy. Four components of pedagogy are suggested: Situated Practice, which draws on the experience of meaning-making in lifeworlds, the public realm, and workplaces; Overt Instruction, through which students develop an explicit metalanguage of Design; Critical Framing, which interprets the social context and purpose of Designs of meaning; and Transformed Practice, in which students, as meaning-makers, become Designers of social futures (p. 65).  One may begin to suspect that the policies governing arts and technology education have not had the same political and economic clout as literacy. First, one may consider the contribution of arts and technology in the heightened speed and breadth by which we have become, as previously expresed, “globalized societies” creating “the multifarious cultures that interelate and the plurality of texts that circulate.” Both arts and technology have been viewed as complicit in propagating an image soaked society through television, video, Internet, and film. Despite tensions that may arise betwen arts and technology researchers on the principle of aesthetics (Gouzouasis, 2005, 2006), it is impossible to not se that today’s digital expresions make arts and technology political and economic alies. From one viewpoint, technology contributes to what Donna Haraway ses as a ‘cyborg’ pedagogy, whereby humans are not merely comparable to machines but are in fact becoming a hybrid of human and machine. For the artist and humanist, technology dangerously crosses the border of what it means to be human (Garoian & Gaudelius, 2001). From another perspective artists who “perform resistance in the digital age” may be considered disingenuous in their artistic critique given the centuries long asociation they have had with multiple technologies (Gouzouasis, 2006).  Second, controversies surrounding the ‘digital divide’ caused by economic inequality betwen school districts and communities have included the prohibitive costs in hardware, software, and the training and hiring of specialists with skils and knowledge requisite of  70 information and communication technologies (e.g., programing). While arts and technology educators argued for political and economic backing that would serve the interests of advancing new technologies and preserving dwindling arts programs, literacy educators argued for political and economic backing that would provide for “a good life and an equitable society” (New London Group, 1996, p. 67). Thus technology and arts educators have often been viewed as promoting pedagogies despite inequalities, whereas literacy educators (buoyed by the field of communications) have been viewed as more closely alied to empowerment. This later view as helped by the fact that ‘reading and writing’ has long been an emancipation goal aimed toward the whole of society. In consideration, certain aspects of arts and technology education retain the unfavorable view of being exclusionary and elitist with technology garnering the hostile view that proliferates comparisons betwen humans and machines, evidenced as early as J.P Guilford’s 1950 (1987) addres and, most recently, in light of what is perceived as ‘cyborg’ pedagogy. In any case, the unrelenting speed of technological developments in the past four years has created a heightened sense of urgency toward digital literacy. Since the 2005 launching of the video streaming on-line program, YouTube, which currently uploads 200,000 new videos per day (Wesch, 2008), educators across al disciplines have hastened to research the digital video phenomenon and to initiate literacy pedagogies in video viewing and making (Jenkins, 2006). In other words, film works have become a renewed point of interest for many educators due to a number of factors, not the least being the introduction and advancement of technologies used to manipulate images. Importantly, I do not speak of images as merely visual. For the most part auditory, visual, visceral, and kinetic images have saturated our brains for over a century as those have emanated from big scren theatres to miniaturized celular telephones and from social to individual spaces re-conceptualized to fit a technological age. Image producing technologies,  71 such as, cameras and MIDI instruments, along with computer hardware and software for projecting, manipulating, scanning, animating, recording, composing, and editing, have become increasingly popular in the clasroom as digital technologies continue to expand (Jenkins, 2006). How are we to understand images and their afect? Taking another look into history, new movements in literacy were on the horizon with the advent of photography and radio in the late ninetenth century, the introduction of which led to the development of educational interests in cinema, television, and video (e.g., Alen, 1940; Child, 1939; Ginsberg, 1940; Gray, 1940; Smith, 1942; Mitchel, 1929). Over one hundred years later, film continues to be a central focus of literacy and arts of our times by virtue of the fact that films, in their multiple genres and technological formats, flood our environment with images and continue to be thought to posses qualities of language and art that serve to construct and transform dialogic, technological, scientific, social, cultural, political, and economic spaces (e.g., Alen & Smith, 1997; Bakhtin, 1981; Baudrilard, 1981, 1998; Braudy & Cohen, 2004; Miler & Stam, 2000; Rogers & Schofield, 2005). One can think of film literacy, generaly speaking, as the critical and expresive ways students ‘read’ and ‘write’ using filmic proceses (i.e., aural, visual, kinesthetic images), which is as relevant to literacy educators as it is to communication researchers rooted in sociological and cultural perspectives (Buckingham, 1990; Sefton-Gren, 2006). Yet film arts also invoke the artistic proceses that arise when students are imersed in subjective aesthetic experiences. Those experiences raise the question on the workings of an embodied brain (Eisner, 1981, 2001; Gouzouasis, 2006). A theoretical view of the embodied brain, from a neuroscience perspective, is one that caries importance if we are to deepen our understanding of what constitutes an image beyond socio-cultural foundations. Understanding images in relation to the workings of an  72 embodied brain through neuroscience frameworks is an area of education that has yet to receive full consideration. The rise of film research in education: In search of the expert  With interests and perspectives steming from the end of the ninetenth century leading the way, which one might argue continue to be in currency today, mas media innovations beginning with photography, gave rise to the study of what arts educator Eliot Eisner (1997) has termed, “alternate forms of representation.” Those alternate forms, in contrast to writen language, were not solely limited to the study of media as art, as the more than one hundred years of research on film shows. In fact, that research is wel documented, with many historical and contemporary journal articles archived in JSTOR. Additionaly, there is a vast collection of books detailing historical acounts of the psychological and social science initiatives arising from pedagogical concerns, with the majority tied to education. Moreover, there is a wide collection on cultural film studies, which emerged from anthropology and critical theory.  Those collections of works from the social sciences sit apart from an even greater collection of magazines, journals, and books specialized and dedicated to understanding film as an art and a language. The comparison of language, contained in the earliest works writen on cinema from clasic film studies to the most recent studies, is what has been caled the “second wave” of semiotics, generative linguistics, cognition, and pragmatics (Caseti, 1999). Generaly speaking, since film studies were widely diseminated to the public, one may find in al the collections—from one discipline to the next—ideas that have migrated and crossed over the mostly porous boundaries. Beginning as early as 1909, with the publication of Nickelodeon, “America’s leading journal of motography,” studies centered on “entertainment, education, science, and advertising” (Grieveson & Wason, 2008). By 1913, Emilie Altenloh, doctoral student in sociology at the  73 University of Heidelberg, completed her disertation on the sociology of cinema, and by 1916, Hugo Münsterberg had published his seminal work on the film viewer, entitled, The film: A psychological study (Grieveson & Wason, 2008). Those theories, coupled with “the study of propaganda emerging in the early 1920s,” were rooted “on the particular conceptions of subjectivity, social order, and media efects” whereby it was “connected to the presing imperative to understand the management of opinion in mas democracies” (p. 14). Acording to Grieveson (2008), given the enormous influx of people moving from rural to urban centers and the extraordinary innovations in mas communication systems at the end of the ninetenth century, many agred that, “democracy is governable only on the basis of a