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Practicum report : Fall 2011 2012

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PRACTICUM REPORT FALL 2011 Presented to Dr. Kyung-Ae Park, Security Stream Supervisor Dr. Julian Dierkes, MAAPPS Program Advisor Dr. Paul Evans, IAR Director for IAR525 Jean-François Roof Student Number: Master of Arts in Asia-Pacific Policy Studies Institute of Asian Research University of British-Columbia February 3rd, 2012 Table of Contents Preface.................................................................................................................................3 1. The Raison d'Être of UNRCPD.......................................................................................7 2. Experience, Tasks and Skills Demonstrated..................................................................15 3. Reflexions......................................................................................................................24 Bibliography......................................................................................................................30 Annex 1..............................................................................................................................33 Annex 2..............................................................................................................................35 Annex 3..............................................................................................................................43 Annex 4..............................................................................................................................44 Preface I believe my efforts to actively seek an internship can be traced back to February 2011. Quite anxious to the idea that I could have missed some important deadlines, but nonetheless very motivated to start  hunting down unique opportunities,  I  embarked on a  journey of mass mailing to  potential patrons. I had the preconceived idea that internships ought to be pursued during summer or otherwise available positions would plummet with the incoming fall season. I later discovered that this was not true. Fall offers also interesting opportunities. My  initial  excitement  quickly  collapsed  after  experiencing  a  lack  of  interest  from  the institutional side. Very few institutions dared responding to my enquiries. My call  for a practicum wandered into quasi-total vacuity. As for the ones who were kind enough to provide me with a reply, they candidly explained that they had no program to accommodate interns. I suppose that one can easily find an internship with a private consulting firm of a financial company with  a  background  in  business  and economics.  Yet,  my specific  background  in  security limited my prospects to the public sector,  academic institutions and think tanks.  I  doubt I  had the adequate background to apply directly to NGOs located in Asia. Not satisfied with a potential position in Canada, I wanted to explore Asia, or at least go back to Japan. The economic situation in Japan did not  reflect any positive prospects,  and it  only became worse after the March earthquake. Nevertheless, thanks to the unfailing support from Dr. Evans and Dr. Dierkes, I was able to meet influential and high profiled persons, ultimately leading to a short-term position with the Social Science Research Council office in Tokyo. The position was not connected to my studies, but Mr. Ozaki, the program manager, did his best to make the experience as profitable as possible for me. For example, he gave me weekly assignments (read Japanese newspapers articles on 3 security developments in the region, summarize the content and brief him in Japanese) and granted me the responsibility over the Abe Fellowship database management. Mr. Ozaki was kind enough to offer me a temporary internship, but meanwhile, he worried that I  would  not  have  much  to  do  in  the  office  and  encouraged  me  to  look  at  other  opportunities simultaneously,  to complement my practicum. This experience was quite interesting as I felt I was entering  the  rather  infamous  world  of  job  hunting.  I  wrote  numerous  resumes  using  Japanese standardized templates. This led me to a highly improbable meeting with the leader of the Socialist Party  of  Japan  (SPJ),  Mrs.  Mizuho  Fukushima.  I  understood  that  in  order  to  be  successful  in networking (and this is also applicable in job hunting), one has to start small and locally. I had sent my resume to the district office of the SPJ in Shinagawa. There was no program to accommodate interns, but the officer in charge thought maybe something could be possible at the headquarters level. Through his introduction, I then met the Secretary-General of the Party, who was not able to help me either. However, there was a one-day volunteering activity at Mrs. Fukushima`s office. Although I met very briefly with her (she was busy sitting in a committee dedicated to the victims of the nuclear incident triggered by the earthquake and the tsunami in March 2011), I was able to talk to her, her legislative aides and a handful of supporters about Japanese politics, society and issues to be addressed. The  other  opportunity  was  pursued by Mr.  Ozaki  on  my behalf  with  the  Sasakawa Peace Foundation. I helped with and attended a 2-day conference the foundation was hosting for the Project 2049 Institute, an American think tank, on the future of the US-Japan security alliance and issues in the Asia-Pacific security environment. Ultimately, I was invited to work at the UNRCPD. I think I was quite lucky to secure something despite the great support and the useful contacts provided by IAR. This only shows that the labour market is shrinking and becoming even more competitive, requiring highly defined skills. I know that I 4 was not the only one struggling with the practicum matter. This pattern is likely to be repeated with future MAAPPS cohorts, even if the students start probing very early. In order to help preventing this situation from happening again, Annex 1 displays the information of different institutions and focal points that might be great connections in the future. Before  proceeding  with  the  actual  internship,  I  would  like  to  conclude  this  chapter  by attempting  to  make  a  parallel  between  securing  a  practicum  and  conducting  fieldwork  in  Japan, drawing on an article  written by Daniel  P.  Aldrich,  a  former Abe Fellow1.  