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Disaster Response Network : Repurposing Military Infrastructure for COVID-19 Pandemic and Other Disasters Goodman, Anna 2020-05-11

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1DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK:Repurposing Military Infrastructure for COVID-19 Pandemic and Other DisastersAnna Elizabeth GoodmanBachelor of Science in Architecture with Honors, Ball State University, 2018Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Architecture in The Faculty of Graduate Studies, School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture, Architecture ProgramCOMMITTEEJoe Dahmen - ChairDavid Zielnicki James Huemoeller © May 2020iiiii Disaster Response Network is an architectural proposal to convert thirty-two decommissioned Cold War-era ammunition storage depots across the United States into a geographically distributed network of temporary intensive care units available to COVID-19 patients and the victims of future outbreaks. The defunct military infrastructure sites targeted in the proposal collectively contain over 20,000 bunkers. If fully implemented, the project will increase the number of intensive care units in US medical facilities by a factor of four, alleviating strain placed on the system by the current pandemic.   The architectural design of the project limits the spread of the disease while ensuring the safety of patients, medical personnel and visitors through carefully planned circulation routes.  Visitors interact with patients through protective barriers that allow acoustic and visual connection while blocking virus transmission, addressing issues of loneliness and social isolation that present challenges during illness and hamper recovery. The landscape surrounding the facility is designed to encourage safe access to the outdoors during recovery. In the future, the sites targeted by the project will be used as emergency command centres capable of housing stockpiles of medical supplies and emergency shelters, ensuring preparedness for future outbreaks and other disasters. When active response is not required, remediation efforts will restore the ecological health of the sites themselves, adding to regional biodiversity.   Disaster Response Network responds to the current COVID-19 pandemic by restoring obsolete infrastructure, streamlining the country’s disaster response capabilities and enabling more effective response to future concerns.abstract  -vivabstract...............................................................................................................................................................................iiilist of figures......................................................................................................................................................................vacknowledgement...........................................................................................................................................................viDISASTER RESPONSE NETWORKRepurposing Military Infrastructure for COVID-19 Pandemic and Other DisastersCOVID-19..........................................................................................................................................................................03DISASTER RISKS...........................................................................................................................................................09THE NETWORK.............................................................................................................................................................19ARCHITECTURAL TYPOLOGIES...........................................................................................................................33LOGISTICS.......................................................................................................................................................................47ARCHITECTURAL ISSUES........................................................................................................................................73afterword...........................................................................................................................................................................123bibliography......................................................................................................................................................................127project figures01 -  COVID-19 cases globally........................0302 -  COVID-19 timeline...................................0503 -  pandemic warning...................................1004 -  climate change..........................................1305 -  economic cost...........................................1406 -  supplies........................................................2107 -  depot network...........................................2208 -  depot aerial................................................2409 -  scope of network......................................2710 -  network efficiency....................................2811 -  bunker...........................................................3512 -  site mapping..............................................3713 -  storage bunker drawings......................3814 -  storage berm drawings..........................4015 -  existing site conditions...........................4216 -  railroad junction.......................................4817 -  site logistics................................................4918 -  supply platforms.......................................5019 -  stockpile storage......................................5220 -  supply cycle................................................5421 -  non-use........................................................5622 -  construction...............................................5623 -  operational.................................................5724 -  early construction....................................5925 -  expanded capacity....................................5926 -  projected capacity needs........................6027 -  field hospital vs. permanent const......6328 -  field hospital subdivision map.............6329 -  hiking path.................................................6630 -  regional parks and tourist sites..........6831 -  views in isolation.....................................7432 -  view