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Sources of information supporting estimates of unreported fishery catches (IUU) for 59 countries and.. Pramod, Ganapathiraju; Pitcher, Tony J.; Pearce, John; Agnew, David 2008

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Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 3   Fisheries Centre Research Reports  2008   Volume 16   Number  4     Sources Of Information Supporting Estimates Of Unreported Fishery Catches (IUU) For 59 Countries And The High Seas          Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Canada ISSN 1 98-6727 Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 5  SOURCES OF INFORMATION SUPPORTING ESTIMATES OF UNREPORTED FISHERY CATCHES (IUU) FOR 59 COUNTRIES AND THE HIGH SEAS    by Ganapathiraju Pramod, Tony J.  Pitcher,  John Pearce, and David Agnew       Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4)  242  pages  © published 2008  by   The Fisheries Centre,  University of British Columbia, 2202 Main  Mall Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z4  and   Marine Resources Assessment Group, London,  United Kingdom       ISSN 1198-67   Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 1  F I S H E R I E S  C E N T R E  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  V O L U M E  1 6  N U M B E R  4  2 0 0 8   SOURCES OF INFORMATION SUPPORTING ESTIMATES OF UNREPORTED FISHERY CATCHES (IUU)  FOR 59 COUNTRIES AND THE HIGH SEAS     by Ganapathiraju Pramod, Tony J. Pitcher,  John Pearce and David Agnew   CONTENTS Page Director’s Foreword ...................................................................................................................4  Executive Summary  ................................................................................................................... 5  HIGH SEAS IUU REPORTS  CCAMLR   ...................................................................................................................6 CCSBT   ...................................................................................................................8 ICCAT   ..................................................................................................................11 IOTC    ................................................................................................................. 12 NAFO   ................................................................................................................. 13 NEAFC   ................................................................................................................. 15 Country Notes  ..................................................................................................................17  COUNTRY IUU REPORTS  Angola    ................................................................................................................28 Argentina   .................................................................................................................32 Australia   ................................................................................................................. 37 Bangladesh  .................................................................................................................48 Brazil   .................................................................................................................52 Canada   .................................................................................................................54 Chile    .................................................................................................................59 China   .................................................................................................................65 Denmark   ................................................................................................................. 67 Ecuador   ..................................................................................................................71 Egypt      ................................................................................................................. 73 Faroes   ................................................................................................................. 76 France   .................................................................................................................78 Germany   ................................................................................................................. 81 Ghana   .................................................................................................................85 Iceland   .................................................................................................................89 India    .................................................................................................................92 Indonesia   .................................................................................................................96 Iran    ............................................................................................................... 104 Ireland   ............................................................................................................... 107 Italy    ................................................................................................................ 111 Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 2  Japan   ............................................................................................................... 115 Latvia   ................................................................................................................117 Liberia   ...............................................................................................................120 Malaysia   ...............................................................................................................122 Mauritania   ...............................................................................................................126 Mexico   ...............................................................................................................129 Morocco   ............................................................................................................... 133 Mozambique  ............................................................................................................... 137 Myanmar   ...............................................................................................................142 Namibia   ...............................................................................................................144 Netherlands  ...............................................................................................................148 New Zealand  ...............................................................................................................150 Nigeria   ............................................................................................................... 153 North Korea  ............................................................................................................... 157 Norway   ...............................................................................................................160 Pakistan   ...............................................................................................................164 Peru    ............................................................................................................... 167 Philippines   ...............................................................................................................170 Poland   ............................................................................................................... 175 Portugal   ............................................................................................................... 177 Russia   ............................................................................................................... 179 Senegal   ...............................................................................................................184 Seychelles   ............................................................................................................... 187 Sierra Leone  ...............................................................................................................188 South Africa  ...............................................................................................................189 South Korea  .............................................................................................................. 200 Spain   .............................................................................................................. 204 Sri Lanka   ...............................................................................................................213 Sweden   ...............................................................................................................216 Taiwan   .............................................................................................................. 220 Tanzania   .............................................................................................................. 223 Thailand   .............................................................................................................. 226 Turkey   .............................................................................................................. 230 Ukraine   .............................................................................................................. 232 United Kingdom  .............................................................................................................. 233 USA    .............................................................................................................. 236 Vietnam   .............................................................................................................. 239 Yemen   ...............................................................................................................241       A Research Report from the Fisheries Centre at UBC and MRAG, London, UK  Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4) 242  pages © Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2008  FISHERIES CENTRE RESEARCH REPORTS ARE ABSTRACTED IN THE FAO AQUATIC SCIENCES AND FISHERIES ABSTRACTS (ASFA) ISSN 1198-6727  Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 4  DIRECTOR’S FOREWORD    Two of the many myths about marine fisheries are that they globally catch about 90 million tonnes per year, and that this catch is stagnating because we are now extracting the ‘maximum sustainable yield’, thus fulfilling decades-old predictions of a global potential yield near 100 million tonnes per year. And Bjørn Lomborg – he of the ‘Skeptical Environmentalist’ – even glibly adds that the 10 million tonnes between present catches and the predicted potential is the (small) price we have to pay for overfishing.  The whole thing is, unfortunately, not even remotely so. In fact, a new concept, that of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) catches had to be invented (in addition to the concepts of ‘by-catch’ or ‘discards’) to be able to approach the reality that the ‘catches’ reported to FAO by member countries are only a part of (sometimes even a small part) of official landings, i.e., that the latter, in most cases, considerably under estimate real ‘catches’.  Perhaps is appropriate here to recall that the catch of a fishery (or more precisely its ‘yield’, i.e., its catch in weight) consist of the landing that is reported, plus the landing that is not reported (because it was caught illegally, or by small-scale fishers that nobody cares about), plus the by- catch that was discarded (and which consist of dead animals in the overwhelming majority of cases) plus the losses due to ghost fishing, i.e., the weight of the animals killed by gear (e.g., traps, or gill nets) discarded or lost by that fishery. It is now understood that, to understand a fishery, all these sources of death must be accounted for, especially in the context of ecosystem based management of fisheries. An ecosystem can be, for example, the Exclusive Economic Zone of a given country, in which case complete catches must be known for all fleets, whether national or distant-water fleets.  The fisheries science community has only recently realized the danger of taking at face value the ‘catches’ that member countries submit to FAO. However, their gradual replacement by sound statistics is going to be difficult, as an early experience I had with the catch of the People’s Republic of China illustrates (although the problem, in this case, was over-reporting of catches). Indeed, I predict that a few governments are going to be put on the spot by the present report, which documents substantial IUU catch for many of the many countries it covers. Some of their representatives will even argue with the data presented therein. But they will not present better data.  