Entering the field as  a foreigner might prevent success at first because of one might bring his biases to the country and the hosts might as well be prejudiced. The student must thus work harder to prove he is as capable as anyone  else.  Aldrich  argues  that  if  played  well,  foreign  nationality  can  become  an  advantage  in fieldwork. The same thing could be said for someone looking for an internship. An institution might feel honoured that a foreigner is interested in their projects and willing to help. Rate of success might vary along the level of the organization concerned. A multinational company would not reply the same (they might even receive a few dozens of enquiries from foreign students) as a local NGO would. As goes the saying: “Act locally, think globally”. Furthermore, a few recommendations prior to departure and during fieldwork are being given by Aldrich that might be of some help for future interns as well: 1. Obtaining letters of introduction Indeed, it would be unfortunate not to take advantages of the notoriety of the IAR faculty to establish contacts overseas and widen the list of possible opportunities. 2. Conception of a strong research plan or detailed list of objectives, but be prepared to be flexible A  strong  document  listing  objectives,  aspirations  and  expectations  will  help  the  host 1Daniel P. Aldrich. “The 800-Pound Gaijin in the Room: Strategies and Tactics for Conducting Fieldwork in Japan and Abroad”, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 42, No 2 (2009), 299-303. 5 organization defining and preparing the student's role during his internship and make it more suitable to the  student's  tastes.  Flexibility  is  necessary  though,  since  the  student  might  have  to  deal  with unexpected tasks or work in a field different than previously thought. 3. Printing business cards This has been brought before during a MAAPPS student council reunion. With some help from IAR, CFIS and UBC Supply Management,  MAAPPS could come up with a common template for students. Dual use of English and local language gives a strong impression to the recipient and helps introducing oneself. 4. Purchase of small gifts (tokens of appreciation) While this might not look important and be easily overlooked, this is a nice way to break the ice with  one's  supervisor  and  to  introduce  one's  cultural  heritage.  In  Japan,  such  behaviour  is enforced by the culture, but anyone would enjoy receiving gifts. 5. Practice militant note taking Memory is a faculty that forgets quite fast. In order to make the most of his experience, the intern should try to note his daily activities and formulate thoughts that will guide him through the redaction of his practicum report and provide substantial content to develop further on. 6 Chapter 1 1. The Raison d'Être of UNRCPD Mandate & Activities The United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific (UNRCPD) was established following the will of the General Assembly to provide assistance to Member States within the Asia-Pacific with regards to disarmament efforts, in parallel with existing regional centres in Africa (1985) and Latin American (1986). Resolution A/42/39D, adopted by consensus in 1987, saw the birth of UNRCPD from that point.  Its  original  mandate,  still  observed today,  aims to “[…] provide,  on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asian region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources […]”2. UNRCPD thus acts as the operational branch in Asia and the Pacific for the Office of Disarmament Affairs, through the Regional Disarmament Branch, based in New York. While it had been agreed that the Centre would have a foot in Asia, and despite a partnership being concluded with the Government of Nepal at that time, financial issues and political instability plaguing the country forced the postponement of the establishment of an office until 2008, two years after the end of the civil war in Nepal. Building on the aforementioned mandate, the Centre has developed its strategy in a three-point approach: 1) To promote global disarmament and non-proliferation norms In order to promote the norms of global disarmament, UNRCPD assists countries in developing capacity-building programs, such as the implementation of UN programs of action, inter-institutional 2UN General Assembly, 42nd Session. Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia (A/42/39D). 30 November 1987. Online. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/512/71/IMG/NR051271.pdf?OpenElement (Retrieved on November 30th, 2011) 7 training courses mainly dedicated to fight and prevent the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and coordinates activities with other agencies in order to enforce national laws and national capacities. These activities are mostly conducted upon reception of a request for assistance coming from a developing country that might lack the capacities or the knowledge to fully implement a treaty it ratified, to report adequately to responsible agencies or to seek a solution to a growing concern. 2) To enhance regional dialogue on disarmament, non-proliferation and security matters The Centre has been engaged in multilateral forums and acted as a catalyst in bringing together government  officials  and  practitioners,  scholars  and  members  of  civil  society  to  discuss  about disarmament and non-proliferation issues in a very open fashion. UNRCPD has been closely involved in  the  “UN Conference  on  Disarmament  Issues”,  held  annually  in  Japan.  This  year  saw the  23rd instalment  of the conference,  with Matsumoto City being chosen as the host.  The second flagship conference is held jointly by the Office of Disarmament Affairs through UNRCPD and the Republic of Korea.  The  “UN-ROK  Joint  Conference  on  Disarmament  and  Non-Proliferation  Issues”  is  held annually on Jeju Island, and has been labelled as the “Jeju Process”. This year has marked the 10 th anniversary of the conference and looked back at the achievements of the last decade and the upcoming challenges ahead in the field of WMD, conventional weapons and the North Korean nuclear program. 3) To facilitate outreach and advocacy activities As stated in the Centre's mandate, the Centre might only act when it is requested to do so by a Member State of the UN. Therefore, any association with entities representing the civil society for example, is subject to approval (or denial) by the government of the said Member State. However, UNRCPD is  engaged  in  increasing  awareness  about  disarmament  and  non-proliferation  initiatives amongst  the  general  public.  The  general  public  might  also  be  encouraged  to  participate  in  such activities.  