from ambulance.............................8033 -  hospital desgin + site circulation.......8334 -  hospital exterior.......................................84list of figures  --  table of contents35 -  floor plan....................................................8736 -  entrance......................................................8837 -  triage section............................................9038 -  patient transport......................................9239 -  staff hallway..............................................9440 -  ICU plan......................................................9641 -  equipment room.......................................9942 -  staff zone....................................................10043 -  patient zone...............................................10044 -  visitor zone................................................10145 -  patient perspective..................................10246 -  visitor perspective...................................10547 -  porch space................................................10748 -  pressure diagram.....................................10849 -  ICU section................................................11050 -  ventilation diagram................................11251 -  uni-strut system.......................................11552 -  shelter flexibility.......................................11653 -  shelter storage..........................................11954 -  morgue........................................................124section figures55 -  hands.....................................................ii, 72, 7756 -  COVID-19.............................................1, 757 -  Camp Fire, CA.....................................8, 1758 -  the network..........................................18, 3159 -  bunker typology..................................32, 4560 -  supplies..................................................46, 7161 -  the hospital...........................................78, 12162 -  protection..............................................12163 -  hurricane Katrina...............................12664 -  COVID ward..........................................131viA special thanks to my chair, Joe Dahmen as well as my committee: David Zielnicki and James Huemoeller for their advice and guidance. I would also like to say thank you to Luis Yanez Hernandez, Tricia Tecson, Ada Sakowicz, Myriam Assal, Sophie Gordon, and Brian and Lisa Goodman for all their support. -  acknowledgementsDISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK:Repurposing Military Infrastructure for COVID-19 Pandemic and Other DisastersCOVID-1932 On December 31, 2019, Chinese authorities alerted the World Health Organization (WHO) to a growing number of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, China caused by a previously unknown virus. Within the next three days, China reported almost fifty such cases while the origin remained unknown. One week later, the infection was identified as SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19; a new form of the coronavirus. On January 11, 2020, China reported the first known death of coronavirus1 and ten days later the United States had announced its first known case2. WHO declared this crisis to be a global health emergency on January 30, and officially a pandemic on March 11, 20203.  Four months after the first death, the virus has spread across the globe infecting more than 4 million people and causing the deaths of over 270,000. Today, the world remains in various states of lockdown and our economies are at a standstill. As this disease continues to spread, and with a vaccine likely to not hit the market for over a year4, the end may be nowhere near in sight.COVID-19  --  COVID-19figure 01 - COVID-19 cases globally, 30 April 202054 -  COVID-19January February March April MayNew disease reported from Wuhan, ChinaWHO declares COVID-19 to be a pandemicFirst death recorded in ChinaFirst case in the United States recorded500,0001 million1.5 million2 million2.5 million3 millionconfirmed casesconfirmed deathsCOVID-19  -figure 02 - COVID-19 timeline6 -  footnotes1. “COVID-19, MERS & SARS.” National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, April 6, 2020. https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/covid-19. 2. “CDC Confirms Possible Instance of Community Spread of COVID-19 in U.S.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, February 26, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0226-Covid-19-spread.html. 3. Ibid. 4. Graham, Barney S. “Rapid COVID-19 Vaccine Development.” Science. American Association for the Advancement of Science, May 8, 2020. https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/05/07/science.abb8923.  DISASTER RISKS11101980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020Measles Outbreak [ongoing]  MERS [2,494 + infected, 858 deaths] Ebola [28,000 + infected, 11,300 deaths] SARS  [8,000 + infected, 774 deaths]Swine Flu    [700 mil + infected, 284,000 deaths]COVID - 19    [ongoing]pandemicepidemicintensity of outbreak“The single biggest threat to man’s continued dominance on the planet is a virus.” [Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg]Prominent U.S. epidemiologist Larry Brilliant warns of looming pandemic threatBill Gates warns that “the greatest risk of global catastrophe… looks like this… a highly infectious virus. Not missiles, but microbes.”Dr. Anthony Fauci warns of looming outbreak...“We assess that the U.S. and the world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease...” [2019 U.S. Threat Assesment]U.S. needs to adopt social distancing models; shortfalls in national stockpile identified[U.S. Department of Health]-  DISASTER RISKS While the situation with COVID-19 is unprecedented, it’s not the first virus in recent history to threaten human life. In 2003, another form of coronavirus was identified in China; known as SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, this form of Coronavirus infected over 8,000 people and caused the deaths of almost 800 individuals5. Through containment and mitigation efforts, SARS remained at an epidemic level with most infections contained in China6. In 2009, a novel form of influenza colloquially called Swine Flu infected over 700 million people and caused the deaths of almost 300,0007. In 2012, MERS, also a form of coronavirus spread through the Middle East infecting almost 3,000 and causing the deaths of almost 900 people8. COVID-19 may be unprecedented, but it shouldn’t be surprising – in fact, it has been a long time coming.   