knowledge of the opinion of the mases” (p. 15). Walter Lippman, Pulitzer prize intelectual and political commentator, for instance, contended that “people’s thoughts were increasingly shaped by the agencies of mas communication, which molded a society’s knowledge and appealed only to ‘stereotypes’ and beliefs rooted in myths, dreams, traditions, and personal wishes, thereby ‘manufacturing consent’ and problematizing the sustainability of democracy” (p. 15). Moreover, Lippman argued that what was needed “was a scholarly elite to ases and interpret objectively the potentialy dangerous public opinion and to work through organizations of independent experts to make ‘the unsen facts inteligible to those who have to make decisions’ ” (p. 15). His views on the scholarly elite, which were held in common among the intelectual and governing clases, were realized within the new fields of psychology and anthropology—giving rise to social psychology and social sciences now interested in the “social behavior” of the mas public. As Grieveson (2008) further elaborates, the rise in empirical methods of investigation, which gave way to measuring “atitudes” and “opinions” believed by many to be the cause of human actions and a “critical component of managing behavior,” established quantitative and  74 qualitative studies that showed “an asesment of people’s mental atitudes could be useful not only for commercial purposes but also for ensuring the sustainability of democracy and of social order” (p. 15, italics added). It was in this frame of mind that “philosophical concerns with mas publics, opinions and miesis” (concerns, one may recal, founded in Ancient Grece) “were made empirical” (p. 15).  In a review of a rather chiling work of Grieveson and others, such as Mark Anderson (2008), one discovers that the new psychology and sociology of that era, which introduced the notions of Freud and Münsterberg on ‘mietic relations, dreams, and hypnosis,’ along with the concerns of “social control” felt endemicaly as part of governmental dispositions, “became the central isue animating a sense of urgency about studying cinema” (Grieveson, p. 11, italics added). As far as the study of film was concerned, Grieveson notes disturbingly, Identifying potential disorder with the goal of instiling social order was a primary impulse underpinning these studies. Acounts claimed that the audiences for nickelodeons were predominantly children, imigrants, or women—al groups regarded as particularly prone to mietic tendencies, as we have sen, because of their unstable location as self-aware/governing subjects. The reform journal Outlook typicaly commented, ‘Undeveloped people, those in transitional stages and children are deeply afected’ by moving pictures. Initial studies of cinema often posited the direct impact of moving pictures on the behavior of audiences and thus on what the social reformer Jane Addams caled their ‘working moral codes’ (p. 11).  Despite the direction empirical study had taken at that time, Grieveson also points out that there were counter forces acting as means of resistance to such popular views among the intelectual elite. Beginning with new discoveries in sciences and social sciences that rejected positivist research, this new perspective resulted in a necesary resistance to extreme ideologies. This resistance led to critical and field theories stil in operation today. Nonetheles, despite Münsterberg’s directorial position with the psychological laboratory at Harvard, it was the University of Chicago, then working toward an elite clas of film experts,  75 which veritably established the film scholar. Operating under the ‘new’ empirical ethos in the humanities (particularly among social scientists and psychologists), the University was the center of empirical film study, whereby such notable film ‘scholars’ rose to public prominence such as, among others, the behaviorists John Watson and Karl Lashley, communications guru Edgar Dale, sociology profesor Ernest Burges and, most notably, two members of the Chicago School of sociology, Frederick Thrasher and Robert Park.   As Anderson (2008) explains, the University of Chicago was poised to utilize “adapted biological concepts of growth and decay to describe the rapid rise of the modern industrial city” steming from the fact that “the city was both a natural environment and research laboratory where the social scientist might observe and record the forces of organization and disorganization that led to continual social change” (p. 41). Elaborating, Anderson renders more insight. Social disorganization was sen as an ordinary part of social formation since it is often necesary that older social relations be broken down so that new relations might form; however, if the rate of growth is too rapid, then social and personal disorganization can easily give rise to social ils such as delinquency, poverty, crime, suicide and disease. Thus social problems should be understood as disequilibrium and degeneration in the social organism (p. 41).   While a difering notion of disequilibrium from a physical science framework requires more detailed examination, suffice it to say that social science had drawn from a biological theory a concept whereby disequilibrium was viewed preferable when it achieved zero entropy (total disorder), since high disorder in society that causes chaos is considered intolerable (and possibly tragic). The history, which Grieveson (2008) and Anderson (2008) carefully details of those laboring under such views, is long and complex. Although only briefly touched on herein, several important educational outcomes that stem from this view need further clarification.  76  Operating under the 1928 commite funded by philanthropist Frances Payne Bingham Bolton, the Reverend Wiliam Short endeavored to conduct a “nationwide study to determine the degre of influence and efect of films upon children and adolescents and ultimately lobby for more stringent forms of legalized social control over the film industry” (Grieveson, p. 17). Short met in Chicago with social scientists Jane Addams and Alice Miler Mitchel, profesor in the Chicago School of Education Weret Walace Charters, psychologist Louis Thurstone and the School of Sociology’s Robert Ezra Park.  Acording to Grieveson, “Together, the scholars gathered worked in the disciplines of sociology, psychology, social psychology and education; the innovation of the study of cinema grew from the disciplinary imperatives to understand individuals, social groups, and the educability of both the individual and social group” (p. 17). Among them, Park was notably enthusiastic about the Payne funded commite, for his goal was to delineate the causes of human behavior and delinquency as was also the goals of Short, whose intention was to study “cinema as a component of collective behavior and its impact on the creation of delinquency” (p. 20).   Thus, the Payne Fund Studies were conducted from 1918 to 1919; while those were published (1928), the thirten studies were not widely read as had been anticipated (Grieveson, 2008). In light of this, the studies were then compiled and published in a popularized 1934 version by commite chairman, W. . Charters and journalist Henry Forman in Our movie made children. Re-edited and re-released in 1996 under the title, Children and the movies: Media Influence and the Payne Fund Foundation Controversy (Jowet, Jarvie, & Fuller, 1996). The studies themselves prove to continue to have some currency in our times.  Notwithstanding the historical analysis conducted on the social, political, educational, and scientific movements influencing researchers at that time, while reading any one of those early studies, one can easily deduce that research interest also coincided, then as now, with  77 changes in mas media innovations. In particular, film played a major role. Media shifted from photography to silent film with orchestrated sounds, then to films with sound vinyl recordings. From live radio to live television, media also shifted to analogue audio-visual taping, then onto digital audio and video at a fraction of the cost of previous production. Emergent technologies in motion photography and recorded sound have thus motivated and driven various groups of researchers for more than a century at diferent junctures.  As mentioned, those early studies under the Payne Fund Studies came up against resistance by the Chicago Motion Picture Commision (CMPC), which was asembled to consider various points of view at a wekly hearing held betwen late 1918 and May 1919. The CMPC had been adamant that empirical verification of the efects of motion pictures was produced and, thus, sponsored a survey conducted by Ernest Burges, “co-editor of the influential textbook, Introduction to Sociology, to quantify the efects of motion pictures on school children” (Grieveson, pp. 15-16). But it came down to the fact that the collection of the studies, on the whole, “had a muted impact on the continuing study of cinema” (p. 22). Grieveson speculates that the reasons for the “limited impact” had to do with the Production Code that was then writen by the Motion Picture Producers and Directors Asociation (MPDA). In the code the political goals of the studies were partly realized or at least deflected…The MPDA also actively sought to undermine the validity of the studies when the organization seized upon a critique of the studies’ methodology and findings articulated by the philosopher Mortimer Adler in his 1937 book Art and prudence. The organization not only promoted Adler’s critique but also commisioned Raymond Moley to write a popularized summary of it.  