As the alert reader will notice, this report emphasizes industrial fisheries, and the ‘Illegal’ part of IUU catches. Thus, it neatly complements Fisheries Centre Research Reports vol. 14(8) (2006), and 15(2) (2008), which present initial steps toward accounting for the catch of small scale fisheries, a major part of the second ‘U’ of IUU. Here too we welcome the outcome of a neat collaboration between the Fisheries Centre and the Marine Resources Assessment Group from the United Kingdom, both groups that have been working on estimating IUU for some time. Through concerted efforts of this sort, it should be possible to overcome some of the myths that the existence of IUU catches have allowed to emerge. The present report will be an important step in this direction.  Daniel Pauly,  Director, Fisheries Centre Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 5  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  Illegal and unreported fishing prejudices the managed recovery of the world’s oceans from severe fish depletions. It is reported to lead to a loss of many billions of dollars of annual economic benefits and has wider consequences for conservation and food supply.   Estimating the level of illegal fishing is, by its very nature, extremely difficult and has not previously been attempted on a global scale. Fishing vessels, especially those fishing in high seas waters and under third party access agreements to EEZ waters, are highly mobile. Although there are a number of studies of the level of IUU fishing in individual fisheries (both EEZs and high seas), in this work we have attempted, for the first time, a detailed study that can provide global estimates of current and historical illegal and unreported catches.  This Report documents source material used in assembling quantitative estimates of illegal fishery catches, unreported catches and discards used in a series of spreadsheet analyses as part of a global estimate of IUU fishing. The results, together with details of the methods used, are published in Agnew et al. (2008, and in prep.) and in Pitcher et al. (in prep.).  High Seas material is based on information from six selected RFMOs, supplemented with notes on high seas activities from individual countries. Information on individual countries is based on material extracted from previous country reports covering compliance with the FAO (UN) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (Pitcher et al. 2006, 2008, 2009), supplemented with some additional and more recent notes. The 59 countries covered here amount to approximately the top 96% of the world fish catch.  References  Agnew, D., Pearce, J., Peatman, T., Pitcher, T.J. and Pramod, G. 2008. The Global Extent of Illegal Fishing.  MRAG, London, U.K., and FERR, Fisheries Centre, UBC, Vancouver, Canada. 32pp. Agnew, D., Pramod, G., Pearce, J., Peatman, J., Watson, R., Beddington, J. and Pitcher, T.J. 2008. The Worldwide Extent Of Illegal Fishing (submitted). Pitcher, T.J., Kalikoski, D. and Pramod, G. (eds) 2006. Evaluations of Compliance with the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 14(2): 1192pp. Pitcher, T.J., Pramod, G., Kalikoski, D. and Short, K. 2008. Safe Conduct? Twelve Years Fishing under the UN Code. WWF, Gland, Switzerland. 55pp. (in press). Pitcher, T.J., Pramod, G., Kalikoski, D. and Short, K. 2009. Evaluations of Compliance with the FAO (UN) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Nature (in press).   ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  We would like to acknowledge Anna Mees for much help with the editing of this material, and the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies at University of British Columbia for providing resources for a workshop between MRAG and FERR in early 2008. Partial financial support for Ganapathiraju Pramod was provided by the Sea Around Us project and by DEFRA, United Kingdom Government.          Ganapathiraju Pramod, Tony J. Pitcher (UBC Fisheries Centre, Canada) John Pearce and David Agnew (MRAG, London, UK) Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 6  CCAMLR (COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES): ANTARCTIC  (HIGH SEAS AND AREAS UNDER NATIONAL JURISDICTION)  Summary of information concerning IUU fishing  Overview   The Antarctic Ocean is covered by three FAO regions 48 (Atlantic Antarctic), 58 (Indian Antarctic) and 88 (Pacific Antarctic).  The development of fisheries within Antarctic waters commenced in the late 1960’s and 1970’s with the development of fisheries for notothenids and for krill in area 48 around South Georgia.  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing  The Sub-Antarctic and Antarctic fisheries for Patagonian and Antarctic toothfish species Dissostichus eleginoides and D. mawsoni have been subject to Illegal and Unregulated fishing from the early 1990s  These high value species are caught by longlines at between 500m and 2000m deep around the Antarctic continent and sub-Antarctic islands. IUU fishing for toothfish in the Southern Ocean has received a great deal of attention over the past few years.  The illegal toothfish fishery was first recorded in 1991 with catches being taken from subarea 48.3 around South Georgia.  With increasing surveillance around South Georgia the illegal fishers moved their attention eastwards towards the South African and French territories of Prince Edward and Marion Islands and Crozet Islands, and by late 1996 had reached Kerguelen Island and the Heard and MacDonald Islands.  At its height, in 1997, CCAMLR estimates that 32,600 t was taken illegally by bottom longliners with a value of $160M (Agnew 2000).  By 2004 CCAMLR estimated that the catch was about 3000 t, which equates to about $40M (CCAMLR, 2004). Thus, even at its height the value of this IUU catch was not particularly significant in world terms.   The reason why this fishery attracted so much publicity is probably that IUU was well estimated, publicly discussed by CCAMLR and publicised by a number of NGO and industry groups (e.g., ISOFISH ; Fallon and Krikoken, 2004) due to the potentially damaging effects of the illegal fleets on endangered seabird populations.  The majority of the early IUU catch was taken from the EEZ areas within the CCAMLR Convention Area  but by 2002 the growing enforcement presence from the coastal states had forced IUU vessels to fish more in high seas parts of the Convention Area, especially close to the Antarctic continent in the Indian Ocean sector (Area 58) and in the Ross Sea (88.1 / 88.2).  There have even been suggestions that there is an organised crime component to IUU fishing for toothfish (Austral Fisheries, 2002).  A full series of estimated IUU catches by area is published annually by CCAMLR (e.g., CCAMLR, 2007a).  Discards  Very few discards occur in the Antarctic fisheries in terms of volume.  Catches are dominated by the krill fisheries which do not suffer from a large scale discarding problem as the majority of the krill catch will be mealed.  Some catches within the other Antarctic fisheries for icefish and toothfish may be discarded e.g., undersized icefish.  CCAMLR Conservation Measures are implemented by Contracting Parties’ vessels. Discarding is monitored by independent scientific observers on board the vessels. A number of rules have been implemented to minimise the discarding of fish, e.g., CCAMLR Conservation Measure 33/03 details a “move on” rule where a vessel catching greater than 1t of any bycatch species (which may be discarded) must move 5 nautical miles before setting again (CCAMLR, 2007b).    For all high-latitude fisheries (i.e. south of 60°S), such as those in the Ross Sea, there is a discard ban within CCAMLR waters.  This is implemented in CM 26-01(2006) where para 5 states that “Vessels fishing south of 60°S shall be prohibited from dumping or discharging:…” which includes offal which would include any discarded fish.    Unreported catches  Most the fisheries within CCAMLR have relatively few problems with bycatch (e.g., krill) and are well reported by their flag states to CCAMLR.  There have been minor problems with the non-reporting of Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 7  bycatch species such as skates and rays and macrourids.  These non-reporting problems have been identified and rectified in many cases due to the level of scientific observer coverage within the fisheries.  CCAMLR as an RFMO has the highest proportion of observer coverage of any RFMO at 100% in most fisheries.  There may be an additional mis-reporting of the catch of krill as the majority of krill catches are mealed and have widely varying conversion factors between vessels.  As this is the one CCAMLR fishery currently without 100% observer coverage the fresh weight catches cannot be verified independently as for the other fisheries.  Unreported artisanal catches  There are no artisanal fisheries operating in the Antarctic Ocean.  Unreported recreational catches  There are no known recreational fisheries operating in the Antarctic Ocean.  References  Agnew, D.J. 2000. The illegal and unregulated fishery for toothfish in the Southern Ocean, and the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme. Marine Policy 24: 361 – 374.  Agnew, D.J. 2004. Fishing South; the History and Management of South Georgia Fisheries. Penna Press, UK. 128 pp.  Agnew, D.J. and Kirkwood, G.P. 2005. A statistical method for estimating the level of IUU fishing: application to CCAMLR Subarea 48.3. CCAMLR Science, 12: 119–141. CCAMLR, 2004. Report of the working group on fish stock assessment. Annex 5 of the report of the 23rd meeting of the Scientific Committee, CCAMLR, Hobart. CCAMLR, 2007a. Report of the Meeting of the Fish Stock Assessment Working Group, 2007.  In, Report of the Scientific Committee, Annex 5. Available from www.ccamlr.org. CCAMLR, 2007b. Conservation Measures and Resolutions adopted at CCAMLR-XXVI. 72pp.  http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/07-08/all.pdf  Austral Fisheries, 2002. The alphabet boats: A case study of toothfish poaching in the Southern Ocean. Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd, Mt. Hawthorn, Australia. Fallon, L.D and Kriwoken, L.K. 2004. International influence of an Australian non-governmental organisation in the protection of Patagonian toothfish. Ocean development & international law 35, 221-266.    Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 8  CCSBT (COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA) Summary of information concerning IUU fishing  Overview  The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) is a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation with a single species focus on southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii).  CCSBT was created in 1984 and currently has 5 members, Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan.  The fishery is dominated by longline vessels although some pole and line vessels operate and additional some purse seine fishing occurs to supply raw material for ranching and farming activities.  The number of fishing vessels selected for targeting southern bluefin tuna in the 2005 fishing season was 168. The number of vessels on the high seas off Tasmania / Sydney was 45, the number of vessels on the high seas off Cape Town was 119, and the number of vessels in Southern Indian Ocean was 58 respectively.  In the 1999 fishing season, 227 fishing vessels (30 vessels less than the 1998 fishing seasons) operated, since Japan cut the number of far-seas tuna longliners following the Plan of Action agreed by FAO. In the 2000 fishing season, the number of vessels for SBT was reduced to 172 in accordance with the reduction of the catch limit based on the provisional measures prescribed by ITLOS.  However, since the provisional measures were revoked, 27 vessels were added to the original, and, consequently 199 vessels operated for SBT based on the increase of the catch limit in September. In the 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 fishing season, the number of vessels for SBT was 227, 224, 221 and 222 respectively.   Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported  The level of IUU was estimated at 110 % of the quota levels in 2004.  This has been estimated at in 1985 – 1993 45,000t ($6-8 billion Australian dollars) and 1994 – 2005 13,300t ($4-5 billion Australian dollars: Australia, 2005).  This is the combined estimate of catches taken by flag of convenience vessels and unreported catches taken by Members.   In the recent past, CCBST has reported that significant and increasing volumes of southern bluefin tuna were being taken by flag of convenience vessels and these catches were not being reported. This has been of major concern to the CCSBT as within the current management strategy that has been put in place to allow the stock to rebuild its biomass, the stock needs to be carefully managed and the catch taken by these vessels will undermine the conservation measures taken by Members.   In order to reduce this problem CCSBT has sought the cooperation of these flag states in supporting its management and conservation measures.  