Scientists and researchers have been warning the world for decades that a pandemic of this proportion or greater is imminent, however, many of these warnings were largely ignored by governments across the globe. Nobel laureate and biologist Joshua Lederberg said back in the 1990’s that the “single biggest threat to man’s continued dominance on the planet is the virus”9. Following the H1N1 or Swine Flu pandemic, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services called for social distancing models to be developed and identified shortages in the national stockpile10. Even as recently as Fall 2019, as U.S. Threat Assessment identified the U.S. along with the rest of the world to be incredibly vulnerable to the outbreak of some sort of contagious, possibly flu-like disease11. Despite the warning, many countries including the United States failed to prepare properly for this outbreak and have struggled to meet the demand for equipment and treatment capacity.  The possibility of a widespread pandemic has been made more possible in recent years as we live in an increasingly globalized society while issues such as climate change are exacerbating the risks. Air pollution is the cause of a number of diseases, such as lung cancer or respiratory infections12, contributing to a global disease DISASTER RISKS  -figure 03 - pandemic warnings1312burden, and can increase the severity of contracting a serious case of infections such as COVID-19 or the flu13. Some diseases are impacted by climatic conditions and changing climate can allow diseases to spread to regions where they previously have not existed, causing outbreaks14.   Over time, pollution and resource extraction cause severe land and water degradation resulting in habit loss or destruction which in addition to over-hunting and poaching, leads to species extinction and a drop in biodiversity. Ecosystems are a delicate web that need biodiversity to thrive, so to remove a species from that ecosystem damages the entire network and can potentially have devastating ripple effects throughout the entire ecosystem. Biodiversity increases an ecosystem’s ability to manage stress and builds resilience, so extinction affects ecosystems with a naturally low biodiversity (such as tundras and grasslands) more15. This can lead to the emergence of disease as normal “defense mechanisms” are destroyed16.  Diseases also get transmitted from wild animals to domesticated animals to humans more frequently, as human activity has put these three groups into closer and closer proximity with one another17. There may be thousands of new strains of coronavirus – similar to SARS-CoV-2 – that already exist in the bat population18 that could be just as deadly.  While this pandemic is certainly the focus of our concerns at the moment, it isn’t the only crisis looming. In the last forty years, both the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen along with the average global temperature, causing a number of environmental issues. The warming atmosphere creates a feedback loop in terms of the water cycle and water evaporation. A warmer climate increases the amount of water that will evaporate. The warmer atmosphere is able to hold more water vapour, which can act like a greenhouse gas, further intensifying global warming. This excess of water vapour in the atmosphere can also increase the quantity and intensity of precipitation events, which coupled with warmer oceans, can make weather events such -  DISASTER RISKS290 PPM +0.1° C+1.2° C410 PPMcarbon dioxidetemperature1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020Measles Outbreak [ongoing]  MERS [2,494 + infected, 858 deaths] Ebola [28,000 + infected, 11,300 deaths] SARS  [8,000 + infected, 774 deaths]Swine Flu    [700 mil + infected, 284,000 deaths]COVID - 19    [ongoing]pandemicepidemicintensity of outbreakDISASTER RISKS  -figure 04 - climate change151450100150200250300350400cost in billions1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020Measles Outbreak [ongoing]  MERS [2,494 + infected, 858 deaths] Ebola [28,000 + infected, 11,300 deaths] SARS  [8,000 + infected, 774 deaths]Swine Flu    [700 mil + infected, 284,000 deaths]COVID - 19    [ongoing]pandemicepidemicintensity of outbreak-  DISASTER RISKSas hurricanes and tropical storms more deadly. While we are not experiencing more frequent hurricanes or tropical storms, we are experiencing stronger weather19. The increased precipitation increases flooding, which can destroy infrastructure and damage crops20.  The increase in global temperature has extended the wildfire season in the U.S. by 105 days, and fires are typically six times larger and three times as frequent as fires fifty years ago21. As dry regions get hotter and dryer thanks to global warming, wildfires will only get more intense.  Wildfires also become a source of carbon emissions further exacerbating the issue.  We’ve seen the impact of these environmental issues in recent years as climate change has increased both the number and severity in recent years of natural disasters. 2017 was the worst year on record for hurricanes, and 2018 was one of the deadliest years for wildfires, and as climate change continues to worsen, so will these disasters22. We live in a world inundated with reports of climate change, disasters, and doomsday predictions. The world’s forests are burning at alarming rates, extreme weather is intensifying, and sea level rise is permanently shaping coastal cities.   Climate change related disasters cost the global economy billions of dollars annually (as seen in figure xx). According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in the last year, from January 2019-September 2019, the United States has experienced ten disasters all related to weather events, costing more than a billion dollars each23. In the last forty years, these climate related disasters have cost the U.S. $1.7 trillion dollars24, and this will only continue to worsen. For this current crisis, the United States has already spent trillions of dollars on aid and economic stimulus. But even on an average year, the government spends roughly $15 billion annually25, and this is often insufficient. Furthermore, this spending does nothing to guarantee future preparedness.  