I  was  able  to  assist  to  a  new and  creative  project  engaging  youth  as  peace  educators. 8 Volunteers from a master program from Tribhuvan University and from a local NGO received training for three consecutive days. They would then teach a shorten version to high school students within Kathmandu Valley. They learned about the notions of peace and conflict and the values of mediation in the resolution of conflicts. Thereafter, they retold high school students how conflicts might influence their  daily  life  and provided  them with  a  conflict  resolution  role  play  exercise  where  they  could experiment  the  precepts  of  negotiation  and mediation.  The activity was a  huge success,  and most participants hoped this could be extended to other regions of Nepal. Issues & Challenges Since my arrival in September, UNRCPD seemed to be embarked on a quest to find the essence of its existence, but it might have well started since its inception in Kathmandu. The Director, Mr. Kimura, warned me that the season from September to December was quite slow as the preparations for the few activities left were already completed. Due to the expiration of his mandate, the Director left  two  or  three  weeks  after  I  arrived.  Meanwhile,  a  new  Deputy-Director  was  hired  from  the headquarters in New York. Deputy-Director Micic was officially second-in-charge but in the absence of a Director, he would be in command. A new Director was nominated in November, but the successful candidate declined the position due to family and professional obligations. Although the Centre is regional, it has limited capabilities. It is quite difficult to represent 43 countries efficiently without having a strong presence in each of them. UNRCPD risks some overlaps with some agencies already present in those countries and does not have close relations with officers in charge.  When  approached  by  a  Member  State,  UNRCPD  usually  takes  a  coordinating  role  in implementing projects, but does not contribute directly to the production of knowledge and its projects do not lead to a practical solution for a particular issue. UNLIREC and UNREC, the regional centres holding functions equivalent to those of UNRCPD for Latin American and Africa respectively, have 9 been established at about the same time, but have been able to create their own workshops in order to fill a gap in existing practices and capacity-building. While UNRCPD usually plans activities based on up-to-date information, the Centre also relies on the other centres' examples, although flagrant regional differences exist. For instance, the Inter-Institutional training course to prevent and combat the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) was based on the UNLIREC curriculum, but was not met  with  the  same satisfaction  since  the  project  was not  adapted  to  the  Asia-Pacific  context.  The capacity-building process often stops short of actual exercises aiming at developing capabilities of a country and remains within the theoretical framework. Development suggests enhancing capacities of a State or authorities at different levels within the State (including simple citizens, men and women, adult and children alike) so they can become responsible for the well-being of the population3 and achieve improvement in standards of living : “The underlying  assumption  is  that  by enhancing the  appropriate  skills,  attitudes,  and knowledge,  these parties will be more effective in their respective governing roles. The result is a greater equalization of power, access to decision-making venues, and a more even distribution of society's benefits”4. In the humanitarian field indeed, development is understood as a mean to achieve sovereignty of the State, which is conceptualized not as the monopoly on violence in the Weberian sense, but as the legitimate capacity to ensure the well-being of the citizens. Likewise, failed states can be considered as such because  they  lack  the  capacities  or  the  will  to  provide  support  to  the  needs  and  rights  of  their population.  In short, the activities of the United Nations and NGOs should be taken over by national or local actors in the long term. Otherwise, reliance on foreign agencies and foreign subsidies would remain a reality and progress would be impossible. 3Mohammad Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No 1 (2002), 84. 4Margaret E. Banyan, "Capacity Building", in Mark Bevir, ed., Encyclopedia of Governance (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2007), 67. 10 The problem I see with the current approach of the Centre is that it remains condemned to be unknown in the region by failing to adopt a more proactive approach. To remedy to what I perceived as inaction,  I  dedicated  some time to draft  proposals  of  action.  I  figured  that  UNRCPD could make contributions  to  multilateral  platforms  by  reminding  the  importance  of  universal  commitment  to disarmament  and  non-proliferation  initiatives.  My  unilateral  actions  were  well  received  by  my colleagues, and while my supervisor acknowledged the humanitarian values of the projects I proposed, none of them were considered further, since time and funding were limited and there was a need to report back to headquarters in New York. These projects are detailed in chapter 3. What  this  problem  illustrates  is  that  UNRCPD  is  fearful  to  engage  in  thought-provoking activities.  The UN system is  careful  not  to  upset  any Member State  (the UNESCO episode when Palestine was accepted as a full-fledged member and saw its  funding cut by the US in November served as a powerful reminder to other UN agencies that their agenda is often contingent on sustainable sources of funding and hence, upon the political will of donors5). A notable exception was the Volunteer for Peace project that was originally conceived by a UN Volunteer under a one-year contract with UNRCPD. This was one of the few original works of the Centre and was pretty well received by the audience to the point of considering expansion of the project to other districts of Nepal. The Centre would have much to gain from a more proactive stance, and encouraging initiatives coming from the staff. The Centre has limited resources that partly explain the pragmatic stance of officials. As it was agreed in the General Assembly Resolution A/42/39D, the budget consists of voluntary contributions, barely sufficient to cover for maintenance fees and salaries. UNRCPD is not allowed to raise funds by itself  and needs to develop partnerships with foreign donors when supporting projects  requests  by 5BBC News, “US cuts UNESCO funds over vote for Palestinian seat”, BBC News, (October 31st 2011) Online. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15527534 (Retrieved on January 5th, 2012). 11 foreign governments. Two things should raise our attention here. First, cash flows tend to dictate which projects hold more importance, putting UNRCP at risk of being  the  target  of  a  battle  of  influence  over  the  agenda  of  the  Centre.  For  instance,  since  the Government of Nepal is the main contributor whilst being the host, Nepal is entitled to expect a special focus on national matters. The problem is that UNRCPD is a regional centre and cannot address issues locally  without  thinking  about  the  regional  implications.  When  working  on  a  project  for  the government of Nepal, UNRCPD should be able to plan frameworks reproducing successes, assessing and  correcting  failures  in  order  to  implement  projects  across  sub-regions  afflicted  with  similar problems. On the other hand, UNRCPD must provide help to States seeking it, and Nepal is always collaborating closely with the Centre. If most of the funds are provided by Nepal, it seems only natural to concentrate efforts on this developing country. Second,  the  agenda  seems  to  be  divided  between  developing  countries  on  one  side  and industrialized countries on the other. The Asia-Pacific region is very diverse, and a variety of ethnicity, language  and  culture,  not  to  mention  religion,  led  to  different  perspectives  on  society,  and  thus governance and development, two important concepts in disarmament. It becomes difficult to adopt a regional framework to address a specific issue when Member States have different priorities. Industrialized countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea for example, value collaboration with UNRCPD over nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. This might have more  to  do  with  their  close  geographical  location  to  the  Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea. Nevertheless, countries like the United States and members of European Union are the vanguards of nuclear non-proliferation on the international scene, hence it would make sense that South Korea and Japan would also adopt the same approach on the regional level. Developing  countries  are  not  meeting  the  same  challenges  and  are  generally  interested  in 12 reducing  and  preventing  the  proliferation  of  SALW on  their  territory.  They  do  not  feel  as  much threatened by the development of nuclear arsenals by other countries, because they do not represent a threat for nuclear powers (with the notable exceptions of Pakistan and India, which are themselves nuclear powers). The spread of SALW enhances the risk for armed violence and conflicts and prevents progress in development6. In order to maintain stability and provide reasonable living standards to the population, action in this field is also important. The threat of terrorism remains a priority for the whole region but is interpreted differently between the  two sides.  For  industrialized  countries,  terrorism is  generally  linked to  WMD and to international  instability,  whereas  in  developing  countries  the  problem  is  more  centred  on  armed violence and national instability.  In others words, it  becomes difficult  for UNRCPD to articulate a strategy for action when different donors push forward competing priorities. How Does the MAAPPS Curriculum Relate to the Practicum Perhaps the Economic and Social Change Module and Professor Job's seminar on the Asia- Pacific security architecture would have been relevant in trying to connect the security element to development. Due to a time constraint, I was unable to register for these courses. Nevertheless, the Security and the Human Rights Modules were complimentary and useful tools to take up the challenges of  this  practicum.  The  field  of  disarmament  supposes  a  prior  knowledge  of  political  sciences,  in particular security studies, but also prior knowledge development trends. The human rights component of development is quite relevant here, since disarmament ultimately seeks to secure conditions under which men, women and children can live peacefully and develop their potential. Based on the argument that an arms race increases the likelihood of conflict, disarmament is thought to reduce the probability 6On landmines, see Gregory L. Bier, “The economic impact of landmines on developing countries”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 30, No 5/6 (2005), 656. On firearms and armed violence, see Keith Krause et al., Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011, (Geneva Declaration Secretariat: Geneva, 2011), chapter 5. 13 of a conflict, which could lead to a violation of human rights. Since spending in military procurements might be considered a diversion of financial resources more useful for the reinforcement of human rights in developing countries and development purposes, disarmament contributes the humanitarian efforts. The methodology course was also quite  useful  in  providing the redaction basics for  policy briefs. It helped me conceptualize formats of proposals for action as well as analysis to be briefed to key  officials.  Moreover,  I  was  able  to  provide  accurate  background  information  and  submit recommendations on the path to be taken following the methods we had been taught in MAAPPS. Overall, the valuable knowledge specific to the Asia-Pacific region and policy studies and the methods gained over these two years with MAAPPS were highly commended by the Centre's officials and should likewise continue to be highly appreciated in the future. 14 Chapter 2 2. Experience, Tasks and Skills Demonstrated I will now proceed with my duties as an intern for the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. The tasks I have been conferred had different purposes. Some were defined to fill up my free time until something more important would show up. Some others were unique in the sense that an academic background in political science or international relations was a major advantage in order to investigate a given issue, report on it and provide recommendations. I also took the initiative to work on some projects of my own when I was under the impression that some issues were being overlooked or neglected. Nevertheless, because of the problems I mentioned in the previous chapter, I was not able to participate in a grandiose project encompassing the work of the whole office. I endorsed an individual type of work and my professional relationships were mostly limited to my interactions with the Deputy-Director. Compilation of Defence White Papers This document was a compilation of all the white papers of Asian States available to the public and related to defence. Each document was categorized according to the origin, the year of publication, the language of publication, the table of content and outlines of the content. On 43 States represented by UNRCPD, about 20 documents were recollected. In order to produce a summary of the outline in a short  time,  only the  executive  summary was  considered  for  the  exercise.  