The flag states have also been informed that if they continue to catch southern bluefin tuna, the Commission will consider measures, including trade restrictive measures, to be taken against them in accordance with the Action Plan.  Catches of southern bluefin tuna by Japan were systematically underreported over the period 1985 to 2005 (CCSBT was created in 1994).  The extremely high demand for this highly valued product in the Japanese sashimi market lead to the very high market price for the southern bluefin tuna which in turn contributed to the level of IUU by the Japanese fleet.  In 2006 the management model that is used to assess the southern bluefin tuna stocks by CCSBT (the “SBT Operating Model”) was used to evaluate the levels of underreported catches.  This estimation process was critical in gaining an understanding of the effects of the additional unrecorded catches on the dynamics of the southern bluefin tuna stock. Results suggested that the spawning biomass is at a low fraction of its original biomass (B0) and well as below the level that could produce maximum sustainable yield (BMSY). The recruitment strength indications in the last few years are estimated to be well below the levels that were observed in the period 1950-1980.  All scenarios that CCBST investigated suggested that recruitment in the 1990s fluctuated with no overall trend.   The level of reported catch was verified against historical trade statistics by an independent panel. This identified a significant underreporting of southern bluefin tuna catch.  This underreported and over-quota catch has left this stock in a highly vulnerable position.  Estimates of the population size if the over-quota catches had not been taken have estimated that the stock size would be at 5-6 times its current level and Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 9  would be well on the way to recovering to the target biomass of the 1980 level if this would not have already been achieved it would have been very likely by the proposed target date of 2020.  In order to ensure that underreported catch cannot enter markets a number of measures have been implemented over the last decade:  • 100% Tagging and tracking of fish through Japanese markets; • 100% inspection of all SBT vessels landing;  • Trade Information Scheme (TIS) document required for all exports; 1 • Landings limited to 8 specific Japanese ports; • Agreed reduction in quota for Japanese vessels and set for 5 years (2007 – 2011) as follows;        Nominal catch (t)    Allocated catch (t) Japan (2007 – 2011)   6065   3000  Australia  (2007 – 2009)   5265   5265 New Zealand (2007 – 2009)   420   420 Korea  (2007 – 2009)    1140   1140 Taiwan  (2007 – 2009)   1140   1140 •  Furthermore, to contribute to the recovery of the SBT stock, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea undertook to maintain their actual catch below 1,000 tonnes for a minimum of 3 years.  This will result in an actual catch level below 11,530 tonnes for a 3 year period. • Possession, sale or purchase of illegally caught/landed SBT, in other words a tag-less SBT without justifiable reasons, is prohibited.  The trade information scheme operates around the central principle that all CCSBT Members and Cooperating Non-Members require all imports of southern bluefin tuna to be accompanied by a completed CCSBT Statistical Document (similar to the ICCAT bigeye tuna scheme and CCAMLR’s Catch Documentation Scheme for toothfish). The Document must be endorsed by an authorised competent authority in the exporting country and includes extensive details of the shipment such as name of fishing vessel, gear type, area of catch, dates, etc. Shipments not accompanied by this form must be denied entry by the Member country. Completed forms are lodged with the CCSBT Secretariat and are used to maintain a database for monitoring catches and trade. Reconciliation of these forms is conducted against electronic lists of exports submitted by CCSBT Members and Cooperating Non-Members.  The Scheme requires the Document to include the country of destination and to set minimum standards for completion of TIS documents. The requirement to include destination country was made in the light of markets for SBT developing outside CCSBT Members. The CCSBT is also seeking the Cooperation of Non- Member importing countries with the TIS aims. The United States has passed domestic legislation to recognise CCSBT documents with effect from 1 July 2005, which brings trade to the United States under the provisions of the CCSBT Scheme.  The primary implication of the higher catch levels, compared to the estimated catch history with the underreported catches included, is that estimated total spawning stock size is more than double that assessed previously by CCBST. However if quotas were maintained at the previous levels of 14,925t projections predict a short-term decline followed by generally stable but not recovering spawning biomass. Catches of over the previous quota levels would result in very serious threats to the stock and not allow any potential for recovery. In order to allow the spawning biomass to recover the quota allocations should be set at levels lower than before under all the scenarios considered, hence the quota of 11325t and the undertaking of Korea and Taiwan to not take their allocations.   Furthermore there is an additional complication in that southern bluefin tuna is also subject to ranching or farming and the levels of wild caught fish that are subsequently “enhanced” by farms may not be recorded fully.  Southern bluefin tuna farming and market data from 2006 again suggest that southern bluefin tuna catches may have been substantially underreported over the past two decades.   The impact of these unreported catches on the estimates of past total catch and CPUE suggest that the current southern bluefin tuna Management Procedure may not be appropriate and that the Management                                        1 http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/trade_information_scheme.pdf  Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 10  Procedure will need to be revaluated.  Discards  Due to the very high values that southern bluefin tuna obtain in the market place it is extremely unlikely that any southern bluefin tuna will be discarded.  Unreported artisanal and recreational catches  There are no known artisanal or recreational fisheries catching southern bluefin tuna.   References  CCSBT,  2007. Report of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Commission. Australia, 2005. Comparison of CCSBT catch data with Japanese auction sales of frozen SBT. CCSBT- EC/0510/25.  Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.   Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 11  ICCAT (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE  CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS): ATLANTIC OCEAN (PELAGIC HIGH SEAS)  Summary of information concerning IUU fishing   Overview  30 species are of direct importance to ICCAT with bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna and skipjack being the most significant in terms of catch volumes.  Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing operations in the context of high seas fishing are limited to unregulated and unreported catches.  IUU catches have historically been estimated by ICCAT for key species (e.g., bigeye tuna IUU, estimated by analysis of Japanese import data) though concern exists over their accuracy.  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated catches  IUU longliners commenced operations in the ICCAT regulatory area in the early 1980s, with estimated unregulated catches peaking in 1998 (ICCAT, 2008).  IUU bigeye tuna catches in the ICCAT regulatory area were estimated at 25 000 and 3 000 tonnes for 1998 and 2002 respectively, or 33 % and 4 % of total catches (ICCAT, 2008).  This decrease may have been caused by ICCAT resolutions and recommendations implemented to combat IUU including an IUU vessel list (ICCAT, 2007), restrictions on transhipments (ICCAT 1998, 2006) and trade restrictions imposed on countries known to have been involved in IUU fishing within the ICCAT regulatory area (e.g., Georgia2).  IUU catches of bluefin tuna in the ICCAT regulatory area were estimated at 1 to 5% of total reported catch (Restrepo, 2004).  Discards  Estimated discard rates in the tuna fisheries within the ICCAT regulatory area are in general low, where available (ICCAT, 2008).  Unreported artisanal catches  Little information is available on artisanal catches in the high seas of the ICCAT regulatory area.  Unreported recreational catches  Little information is available about recreational catches in the high seas of the ICCAT regulatory area.  References  ICCAT, 2003. Recommendation by ICCAT for bigeye tuna trade restrictive measures on Georgia. http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2003-18-e.pdf ICCAT, 2006. Recommendation by ICCAT establishing a programme for transshipment. http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2006-11-e.pdf. ICCAT, 2007. List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out IUU Fishing Activities in the ICCAT Convention Area. http://www.iccat.es/IUU.htm. Accessed 27 June 2008. ICCAT, 2008. Report for the Biennial Period, 2006-2007, Part II (2007) – Vol 2. ICCAT, 1998. Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Ban on Landings and Transshipments of Vessels From Non-Contracting Parties Identified as Having Committee a Serious Infringement. http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/1998-11-e.pdf. Restrepo, V., 2004. Estimation Of Unreported Catches By ICCAT In: Fish Piracy: Combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OECD.                                          2 ICCAT (2003). Recommendation by ICCAT for bigeye tuna trade restrictive measures on Georgia. http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2003-18-e.pdf Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 12  IOTC (INDIAN OCEAN TUNA COMMISSION) WITH CCSBT:  WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN (PELAGIC HIGH SEAS)  Summary of information concerning IUU fishing   Overview  The key fisheries in the high seas of the Indian Ocean are those targeting sharks and tunas.  Catches have risen steadily from 1950 onwards, increasing from approximately 1 500 tonnes in 1950 to 1 600 000 tonnes in 2003 with catches of tuna species dominating by catch volume (46 % for the period 1950 – 2003)3.  Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing operations in the context of high seas fishing are limited to unregulated and unreported catches.  Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported catches  Unreported catches in the Indian Ocean in general have been high.  IOTC have estimated IUU catches in the Indian Ocean to be approximately 10% of reported catches (Herrera, 2003).  CCSBT has estimated IUU catches as 35 % of its reported catches (CCSBT, 2007).  The levels of unreported tuna catches are assumed to have remained relatively stable throughout 1950 – 2003.  Small longline vessels have historically been implicated in unreported fishing in the Indian Ocean (MRAG, 2005). Clarke et al. (2006) analysed global trade data for shark species and concluded that global trade is three to four times that of recorded catches.  It is likely that unreported catches of sharks in IOTC since 2003 have decreased due to the implementation of resolutions aiming to combat the practise of shark finning (e.g., IOTC Resolution 05/05). Both IOTC and CCSBT have introduced measures to combat IUU including an IUU vessel blacklist (IOTC 2006, 2006) and a Trade Information Scheme (CCSBT, 2006).  Discards  In general, little quantitative information is available on discard rates in the West Indian Ocean.  It is assumed that discards rates in the tuna fishery were high from 1950 through to 1983.  After this period the discard rate decreased with the shift from longline gear to purse seiners.   Unreported artisanal and recreational catches  There are very limited artisanal catches and little information is available about recreational catches in the High Seas of the Western Indian Ocean.  References  CCSBT, 2006. Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program. Available from http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/trade_information_scheme.pdf. Accessed 26/06/08. CCSBT, 2007. Report of the Second Meeting of the Compliance Committee, Canberra, Australia. Clarke et al., 2006. Global estimates of shark catches using trade records from commercial markets, Ecology Letters, 9: 1115–1126. Herrera, M., 2003. Catches of industrial fleets operating under flags of non-reporting countries in the IOTC Area of Competence: An Update. Unpublished IOTC meeting internal paper. IOTC, 2006. Resolution 06/01 on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in the IOTC Area. IOTC, 5p MRAG, 2005. Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries. Available from http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/illegal-fishing-mrag-report.pdf [accessed 12/7/8.]                                          3 High seas catches for West and East Indian Ocean taken from www.seaaroundus.org. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 13  NAFO (NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES ORGANIZATION):   NORTHWEST ATLANTIC OCEAN (HIGH SEAS)  Summary of information concerning IUU fishing   Overview  The high seas of the North West Atlantic Ocean are located within the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation’s (NAFO) regulatory area.  Major directed fisheries within the NAFO regulatory area have targeted inter alia Greenland halibut, plaice, Atlantic redfish, northern prawn, capelin, herring, cod and haddock4.  The cod fisheries on the Flemish cap and the high seas region of the Grand Banks provided the highest catch volumes through to the collapse of the Grand Banks fishery in 1992 with the northern prawn fishery providing the highest catches in the last 10 years.  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated catches  The issue of IUU fishing in NAFO is primarily limited to the unregulated and unreported fishing activities of non contracting parties, although 4.5%, 9.5% and 6.1% of inspections (which would be conducted on Contracting Party vessels) resulted in citations for 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively.  The most frequent infractions included: misreporting of catches; illegal gear attachments; and, infringement of by-catch requirements (NAFO, 2007).    Unregulated catches peaked in the NAFO regulatory area at 47,000 tonnes in 1991, subsequently decreasing to an estimated level of 1,000 tonnes in 1998 (Bray, 2000).  These catches were made by 47 and 4 vessels respectively, flagged to non-contracting parties.  NAFO has implemented a variety of measures to curb IUU fishing, including the formation of the Standing Committee on Fishing Activities of non-Contracting Parties in the Regulatory Area, the NAFO scheme to promote compliance by non- contracting party vessels and the NAFO IUU vessel black-list (NAFO, 2008).  The implementation of NAFO’s IUU mitigation measures has been successful in reducing levels of unregulated and unreported catches.  Discards  Discard rates associated with the main NAFO fisheries are relatively high (Kelleher, 2005), for example discard rates of Spanish vessels in the cod fisheries have been estimated as high as 25% (López Losa, 2001).  Bycatch reduction devices have been implemented by Canadian vessels operating in the NAFO fisheries and NAFO has initiated work on a establishing a database on discards.  All vessels should report discard information on exiting the NAFO Regulatory Area using their vessel monitoring system and an NAF (North Atlantic Format) message.  The shrimp fisheries within NAFO waters are likely to have the same discard rates as the fisheries within the Greenland EEZ.  Sünksen (2007) examined the discard levels of fish in the shrimp fishery within the Greenlandic Exclusive Economic Zone in 2006 and 2007 for NAFO divisions 1B-1E and ICES XIVb.  The average discard rates of fish as recorded by the onboard scientific observers ranged by area from 1.6 % by weight of the shrimp in NAFO 1B to 5.8 % in ICES XIVb (average 2.2%).   The rates normally reported without observer coverage the discard level on average has remained well below 1% for several years.  Unreported artisanal catches  Few, artisanal fisheries exist in the High Seas of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, if any.  Unreported recreational catches  Little information is available about recreational catches in the High Seas of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean.                                        4 High seas catches for the Northwest Atlantic Ocean were taken from www.seaaroundus.org. Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 14   References  Bray, K. 2000. A Global Review of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing. 53 p. Kelleher, K. 2005. Discards in the world’s marine fisheries. An update. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 470. Rome, FAO. 131p. López Losa, E. 2001. Spanish Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) fisheries in Newfoundland in the second half of the 20th century. In: Fisheries Impacts on North Atlantic Ecosystems: Catch, Effort and National/Regional Data Sets. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 9(3): 254 pp Sünksen, K. 2007.  Discarded by-catch in shrimp fisheries in Greenlandic offshore waters 2006-2007.  NAFO SCR Doc 07/88.  Serial No. N5474. NAFO, 2008. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Conservation and Enforcement Measures.  NAFO document 08/1 NAFO, 2007.  Annual compliance review.  NAFO document 07/23.   Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 15  NEAFC (NORTH EAST ATLANTIC FISHERIES COMMISSION):  NORTH EAST ATLANTIC OCEAN (HIGH SEAS)   Summary of information concerning IUU fishing   Overview  Stock assessments within the northeast Atlantic Ocean are carried out by the International Council for the Exploration for the Sea (ICES).  The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is the recognized regional fisheries management organization and implements ICES recommendations within the High Seas areas of concern.   NEAFC itself, however, does not make estimates of IUU fishing in its area. IUU catches are an increasing concern to ICES as a major source of uncertainty in stock assessments within the northeast Atlantic Ocean (ICES, 2005, 2007).  Accurate reports of IUU fishing available to the various ICES working groups are rare and the working groups use analytical techniques similar to those reviewed in MRAG (2005).   Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Catches  There is a unregulated and unreported fishery for redfish in NEAFC waters just outside the Icelandic EEZ along the ridge to the southwest of Iceland.  Here redfish (Sebastes mentella and to a lesser degree Sebastes marinus) is a straddling stock which is managed on the high seas under NEAFC regulation.  Straddling stocks are typically under intensive fishing pressure from inside and outside the regulated areas.  Redfish are also typical of a slow growing deep water species that requires highly precautionary management to avoid overfishing and any over-quota IUU fishing effort is a high risk to the stock.  Catches from the fishery are estimated by the Icelandic Authorities at 30,000t per year 5 which equates to 330 million Norwegian Kr (US$ 58.586 million).The good management of this fishery is also critical as the Reykjanes ridge is an important site for cold-water lophelia corals.  Bottom trawling which may be banned in the legal regulated fleet but an unregulated fleet may ignore such conservation measures and would therefore put these areas of slow growing corals at a much higher risk.  There are a number of successful IUU mitigation strategies that have been recently implemented in this fishery.  NEAFC has a detailed IUU list published on its website detailed the vessels involved in the fishery and requests Members to exercise port state control of vessels on IUU list and not allowing them to use their ports.  The use of vessel detection systems (VDS) and vessel monitoring systems (VMS) allows identification / enumeration of the level of IUU activity in the fishery.  The activities of the IUU fleet have also received a significant amount of negative publicity from environmental organisations.  Cod and haddock in Arctic waters covered by ICES have two areas of high seas enclosed by coastal EEZs.  These fisheries have identified problems with unreported catches that have been estimated by the ICES Arctic Fisheries Working Group (AFWG) by calculating the difference between reported catches and landings.  These unreported and unallocated catches were of the order of 10-25% between 1990 and 1994 and 15-25% between 2002 and 2007 (ICES, 2008).  Illegal catches taken in the mainly EEZ fisheries of the Barents sea are assigned to Norway and Russia in our respective analyses of these countries. WWF reports Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries estimates of the following percentage of the Russian quota being taken, additionally, by Russian vessels in the Barents sea from 2002 – 2007:  cod 47%, 57%, 37%, 47%, 38%, 21%; and haddock 71%, 28%, 33%.  Whitefish fisheries around the high seas areas and coastal EEZs of the Rockall Bank are also  identified as having “Problem but no estimates” for IUU.  This is particularly relevant to the cod and whiting fisheries and discards in this fishery are also a problem for whiting where it may be discarded for the more valuable cod catches.    Mackerel catches in the northeast Atlantic are also identified as having an IUU problem but again no formal estimates of the level of IUU in this fishery are available to ICES working groups.                                        5 http://www.fiskaren.no/incoming/article100308.ece  Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 16   ICES (2005) reports that unregulated and unreported fishing is a “Problem but no estimates” for all the deep water fish species assessed by WG-DEEP for ICES region 10 which covers most of the deep sea ICES areas.  These species include black scabbardfish (Aphanopus carbo), blue ling (Molva dypterygia), goldeneye perch (Beryx splendens), greater forkbeard (Phycis blennoides), greater silver smelt (Glossanodon leioglossus), ling (Molva molva), orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus), roundnose grenadier (Coryphaenoides rupestris) and tusk (Brosme brosme).  Of these the stocks of blue ling, ling and tusk are listed as critical stocks.  Discards  ICES (2005) reported that discards were a problem in 36% of all stocks and only not a problem in 3% of all stocks.  The remaining 61% were reported as unknown highlighting a major data deficiency problem.  With regard to ICES critical stocks 50% of stocks were reported to have a known discard problem, no critical stocks are reported as having no discard problem and the remaining 50% were reported as unknown.  For deep-water species that are entirely on the high seas there are known discard problems although the level of data collection is too poor to provide accurate data on the levels of discards to contribute to stock assessments in many cases.  Many deep-water species caught in these fisheries are discarded as there do not currently exist markets for these species.  Discards within ICES are not recorded as a matter of course and EC fisheries legislation does not require mandatory recording of discards, at best discard data may be collected on a three yearly basis (EC Regulation 1639/2001) for some at risk stocks.  The few data that are available have been compiled by the ICES Study Group on Discard and Bycatch Information (SGDBI) and more recent coordinated discard sampling has been coordinated by the ICES Planning Group on Commercial Catches, Discards and Biological Sampling (PGCCDBS)  Straddling stocks between the high seas and European coastal EEZs provide an opportunity for discarding to maximize the quotas allocated for fleets and vessels.  Hi-grading of high value fish where quotas have been set for particular species is common with small or damaged fish being discarded to allow the quota to be filled with the highest value of fish possible.  This problem exists in many low quota whitefish species such as cod and haddock, but without high levels of observer coverage it is difficult to detect and quantify.  The fisheries in the far northern high seas areas managed by ICES areas have relatively low discard rates.  These fisheries are quite selective with a low diversity in catch composition and also because of the national policies of Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands.  These three countries have implemented “no discard” policies locally in the fisheries in their own EEZs and these practices often carry over onto the high seas within fleets operating between the two.  Due to the local discard bans a high capacity for the production of fishmeal has developed in these countries.  This  has been quoted by the fishing industry as a limiting factor on retention of discard species, as they may land catches but with no downstream industry with the capacity to deal with it  there would not be much sense.  Unreported artisanal and recreational catches  There are very limited artisanal and recreational catches in the High Seas of the North East Atlantic Ocean.  References  ICES, 2005. Joint report of the Study Group on Unaccounted Fishing Mortality (SGUFM) and the Workshop on Unaccounted Fishing Mortality (WKUFM), 25-27 September 2005, Aberdeen, UK.  ICES CM 2005/B:08. 68pp. ICES, 2007. Report of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management, Advisory Committee on the Marine Environment and Advisory Committee on Ecosystems, 2007. ICES Advice. Books 1 - 10. 1,333 pp. ICES, 2008. Report of the Arctic Fisheries Working Group (AFWG), 21-29 April 2008, ICES Headquarters, Copenhagen. ICES CM 2008\ACOM:01. 531 pp WWF, 2008. Illegal fishing in Arctic waters: catch of today – gone tomorrow?. WWF International Arctic Programme, Oslo, Noway.   Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 17  COUNTRY NOTES ON HIGH SEAS IUU ISSUES   Angola  No high seas IUU activity by Angolan vessels is reported by HSTF (2006).  Australia  In the southern bluefin tuna fishery Australia, through the Commission for Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, has implemented a Trade Information Scheme (TIS) since June 2000 aiming to collect more information on SBT fishing through trade monitoring. This will help in deterring IUU fishing by denying access to markets for illegally caught SBT. “The core of the TIS is the provision for all members and cooperating non-members of the CCSBT to maintain requirements for all imports of SBT to be accompanied by a completed CCSBT Statistical Document. The Document must be endorsed by an authorized competent authority in the exporting country and includes extensive details of the shipment such as name of fishing vessel, gear type, area of catch, dates, etc. Shipments not accompanied by this form must be denied entry by the member country. Completed forms are lodged with the CCSBT Secretariat and are used to maintain a database for monitoring catches and trade” (CCSBT, 2006). Further, 10 % of the current SBT fishing activity is monitored through observer coverage in the CCSBT convention area. (CCAMLR, 2005).  Also in the southern bluefin tuna fisheries “During the 2003–04 and 2004–05 seasons, no discarding of SBT was reported in logbooks collected in the purse seine fishery in the Great Australian Bight. In 2004, AFMA observers monitored longline operations in the Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery during the months and areas in which SBT are most likely to be taken incidentally (i.e. south of 30◦S from May to September). Observer data showed that 61% of longlined SBT were discarded during the observed operations. In contrast, the level of SBT discards recorded in logbooks from other vessels fishing during the same period south of 30oS was only 10%. In response to this new information the Australian Fisheries Management Authority has implemented tighter access controls and implemented 100% observer coverage for the 2005 season” (CCSBT, 2005).   In the CCAMLR convention area a Centralised Vessel Monitoring System (C-VMS) has been in operation since May 2005. During 2005 Australian flagged vessels submitted data on C-VMS to CCAMLR. Vessels from Australia, Korea, Chile, New Zealand and Ukraine also voluntarily reported VMS data on fishing activities outside the convention area. Australian vessels also issued electronic catch, export and re-export documents to the commission for the electronic web-based (E-CDS) Catch Documentation Scheme  “Fishing will not be allowed on the high seas (outside 200 nautical miles) adjacent to the AFZ around Norfolk Island, unless an AFMA observer is on board to verify the catch taken in the fishery and on the high seas” (AFMA, 2000).  China  High seas and international fisheries by Chinese vessels reveal a different story to Chinese domestic fisheries: some examples are documented below.   “Fishermen in Cameroon have a rough time with Chinese trawlers. A fisherman said: "They come and fish right on the shores which is reserved for us". They complained that the Chinese use a twin-fishing trawler system with a single net tugged between two trawlers. As the trawlers positioned about 100 or more meters apart, anything in their path is caught in the trawl. The disgruntled fishermen held that trawlers operators had threatened to shoot them whenever they confront them in the seas on account of their nets or canoes having been destroyed by them… According to a representative from the Fisheries authorities, regulation requires that the trawlers limit themselves to three nautical miles into the ocean. She insisted that such indiscriminate fishing methods carried out by the Chinese trawlers could lead to very poor fish production.” (Cameroon Online, 2007).  “Turtle poaching in the waters off Sabah may be more widespread than imagined – a second illegal Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 18  Chinese fishing vessel was caught Wednesday, laden with more than 250 protected turtles. The staggering number of Greenback and Hawksbill turtles - including about 20 that were alive – were recovered from the vessel from Hanian, … The marine police, who were keeping surveillance under Ops Octopus, spotted the foreign vessel, with 17 crewmen, about 17.5 nautical miles from the island about 9.05am. Just two days ago police pulled up a similar fishing vessel, also from Hainan, at Mantanani Kecil Island, off Kota Belud, and recovered 72 dead turtles of the same protected species.” Daily Express, Malaysia (2007).   “International fisheries law enforcement operations continue with the interception of two Chinese fishing boats suspected of high-seas driftnet fishing in the North Pacific Ocean. September 24, a Coast Guard HH- 65 helicopter, deployed from Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell, observed Zhe Dai Yuan Yu 829 concealing net spreaders. Once boarded ... the master of the vessel admitted to having two groups of nets approximately 18,000 to 21,000 feet in length. These illegal driftnets were also spotted on board the Lu Rong Yu 829 during a separate boarding. The vessel had also attempted to disguise its name and origin. Both vessels reportedly contained squid, shark fins and various other marine life. They were confirmed to be registered in the People's Republic of China and taken into custody.” (U.S. Coast Guard 2007).   However, in this latter example, some cooperation with the Chinese government led to the arrest. "The presence of a Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command ship rider on board Boutwell expedited the boarding and seizure process, basically allowing the Chinese to enforce Chinese law on a Chinese vessel," Capt. Michael Neussl, chief of staff for the 17th Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, said. The United States, Japan, Canada, Russia, South Korea and China are part of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which was developed to fight illegal fishing and increase international maritime safety and security, according to the release. As part of that mission, the [US] Coast Guard regularly participates in international cooperative efforts against high-seas drift-net fishing.”  Ecuador  Gianni et al. (2005) identify some Ecuador-flagged vessels fishing on the High Seas, with Japanese or Taiwanese owners, involved in the illegal supply of fish to the Japanese market.  Faroes  Greenpeace has recently reported that there is significant IUU activity by vessels fishing for redfish in the vicinity of Irminger Sea, (NEAFC area).  France  “A 2003 article in the Boston Globe newspaper in the US mentioned that Pac-Fish Inc. was investigated by US authorities (NOAA) in Boston for importing 33 tonnes of toothfish from the IUU fishing vessel Arvisa I – a vessel with a well known history of IUU fishing subsequently arrested by French authorities for illegal fishing in the Kerguelen Island EEZ.” “In June 2004 [the Honduran flagged Uruguayan vessel] Apache was detected by the French patrol vessel Albatross fishing illegally within the EEZ of the Kerguelen Islands. She was placed under arrest and taken to Reunion where she is still being held. In September a French court convicted the captain and crew of illegal fishing.” (Gianni and Simpson 2005).  Ghana  The vessel Hsiang Pao No. 601 registered to Ghanaian company Kwo-Jeng Marine Services Limited has been engaging in re-flagged to Trinidad and Tobago and engaging in Illegal long line fishing” (Komatsu, 2000). However, no subsequent reports are available to substantiate the same. One vessel ‘Alos’, has been reported to be flagged to Ghana, participating in IUU activity for Patagonian toothfish in 2003 according to Gianni and Simpson (2005).  Japan  Gianni and Simpson (2005) report, “At-sea trans-shipment of the catch in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans is a major component of the infrastructure supporting longline fishing fleets targeting high value species of tuna operating on the high seas. These trans-shipment vessels are purpose built to freeze the Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 19  catch to minus 40º Celsius and keep it deep-frozen to preserve the quality of the fish, which is sold as sashimi grade tuna on the Japanese market ... the major ports of entry for trans-shipment vessels bringing sashimi grade tuna into Japan are Shimizu and Yokosuka.”  Malaysia  Gianni et al. (2005) provide a single reference to Malaysia: a vessel landing illegal toothfish in a Malaysian port. MRAG (2005) reports that, “Over 90% of abalone harvested in South Africa is exported, primarily to Hong Kong, but also to China, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan.”  Russia  Russian-owned vessels are listed 11th out of the top 20 worst FOC offenders in Gianni and Simpson (2005). Many Russian-owned vessels are flagged in Bolivia. Gianni and Simpson (2005) write, “Pacific Andes, a company based in Hong Kong, is believed to be the parent company of Sun Hope Investments in Jakarta. In its report on Pacific Andes activities entitled The Alphabet Boats, A Case Study of Tooth fish Poaching in the Southern Ocean, COLTO responds to Pacific Andes’s denials by stating that: “what Pacific Andes does not deny is that it does service the ‘alphabet’ boats and does purchase and process the fish they catch. This would appear to be just another of Pacific Andes’ customarily highly leveraged arrangements with the fishing operations it sold out of in 1998 – in retaining exclusive marketing arrangements as part of the sale agreements. The ‘alphabet’ boats are, of course, technically operated and controlled by their Spanish skippers while being owned by dummy companies in (at various times) the British Virgin Islands, Russia, Belize, Bolivia and elsewhere … As for getting the right certification and documentation, it is generally regarded as a fairly simple task to get officials in agencies under inadequate central government control in flag states like Bolivia and Russia and port states like Indonesia to generate ‘appropriate’ paperwork. There are a number of measures under ongoing discussion among CCAMLR governments aimed at closing loopholes in their tooth fish Catch Documentation Scheme and at making it easier to detect bogus documentation.”  Netherlands  There is considerable FOC activity in Netherlands fisheries jurisdictions. According to Gianni and Simpson (2005), Netherlands Antilles has over 20 FOC vessels involved in illegal Japanese sashimi trade and five Spanish-owned vessels flagged in Netherlands Antilles are named in this report. The ITF Fair Practices Committee (or the FPC sub-committee) decides on the stauts of FOC countries. The FPC maintains a list of countries offering FOC facilities and from time to time adds or deletes countries from the list. The basis for membership in this select club is the so-called "Rochdale Criteria" laid down by a British Committee of Inquiry in 1970. These were:  • the country allows non-citizens to own and control vessels; • access to and transfer from the register is easy; • taxes on shipping income are low or non-existent;  • the country of registration doesn¹t need the shipping tonnage for its own purposes but is keen to earn the tonnage fees; • manning by non-nationals is freely permitted; • the country lacks the power (or the will) to impose national or international regulations on its ship- owners.  Second registers, charter arrangements and other methods are designed to get around ITF policy, and so defining an FOC is becoming more and more difficult. However, ships registered in an FOC register which can demonstrate that they are genuinely owned in that country are not treated as FOCs. Equally, ships from countries not on the list will be treated as FOCs if the ITF receives information that they are beneficially owned in another country.  According to the Global Policy Forum (2003) the following 27 countries have been declared FOCs by the ITF: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba (the Netherlands), Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (the UK), Burma, Cambodia, Canary Islands (Spain), Cayman Islands (UK), Cook Islands (New Zealand), Cyprus, Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 20  German International Ship Register (GIS), Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands (USA), Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.  In 2002 the European Parliament stated the following in the ‘Resolution on the Role of Flags of Convenience in the Fisheries Sector’ A5-0405/2001 (Greenpeace, 2002): “… that the use of flags of convenience is generally motivated by a desire to minimize costs and circumvent certain tax regulations by means of complex legal devices and results in numerous difficulties with regard to the attribution of responsibility in the event of illegal fishing, accidents at sea and , in general, with regard with the competition rules to which sea transport is subject.”  