Disaster Response Network seeks to address this.DISASTER RISKS  -figure 05 - economic cost16 -  footnotes5.  “COVID-19.”6.  Ibid.  7. “Information on Swine/Variant Influenza.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. U.S. De-partment of Health & Human Services, August 6, 2018. https://www.cdc.gov/flu/swineflu/index.htm. 8. “COVID-19.”9. Robin Marantz Henig. “Experts Warned of a Pandemic Decades Ago. Why Weren’t We Ready?” National Geographic. National Geographic Partners, LLC., April 8, 2020. https://www.nationalgeo-graphic.com/science/2020/04/experts-warned-pandemic-decades-ago-why-not-ready-for-corona-virus/. 10. “Information.” 11. “Statement For The Record: 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The U.S. Intelligence Commu-nity.” ODNI. Office of the Director of National Intelligence . Accessed May 10, 2020. https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1947-statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community 12.  WHO. “WHO | Mortality and Burden of Disease from Ambient Air Pollution.” Accessed December 15, 2019. http://www.who.int/gho/phe/outdoor_air_pollution/burden_text/en/. 13. Ibid. 14.  “Climate Change and Human Health - Risks and Responses. Summary.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 9 July 2009, www.who.int/globalchange/climate/summary/en/index4.html. 15. Randal Jackson. “The Effects of Climate Change.” Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. Ac-cessed September 15, 2019. https://climate.nasa.gov/effects.16. Abrahm Lustgarten. “How Climate Change Is Contributing to Skyrocketing Rates of...” ProPublica, Pro Publica Inc., 7 May 2020, www.propublica.org/article/climate-infectious-diseases. 17.  Ibid. 18.  Ibid.19.  “Climate Central: A Science & News Organization.” Accessed December 15, 2019. https://www.climatecentral.org/. 20.  “A Warming Arctic Could Cost the World Trillions of Dollars Thanks to Permafrost and Ice Melt Feedback Loops.” Accessed December 15, 2019. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environ-ment/2019/04/arctic-climate-change-feedback-loops-cost-trillions/. 21.  “2019 Billion-Dollar Disasters.” Accessed December 6, 2019. https://www.climatecentral.org/gal-lery/graphics/2019-billion-dollar-disasters. 22.   Ibid. 23.  “Predictions of Future Global Climate | UCAR Center for Science Education.” Accessed December 15, 2019. https://scied.ucar.edu/longcontent/predictions-future-global-climate. 24.  State of the Planet. “How Climate Change Impacts the Economy,” June 20, 2019. https://blogs.ei.co-lumbia.edu/2019/06/20/climate-change-economy-impacts/. 25.  Kompas, Tom, Van Ha Pham, and Tuong Nhu Che. “The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by Country and the Global Economic Gains From Complying With the Paris Climate Accord.” Earth’s Future 6, no. 8 (2018): 1153–73. https://doi.org/10.1029/2018EF000922. THE NETWORK2120 -  THE NETWORK Disaster Response Network is an architectural proposal to convert thirty-two decommissioned Cold  War-era ammunition storage depots across the United States into a geographically distributed network of temporary intensive care units available to COVID-19 patients and the victims of future outbreaks. These facilities would also serve as emergency shelters and response centres during other disasters.  Disaster  Response Network responds to the current COVID-19 pandemic by restoring obsolete infrastructure, streamlining the country’s disaster response capabilities and enabling more  effective response to future concerns.THE NETWORK  -figure 06 - supplies 2322 -  THE NETWORKBLACK HILLSARMY DEPOT 810700PINE BLUFFARSENAL 462ANNISTONARMY DEPOTBLUE GRASSARMY DEPOT13101035JOILET ARMYAMMUN. PLANT 1035SAN DIEGO NAVALSUPPLY CENTER 50LOS ALAMITOSTS AFRCFORT IRWINTRAINING CENTER8022BENICIAORD. DEPOT 133KANSAS ARMYAMMUN. PLANT 243LOUISANA ARMYAMMUN. DEPOT 90REDSTONEARSENAL 270HOLSTEN ARMYAMMUN. DEPOT 130CAMP STANLEYSTORAGE ACTIVITY 130IOWA ARMYAMMUN. DEPOT 271NAVAL SURFACEWARFARE CENTERRAVENNA ARMYAMMUN. DEPOT800688MILAN ARMYAMMUN. DEPOT 873SHUMAKER NAVALAMMUN. DEPOT 600RED RIVERARMY DEPOT 721SAVANNAARMY DEPOTSENECAARMY DEPOT409520MCALESTER ARMYAMMUN. PLANT 1611SIOUX ARMY ORD. DEPOT 801PUEBLO CHEM.DEPOT 1545HASTINGS NAVALAMMUN. DEPOT802CAMP NAVAJO996FORT WINGATEDEPOT ACTIVITYHAWTHORNEARMY DEPOT 1822SIERRAARMY DEPOT 802UMATILLACHEM. DEPOT 1001TOOLEARMY DEPOT 902INVENTORY - large scale:TOTAL CAPACITY:21,540 bunkers..........32.3 mil. cubic metres*bunker volume = 1500 m3  || area = 75 m2INVENTORY - small scale:22 facilities.........20,245 bunkersHawthorne Army Depot   1822McAlester Army Ammun. Plant  1611Pueblo Chemical Depot   1545Anniston Army Depot    1310Blue Grass Army Depot   1035Joilet Army Ammunition Plant  1035Umatilla Chemical Depot  1001Fort Wingate Depot Activity   996Toole Army Depot    902Milan Army Ammunition Depot   873Black Hills Army Depot   810Camp Navajo     802Sierra Army Depot    802Sioux Army Ord. Depot    801Naval Surface Warfare Center   800Red River Army Depot    721Hastings Naval Ammun. Depot 700Ravenna Army Ammun. Depot 688Shumaker Naval Ammun. Depot 600Seneca Army Depot  520Pine Bluff Arsenal   462Savanna Army Depot  40910 facilities...........1,295 bunkersRedstone Arsenal   276Iowa Army Ammun. Depot  271Kansas Army Ammun. Plant 243Benicia Ord. Depot  133Camp Stanley Stor. Activity  130Holsten Army Ammun. Depot 130Louisana Army Ammun. Depot 90Los Alamitos TS AFRC  80San Diego Naval Supply Center 50Fort Irwin Training Center  22THE NETWORK  - The defunct military infrastructure sites targeted in the proposal collectively contain over 20,000 bunkers26  and contain over 32 million cubic metres of storage capacity. These sites are distributed across the United States as seen in figure 07. While each depot differs in size and layout as a response to local conditions, they each follow the same logic in terms of design and contain the same key architectural elements such as the storage bunkers. Built predominantly in the 1940’s, these sites were part of the war effort to store, process, maintain, and dispose of chemical munitions and other types of ordnance27. Most of these sites were decommissioned by the end of the Cold War in the 1990’s as the changing state of warfare rendered them more or less obsolete28.  These sites sit mostly vacant and are still mostly owned by the federal government, as contamination from ordnance in isolated zones make it difficult to sell the land to a private developer. These sites now sit empty or underutilized, representing a massive capital investment going to waste.  