Moreover, as one begins to take note in the following addendum, the constant technological changes influenced the direction of political leadership, a factor that continues today as we grapple with isues of government control and aces (e.g., Google in China).  78 One other important potential reason for the eclipse of the Payne Fund Studies…cinema itself became les centraly important to practices of governance in line with the increased importance of other media, starting with radio and later with television (pp. 22-23).   Although the MPDA exercised a degre of force in opposing the centrality of those studies in the “new and as yet unformed discipline of film studies” (p. 22), it should come as no surprise to anyone in education that the Payne Fund Studies had some “impact on pedagogical practices in high schools and universities” (p. 22). One can only conjecture as to why those kinds of studies sem to impact education more forcibly than in the fields that study media. Clearly, education has much broader concerns that occlude the importance of understanding the medium of communication, not the least is an understanding of human behavior. I can imagine the efect such empiricaly studied viewpoints held on the public, let teachers. What I suspect was that the studies, based on views largely generated by teachers who were part of those studies, caried an air of grave importance. Teachers considered movies to have a negative impact on “clasroom” behavior as “moving pictures induced in young girls the ‘vampire atitude,’ taught young boys ‘boy bandit games,’ and stopped children from becoming ‘good citizens’ ” (Grieveson, p. 16).  As a teacher and educator in a teacher education program, I can atest to the sensitivity to ‘clasroom behavior.’ This has been an ongoing theme in schools of teacher education, probably since the start of compulsory education and possibly due to the task of managing large numbers of children at once. In turn, this ‘behavioral’ concern has caused many to wonder about the ‘artificiality’ and ‘coercivenes’ found within a clasroom that inevitably produces uncharacteristic behaviors in children as a result, as it was most notably observed by philosophers John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead.  79 Finaly, the Payne Fund, as mentioned, “went on to support research in radio,” and, thus, “communication studies emerged here…aligned with the social sciences then coalescing into a discipline in the 1940s when the term “communication research” first became apparent” (Grieveson, p. 23). Privately or governmentaly funded, the field of communication studies became established in universities in the 1950s and although film was thought to fal under this new field, in fact, film study gave way to the humanities. That change came about when film was viewed increasingly as a category of ‘art’ largely thanks to the initiatives to show and preserve film arts by the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) and such tenacious individuals as Henry Langlois, who was considered instrumental in the preservation of vast quantities of films, particularly during WI, where many films were in danger of being destroyed by enemy forces. Having been obsolesced by the study of radio and television, the study of film texts was left to the expertise of the film enthusiast interested in the art of filmaking. Film studies became an unbridled ‘invisible college’ that semed to operate outside the tenets of communications. As I witnesed in my early years of teaching, however, with the development of video, then computers, a new ave of interest by the 1980s put film texts and film study back under the communications’ microscope and, naturaly enough, education.  As mentioned, I had found filmaking books in the communication arts section of our school library—a section that did not include, for instance, traditional arts, but rather many books concerning technologies utilized in the art of communication, namely, radio, television, and film (interestingly, books on photography were shelved under visual arts). Thus, under the communication arts section, I also came across a book that had developed a film and television curriculum by Considine and Haley (1992).  80  In their preface, the authors explained that TV and film audiences either perceive and proces at a shalow level or have a deep understanding depending on the level of media literacy—a term frequently employed by diverse experts—though what this kind of literacy entailed (beyond the notion of critical viewing and responding) was not explained further. And at that time, no doubt to visual artists reading this today, I shared the same concern as to how a communication arts specialist can lay claim to understand the image without some recourse to experts in the arts or neuroscience.  At any rate, in keeping with their research interests and background, the authors did not describe film as a form of art or language, nor any detail regarding what is an image, rather, everything was explained through a communication model (making the shelving more obvious, while not explaining the distinction). This work was, more or les, a model that descended from the ideas of Harold Innis and Marshal McLuhan, thus more specificaly tied to ‘media studies.’ More curiously, the ideas expresed in the authors’ preface gave way to the view of what Adorno and Horkheimer caled “the culture industry.” Nothing led me to consider their pedagogy had much to do with the European Marxist intelectuals of the 1930s, which descended from the Frankfurt school’s luminaries such as Habermas, and their American counterparts, Kracauer, Lowenthal and Marcuse, nor that of the American traditions of cultural critique. Yet, their premises, I was to discover, were deeply aligned with the research tradition known as critical theory—a tradition vastly diferent from empirical social sciences.  It sems logical that, if one aims toward critical thinking, some aspect of critical theory wil filter the perspective. Indeed, Considine (2009) recently stipulated, “Media literacy can be an empowering pedagogy to protect students from potential media manipulation while also preparing them for the responsibilities of citizenship” (p. 66). Since the notion of “empowerment” and “protection from manipulation” has long been the general aim of critical  81 theory, if not stated, it is fair to suggest that some hidden connection exists betwen the two. Critical theory, as a form of resistance, had a broad mandate, not only to critique research based on normative values, such as those underpinning the work of psychologists and sociologists, but it could also align itself with critiquing mas production that advanced Marxist materialist views. The evidence for this suggestion lies in the makeup of the broad field of communication studies.  Considine and Haley (1992), for instance, found support for their ideas as part of the vast, overlapping and, some say, al encompasing field of Communication Studies. While not the most authoritative, Wikipedia describes communication studies to be “part of both the social sciences and the humanities, drawing heavily on fields such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, and economics as wel as rhetoric, literary studies, linguistics, and semiotics.” And as broad as that may sem, “the field can incorporate and overlap with the work of other disciplines as wel, however, including engineering, architecture, mathematics, computer science, gender and sexuality studies.”  Despite this les-than-reliable information source, one can verify that the National Communication Asociation (NCA) list of disciplines is aligned with the preceding insofar as the list includes: Communication & Technology, Critical-Cultural, Health, Intercultural-International, Interpersonal-Smal Group, Mas Communication, Organizational, Political, and Rhetorical.  While The International Communication Asociation (ICA) includes, among others: Communication History; Communication Law and Policy; Ethnicity and Race in Communication; Feminist Scholarship; Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Studies; Global Communication and Social Change; Information Systems; Journalism Studies; Instructional/Developmental Comunication; Language and Social Interaction; Organizational Communication; Philosophy of Communication; Political Communication; Popular  82 Communication; Public Relations; and Visual Comunication Studies. In short, anything that might be considered a mater of communication.  