New Zealand  CCAMLR estimates that IUU catches of Antarctic tooth fish, which are mainly taken by New Zealand in area 88 (NZ Sea Food council, 2001), are probably low. “This encouraging tendency seems to result from surveillance and patrol efforts by the New Zealand government in recent years in the Ross Sea area (sub area 88.1) and it also appears difficult for illegal fishers to find a close port of convenience for landings” (Lack and Sant, 2001; Corveler, 2002).  Norway  ISOFISH (1998) reports some involvement of Norwegian companies in the illegal toothfish fishery, identifing three principal Norwegian groups involved in toothfish poaching operations in the Southern Ocean. While commending the Norwegian Government for having introduced new regulations to allow it to control the activities of Norwegians on Norwegian ships anywhere in the world, ISOFISH urged them to require all Norwegian crew on foreign flagged fishing vessels to be licensed by Norway. ISOFISH also proposed some specific measures which it believes the Norwegian Government should take to stop poaching and support for poachers by companies and individuals subject to its jurisdiction, including:  • withdrawing public money from all companies associated with those in operational control of past or present toothfish poaching operations; • publishing a blacklist of Norwegian individuals known to be associated with fish poaching operations anywhere in the world (especially in the CCAMLR area); and • demanding that Norwegian banks and other investors immediately conduct internal inquiries to identify and then terminate any and all support for and involvement with poachers identified on the blacklist.  Gianni and Simpson (2005) report, “A number of positive measures have been taken by States individually to discourage nationals and companies within their jurisdiction from engaging in IUU fishing. Amongst the most effective are measures adopted by Norway which preclude any vessel with a previous history of IUU fishing from obtaining a licence to fish in Norwegian waters. This appears, for example, to have been an effective means of deterring Norwegian owned vessels from engaging in IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean.” See: http://www.fiskeridir.no/fiskeridir/ressursforvaltning/blacklisted_vessels.  Reflagging is not reported to be a serious problem, and foreign vessels fishing in Norwegian waters are, like Norwegian vessels, obliged to go through detailed reporting. However, three Norwegian owned Panamanian-flagged vessels appear in a list of 132 refrigerated cargo vessels that are reported as trans- shipment of fish for the Japanese market (other than Sashimi grade tuna) are reported by Gianni et al. (2005).  In 1996, the Vietnamese customs seized four tonnes of whale meat allegedly of Norwegian origin destined for Japan. The Norwegian police decided to investigate this case in Norway and concluded that no connection could be established between the shipment seized in Vietnam and Norway” (Mr Stein Owe, pers. com. to TRAFFIC Europe, 3 November 1999).  Illegal whaling itself appears to be well under control (Raymakers, 2001): “Norwegian whalers have been prosecuted for not complying with Norwegian laws on whaling. In 1994, the Norwegian coastguard discovered that a whaling vessel had caught one whale more than its assigned quota. The inspector on Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 21  board was allegedly asleep when the whale was harpooned and brought on board. The owner of the vessel was fined NOK 10,000 (US$ 1,600 – 1994 exchange rate). In addition, both the owner and its vessel have been excluded from taking part in whaling for five years (Anon, 1997b). “… There has been one recorded attempt of smuggling of whale meat out of Norway. In 1993, two carriers were stopped and their merchandise seized. The police decided not to forward the case to the Norwegian court of justice. The case was closed six years later, in December 1999, without giving any explanation about the reason for such a long investigation. The whale meat was confiscated and destroyed soon after the seizure was performed. The two smugglers were given fines of NOK 20,000 and 10,000 (US$2800 and 1400) respectively and were charged NOK 40,000 and 20,000 (US$5600 and 2800), the equivalent of the profit they would have made if they had succeeded their attempt, i.e. the commercial value of goods they were smuggling (Moy, 1999).  South Africa  South Africa is tracking the problem of FOCs (Flag of Convenience) by prohibiting offloading in its ports by suspicious vessels, using a vessel blacklist drawn up by ICCAT. Cape Town is one of the most important harbors in the south Atlantic for fishing vessels and their transport and chandler vessels (EJF, 2005). South Africa, in the context of ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas), has taken steps to combat FOCs by announcing that it will prohibit any fishing ship that does not fly the flag of an ICCAT member country, or that is on the ICCAT blacklist, from offloading in its ports. Previously, Cape Town seems to have been a preferred destination for pirate tuna fleets (SeaWeb, 2002), and, together with Durban, the two ports are still mentioned as ports of call for freezer vessels suspected of having a role in illegal shipments of tuna to Japan (Gianni et al., 2005). Some SA vessels are known to re- flag and fish under flags of convenience but this is not thought to be a widespread practice. There is movement of vessels between SA and Namibia with some changing of flag. The main problem is SA has an old fleet and there are not many new vessels being built so there is pressure to bring in capacity from outside of SA, mainly from the EU. The authorities are aware of the issue and are attempting to address the problem.  In 2004 South African maritime patrols collaborating with French navy patrol boats (there is an agreement between both countries to fight IUU) reported illegal fishing of the Patagonian toothfish around the French Antarctic island of Kerguelen (5,000 km south-east of Cape Town) according to the European Cetacean Bycatch Campaign (2004). The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism’s fishery compliance official assisted the French sea patrol unit to arrest an illegal fishing vessel in French fishing waters. (South African Government Information, 2004).  In August 1997 the SA Cabinet approved plans to mount a joint operation to counteract the illegal fishing of the Patagonian toothfish in South Africa’s territorial waters, around the Prince Edward Islands. The joint operation includes the DEAT, the SA Defence Force, and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice (Jordan, 1998).  South Korea  Korea’s distant water fleets, although technically under the management of RFMOs, and with the overall responsibility of the flag state, appear to be fishing illegally in waters beyond the EEZ and on the high seas.  “In accordance with the Third Korea-China High-Level Meeting on Fisheries held in Beijing on June 8, 2005, the following steps will be implemented 1) Relevant officials in fishery monitoring and surveillance of both Parties are scheduled to conduct boarding exchanges between fishery supervision vessels, once in late May 2006. Both Parties decided that the West Sea specifically forbidden zone and the Yangtze River preservation zone will be designed as the area for the mutual boarding exchanges” (http://www.momaf.go.kr/eng/fish/science/F_resources.asp).  Clarke (2007) however suggest a different scenario for South Korean fleets operating outside its EEZ “According to one interview respondent, there is a considerable amount of South Korean vessel activity (fishing and cargo) in the area near the Kurils and he believed these vessels may be funnelling Russian salmon to Pusan. Illegal fishing activities by South Korean vessels in the area north-east of Hokkaido have been documented (Associated Press, 2006a). Also, South Korean (and Chinese) flagged vessels were some Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 22  of the 67 vessels sighted illegally fishing with driftnets for salmon just outside the Japanese EEZ in July– November 2006 (Kitagawa, 2007).“Some incidents of IUU fishing by South Korean vessels in or near Russian waters have been reported but these activities may be unrelated to the third party salmon trade. South Korean cargo vessel involvement could not be assessed. Despite South Korea’s recent international commitment to fight IUU fishing, its vessels have been implicated in numerous IUU fish activities both on the high seas and in EEZs (MRAG, 2005) including the NPAFC high seas Convention Area in 2006 (Kitagawa, 2007)”.  Korean vessels have been re-flagged in Panama and have been involved in IUU fishing of Patagonian toothfish. There is also transshipment of fish on board vessels that are also are flagged to contracting parties of ICCAT, with most flagged to Panama and Japan. All are owned and managed by companies based in countries that are members of ICCAT, with most based in Japan and Korea. South Korea comes 6th out of 20 nations blacklisted for extreme FOC fishing activities (Gianni et al.,2005). Many Korean- owned ships are flagged in Panama or Liberia. Out of a list of 77 refrigerated cargo vessels likely to be transshipping at sea and delivering sashimi grade tuna to Japan, 12 (16%) were Korean-owned. Moreover, Koreans owned or managed 18/132 (14%) listed refrigerated cargo vessels that are suspected of transshipping fish (other than Sashimi grade tuna) at sea from time to time.  Spain  A WWF report (Gianni and Simpson, 2005) reveals the link between illegal fishing operations in the world’s oceans and countries that offer cheap registration services, or flags of convenience, to fishing vessels. The report shows that EU nations top the list of countries of residence of the owners or operators of fishing vessels operating under flags of convenience, with Spain/Canary Islands comprising approximately one-half of the EU total. Spanish fishermen are desperate to catch more fish and move into other waters. Because the stocks in their own EEZ have been severely depleted, Spanish fishing operations have spread all over the world. Their regular grounds include Canada and Morocco, and they were forced out of Namibian waters early in 1991 (European Commission, 2005). A report released in 2004 by the EC highlights that “monitoring of activities of fishing vessels from EU operating beyond Community waters remains an issue which must be particularly targeted … much data is entirely absent for certain activities in waters where EU agreements with third parties have been concluded”. Furthermore, ”the satisfactory integration of monitoring systems which allow systematic cross-checking of information from VMS, the fleet register, logbooks and sales notes, remains the exception”. It concludes: ”The great challenge is to use existing tools to their full potential. Accordingly, cooperation and coordination between administrations at all levels must be greatly strengthened and the proposed Community Fisheries Control Agency will have a crucial role to play in this respect” (European Commission, 2005).  By registering under the UK flag, Spanish vessels have irresponsibly fished for part of the quota set aside by the EC for the United Kingdom. By doing so, the Spanish, the UK claimed, had an adverse effect on their fishing industry (European Commission, 2005). The Spanish, on the other hand, claimed that they had not been poaching or "quota-hopping" in UK waters. Even though each EC country has had exclusive fishing zones (200 miles from shore) since 1977, an agreement between the EC and Spain had allowed for several Spanish boats to be registered under the British flag. The Spanish claimed that “many of the vessels they operated had been acquired from British fishermen who had ceased operations.” (European Commission, 2005).  The UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225 prohibits the use of driftnets greater than 2.5 km in length on the high sea. The EU legislation in 1997 prohibits keeping on board and use of drift nets greater than 2.5 km both in high seas and community waters, w.e.f January 1, 2002. This measure has been opposed by some member states notably France, Spain and Italy. Churchill (1999) states that a number of vessels of these countries were subsequently re-flagged to other countries to avoid the driftnet ban.  Spanish-owned vessels are notorious throughout the world for trying to avoid fishery compliance enforcement actions by reflagging. To its credit, Spain has enacted legislation which allows prosecution of their nationals who may be engaged in illegal fishing on board fishing vessels flagged in third countries (Greenpeace, 2003). But Spain is among the top 20 countries in the world where registered owners of ‘Flags Of Convenience’ vessels are based (Greenpeace, 1999) [WWF (2005) identifies Spain as being 4th in the world.] The “Salvatora” typifies the problem of FOC fishing by Spain, because this ship flies the flag of Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 23  Belize but is owned by a company based in Galicia, Spain (Greenpeace, 1999). This ship was illegally fishing in the southern ocean and planning to offload its catch in Mauritius (Greenpeace, 1999).  