This project focuses in on the former Black Hills Army Depot in southwestern South Dakota as a case study, with the architectural interventions applied here to serve as a model that could be applied to any node in the network. figure 07 - depot network 2524 -  THE NETWORK THE NETWORK  -figure 08 - depot aerial2726 -  THE NETWORK The advantage of this network is that a majority of the continental United States is within a six-hour drive to at least one node in the network, as seen in figure 09. These radii contain most major population areas within the United StatesTHE NETWORK  -BLACK HILLS ARMY DEPOTfigure 09 - scope of network 2928 -  THE NETWORKLEGEND:EARTHQUAKE RISKS TORNADO RISKSFLOODING RISKS HURRICANE RISKSevacuationevacuationquarantineLEGEND:EARTHQUAKE RISKS TORNADO RISKSFLOODING RISKS HURRICANE RISKSevacuationevacuationquarantineLEGEND:EARTHQUAKE RISKS TORNADO RISKSFLOODING RISKS HURRICANE RISKSevacuationevacuationquarantineLEGEND:EARTHQUAKE RISKS TORNADO RISKSFLOODING RISKS HURRICANE RISKSevacuationevacuationquarantineLEGEND:EARTHQUAKE RISKS TORNADO RISKSFLOODING RISKS HURRICANE RISKSevacuationevacuationquarantineTHE NETWORK  - This allows for the network to respond locally and efficiently to disasters wherever they occur in the continental U.S. For example, in the case of an evacuation from a wildfire in California or a hurricane in the South, evacuees could retreat to the closest node in the network for shelter, while those nodes could then deploy supplies and aid to the affected zones in a timely and efficient manner. The remaining, inactive nodes in the network could shift supplies and personnel as needed to active nodes, providing logistical support.figure 10 - network efficiency30 -  footnotes26.   Army Ammunition and Explosives Storage During the Cold War (1946-1989), Army Ammunition and Explosives Storage During the Cold War (1946-1989) § (2009).27.   Ibid.28.   Ibid. BUNKER  |  1:100ARCHITECTURAL TYPOLOGIES3534 The former Black Hills Army Depot is organized much like the other nodes in network with bunkers being on placed in smaller subdivisions across the site connected through an extensive suburban road network. The sites also contain an existing rail junction which the project will engage with and use to ship out and receive supplies to this node in the network. This site in particular contains about 810 bunkers29 that are divided between nine different subdivisions on the site. These bunkers were originally used as storage spaces for ammunition and ordnance30 while other sectors of the site were utilized for the purposes as seen in figure 1231.  The two dominant architectural typologies on the site are the former storage bunkers and the storage berms. The bunkers – 8 metres in width and 24 metres in length32– are simple concrete vault forms built above ground and then later mounded over with earth. The bunkers are alternated on the site with the storage berms which are c-shaped landmasses approximately 1.3 m high33 and have a similar overall footprint to the bunkers. These bunkers and berms are accessed off of single-loaded road networks laid out in a similar fashion to a suburb. Criss-crossing the site are seasonal creek beds and an old railroad track which will serve as the route for a new hiking trail. -  TYPOLOGIESfigure 11 - bunker TYPOLOGIES  -3736 -  TYPOLOGIES1 - Residential Area2 - Combat Mat. Area3 - Ammun. Maint. Area4 - Ammun. Workshop*5 - Ammun. Packing Area*6 - Chem. Warfare Area*Bg1 - Burning Ground 1*Bg2 - Burning Ground 2*Bg3 - Burning Ground 3**A : J - Storage Blocks6*BG3**5* 4*BG2*BG1*ABDEGFJHA321*non-use **surface use onlyCHISTORICAL ZONINGWYOMINGSOUTH DAKOTANEBRASKATYPOLOGIES  -3000200010005000metresland leased for grazingbunker subdivisions- 810 bunkers - railroad junctionexisting residentialroad to edgemontfigure 12 - site mapping 3938BUNKER  |  1:100BUNKER  |  1:100-  TYPOLOGIESfigure 13 - storage bunker drawings BUNKER  |  1:100BUNKER  |  1:100TYPOLOGIES  -4140STORAGE BERM  |  1:100STORAGE BERM  |  1:100-  TYPOLOGIESSTORAGE BERM  |  1:100STORAGE BERM  |  1:100figure 14 - storage berm drawings TYPOLOGIES  -4342land leased for grazingold railroad trackseasonal creek beds-  TYPOLOGIESfigure 15 - existing site conditionsstorage bunkerstorage bermfoxholeTYPOLOGIES  -44BUNKER  |  1:100-  footnotes29.   Preliminary Assessment of Ordnance Contamination At The Former Black Hills Army Depot, South Dakota, Preliminary Assessment of Ordnance Contamination At The Former Black Hills Army Depot, South Dakota § (1992). 30.   Ibid.31.   Ibid.32.   Ibid.33.   Ibid.LOGISTICS4948 Of the nine subdivisions on site, the eastern most two containing roughly 188 bunkers will serve as storage capacity for the national stockpile due to their proximity to the existing railroad junction. Stockpile supplies and other equipment would be brought to and from the site via both truck and rail, and then stored in these bunkers until needed. The project utilizes the existing railroad platforms and rail lines, indicated in red in figure 16 to unload and reload supplies for storage or deployment.-  LOGISTICSLEGEND:bunkers to serve national stockpile3000200010005000metresfigure 16 - railroad junctionbunkers to serve field hospitals and      emergency sheltersemergency response subdivisions- 622 bunkers - figure 17 - site logisticsLOGISTICS  -land leased for grazingstockpile subdivisions- 188 bunkers - railroad junctionexisting residentialroad to edgemont5150 -  LOGISTICSfigure 18 - supply platformsLOGISTICS  -5352 -  LOGISTICSfigure 19 - stockpile storageLOGISTICS  -5554figure 20 - supply cycle-  LOGISTICS~ 5 years hospital unused supplies cycled back into system before expiration dates This part of the network would act as an expansion of the existing national stockpile, storing supplies in surplus to be cycled out into regional hospital networks as needed. Most supplies being stored have a five-year shelf life, so surplus supplies being stored in the network would be cycled out into local hospitals approximately every four years to be used and then are replaced with new supplies. This is to ensure that supplies being stored for emergencies will be ready and functioning for whenever disaster strikes.LOGISTICS  -5756figure 21 - non-use-  LOGISTICSfigure 22 - construction figure 23 - operationalLOGISTICS  -5958 -  LOGISTICSThe remaining seven sectors will serve