This diversity within the field of Communication Studies may explain the overlap of critical theory in film criticism, for instance, as expresed by communication arts specialist Henry Jenkins, critical theorists Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, anthropologists Bruno Latour and Marcus Banks, and feminist theorists Laura Mulvey, Kaja Silverman, Teresa de Lauretis and Barbara Cred, to name a few. Upon reflection, there is a feling of the same alarmist views in the later critical frameworks for film study as the earlier empirical ones regarding the deleterious efects of films on audiences—which, to put it politely, smels the same, while theoreticaly is situated in a diferent pile.   In other words, critical theorists have fought to reveal the forces that “worked to implement social control by reproducing normative subjectivity and so efectively enslaving people and making totalitarianism possible” (Grieveson, 2008, p. 23)—and in some sense or another, both groups of experts, empirical and critical, have labored as resisters against an advancing sinister force. To be able to discern sinister forces—those that destroy the life and dignity of human beings—requires more than one kind of critique. Unfortunately, for many kinds of resisters, ideologies may at times blind one’s capacity to make such discernment fuly conscious.  If empirical studies were conducted as a means to measure the deleterious efects of film contributing to the ‘delinquent’ behavior of individuals and societies, critical theories, by contrast, sprang from the wel of a materialist view on the deleterious efects of film as a means of social control, whereby society was viewed as controlled principaly by consumption and production. Whereas the first sought to control and shape society into ‘good citizens,’ the later hoped to fre society from the pernicious control of the market (i.e., capitalism).  83  In other words, both rational positions frame the individual and society as fragile beings. Unable to make critical decisions, individuals or whole societies are governed by their “emotional, psychic, mietic, and delusional” (Grieveson, 2008, p. 23) impulses that lead them to exceses in consumption and, thereby, are driven to enslavement by the forces of production (e.g., an unregulated, fre market). Fundamentaly, both theories stem from observing and speculating on the forces at play as society moved into mas reproduction and the perilous twentieth century filed with mas kilings. As always, this rational and social view has positioned itself without consideration to the emotional and subjective.  This privileging of the rational over the emotional has largely played into religious contexts. For individuals like Reverend Short, I suspect it is neither social or material forces that governs behavior and hinders ‘good citizenry,’ rather it is the pernicious forces of ‘evil’ undermining the moral fiber of individuals (including the feble emotional register that pervades human thought), but with an entirely diferent force perhaps bearing horns, tail, and pitchfork. Above al, there is an ongoing complicity betwen religious and empirical views that se ‘reason’ as necesary to govern human pasion if we are to rise above the folly of nature.  The two distinct paradigms of resistance to the advancing changes in society at the start of the twentieth century, i.e., positivism, came to be known as post-positivism and critical theory. Those paradigms simply ilustrate the iterations of a familiar conflict that plagued society within the diferent ages, e.g., within Ancient Grece or within the Enlightenment. But also in evidence across the ages: betwen Ancient Grece and the Roman Empire, betwen the Renaisance and the Enlightenment, betwen the Industrial Revolution and Postmodernism. In esence this may be viewed as Hegelian in nature (i.e., thesis, antithesis, synthesis) and reflect the numerous ‘revolutions’ (as the word implies) that simply go round and round.  84  Like variations on a theme but played out in a shorter rif (i.e., decades versus centuries), one observes that, throughout the 20th century, the realist-idealist or empirical-rational positions, along with the distinctive methods of induction-deduction, have created the age-old tensions that continue to invoke both ontological and epistemological debates. In fact, this iteration is an important point to be made with respect to the neglect of the emotional, which rarely factors into such critiques of the social. Although an exploration of the emotional is one that requires a more thoughtful review, before leaving this section on the history of educational film research and in keeping with the crescendo of impresions I experienced while reviewing the literature, several more observations are worth discussing. The dizying efects of revolution: An imperative for creating experts  With each novel change in mas communication technologies, first appearing in the late ninetenth century, the public was offered entertaining and artistic diversions at an economical rate (compared to live art exhibits and performances) and, by consequence, new media gained vast aceptance into society. Mark Anderson (2008) argues that “the cultural ascendancy of the modern human sciences coincide with the rise of mas culture” (p. 39). More importantly, not merely a societal change, but one that is felt as a rapid succesion of large-scale, gestalt shifts (or the speed at which the magnitude and totalizing efect of the audio-visual could be compared with print technology) that makes a ‘dizying’ impresion, or as quoted earlier, a feling of “disequilibrium.”   Is it possible that modern human sciences might not have devoted so much intensity to the study of film if researchers had not themselves felt disoriented or imbalanced by the flux of images? The irony, of course, is that ‘rapid’ change is something we experience as children naturaly and may wel be why the spread of new media is taken up by those whose inclination is to adapt to change (until such time as an adult perspective brings a ‘steady’ rate). At any rate, the  85 many discussions I had had over the years with colleagues expresing a certain reluctance or distaste for technology versus those who embraced technological change, led me to believe that the tension I felt from teachers resisting new technologies came about because of rapid change. That kind of thinking appears as commonsense, however, cannot be so simple.   While mas culture was arguably the primary impetus for the large body of empirical studies on the impact of movies on society, which then gave way to critical studies, Anderson ventures that “before any aesthetic, psychological, economic or sociological inquiries into motion pictures could properly converge to form a unique area of scholarship, an important institutional condition had to be fulfiled: the creation of the media expert” (p. 38, italics added). In other words, a change in society often pushes a group of experts to the fore as a means to ases and evaluate the phenomenon using objective means. Often, but not always, it is left to the group of experts to resolve isues of deep social concern.  Invariably, the creation of the expert is a prickly mater for artists. Personaly, expertise in the arts has always been confusing since it was clear that ‘expertise’ is first and foremost derived by experience—at least as it implies fluency. To be fluent suggests a conditioned and skiled reflex stored in memory after long practice, which does not require labored thought in order to perform or produce an efect. Fluency is a type of rapid ‘dexterity’ and range of ‘vocabulary’ not found in the novice, for instance, when playing an instrument or speaking a language. Thus, fluency implies rapid perception, comprehension, and performance.  Without question, fluency has long been argued to difer from theoretical knowledge, i.e., knowing which elements are necesary versus applying those elements. In this respect, the art critic has a rather long and contentious history with the artist, as do art historians, art scholars and, art journalists. My sensibility toward artistic expertise laid somewhere betwen my years of practice and performance next to those who supported and understood my intentions. While I  86 certainly consulted the expert views of those who critiqued artistic works (at times to deflect a negative audience response), I was also prone to consult friendly audiences (usualy to deflect the expert view). The ‘expert’ evaluating my artistry, therefore, semed to vacilate with the winds of my ego, which grew or shrank dependent on the actual value ofered by friends (and having spent many years in the midst of large numbers of artists, I suspect is true for most). But none of the preceding emotional content served to reconcile the diference betwen tacit and conceptual knowledge. In other words, the expert remains controversial in light of the insoluble problem betwen the subjective and objective viewpoints. Or more precisely, the problem rests betwen the diferences of the rational and the experiential.  