A Spanish vessel was caught fishing in the Namibian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by a patrol vessel: the Spanish Embassy told New Era in 2004 that it would give its full cooperation in the investigation of the Spanish-registered vessel caught fishing in Namibian waters (EuroCBC, 2004).   Since 1997 Spanish vessels have been taking large quantities of swordfish off Chile, now one of the last abundant sources of swordfish world-wide. In an attempt to halt the slaughter, and claiming management under the Straddling Stocks agreement, Chile refused to re-provision Spanish vessels in Chilean ports. Then Spain persuaded EU bureaucrats in Brussels to threaten a ban on Chilean wine imports to Europe. So Chile had to give in. Broadbill swordfish are the losers (Pitcher, 2001). Spain is documented as a refuge for illegal fishers of Chilean sea bass and swordfish. For example, 75% of swordfish sold in Spain – the principal world market – were illegally caught and catches are clearly under-reported (Raymakers and Lynham, 1999). In 2004, it was reported that the high productive regions associated with seamounts (i.e., Azores seamounts in the Iberian region) are not just poorly protected within the EEZ but are also practically unprotected in international waters, and their conservation is required as part of the global common heritage belonging to all nations (Morato and Pauly, 2004).  Illegal Spanish fishers in this region are noted as a significant problem (Morato et al., 2001). Spain is one of the 23 members of CCAMLR (Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources), an organization that is responsible for fisheries management in the Southern Ocean as well as enforcement of conservation and management measures to protect this area. Illegal and unregulated fishing is completely undermining attempts to conserve the biodiversity of the Southern Ocean (Greenpeace, 2003). CCAMLR is considering proposals by Greenpeace to stop illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean. Some of these initiatives include (Greenpeace, 2003b):   “a) Greenpeace believes CCAMLR should declare and enforce a moratorium on fishing for toothfish. This moratorium needs to be supported by a trade ban in toothfish, such a ban to require toothfish to be listed for protection on CITES Appendix 1; that is, no international trade.  b) Mandatory Vessel Monitoring Systems--to be effective immediately. Satellite-linked vessel monitoring systems allow governments to track all legal fishing vessels operating in the Southern Oceans. c) Denial of port access to illegal fishing vessels. All countries must ban illegal fishing vessels from using their ports. Ships without vessel monitoring systems and proof that they are legally fishing must be banned from non-emergency port access.”  It is not yet clear how effectively these requirements have been addressed by Spain.   There are also persistent reports that Spanish vessels abuse joint-venture arrangements in African and other countries (one trick is said to be to process under-sized fish into fish sausages on board). “South Africa Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) services have come under fire for allowing Spanish trawlers to strike deals with local hake quota holders. Hake stocks are believed to be under pressure yet the number of fishing rights issued in the hake sector has skyrocketed in recent years, with many new rights holders seeking boats to catch ever smaller quotas. But Spanish trawlers have found new ways of stretching quotas: they process hake into sausage. A company that places independent scientific observers on board local and foreign fishing vessels for MCM to collect information on fishing practices, says "we believe a lot of small fish (hake) are going into the sausage machine." The problem is also that MCM has not yet determined an official conversion factor for this sausage, which means it is difficult to estimate the volumes of fish being processed and therefore actual catches cannot be accurately determined, providing a potential loophole which could allow quotas to be stretched. The former head of MCM, said the Spanish "creep" into the local fishing industry was progressing rapidly and that they had done the same thing in Namibia a decade ago. Namibian fishing stocks are now extremely low. "One might say today that the more Namibia fisheries have 'transformed' and taken on a 'black' identity, the more they have in fact become Spanish." He said the Spanish had a poor record. "Their record off Brazil and Argentina is well known. They raided fisheries in joint venture agreements and when the fisheries collapsed, they disappeared. Their conduct up the African coast, all the way to Morocco, is horrendous." (Cape Argus 2007), November 10th.  Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 24   Taiwan  MRAG (2005) states that, “Many IUU vessels are flagged to Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN), which are China, Taiwan, Korea, Spain and Russia. However, there is also significant IUU fishing, both in high seas and EEZs, by vessels flagged to developing countries. The principal problem with all these vessels is a lack of control by their flag states which leads to IUU fishing.” Taiwan is involved in the illegal tuna and abalone trade. MRAG (2005) reports, “…IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean amounted to 130,000 tonnes in 2001 …. the problem is particularly pronounced for small longline vessels and that these vessels often do not report to their flag authorities or to the countries in which they are based (Taiwan-owned vessels below 100 GT).” For tuna, there may have been a recent improvement; “… [Indian Ocean] IUU amounts to about 33% of reported catches, although this may now have dropped to about 10% with Taiwan recently gaining membership of the Commission.  “Taiwanese fishing companies have now deliberately built a fleet of vessels that fall just under the 24 meter minimum length for application of most ICCAT measures. These 23.9 meter vessels have operated extensively in the Caribbean decimating shark stocks and causing serious billfish bycatch problems. The government of Taiwan either lacks the means or will to control this situation” (Delaney, 2003).   Moreover, over the past four years, MRAG (2005) reports a persistent series of incidents involving Taiwanese fishing vessels. For example, “In 2001, Tanzanian officials carried out a major patrol operation against illegal vessels and pirate ships in the country's Indian Ocean waters as part of a five-African nation programme sponsored by the European Union (EU)… findings included 13,000 tonnes taken by Taiwanese ships”. “in 2003 … Skipper Lin Ven Chang was arrested after allegedly fishing illegally in New Caledonian waters, attempting to escape and removing identification from his vessel Shang Sheng. The vessel and crew were escorted to Noumea.” “In 2004 Seven inspectors from Mozambique and three from South Africa were on a joint patrol when they found 2 vessels suspected of fishing illegally in Mozambican waters. One ship (Indonesian) had on board several km of fine mesh gill net, whilst the other (Taiwanese) was carrying large mesh demersal gill-nets when it is licensed to purse seine.” Also in 2004 Argentina sank an illegal Taiwanese squid fishing vessel: “Chin Hsing was jigging 'near' Argentine waters when hit and sunk by a missile fired by the Argentine naval ship Granville. Argentina claims that, while Granville fired warning shots, the jigger's crew set fire and tried to scuttle her.” In 2005, “Officials of the ARA Guerrico corvette of the Argentinean Navy’s Maritime Patrolling Division arrested a Taiwan-flagged squid jigger, Hsien Hua 6, for fishing without authorisation for Argentine shortfin squid within the Argentine exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 250 km to the southeast of Puerto Deseado. The Taiwanese squid jigger, with a 30- member crew, was chased by the corvette that eventually succeeded in overtaking the vessel preventing its escape, ordering it to stop-down its engines.” Also in 2005, “The crew of the patrol vessel Prefecto Derbes, owned by the Argentine Coast Guard (PNA), apprehended a Taiwanese squid jigger, Chich Man 1, illegally fishing Argentine shortfin squid within the Argentine exclusive economic zone (EEZ), off the Chubut coasts.”  There are also serious FOC issues with Taiwan from the information currently available. For example, MRAG (2005) reports, “While the registration nationalities of fishing vessels are located in around 80 countries, most of the beneficial owners are based in Taiwan, Japan and the European Union.”  “This is a real problem as a significant portion of new large-scale fishing vessels appear to be built with a view to engaging in IUU fishing. Of the 51 fishing vessels over 24 metres built in Taiwan during the same period, 50 were flagged in FOC countries by the end of 2003 – only one was flagged in Taiwan. Taiwan, Honduras, Panama, Spain, and Belize are the top five countries where companies that own or operate fishing vessels flagged to one of the top 14 FOC fishing countries are based. Taiwan and several other countries not generally considered to be FOC countries. Taiwan, Honduras, Panama, Spain, and Belize are the top five countries where companies that own or operate fishing vessels flagged to one of the top FOC fishing countries are based” (Gianni et al. 2005). There are 142 fishing vessels of more than 24m length, whose Country of Residence of Owner, Number of fishing vessels Percentage of all fishing vessels Manager, or Group are based in Taiwan, accounting to about 11.2 % of the 14 countries where FOC vessels are based. “Most of the vessels registered to an FOC country or listed as flag ‘unknown’ were built in Taiwan. Furthermore, by the end of 2003, of the 51 vessels, ≥ 24 m built in Taiwan during this period, only one was flagged to Taiwan; the remainder were flagged in FOC countries. According to the Organization Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 25  for Promotion of Responsible Tuna Fisheries and a number of other sources, many of the Taiwanese large- scale tuna longline vessels have recently reflagged to Taiwan. Some Taiwanese shipyards have a large percentage of the vessels they build adopt Flags of Convenience immediately when launched. The Lien Cherng Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. of Kaohsiung, for example, launched 18 vessels in the last five years, all flying FOCs when they left the shipyard. Ten of these 18 vessels have been implicated in IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish. 46 Taiwanese owned longliners between 22.5 and 23.9 metres, mostly fishing in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, on the Lloyd’s Register of Ships. 90 Honduran flagged fishing vessels ≥ 24 metres are listed on the Lloyd’s Register of Ships as owned and/or operated by companies based in Taiwan). 28 tuna longline vessels owned by Taiwanese companies – 25 flagged to Taiwan and three to Vanuatu –transshipped their catches to the Lung Yuin while it was in the Pacific prior to its return to Japan” (Gianni and Simpson, 2005).  “Taiwanese fishing companies have now deliberately built a fleet of vessels that fall just under the 24 meter minimum length for application of most ICCAT measures. These 23.9 meter vessels have operated extensively in the Caribbean decimating shark stocks and causing serious billfish bycatch problems. The government of Taiwan either lacks the means or will to control this situation” (Delaney, 2003).  “Catches of non-target species (for tuna fisheries in south pacific) were estimated to have accounted for 0.71 percent of the total purse seine catch, including discards” (Lawson, 2001).  Taiwan  “At present the greatest proportion of non-party, unregulated Southern Blue fin tuna catch is taken by Taiwan, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea. There is particular concern that some of these fish are being taken on the spawning grounds in the Java Sea” (Foster, 1998).  Observer data is limited to catch rates determined from catch and effort data of RFMOs, stratified by time and area, which is probably provided by vessel operators. So, it is questionable as to how much of the data are trustworthy from the records, as there are no onboard observers on any of these vessels. Limited observer data is available for tuna from the South-Pacific area.   Thailand  There have been improvements in Thai fishery census reporting; “Thai Fishery census data give the number of boats fishing in other country’s waters (by country). The recorded catch also includes other EEZs. SAU estimates Thai catch in Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia. Thai catch in Indonesia is 30% of that taken by Indonesia” (Staples – pers. comm.), although there are serious discrepancies between this total catch and that estimated taken by Indonesian vessels (Nurhakim et al. 2008). It has to be emphasized that some of the neighbouring nations indirectly recognize presence of Thai vessels in their countries as they have fisheries agreements to allow their vessels to fish in their waters. (e.g., Indonesia, Myanmar; Anon, pers.comm.)  