The  white  papers  were downloaded and put under the share drive, so the personnel consulting the compilation could refer to the original documents. It is quite unfortunate that about half of the white papers coming from Asian States could not be included because of language barriers (no translation available) or a deficiency in transmission means (no online version or broken links). Two in particular were so outdated that they 15 did not generate any interest. The white papers from the Philippines and Mongolia dated from 1998. Without consideration of important changes in the post-9/11 security environment, it is almost certain that their policies are not adequate anymore to meet contemporary challenges, such as the growing ambitions of a rising China in the region, reliance on the American security umbrella, terrorism, etc. The absence of the Indian defence white paper in this compilation was shocking. The 2009 version is  the most  up-to-date  and has  been analyzed by some South Asia analysts.  However,  the Ministry of Defence of India does not show any such document on its website and I was not able to find and retrieve it on a mirror site either. From the glimpses I saw in some analysis, this white paper looks quite controversial as it initiated the conception of a new war doctrine: how to win a two-front war, from the sub-conventional to the fourth-generation level, likely targeting China and Pakistan, long time rivals of India. Although the explicit purpose of this exercise was not fully explained to me, I can assume that it will serve as a reference document in order to comprehend and explain certain behaviours in armament spending, modernization or even mobilization in Asia. Asia-Pacific Digest Review The Asia-Pacific Digest is a daily recollection of newspaper articles relevant to the field of disarmament proper to the Asia-Pacific region. I was asked to follow a template similar to the UN Guide to Disarmament7, namely to sort the articles according to five main categories: WMD, SALW, landmines, cluster munitions and conventional weapons. This was a great exercise since I could stay informed daily about security trends and I discovered interesting online publications that I  did not know previously, such as The Diplomat, Relief Web and Global Security Newswire. An employee from headquarters was in charge of collecting excerpts of articles related to disarmament in general. I only 7Melissa Gillis, Disarmament: A Basic Guide, (United Nations: New York, 2009). See the table of content. 16 had to sort them out and keep the ones relevant for the Centre. The categories for the digest might have made sense during the elaboration of the disarmament agenda of the United Nations, but media do not follow the same categories. The media tend to look for astounding news. Threats of nuclear terrorism, nuclear war or military clashes seems like potential dangers for people of the Western Hemisphere and developments in this field are carefully monitored and reported back by media outlets. However, for millions of people who experience armed violence in their daily life, a nuclear warhead is anything but an immediate concern. These people might step up on an anti-personnel landmine while labouring a field, they might become civilian casualties caught in the cross fire of rival military factions, to mention only a few examples. SALW, landmines and cluster munitions do not receive the attention they deserve in media, because they do not represent a tangible danger  and only hit  parts  of  a  “remote”  world,  whereas  nuclear  energy is  easily conceivable  and perhaps demonized. In order to cover these categories as well in the digest, I looked for reports and news wires coming from international NGOs or UN-related agencies' websites.  Since I was commissioned for this task, I was about the only one in the office having read the available information. The Deputy-Director was extremely busy with other projects, and for him to keep being informed about his region of jurisdiction, I summarized the content I amassed in three months in a 5-pages document that I subsequently briefed to him. I am grateful that I could participate to a project like this one, because it provided me with substantial information on the state of the world in  the  security field  and made me  realize  the  weaknesses  of  some approaches.  Without  access  to information, it  is quite difficult to take an enlightened decision, but stories of government officials basing their policies in the name of principles without taking account of the reality and without fully understanding the issues at stake are numerous. Recollection of Statements & Policies regarding an Arms Trade Treaty from Asia-Pacific States 17 The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a yet-to-be negotiated treaty, planned for July 2012, which will regulate elements of arms trade, notably imports, exports, transfers, brokering, dual-use technologies, ammunition,  etc.  The  elements  are  understood  under  the  definitions  agreed  in  the  Wassenaar Agreement, an international treaty aiming at limiting transfers of dual-use technologies and promoting transparency measures in military and civilian procurements. The ATT seeks to ensure that the trade of weapons is not diverted for illicit purposes, such as fuelling civil wars, killings and terrorism and make explicit the link between the availability of weapons and armed violence. As the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Duarte, puts it: “Sometimes, the irresponsible transfer of conventional weapons can destabilize security in a region, enable the violation of Security Council arms embargoes and  contribute  to  human  rights  abuses.  