Second, what remains quite puzzling is the isue of emotional investment. I have often wondered whether an expert was supportive or resistant to the medium upon which they were focused (as many have puzzled over the role of the art critic). Coming from my background, art critics, art historians, art scholars and art journalists, largely tend to be emotionaly invested in art appreciation, while cultural critics appear to swing in either direction (a position not easily defined). Arguably, criticism ay be sen as an art form, yet, those who do not practice or have not mastered fluency in the art they are critiquing, are in danger of producing a detached, rational impresion that difers vastly from the subjective ones experienced by the artists themselves. This unfortunate state of afairs renders critical interpretations as having an air of pedantry with some mean-spiritednes atached. Of course, this brings up other isues pertinent to expertise, not the least of which is our subjective preferences.  From a linguistic perspective, we are al experts in our maternal tongue, rarely making the kind of gramatical or syntactical erors of foreign speakers. Nonetheles, we are les than expert in trying to explain the structures of language, making us sem rather naïve in our use of language. Expertise, it would sem, requires both a profound subjective experience, richly  87 endowed with emotion, and an objective rational understanding that can pull apart the elements of a complex system without losing sight of our emotional salience. It is not clear that either the language or film expert emerged from such a holistic center. What is more likely is that the emergent experts in film arts were more or les ‘technicians’ favoring film’s function as language or social mediator.  As Kracauer (1960) aptly noted, “The pervasive growth of technology has given birth to an army of technicians trained to supply and service the innumerable contrivances without which modern civilization cannot be imagined…the esence of al of them is tantamount to their function” (p. 292). He contrasted the ‘army of technicians’ with that of the artist since, “artists have a way of sensing and baring states of mind of which the rest of us are only dimly aware” (p. 294). This statement aligns itself with McLuhan’s (1988) declaration that, “artists are the antennae” of society (p. 6). I can only surmise in these statements that the diference betwen the expert technician and artist is precisely what ‘machines’ are incapable of possesing, namely, emotional awarenes. By technician, I am also speaking of the merely ‘rational,’ which Damasio (1999) clearly showed through compeling evidence to be no les than a ‘technique’ or device for decision-making (such as the ability to perform a cost-benefit analysis). Individuals who have diminished emotional capacity due to brain lesions but are otherwise completely rational have shown to be stymied by decisions requiring emotional valence (i.e., values).  Why this isue of expertise or what one may cal relational authority is important extends to the problem an artist researcher faces when discerning betwen the varied theories that underpin film scholarship. That discernment is not just a mater of degre, it is central to an artist turned arts educational researcher. Whose expert view should the artist lean upon to help frame their understanding once turned art educator and researcher? Which expert can best support and deepen what one tacitly knows as an artist and teacher gained through the subjective  88 experiencing of art and teaching? The problem rests partly on whether the analyses based on theories of a ‘technical nature,’ which are often chalenged by subjective experiences, are able to reach concomitance. And partly on the isue of the intent behind the expert, which can so easily be governed by ideology (i.e., utopian view). At any rate, the media and film expert, acording to Anderson (2008), was made up of university scholarship and “founded upon the emergent authority of the human sciences…namely anthropology, psychology, sociology—disciplines whose application to practical tasks discursively produced various forms of modern expertise as so many sets of power relations, e.g., anthropologist/native, psychologist/patient, sociologist/deviant” (p. 39). Reading from the list, I wonder if not also scholar/artist could be added. The forces at play may wel fit with Foucault’s view of “modern scientific disciplines” as “sites of power” (Anderson, 1985, p. 39) but, as noted, it is not limited to the scientific but to empirical disciplines at large. To complicate the problem of authority, while perusing the mision statements expresed by varying organizations on media literacy, for instance, in Canada as in the United States, it is the intent behind the expert that leaves one unsetled. It is dificult to determine which view prevails as a thread of continuity betwen early thinkers and which view deviates from that course of thinking and action. The Canadian Center for Media Literacy (CML), which is also part of the Aliance for a Media Literate America (AMLA), for instance, has established its authority while making the following statement, To become a succesful student, responsible citizen, productive worker, or competent and conscientious consumer, individuals need to develop expertise with the increasingly sophisticated information and entertainment media that addres us on a multi-sensory level, afecting the way we think, fel and behave.  As if in response to some form of criticism, they adjoin this anti-media ‘disclaimer.’ Finaly, while media literacy does raise critical questions about the impact of media and technology, it is not an anti-media movement. Rather, it represents a coalition of concerned individuals and organizations, including educators, faith- 89 based groups, health care-providers, and citizen and consumer groups, who sek a more enlightened way of understanding our media environment.  Coinciding with the mision statement is also a statement in a section entitled, Values education, which expreses the following, The mas media are an ideal resource for the discussion of moral dilemas, the development of moral reasoning, and the use of techniques such as values clarification. Dialogical reasoning, which has ben described as an important part of critical thinking, can play a significant role in discussions of topics such as the pros and cons of the mas media, government control of media, censorship, advertising, and the moral values identified in popular television and films. Consult the bibliography in the ministry's resource guide Personal and Societal Values (Toronto: Ministry of Education, Ontario, 1983) for further information on values education.  Based on the preceding, projects aimed toward media literacy contain important ideas, yet do not clarify who the expert is that is conducting research, influencing or making policies, directing educational curriculum, and forming pedagogical practices in response to our concern with images and sound. To a particularly keen observer of ideology, some clues are imbedded in the language used to describe their aim. For instance, a ‘values education’ statement caries very strong implications that normative values based on ‘moral’ grounds are being upheld.  That a ‘values education’ is founded upon moral concerns may not come as a surprise given the long history of the role of religious thinkers with a deep commitment to educating the young. The trend for religious leaders in media education began by the 1920s with the aforementioned Reverend Short, followed in the 1960s with Father John Culkin, the later appointed by Marshal McLuhan to become felow at the University of Toronto's Centre for Culture and Technology and whose appointment was announced by McLuhan as having, “obtained the services of John Culkin, the film Jesuit, who is known throughout the world among film-makers and teachers.” And, finaly, with the current Director of the Jesuit Communication  90 Project in Toronto, Father John J. Pungente, who “continues his main work of promoting Media Education across Canada.”  Indeed, there have been many with religious convictions in Canada and the US laboring to promote film and media literacy, which has led me to wonder what may have been and continues to be their underlying motive. Moreover, whether they are supportive or resistant to film and new media in general, what steps have they taken to reach out to scientific research for further understanding? Given the conflict betwen religions and sciences, it is troubling to think that there is a very real possibility that science has not been part of the discourse and policies that concern the mas production of images, their latest developments and impact on the individual. Simply put, decision makers and the public require more than rhetoric or convictions that lean heavily on moral grounds.  