Gianni et al. (2005) report three Thai-owned vessels out of a list of 132 refrigerated cargo vessels suspected of transshipment of fish into the Japanese market. MRAG (2005) states that in the Indian Ocean the ex-Russian fleet routinely transships at sea and there is also some transshipment in PNG ports to service canneries in Thailand. Foreign fleets fishing for tuna in the EEZ of PNG often transship Beche- de-mer onto reefer vessels in parts of Wewak, Manus, Kavieng, Rabaul, Lae and Madang for shipment to canneries in Thailand, Philippines and American Samoa (MRAG 2005).  Ukraine  Ukrainian flagged vessels have been engaged in illegal fishing in Southern Ocean. There is no information available on domestic fisheries, but in the Black Sea illegal activity by vessels from several nations has been reported. “Questions were raised at CCAMLR XXIII in 2004 by New Zealand about the vessels Mellas and Simeiz, formerly the Florens 1 and Eva 1, both of which had been engaged in IUU fishing activities in the CCAMLR area. These vessels eventually reflagged to, and were licensed to fish by, Ukraine in the CCAMLR area even though they remained under control of the same operator, apparently with the knowledge of the flag State. In addition, of the 10 toothfish vessels built at the Lien Cherng shipyard in Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 26  Taiwan since 2000 originally flagged to Bolivia, six have since been reflagged to CCAMLR member countries Russia, Chile and Ukraine. All of these vessels have been engaged in IUU fishing at some point since built according to the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) and documents submitted to CCAMLR. Mellas and the Simeiz (both flagged to Ukraine) – are managed by Chuan- Chuan Yoo, a company based in Taiwan. Chuan- Chuan Yoo and an associated company, Kando Maritime, also manage several other toothfish vessels, including the Ukranian flagged Sonrisa, the Belize flagged South Ocean, and the Georgia flagged Jian Yuan, Kang Yuan and Kiev” (Gianni and Simpson, 2005).  Further, Gianni and Simpson (2005) report two Taiwanese vessels Mellas and Simeiz to have been flagged to Ukraine and suspected to be engaged in IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish in the Southern Ocean.  References  AFMA 2000. Norfolk Island Offshore demersal Finfish Fishery, Exploratory Management Report, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, 26 pp.  (http://www.afma.gov.au/fisheries/ext_territories/norfolk/publications/offshoreexpmgt.pdf) Cameroon Online 2007. October 25th. www.cameroonone.com/site/news/index.php?op=view&id=30017 Cape Argus 2007. Spanish trawlers threaten South African hake with a sausage machine. November 10th, 2007. www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?from=rss_News&set_id=1&click_id=79&art_id=vn2007111009425 3119C813836 CCAMLR 2005. Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Commission, Hobart, Australia, 24 October - 4 November 2005, CCAMLR-XXIV, Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 179 pp. (http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cr/05/all.pdf) CCSBT 2005. Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 15 October 2005, Narita, Japan, Commission for the Conservation of Bluefin Tuna, 91 pp.  (www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_ccsbt12.pdf) CCSBT 2006. Management of SBT, Commission for the Conservation of Bluefin Tuna, (http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/management.html) Clarke, S. 2007. Trading tails: Russian Salmon fisheries and East Asian markets. TRAFFIC East Asia, 131 pages. Corveler, T. 2002. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: taking action for sustainable fisheries. WWF New Zealand, Wellington, 31 pp. Daily Express, Malaysia 2007. More turtle poachers caught 29 March, 2007. Delaney, Statement of Glenn Roger 2003. U.S. Commissioner to ICCAT before the Committee on Resources. Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans, U.S House of Representatives, October 30, 2003. Washington, DC, USA. Foster, B. 1998. Status of the Southern Blue fin tuna. The Australian Marine Conservation Society Bulletin 20(2). Gianni, M. and Simpson, W. 2005. The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how flags of convenience provide cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, International Transport Workers’ Federation, and WWF International. 83pp. Greenpeace 2003. CCAMLR governments are failing the toothfish and albatross. Source: http://archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/piratefishing/ccamlr.html Greenpeace 2003b. The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. ww//archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/southernoceans/2003/moreinfo/bg_ccamlr.html HSTF 2006. Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas. High Seas Task Force, Governments of Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United  Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, 30 pp. ISOFISH 1998. The Vikings: The Involvement of Norwegian Fishermen in Illegal and Unregulated Long- line Fishing for Patagonian Toothfish in the Southern Ocean. ISOFISH Occasional Report No.3. Kitagawa, H. 2007. Enforcement Activities in NPAFC Convention Area by Japan Fisheries Agency. Presentation at North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission Enforcement Evaluation and Coordination Group Meeting, Pusan (unpublished). Komatsu, M. 2000. The Importance Of Taking Cooperative Action Against Specific Fishing Vessels That Are Diminishing Effectiveness Of Tuna Conservation And Management Measures Document AUS:IUU/2000/5. 2000. 28 pp.  Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 27  http://www.dpie.gov.au/corporate_docs/publications/pdf/fisheries/eciouuf/ausiuu20005.pdf Lack, M. and Sant, G. 2001. TRAFFIC Bulletin, Patagonian Toothfish: are conservation and trade measures working? Lawson, T. 2001. Methods for analyzing by catch with observer data. SCTB14 Working Paper, SCTB 14, Noumea, New Caledonia, 15 pp. Morato, T. and Pauly, D. (eds) 2004. Seamounts: Biodiversity and fisheries. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 12(5): 78pp. MRAG 2005. Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries. Marine Resources Assessment Group, London, UK, 180pp. New Zealand Seafood Industry Council 2001. http://www.seafood.co.nz, 11/2001 Nurhakim, S., Nikijuluw, V.P.H., Badrudin, Pitcher, T.J. and Wagey, G.A. 2008. A Study Of Illegal, Unreported And Unregulated (IUU) Fishing In The Arafura Sea, Indonesia. Report to FAO, Rome. 41pp. Raymakers, C. 2001. Monitoring progress in Norway’s development of a DNA register as part of its domestic management system for whale meat, investigating local whale meat trade, and investigating reports of illegal trade in blubber. Traffic, Europe, 26pp. South African Government Information 2004. South Africa and France arrested illegal fishing vessel in southern ocean. www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04062812451002. TED (Trade and Environmental Database) 1999. ICES case studies.   www.american.edu/ted/ice/canfish.htm U.S. Coast Guard 2007. Coast Guard intercepts Chinese vessels suspected of driftnet fishing. October, 2007, Juneau, Alaska. See http://oceans.greenpeace.org/defenders   Sources and Notes on IUU, Page 28  ANGOLA  Summary of information concerning IUU fishing   Overview  Prior to independence from Portugal in 1975 the industrial fishing sector was dominated by foreign vessels and foreign nationals. A large fishmeal industry supplied by purse-seine fleets was developed in the early 1950s with total catches exceeding 300,000 t by the middle of that decade (Campos Rosado, 1974a). After a decline in fish caught in 1960, the production increased and reached nearly 600 000 t in 1972, but then the fishery collapsed during the war of independence” (Agostinho et al. 2005). “The abandonment of part of the productive infrastructure in the ports contributed to the near collapse of the lucrative industry into the 1980s. By 1986, for example, only 70 of the 143 fishing boats in Namibe, the port that normally handled two-thirds of the Angolan catch, were operable. Furthermore, most of the fish-processing factories were in need of repair. Pre 1975 there was also a very active artisanal or inshore fishing sector that provided both food and income to the local coastal population. The war of independence and the subsequent civil war resulted in the collapse of the industrial fisheries sector in Angola and large-scale shifts in the population to the coastal regions (Agostinho et al. 2005).  Offshore industrial fisheries were gradually re-established after independence and the cessation of civil hostilities. Pressure on nearshore fish resources has steadily increased because there are very few alternative livelihood options (Agostinho et al. 2005). A large proportion of the population still has no access to water, basic sanitation, medical care and education, and all forms of communication networks are in poor condition.  Massive changes are expected in Angola’s marine fisheries with the advent of 600 vessels that have been ordered by the government to expand its landings. The ordered fishing vessels include several hundred 7.4 and 9.6 metre artisanal boats, purse seiners (18–25 metre), longliners (34 metre), shrimp boats (34 metre), catamarans (18 metre), fuel supply ship (89 metre) and 10 fishery patrol vessels (Strutt, 2007).   Illegal fishing  The Directorate of Surveillance (Direcção Nacional de Inspecção e Fiscalização) under the Ministry of Fisheries is responsible for fisheries surveillance in the Angolan EEZ.  Apart from conflicts between national fleets, frequent conflicts have also been reported with foreign fleets, flags of convenience vessels and IUU vessels fishing in the Angolan EEZ. Angola’s marine fishery is managed through the Fisheries Act of 1992, which has specific articles related to policy, licensing and surveillance. Conflicts are bound to occur as both the industrial and small- scale fisheries sectors target the same sardine and horse mackerel stocks in inshore waters. Each individual fishery licence is unique and not transferable from one boat to another, as per Art. 14 º of Lei das Pescas nº20/02. Articles 3 º n º 2 and 13 º of the Executive Order of 2 February 2002, states that coastal waters from shore to 4 nautical miles is reserved for artisanal boats, beyond 6 nautical miles for semi-industrial boats, beyond 8 nautical miles for pelagic purse seiners and deep sea boats. Shrimp boats are authorised to operate beyond 12 miles, while crab boats can operate from beyond 5 miles. Articles 49º, 50º, 51º, 53º and 54º of Lei das Pescas nº20/02, state that activity of boats in unauthorised zones would be considered as infraction. Article 18 of the Fisheries Law of 2002 also states that Centro de Informação e Monitorização das Pescas (CIMP) has the right to fine infractions with amounts ranging from US$5,000 to 10,000 depending on the nature of the activity. CIMP is also responsible for implementation of satellite monitoring of industrial boats that operate in the Angolan EEZ through reception and processing of data received at its monitoring centres (Anon, 2007).   National as well as foreign fleets fishing within Angolan waters have been reported as engaging in illegal fishing. Distant water fleets from several nations operated off the Angolan coast, with rusting hulls of Soviet trawlers in Luanda Harbour bearing testimony to this fact. Gianni and Simpson (2005) report significant IUU activity within the periphery of the Angolan EEZ. MRAG (2005) reports that off the Angolan coast there are significant demersal shrimp and ground fish resources that are vulnerable to IUU Fisheries Centre Research Reports 16(4), Page 29  fishing. This is especially important as there is a significant offshore fishery for tuna stocks, but most of the coastal states, including Angola, do not possess adequate infrastructure to monitor and control presence of foreign vessels. IUU activity is capable of exerting substantial impact, as small-scale and subsistence fisheries depend on the same pelagic fish stocks targeted by foreign and IUU vessels in Angola. Conflicts between IUU vessels and small-scale vessels have been reported in Angolan waters. MRAG (2005) report further states that high numbers of tunas and sharks have been caught by IUU longliners. During April to May 2004, a joint SADC patrol inspected 19 vessels, six of which were seized for reported serious infringements of fisheries laws.   Use of gill nets by IUU vessels has also been reported from the Angolan coast. Community observer schemes have been introduced to mitigate this problem in inshore waters, but offshore surveillance suffers from inadequate monitoring due to absence of regular aerial surveillance. Of vessels apprehended between 2003 and 2005, some 13% were fishing illegally without licences. These were largely national pelagic trawl vessels but also included some Japanese longliners. A further 21% were caught during the closed season w