Importantly,  investment  is  discouraged  and  development disrupted in countries experiencing conflict and high levels of violence, which also affect their ability to attain the Millennium Development Goals”8. The ATT will be extremely difficult to negotiate because of the plethora of divergent interests. This treaty would hurt the weapons manufacturers and their host country as their list of customers (some of them being overt  human rights violators) will  be significantly reduced. For example,  the United States will have to seriously consider the governance and human rights record of important buyers,  like  Saudi  Arabia,  Pakistan,  Israel,  Bahrain,  etc.  Some within  the  civil  society,  the  rather infamous National Rifle Association being perhaps the most prominent member, fear that the right of citizens  to  possess  firearms  might  be  flouted.  Yet,  Ambassador  Moritan,  the  Chairperson  for  the Preparatory Committee for the ATT has made clear that the treaty will not regulate transactions carried out under a State's jurisdiction, but only international transactions. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the United Nations recognizes the sovereign right of States 8Sergio Duarte, Statement of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs: Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Arms Trade Treaty (United Nations: New York, 12 July 2010), 1. 18 to  preserve  their  sovereignty by means of  self-defence in  the  case of  an  armed attack9.  Likewise, numerous States, such as Vietnam and India, argue they have the inherent right to produce or acquire weaponry in order to defend the sovereignty of the State. During the Preparatory Committee sessions, they expressed their wish for the ATT to have no constraint on such sovereign rights10 11. Moreover, they  fear  denial  on  key  elements  of  trade,  like  dual-use  technologies,  that  might  impede  the development  of  developing  countries  and  strengthen  the  unfair  advantage  industrialized  countries already have. By having easier access to new technologies, even those which could be diverted for military purposes,  developing countries argue that  they could reinforce their  position in  the global market and capitalize on the production of arms and equipment. The criteria to allow for a transaction or not risk becoming subjective and many countries fear it will further isolate them on the international scene. Mine Action Research The  neophyte  might  experience  difficulties  to  grasp  the  full  implications  of  mine  action activities. It is a highly technical field and many professionals come from the military. The purpose of this research was to monitor mine action activities in the region covered by UNRCPD. I selected Laos, Cambodia,  Tajikistan  and  Sri  Lanka  as  research  subjects  because  of  the  striking  challenges governments, NGOs and, most of all, the people live over there. Although the use of anti-personnel landmines is vividly denounced and although the global citizen is often sensitized to their lethal legacy, they  still  plague  enormous  portions  of  territory,  impeding  progress  in  development  because  they contaminate and prevent the use of the soil for agriculture purposes (the very basis of the economy), 9United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51 (1945). 10A. Gopinathan, Statement by PR/Ambassador of India to the CD at the First PrepCom on the ATT, (Permanent Mission of India to the UN Geneva: Geneva, 2011), 1. 11Hoang Chi Trung, Statement by Mr. HOANG CHI TRUNG Director General, Department of International Organisations Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam at the 2nd Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Vietnam, 2011), 1. 19 they hurt  and kill  labour forces,  hamper the delivery of care and treatments and victims are often abandoned to their fate, stigmatized and without the capacity to earn a living. As I was struggling with my research owing to the lack of information available, I met with Mr. Hugues Laurenge from UNICEF, who is a mine specialist. He provided me with valuable references and  explained  me  the  context  of  mine  action.  Five  pillars  represent  the  concept  of  mine  action: Clearance,  Risk  Education  (RE),  Victim  Assistance  (VA),  Stockpile  Management/Destruction  and Advocacy. Actors and stakeholders engaged in mine action work on one or a few aspects of mine action. UNICEF, for example, is involved in risk education. Risk education is a parameter that needs major improvement to meet contemporary issues. Researches have demonstrated that casualties are still important in countries like Laos, despite the people being informed about the risks. Children and adults alike engage in a rational decision that leads them to voluntarily interact with landmines. In fact, the economic  benefits  of  interacting  with  landmines  outweigh  the  physical  costs.  Landmines  and unexploded remnants of war (UXO) are scavenged by the neighbouring population for parts or scrap metal to sell on the market. The scrap metal industry supplies directly the foundries popping up in the region. This activity provides poor households with complementary income12. Unfortunately, the sectors in needs do not match with the UNRCPD's capacities and resources and must be left to specialized agencies. The only thing UNRCPD could help with could be to raise funds for mine action projects. Donors fatigue is well felt by developing countries and NGOs. The United Nations have calculated a shortfall of US $375 millions for mine action projects13. Asia alone shows a shortfall  of US $139 millions14.  Demining and clearance are particularly expensive if  we consider  the  human  resources,  the  methodology,  the  training  and  the  tools  involved  at  all  levels. Meanwhile, proliferation of landmines provides a very-low cost mean of defence and provides a false 12Richard Moyes and Lamphane Vannachack, A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR (GICHD: Geneva, 2005), 12. 13UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011 (United Nations: New York, 2011), IV. 14Ibid. 20 sense of security. Although very cheap to produce, landmines and bombs suggest a long-term cost over development and quality of life. Proposal for Action regarding the 11th MSP the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Convention This project never came into being. The 11th Meeting for the State Parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty Convention was held from November 27th to December 2nd, 2011 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The hosting of such a conference in Asia was a golden opportunity for the UNRCPD to engage with signatories of the treaty on one hand, and to promote the laudable goal of reducing the indiscriminate  threat  landmines  represent  with  non-signatories  on  the  other.  