Finaly, given the influences that religion has had on the field of media literacy in research and pedagogy, ought there be concern? In light of the long asociation betwen religion and education throughout history, it is tempting to view values education as solely being the providence of the religiously motivated, which inevitably raises concern in an era of the separation of state and religion. To be fair, however, moral reasoning is the capacity to judge and asign responsibility for actions taken—our own as much as another—which is not merely a religious concern. Moral reasoning, it may be argued, is part of being a responsible and judging human (Arendt, 2003). And the fact that religious and educational institutions have been the principle vehicles for delivering a moral-based education is perhaps something neuropsychology can bring to light without the century long polemics. The question that remains unanswered, however, is the distinctions in moral reasoning and whether there is room for a broader discourse.  91 Not every concerned investigator in media literacy or communication arts has held a notable religious background. For instance, communications guru Edgar Dale who published the 1933, How to appreciate motion pictures, which became the best-seling volume from out of the Payne Fund Studies, “pursued a program of film education in concert with Ohio State University and the National Council of Teachers of English.” In general, he appeared enthusiastic toward film after “commending a cannon of approved movies such as the adaptations of A tale of two cities, Great expectations, A midsummer nights dream, Anne of Gren Gables, and so on” (Grieveson, 2008, p. 22). That sort of selective curriculum, however, has troubled film theorists (as much as it has literary theorists), since their aim was to study al films in order to deepen our understanding of the breadth and depth of human nature. Not merely works that uphold moral values but works that ‘teach’ us something about the nature of being human. The fact remains that educational film programs (i.e., viewing and critiquing) “were conceived as a way of destroying the mietic efects of cinema” made possible with the list that Dale (1933) promoted as folowing from the “model of spectatorship advanced by the Payne Studies as a whole” (p. 22). Seting aside the notion of ‘mietic efects,’ one can begin to surmise that Dale was governed by a moral code based on normative values and ‘common’ folk wisdom. Searching for a new direction Why should any of the foregoing mater? In light of the inexhaustible body of work on film studies found in books, trade magazines, and academic journals—in libraries and on the Internet—an historical perspective on motives and drives behind film research and study clearly demonstrates the importance of the subject of film. For complex social, psychological, and cultural reasons, film is not simply a fascination, but a cause for profound concern. Nonetheles, in light of the diversity of theories, which span more than a hundred years with no explanatory  92 whole, many theorists have abandoned any hope of achieving a grand theory of film (Smith, 2003). Whatever may be said of film today, many theorists are cautiously treading where once they spoke with definite asurance. This caution can be sensed across many fields of research, largely because the naive belief we once held, which was that science and technology would solve many complex human isues, has been thwarted by escalating concerns that have turned global and epidemic. Given the numerous technological calamities—principaly rooted in physics, chemistry, and biology—we are slowly gaining a view of technology that it is best directed toward problems of logic, not problems with the kind of complexity that make up humans, cultures, and societies. As one sifts through the literature on film, one finds complex human themes that have been cycled through theories in psychology, sociology, politics, and economics—al manners in which humans have been entangled throughout history. The range of those complex themes—representation, meaning, subject formation, identification, ideology, agency, subjectivity, and authority—have been theorized anew under what appears as new conditions (e.g., modern or postmodern). Yet the same underlying motives and drives permeate new frameworks as the generation previous, namely, an emotionaly laden logic imbued with values of ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ It is the ‘loop of logic’ that led Latour (1993) to make the claim that “we have never been modern.” Though he did not base this view on the study of emotions and values, Latour had a point. Nonetheles, without understanding the atached emotions and values imbedded in logic, we are bound to create an eternal loop of reasoning from which there is no escape. What we end up with are interminable descriptions of universal themes retold in particular ways. Of course, the descriptive always reaches a state of exhaustion before an explanation that would lead to a solution is ventured. In the area of film studies, an explanation began when Christian Metz  93 (1974) ventured to compare film with language. Dependent on emerging studies in structural and cognitive linguistics, Metz’ efort to explain film works were foiled by new film forms linked to new technologies in sound and photography. In esence, Metz’ theories underwent half a century of critique and although his work made a tremendous impact in film studies, his ideas were also both lauded and discredited due to the many descriptive examples of new film forms. As in the case of the novel, film explanations always faced an exception to the rule (Caseti, 1999). Had Metz read Bakhtin’s (1981) view of the novel, which has in common with film a form that is always in flux, he might have been able to envision the dificulty he was bound to encounter. The salience of technology is not merely an element of film works. Cosmology, mechanical physics, chemistry, and biology—have relied on two thousand years of mere descriptive understanding, with explanations defered to philosophy. These were given explanatory depth through technologies capable of seing macro and microelements. Neuroscience has also benefited from evolutions in technology. Given the limited manner in which the brain could be studied, descriptions in neuroscience semed to be al that could be ventured for several hundred years, with explanations and solutions defered to philosophy and psychology. Today, neurological explanations are being posited, which would lead to real solutions, because as Ramachandran (2004) expresed, scanning technologies—leading to designing beter experiments—are giving us aces to what lays inside the ‘black box.’ Through the countles eforts to describe phenomena in film, many have made speculative, rational explanations only to be displaced by the next, more eloquent interpretation. Quasi-experiments in psychology and sociology have loaned theoretical frameworks to film studies that tend toward isolating elements from the whole or reducing and simplifying complex mental proceses and social interactions. In turn, those theories have been both simplified and conflated through film analyses (Smith, 2003). In film works, rather than the ‘brain peering into  94 the brain,’ as the frontier of neurology appears to lead us, we appear to have something made by the brain, which is yet entirely removed from the brain—something purely technological or artistic. Or is it?  In truth, theories and analyses in film studies reflect areas of human concern that have changed litle over the centuries and for which we have had litle capacity to resolve (e.g., mietic efects, identification, and subject formation). What remains is not beter film analysis or a beter way to penetrate technology, but to understand consciousnes and the brain-mind-body problem because technology is a human expresion of inquiry. Technology has brought us ever closer to the age-old, self-conscious question: Why are we here? Though not yet answerable, understanding consciousnes and exploring mental proceses from a holistic perspective (i.e., brain-mind-body) has taken our concern into new directions. Largely this is due to the fact that technologies are helping us to peer further into the brain as it has done into the heavens (Damasio, 1999; Ramachandran, 1998; Sacks, 2010). The embodied brain has appeared to us as a black box, which has prevented us from understanding its workings. Yet we are growing closer to capturing mental proceses and in so doing, understanding human cognition, emotion, motivation, drives, and intent (Grodal, 2009). Reflecting on the urgent call to action  Of the individuals world-wide now fully intoxicated with inexhaustible images, none have become so thoroughly drunk as children and youth whose estimated time spent in front of the television, Internet, and PDA’s (personal digital asistants) has lengthened and intensified beyond anyone’s expectations at the turn of the 21st century (Kaiser Family Foundation Study, 2010). This increased duration and intensity is dificult to explain in rational terms, making it increasingly dificult to curb the latest advances in imagery. Yet, through anecdotal reporting, one notes the concerns that have been raised as we move