as the bases for field hospitals or emergency shelters. Bunkers in these regions would store emergency supplies, equipment, generators, and materials to construct the field hospitals or shelters. When needed, volunteers and the National Guard would construct these temporary facilities around the respective bunker the materials were stored in and operated with the bunker becoming the mechanical and power hub for each facility. The advantage of this system is that facilities can be built in stages as capacity needs shift, allowing for extreme flexibility from the network. Built facilities can begin to operate, as new facilities continue to be built, allowing the project to begin operation as soon as possible.figure 25 - expanded capacityLOGISTICS  -figure 24 - early construction6160 -  LOGISTICSIntensive Care Projected Needs: 200,000 - 2.9 million beds(currently available) (needed)*one person = 10, 000 patientsLOGISTICS  - This network of field hospitals would help to cover hospital shortages in the United States. On an average year, the United States has roughly 65,000 ICU beds available for all 328 million people34. In an emergency – like the current situation – most hospitals can roughly double their ICU capacity by converting other rooms into makeshift ICUs. This brings the available capacity in the U.S. to around 130,000 ICUs35, which many projections and estimations show may be tragically insufficient36. This is especially true in rural areas, where the proportion of space available to the surrounding population is incredibly problematic. A study conducted in 2018 showed that metro areas on average had 2.9 ICU beds per 10,000 people whereas many rural areas only had 1.6 beds for the same population sample37.   This means that in rural areas, a population of 80,000 may have as few as 20 ICU beds available (including units temporarily converted to ICU). This means that during a pandemic, there would not need to be a massive surge of cases in rural communities to put the local hospital at full capacity38, but rather, the infection might only need to hit one nursing home, one church choir, etc. before the hospital is overrun and patients can’t receive life-saving treatment.figure 26 - projected capacity needs6362 -  LOGISTICS The advantage to a field hospital system over building additional permanent facilities is that the field hospital is far quicker and cheaper to construct. On average, a new hospital would cost eight times more and take five times as long to construct compared to a temporary facility39. In addition, new facilities would have to be operated and maintained outside of a crisis, which is inefficient and costly.$4000 / sq m or $1.5 mil / bed $500 / sq m~ 5 years < 1 year$$$$$$$$ $figure 27 - field hospital vs. permanent constructionLOGISTICS  -$4000 / sq m or $1.5 mil / bed $500 / sq m~ 5 years < 1 year$$$$$$$ $$4000 / sq m or $1.5 mil / bed $500 / sq m~ 5 years < 1 year$$$$$$$$ $6564LEGEND:field hospitalstorage bunkertemporary morgueland bermring roadhiking trail on old railroad tracks-  LOGISTICS In the emergency response blocks, central bunkers are designed for supply storage only (see map), allowing the surrounding field hospitals to readily access these supplies during operation. In addition, a couple of bunkers in each sector would be designated as temporary morgue space. These sectors are accessed via the ring road, which is the main circulation road on the site and connects to each sector via several secondary roadways. Looping the exterior of the ring road is an old railroad track, which would serve as a hiking and recreational trail on site.figure 28 - field hospital subdivision mapLOGISTICS  -6766 -  LOGISTICS This hiking path would be four metres wide to accommodate for social distancing measures and would have periodic signage to provide wayfinding on site. This path would be maintained and utilized post disaster as well, providing a recreational space for local communities. Signage would be added to teach visitors about the history of the site as well as ecological measures being taken to improve the ecology and biodiversity of the site when not in use. This would serve as a tourist and recreational attraction for the region. This would be part of existing tourist circuits and parks, as well, as help educate visitors about the Buffalo Gap National Grassland that surrounds the site.LOGISTICS  -figure 29 - hiking path6968BLACK HILLS ARMY DEPOTLEGEND:REGIONAL MAP50 10 25 50 100 200 300 400 500DESIGNATED LAND USESITEBOUNDARIESNATIONAL PARKSTATE PARKNATIONAL GRASSLANDNATIONAL FORESTSTATE LINECOUNTY LINEWATERHIGHWAYSSECONDARY ROADSPOPULATION CENTRENWYOMINGMONTANANEBRASKASOUTH DAKOTAWYOMING SOUTH DAKOTAThunder Basin National Grassland-  LOGISTICSBlack Hills National ForestWind Cave National ParkSITEBuffalo Gap National GrasslandPine Ridge ReservationBadlands National ParkOglala National GrasslandCuster State ParkLOGISTICS  -figure 30 - regional parks and tourist sites70 -  footnotes34.  “Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, 2020: AHA.” American Hospital Association. American Hospital Association, 2020. https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals. 35.   Ibid. 36.  “IHME: COVID-19 Projections.” Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. Accessed May 10, 2020. https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america. 37.  Kendal Orgera. “Urban and Rural Differences in Coronavirus Pandemic Preparedness.”  Health System Tracker, Peterson-Kaiser, 22 Apr. 2020, www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/ur-ban-and-rural-differences-in-coronavirus-pandemic-preparedness/.38.  Adrian Diaz, “The COVID-19 Pandemic And Rural Hospitals-Adding Insult To Injury.” The COVID-19 Pandemic And Rural Hospitals-Adding Insult To Injury | Health Affairs. Project HOPE, May 3, 2020. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200429.583513/full/.39.  “2016 Hospital Construction Survey.” Health Facilities Management. American Hospital Asso-ciation, February 3, 2020. https://www.hfmmagazine.com/articles/1878-2016-hospital-construc-tion-survey. ARCHITECTURAL ISSUES7574 -  ISSUES This project, in addition to meeting the logistical issues of this crisis, seeks to improve upon existing methods for treatment and disease containment. Specifically, this project seeks to address both issues of loneliness and isolation, as well as better protect healthcare workers from exposure to the virus.  