As  a  regional  centre, UNRCPD  could  have  initiated  a  pan-Asian  movement  committed  to  the  goals  and  principles  of disarmament with the collaboration of local UN agencies.  I  submitted a proposal for action to the Deputy-Director including the following ideas: 1) To obtain an observer status at the meeting; 2) to advocate non-signatories to ratify the treaty;  3) to produce a video transmitting the testimonies of landmine victims across the Asia-Pacific; 4) to disseminate accessible knowledge about mine action, problems and solutions on UNRCPD's website. The Deputy-Director recognized the potential, but his uneasiness to proceed without prior approval of headquarters brought forth a time constraint that made the project unrealizable. UN-ROK Annual Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Matters 2011 Edition Although I was not involved closely with the aforementioned conference in Jeju, Republic of Korea, the Deputy-Director gave me some urgent tasks upon his return from the conference. I was instructed to make research on the ten editions of the conference and retrieve data concerning the participants. I built numerous sheets and colourful pie charts showing the number of participants for each conference (active presenters at first, followed by the total audience) and breaking down data relatively to their representation according to geographical provenance (region and ethnicity) and the 21 professional background. We discovered that although the Koreans consisted of the majority of the audience, they did not, in fact, represent an overwhelming proportion of the participants. Their Asians counterparts were not in parity with them, but this should not prove difficult to solve, on the condition that it does not lead to disproportion within the region (i.e. East Asia over South Asia). The important proportion of American presenters amongst Westerners is a striking contrast and will be looked into. The disturbing conclusion of the statistical  findings is  that  civil  society and private businesses are seldom represented, meaning that the set of conferences has been monopolized by government officials and academics up until  now. In order to sustain thought-provoking discussions on a wide array of disarmament  matters,  this  is  a  factor  that  should  not  be  overlooked.  The  statistics  were  sent  to headquarters to follow-up on the conclusions. Indian Policy Project The Indian Policy Project was the most comprehensive individual project I worked on during my term with UNRCPD. Rather than writing a lengthy paragraph on it, I included an edited version of the research paper (Annex 2). The project looked at Indian foreign and domestic policy in order to understand where the difficulty to engage the emergent power in the Centre’s activities relies. After investigation, we could not find satisfactory answers, but the project helped to build knowledge on India. Brief on Australia and its stance on the CCM In mid-November, the Obama administration announced its plans to dispatch US soldiers on a rotation basis  in  the military base of Darwin,  Australia  and seeks  permanent  establishment  of  this contingent15. This new policy move has been reported to improve the security relations between the two 15David Nakamura, “U.S. troops headed to Australia, irking China”, The Washington Post, November 16th 2011. Online. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-troops-headed-to-australia-irking- china/2011/11/16/gIQAiGiuRN_story.html (Retrieved on January 11th 2012). 22 partners as the United States seek a swift  reposition in  the Asia-Pacific  and Australia grows more reliant on its big brother for its security given the overt Chinese rise in the region16. But the Australian civil society denounces the policy for quite another reason. The Australian Parliament has expressed its wish to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which it  had signed in 2008. For this purpose, a bill amending the Criminal Code has been submitted before the Parliament, but it contains legal loopholes allowing for important exceptions for allied countries regarding the use, the stockpiling or the transfer of cluster munitions on Australian soil17. The proposition has been denounced by civil organizations involved in development welfare and disarmament. According to them, the United States, a  non-signatory  of  the  CCM,  could  bring  cluster  munitions  and  stockpile  them  in  Darwin  with impunity,  thus  undermining  the  essence  and  the  goals  of  the  CCM,  not  to  mention  Australia’s membership18.  I drafted a short brief addressed to the Deputy-Director to summarize the problem. I believe this issue raises a red flag over a Member State’s foreign policy that is detrimental to efforts in building a peaceful and more secure law-abiding region. This is a problem UNRCPD could seek to resolve. 16Raoul Heinrichs, “A Cold and Clever U.S. Base Move”, The Diplomat, November 17th 2011. Online. http://the- diplomat.com/2011/11/17/a-cold-and-clever-u-s-base-move/ (Retrieved on January 11th 2012). 17See Article 72.41 and Article 72.42. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representative, Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010: A Bill for an Act to criminalise some acts involving certain munitions, and for related purposes, (2010) Online. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r4487_first/toc_pdf/10263b01.pdf;fileType=application %2Fpdf (Retrieved on January 12th 2012). 18Simon Lauder, “US troop deployment raises cluster bomb concerns”, ABC News, November 17th 2011. Online. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-17/troop-deployment-raises-cluster-bomb-concerns/3677506 (Retrieved on January 12th 2012). 23 Chapter 3 3. Reflexions “The life of states cannot, any more than the life of individuals, be conditioned by the force and the will of a unit, however powerful, but by the consensus of a group, which must one day include all states.” Lester B. Pearson Disarmament and the Asian Security Community Disarmament  is  a  laudable  field  of  activity  and  should  be  commended  for  reducing  the likelihood of conflicts and armed violence. Just to mention Asia, a plethora of international fora exist at the  subregional  level,  but  coordination  mechanisms seem to  be  inefficient.  