into the latest technological invention  95 in 3-D images. Not able to make conclusive statements as to the cause of such mental ‘disturbances,’ we are faced with only one option, namely, to reconsider what constitutes an image and its relationship with our brain-body. Putting this latest phenomenon into context makes our present world sem rather unique in the history of humankind. Our world is experiencing images in a manner unprecedented in human history, with innovations being introduced at an acelerated tempo with no sign of slowing down. From personal experience, I have sen that even in remote, impoverished regions of the world, audio-visual media are acesed via community resources with links to larger metropolises made possible by infrastructures in transportation, optic cables, and satelite. The idea of ‘remote locations’ has been forever altered. For anyone who aims toward ensuring a safe and healthy environment for children, there is much to consider. In what direction should this dramatic change take those whose concerns lay in children and youth as they grow, study, and mature into adulthood? Certainly interest in the education of the child is as varied as the fields of concentration aimed toward understanding the many facets that make us human. And every field hopes to contribute in meaningful ways to understand the pedagogical consequences to the psychological, emotional, social, intelectual, physical, and spiritual development of the child or youth as such. But the enormity of asembling such diverse views, with the hope of finding our way through the tide of initiatives in order to best serve our children and youth, sems almost inconceivable. It also fels that when we rush the decisions, we may cause further harm rather than good. In the ensemble of theories and methodologies, one may wonder, what are the avenues that can help position and guide educational researchers to beter understand the course of knowledge in coming years with a litle more circumspect? Is there time to be circumspective in such a sped-up environment? Clearly, film’s impact on children has been on people’s minds  96 since as early as 1909 (Grieveson & Wason, 2008). Without wishing to overstate the points outlined thus far, the following brief acount concludes that a century has not be sufficient in bringing us to conscious terms with the feling of urgency that motivates and drives our research and policies.   When Alice Miler Mitchel (1929) published her lengthy qualitative study, replete with statistics of children’s film “behaviors and atitudes,” her study drew the atention of educators, sociologists, and psychologists with interest in child behavior and dispositions, which in turn, prompted several published reviews. Naturaly enough, each specialist took a diferent perspective on the study’s conclusion. Some were ‘positive’ in their critique. One pair of authors thought Mitchel’s study showed undeniably that, “Al clases prefered movies to reading, but the delinquents more especialy” (Bernard & Bernard, 1930, p. 127). One author considered the study “shows conclusively that atendance at motion-picture exhibitions is a regular experience with the vast majority of city children” (Freman, 1930, p. 636).  Others were significantly les positive. One atacked the methodology and conclusions, suggesting instead that, “This book is realy a statistical collection of opinions…the interpretive sections al grow out of more or les common asumptions made by social workers, juvenile judges, recreation directors, and school authorities about the deleterious efects of the motion picture upon conduct” (Young, 1930, p. 307). Yet another indicated that, “What the data actualy show is that al of the children are alike in prefering play to movies” (Peters, 1930, p. 207). Within such vast perspectives one can begin to detect a familiar debate that stil centers then, as it does today, on the problem of epistemology and methodology. The knowledge digital ethnographic experts presently offer To update the debate that took place under a sense of urgency at the turn of the twentieth century, the following puts maters into a current context. In the words of digital ethnographer  97 and YouTube specialist Michael Wesch (2009), “This new media environment can be enormously disruptive to our curent teaching methods and philosophies” (p. 1). Thus it would appear that our concerns cary the same threads of the early empirical film studies. But in what manner are new media environments disruptive? Is it contributing to youthful ‘delinquency’ as it was thought to do in Mitchel’s day?  Acording to Wesch, this new virtual world, made up of images, sound and writen text, is disrupting traditional schooling with “physical structures” designed for transmiting information, implacable “social structures” in the form of “standardized testing” that evaluates the degre to which information has been acquired, and “cognitive structures,” which has shifted a traditional understanding of space-time (pp. 1-2). Given Einstein’s concern with the indexical now and the enduring problems dividing physics from the human experience, one wonders just how our view of space-time has been altered, and whether Wesch can provide us with the answer. In a strange turn of events, however, acording to Wesch, the ‘delinquents’ of today are researchers (i.e., faculty members) who wish to “subvert the system.” It is interesting how ‘delinquency’ has been recast. In Wesch’s view, it is not the youth who display deviant behavior from the norm, rather it is those scholars who also atempt to instruct through these new technologies. Understandably, the ubiquity of images and sound, as these exploded on the scene at the start of the 21st century, makes it dificult for many educators to sustain learning through ‘old’ traditional approaches.  Perhaps there is a dual mesage in Wesch’s analysis. Perhaps his thoughts follow the sequence of causation that media has disrupted youth, which in turn now disrupts the system of education. In any case, taking his argument at face value, the disruption of which he speaks appears to be betwen traditional and new forms of teaching and learning. By consequence, he is  98 part of the new vanguard of scholars repositioned to promote new media and, along with it, new approaches to research and pedagogy. But one does not get the sense that this promotion is in favor of a new generation finding their voice and generating critical views. Wesch’s ethnographic work, particularly on the development of YouTube, suggests something of the old ‘authoritarian’ spirit remains. For instance, Wesch is not unlike the intelectual elite of the past who saw the rapid change in our environment as requiring experts poised to be able to mediate or manage (perhaps control) the learning of children and youth. We are thus, imediately thrown back to a time when it was thought necesary to create a particular kind of expert, namely film or media scholar, able to interpret the physical, social, and mental change and to translate this for those unable to make the shift. As an arts educator, more inclined to explore collaborative proceses with learners that lead to critical and creative thinking, the expert presence becomes a misplaced interpretation of the role of the pedagogue.  Thus, it is interesting to note that, then as now, ethnographers are positioned at the front lines to offer us convincing views, for instance, Wesch’s popular 2002 YouTube video: The machine is us/ing us. There is something disconcerting, perhaps even disingenuous, about a digital ethnographer using digital video to persuade us. Curiously, my university students have picked out a subtext in his videos that counter his main text—one that they fel is manipulative (the author, that is, not the medium as Wesch had hoped to show). I do not wish to suggest Wesch has consciously set out to promote his ideas through devious means, rather, it is clear that the use of video caries ethical implications in a research context aimed to defining and explaining the medium of video. I would expect no les meta-awarenes of a writen context. What would be the point behind the study of language if not to acquire an understanding of its ethical use in society? In anthropology, ethical concerns of this  99 kind dates back to the uses of photograph and documentary film—a history that made many anthropologists wary of tampering or ‘staging’ visual and aural data (Barnouw, 1993). Aside from ethics, what is curious is that my students gave a critical ‘reading’ of the video independent of any comments from e. Some researchers would have said that their competency to read a video is a result of highly developed language skils. In this statement one would asume that language is the optic through which to understand film. Yet, acording to my personal observations, the fact is that whether the viewers are made up of university students or youth with ‘low’ literacy rates, al viewers demonstrate the ability to ‘read’ video criticaly. This phenomenon, which was ilustrated so wel at the end of Rouch’s 1960 film, Chronicle of a Summer, a broad swath of individuals are able to criticaly ‘read’ moving images (Rouch, 2003). This wel known fact continues to elude film theorists and researchers. Due to the type of resistance shown by first year undergraduate students toward acepting film analyses as they are presented in the clasroom, many film educators, analysts and theorists wil contend that the depth of reading depends on the level of filmic knowledge. But that kind of bias only reinforces an authoritative view that cannot easily acount for creative or logical conclusions made by ‘naïve’ readers. Moreover, the capacity to read ‘virtual’ moving images appears to entail certain ‘competencies’ similar to language, which point to cognitive proceses. Those mental proceses, however, leave out the ‘social’ proceses involved in communication since both filmic and writen texts do not have a communication ‘back-and-forth.’ This confusing state of afairs questions both the expert views of film ethnographers and cognitive film theorist to explain social and structural phenomena as occurring in a film context.    100 The knowledge communication experts presently offer Besides ethnographers, there are other experts on the front lines of study offering slightly diferent views. Media and communication theorist, Henry Jenkins (2006) outlines, “thre concerns [that] suggest the need for policy and pedagogical intervention.” The first of these current concerns is what he cals the “participation gap,” whereby al youth are not fully prepared for “participation in the world of tomorrow.” Second, “the transparency problem,” which “chalenges young people…to se clearly the ways that media shape perceptions of the world” And third, “an ethics chalenge,” which is felt in the “breakdown of traditional forms of profesional training and socialization that might prepare young people for their increasing public roles as media makers and community participants” (p. 3). What Jenkins and Wesch both sem to suggest and share in principle, is that there exists a gap betwen the youth now actively engaged in image and sound production (as it is readily apparent on YouTube) and traditional print-bound educators. And both are poised to suggest that media shapes perception (whether cognitively, emotionaly or socialy). Yet, Jenkins extends his argument to include an ethical chalenge to youth becoming full members of society, which alows them to, “articulate their understanding of how media shapes perceptions, and has been socialized into the emerging ethical standards that should shape their practices as media makers” (p. 4). Here Jenkins argues that youth, being not yet ful members of society (asumingly politicaly and economicaly), require expert intervention to help them to articulate how media shapes perception as wel as how they are socialized, or ought to be, acording to new ethical standards emerging in society. Those principles, as far as I can determine, neither disfavors youth nor new media.  101 It is perhaps a truism that a digital gap exists betwen learner and teacher, though I suspect this is not particularly unique to our time, despite what is sen as the ‘digital shift’ as it is depicted in the popular Shift happens series on YouTube. From a linguistics viewpoint, the video may be an ideal example of film’s referential-indexical capacity, for its content begs the question: is the content speaking through a first person singular, and, if so, who is doing the talking? This is an important question to pose if one is to try to deconstruct what is meant by what Jenkins and Wesch, cal the “digital native” in contrast with the “digital non-native.” And which voice, whether native or non-native, is in authority? But the language that is used to describe the ‘generation gap,’ such as ‘analogue’ and ‘digital,’ creates confusion as to what has specificaly caused the gap in the first place, since there is a lack of precision in the use of the two adjectives. In other words, caling today’s generation “digital natives” confounds how “digital” media impacts today’s generation diferently than those preceding it given the binary nature of the writen language versus the analogue nature of natural language or the traditional arts (such as music, visual art and dance).  As linguists and media specialists have noted, the writen word is a linear, sequential digital medium (i.e., in that writen leters are the smalest logical units to represent linguistic sounds)—precisely as are computer languages. The confusion appears to rest in the fact that “digital” new media produce ‘holographic’ projections that imitate traditional analogue systems (e.g., natural language, images, sounds, and movement), which are multi-directional or non-linear. The first word procesing system that alowed us to produce non-linear text by moving text around (as Wesch’s video ilustrates) is simply a medium imitating what we have always been able to produce through spoken word and other art forms, namely, syntactic flexibility. Certainly the traditional forms of visual art, music, and dance have always possesed the  102 temporal-spatial qualities that are now found at the touch of a mouse (or fingertip). What, therefore, can be said to have altered our analogue proceses through digital new media?   Philosophers, linguists, neurologists, and cognitive scientists, having described the writen word as a digital abstraction, provide compeling ideas and facts regarding the relationship of the writen word with thought. To suggest that youth today are “digital natives” ultimately overlooks certain kinds of knowledge, then oversimplifies the cause and complicates the phenomenon we are witnesing today. Ultimately, this creates an unnecesary tension where there need not be one. In other words, the isue of “digital natives” may be nothing more than a red hering that serves to divide us conveniently into two groupings (the technologicaly adroit and the non), ultimately distracting us from reflecting more deeply on the mater.  While more could be said on this isue, one final thought sums up the foregoing. Whatever aspect of the human being one views new media to afect, whether cognitive, social, emotional, physical or spiritual, media (signs, symbols, objects, etc.) have been predominantly viewed to shape or form human beings in some fashion. The form, in other words, is informing the human. In neither the positions taken by Jenkins or Wesch, do they clearly expres that all media, as extensions of thought, both inform us and are, in turn, deformed by us. Although Wesch shows the ease with which we are able to move text around on a virtual page or shift from one image to another seamlesly, the slight of hand sems to underscore the medium’s hold over us rather than acknowledging the creative capacity to capture ideas on video—something that machines have never been shown to posses. There is something uncannily Hollywood in such a position that ventures that the “machine is us/ing us.”  On the other hand, perhaps I am not doing the field of cybernetics due justice (if this is Wesch’s position). Cybernetics (which is also a branch of communication studies) has certainly given food for thought, not the least of which, ofered by Donna Haraway (1991) in her seminal  103 esay, A cyborg manifesto. I cannot hide the fact, however, that Haraway’s view of esentialism and naturalism is not one that I share. Despite my deep admiration of al those who have resisted and continue to resist normative values, I disagre with her claim that, “We are al chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs” (p. 150).  I disagre on the ground that humans are entirely organic in nature. To confuse the fact that our use of technology, including language, informs our brains with the imaginative view of Roddenbery’s cyborgs, is rather like comparing our brain-body-mind to clocks or machines. Our entirely organic impulse to create, that is our human evolutionary inheritance, is one that needs careful consideration in the face of the many forces that continue to do harm to our lives and dignity. Nowhere then or now has the evolution of human beings been the result of machine/organ mutation, except in Hollywood films.  Finaly, this lopsided view of media sems to position vulnerable segments of society (e.g., youth, the artist, the ‘non-expert’) as either ‘victims’ or ‘champions’ of new media (depending on one’s expert view); and ultimately puts new media as the primary and unstoppable force, acording to Wesch, that is rendering traditional schooling insignificant, which is not much diferent from the kind of view experts ofered in Mitchel’s day. What is confusing to an educator or an artist is the dichotomy betwen ‘traditional’ and ‘new.’ Once again, our research or schooling problems, may lay in the fact that educational researchers and teachers overlook compeling ideas, oversimplify a cause and complicate the isue by the lack of precision in the use of the terms traditional and new. Before we begin to name, define, and explain the relationships betwen words and ideas, we must, at the very least, begin to c