Typical hospital design as well as current designs for field hospitals do little to address these issues. These current designs leave COVID -19 patients isolated from normal human contact, as visitors are prohibited to prevent spread and nurses and doctors treating patients are so covered in personal protection equipment that their appearance is dehumanizing. This project seeks to safely connect families to their sick loved ones to address these isolation issues, while maintaining physical separation between patients, staff, and visitors to prevent the spread of the virus and protect the health of everyone.  The project relies on visual and auditory connections to replace physical ones, and seeks to provide a more humane, comforting treatment experience. ISSUES  -figure 31 - views in isolation76DESIGN8180 -  DESIGN DESIGN  -figure 32 - view from ambulance8382 The hospital is designed around the existing storage bunker and separates visitors and staff to lessen the possibility of the virus spreading. Staff circulate on foot between the hospital, and their sleeping/socialization quarters located in the berms on the roadway itself. Visitor drive to the hospital site park along the roadway and circulate mostly in the landscape and path around the back of the hospital. Visitors access patient rooms from the exterior, while entrance into the hospital itself is restricted to authorized personnel only.-  DESIGNfigure 33 - hospital design and site circulationDESIGN  -8584 -  DESIGNfigure 34 - hospital exteriorDESIGN  -8786 Patients are brought to the hospital via ambulance and are brought into the triage space located at the front of the facility. This triage space is left open to provide a flexible staging and transfer space to efficiently move patients from gurneys to hospital beds and switch over necessary equipment.  From triage, patients are moved through staff hallways to intensive care units located around the outside of the facility. LEGEND:mechanicalstoragetriageICU units-  DESIGNfigure 35 - floor planmech. storagevisitor pathICU unitsstaff circulationtriageDESIGN  -parking8988 -  DESIGNfigure 36 - entranceDESIGN  -9190 -  DESIGNfigure 37 - triage sectionDESIGN  -9392 -  DESIGNfigure 38 - patient transportDESIGN  -9594 -  DESIGNfigure 39 - staff hallwayDESIGN  -9796staffcorridorequiptmentroom-  DESIGNpatient roomporch exterior circulationfigure 40 - ICU planDESIGN  -9998 These ICU spaces pull the monitoring and life-support equipment out from the patient spaces in the middle to an antechamber, separated from patient spaces by plastic sheeting. This cuts down the number of times that staff must be directly exposed to the patient, as they can access this equipment away from the patient. Staff would periodically have to enter the patient room, but by separating out this equipment, the number of times they might have to do so would go from fifteen to twenty times per day to perhaps two.-  DESIGNfigure 41 - equipment roomDESIGN  -101100figure 43 - patient zonefigure 42 - staff zone-  DESIGNfigure 44 - visitor zoneDESIGN  -103102 -  DESIGNfigure 45 - patient perspective Patients would occupy the centre space, which has access to a washroom unit, and windows out to the porch visitation space and surrounding landscape. While hospital staff would still be wearing the extensive personal protection equipment, visitors could sit on the porch space free of masks, allowing for a more friendly, and comforting experience for the patient.DESIGN  -105104 The porch space on the exterior of the building is accessed off the exterior path and can be enclosed during colder months to provide protection from the elements. There are two visitation spaces per porch, and the viewing windows are in alcoves hidden behind planter boxes to provide privacy. From these porch spaces, visitors could talk to and look in on loved ones, while remaining physically separated with a thin acrylic window divider. -  DESIGNfigure 46 - visitor perspectiveDESIGN  -107106 -  DESIGN DESIGN  -figure 47 - visitor perspective109108+_-  DESIGNpositive air pressurenegative air pressurefigure 48 - pressure diagram The facility mechanical systems provide a further layer of protection by ventilating the hospital in such a way as to protect from further viral spread. Make-up air is introduced into the staff circulation hallway, creating a positive pressure in this zone. The system then ventilates the stale air out from the roof of the patient spaces, creating a negative pressure in this zone. This system prevents contaminated air from back tracking into the staff spaces, and further protects their health.  A utility channel runs above the equipment and patient rooms to accommodate this ventilation, as well as run power lines to the hospital. DESIGN  -111110 -  DESIGN DESIGN  -figure 49 - ICU section113112 -  DESIGN DESIGN  -figure 50 - ventilation diagramutility spaceventilation115114 -  DESIGN  These facilities are built using a Uni-strut structural system40 which is an easy to assemble framework that is commonly used in scaffolding and other such functions. The advantage to this system is that it is strong and flexible, but lightweight and easy to assemble allowing for the design of the system to be flexible and simple enough that an inexperienced volunteer could assemble it.DESIGN  -figure 51 - uni-strut system117116 -  DESIGNfigure 52 - shelter flexibility The grid structure allows this framework to adapt and change to accommodate for future disaster scenarios. This project was laying out one possible design for a field hospital, but the structure could be adapted to simply be an emergency shelter or reconfigured to meet other future needs for these facilities.DESIGN  -119118 -  DESIGN Once the need for these facilities disappears, these temporary structures would be disassembled and repacked into the storage bunkers where they would wait until they are required once more.DESIGN  -figure 53 - shelter storagecomponents repacked into bunker120 -  footnotes40.   https://www.unistrut.us/  AFTERWORD125124 -  afterwordfigure 54 - morgue This project did not begin as a response to COVID-19 or even a hypothetical pandemic. In fact, when I began this project, the possibility of a pandemic seemed more like a far-fetched Hollywood plotline than reality. This project began as a plan to prepare the future for a possible disaster, while also addressing the present, where no such disaster was occurring. But while I was studying, assessing, and contemplating solutions for a hypothetical disaster – the unthinkable occurred – and suddenly we were in the middle of an actual crisis. As this crisis is ongoing, this project remains ongoing. The future will likely continue to shift ideas about what it means to respond in a crisis – this thesis is a first step in this.  Disaster Response Network is a critical investigation of current and past events that seeks to address many of the design and logistical issues that have emerged in the last several months as this crisis unfolds. This is a reflection on current mitigation efforts for both this crisis and others that responds specifically to the emerging issues of this current COVID-19 pandemic while also trying to address the United States’ disaster response solutions holistically. By restoring obsolete infrastructure, streamlining the country’s disaster response capabilities, and enabling a more effective response to future concerns, this project helps prepare the U.S. for inevitable future crises in a more humane, sustainable manner. afterword  -BIBLIOGRAPHY129128“2016 Hospital Construction Survey.” Health Facilities Management. American  Hospital Association, February 3, 2020. https://www.hfmmagazine.com/ articles/1878-2016-hospital-construction-survey.  “2019 Billion-Dollar Disasters.” Accessed December 6, 2019. https://www. climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/2019-billion-dollar-disasters.Army Ammunition and Explosives Storage During the Cold War (1946-1989), Army  Ammunition and Explosives Storage During the Cold War (1946-1989) §  (2009).  “A Warming Arctic Could Cost the World Trillions of Dollars Thanks to Permafrost  and Ice Melt Feedback Loops.” Accessed December 15, 2019. https://www. nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/04/arctic-climate-change-  feedback-loops-cost-trillions/.“CDC Confirms Possible Instance of Community Spread of COVID-19 in U.S.” Centers  for Disease Control and Prevention. U.S. Department of Health & Human  Services, February 26, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0226- Covid-19-spread.html. “Climate Change and Human Health - Risks and Responses. Summary.” World  Health Organization, World Health Organization, 9 July 2009, www.who.int/ globalchange/climate/summary/en/index4.html. Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. “Climate Change Evidence: How Do We  Know?” Accessed October 14, 2019. https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence.“COVID-19, MERS & SARS.” National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services, April 6, 2020. https://www.niaid. nih.gov/diseases-conditions/covid-19. Diaz, Adrian. “The COVID-19 Pandemic And Rural Hospitals-Adding Insult To  Injury.” The COVID-19 Pandemic And Rural Hospitals-Adding Insult To  Injury | Health Affairs. Project HOPE, May 3, 2020. https://www.healthaffairs. org/do/10.1377/hblog20200429.583513/full/. “Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, 2020: AHA.” American Hospital Association. American  Hospital Association, 2020. https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us- hospitals. “Global Warming Effects on Sea Level.” Accessed December 15, 2019. https://www. climatehotmap.org/global-warming-effects/sea-level.html.Graham, Barney S. “Rapid COVID-19 Vaccine Development.” Science. American  Association for the Advancement of Science, May 8, 2020. https://science. sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/05/07/science.abb8923. Henig, Robin Marantz. “Experts Warned of a Pandemic Decades Ago. Why Weren’t  We Ready?” National Geographic. National Geographic Partners, LLC., April  8, 2020. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/04/experts- warned-pandemic-decades-ago-why-not-ready-for-coronavirus/. “IHME: COVID-19 Projections.” Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. Accessed  May 10, 2020. https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america. “Information on Swine/Variant Influenza.” Centers for Disease Control and  Prevention. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, August 6, 2018.  https://www.cdc.gov/flu/swineflu/index.htm. Jackson, Randal. “The Effects of Climate Change.” Climate Change: Vital Signs of the  Planet. Accessed September 15, 2019. https://climate.nasa.gov/effects.Kompas, Tom, Van Ha Pham, and Tuong Nhu Che. “The Effects of Climate Change  on GDP by Country and the Global Economic Gains From Complying With  the Paris Climate Accord.” Earth’s Future 6, no. 8 (2018): 1153–73. https://doi. org/10.1029/2018EF000922.Lustgarten, Abrahm. “How Climate Change Is Contributing to Skyrocketing Rates  of...” ProPublica, Pro Publica Inc., 7 May 2020, www.propublica.org/article/ climate-infectious-diseases.Orgera, Kendal. “Urban and Rural Differences in Coronavirus Pandemic  Preparedness.”  Health System Tracker, Peterson-Kaiser, 22 Apr. 2020,  www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/urban-and-rural-differences-in- coronavirus-pandemic-preparedness/. “Predictions of Future Global Climate | UCAR Center for Science Education.”  Accessed December 15, 2019. https://scied.ucar.edu/longcontent/predictions- future-global-climate.Preliminary Assessment of Ordnance Contamination At The Former Black Hills  Army Depot, South Dakota, Preliminary Assessment of Ordnance  Contamination At The Former Black Hills Army Depot, South Dakota § (1992). Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. “Air Pollution.” Our World in Data, April 17, 2017.  https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution.-  bibliography bibliography  -130State of the Planet. “How Climate Change Impacts the Economy,” June 20, 2019.  https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2019/06/20/climate-change-economy-impacts/. “Statement For The Record: 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The U.S.  Intelligence Community.” ODNI. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  Accessed May 10, 2020. https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/ congressional-testimonies/item/1947-statement-for-the-record-worldwide- threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community WHO. “WHO | Mortality and Burden of Disease from Ambient Air Pollution.”  Accessed December 15, 2019. http://www.who.int/gho/phe/outdoor_air_ pollution/burden_text/en/. -  bibliography

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