We can think  of  ARF, SAARC, SCO, CSCAP and a multitude of UN agencies well implemented in Asia, such as UNESCAP. They provide a platform of dialogue - often for the same actors - but somehow, their agenda does not overlap. An efficient way to transform pledges to disarmament in practical terms is through regional cooperation,  a method the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs  acknowledges through its  Regional Disarmament Branch, which UNRCPD subordinates to. Indeed, the proliferation of weapons (illicit or not)  and  the  potential  for  conflict  do  not  affect  countries  in  an  isolated  fashion,  but  by  clusters. Moreover, the root(s) of the problem(s) cannot be significantly addressed by a single State, hence the need for consolidated efforts. Let  us  take  the  example  of  proliferation  of  SALW  in  Nepal.  It  is  inconceivable  for  the authorities and the political elite to manage the effective control of weapons on their territory because of a flagrant lack of financial and human resources. The flow of weapons into Nepal is not just the materialization of the weak institutionalization of power structures or the mismanagement of resources; the problem is also due to neighbouring countries that are also plagued by similar shortcomings. A regional  approach should  be  able  to  oversee  the  multifaceted  problem and address  an  appropriate 24 answer with lesser limits than those done by single States. Collective security can be built upon if the idea of a common threat is equally conceptualized and understood from State actors within the same region. This example illustrates the idea that security issues, traditional and non-traditional alike, bring States closer to each other, may they be perceived as enemies or friends. The matter is that security issues evolved in a way that transcend frontiers and while they do not always make it to the global level, they surely have an effect on the surrounding region, becoming a security complex where: “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from each other”19. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could also have been a pertinent example. For a few reasons mentioned in previous chapters, UNRCPD lacks the initiative to build upon existing multilateral platforms and usually targets individual States. Some activities have been designed to allow for a subregional workshop (i.e. Pacific Islands, South Asia) but I suspect this was for financial reasons that many countries were regrouped. In any case, it did not lead to substantial transformation or commitment and remained quite theoretical. Security issues overcome frontiers, are multifaceted and have implications not just for subregions, but for Asia as a whole. Asian countries can hardly remain neutral if a conflict was to break out (and many contemporary deadlocks over territories, ideology, ethnicity  are  potential  sources  of  instability).  Even  subconventional  warfare  can  have  regional implications, the best example at hand being terrorism. It is the duty of intergovernmental organizations like the UN to teach States how to recognize each other not as threats but as fellow neighbours. Because the classic balance of power, or rather the balance of perceptions, brings States to the brink of war by fear of the Other, it  would be in their interest to go further than the actual ARF and build together a set of guidelines addressing the correct 19Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 12. 25 behaviour to adopt in the region, confidence-building measures to assess the good will of fellow States and transparency measures to consolidate cooperation. As Wendt puts it: “States might initially engage in  prosocial  policies  for egoistic  reasons.  For example (and indeed,  in  a  Lockean structure this  is exactly what we would expect) but if sustained over time such policies will erode egoistic identities and create collectives ones”20. Because it seems difficult for States part of a region plagued with misunderstanding rooted in their historical legacy, it is the role of the UN to bring them together and change their anarchic vision of the world. It would show them a possible path towards the institutionalization of a security community, similar to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)21. The principles inscribed in the Helsinki Accords, leading to the OSCE, allowed the two antagonists superpowers of the Cold War to reduce military procurements and armaments in a symmetrical fashion and prevent the outbreak of a confrontation on the European theatre. One might  argue that  the  tensed climax during the Cold  War  was proper  to  a  reduction of disarmament and tensions because a nuclear war was inconceivable. More importantly, a bipolar order makes easier compromises because of the limited numbers of interests to consider. In a multipolar order,  the  variety  of  interests  to  take  into  consideration  makes  for  difficult  negotiations  and  is multifaceted. The field of disarmament is also under fire for enabling further instability. Some scholars fear that once the objectives leading to a nuclear weapon-free world are attained, those States with the technology and the knowledge would be able to take advantage of the vacuum left by the absence of nuclear  deterrence  and  seek  an  overall  strategic  advantage  to  reacquire  nuclear  weapons  first22. According to them, also likely is  the nuclear proliferation threat from non-nuclear  weapons States which would seek to obtain security guarantees in the case of a failure of the US nuclear umbrella due 20Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 342. 21Varun Sahni, “From Security in Asia to Asian Security”, International Studies, Vol. 41, No 3 (2004), 260. 22Scott S Dagan, “Shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament”, Daedalus, Vol. 138, No 4 (2009), 165. 26 to disarmament23. Well,  disarmament  initiatives  have  the  merit  to  provide  confidence-building  measures  by reducing tensions. The Cold War climax surely helped in dressing the urgency of the moment and led to bilateral commitments for cooperation in the field of disarmament in Europe. Asia is not at the brink of war, although frictions are palpable on land and on sea. The situation provides plenty of time to come up with solutions regarding the settlement of disputes (mediation, arbitration, consensus). Decisions would not be hasty given the lack of urgency and would give time to form the base of a collective security community and collective identity through recurring interactions. Of course, the risk of an arms race resurgence following the multilateral reduction of weaponry is still plausible, meaning that disarmament itself is seldom sufficient to lead to peace and stability. It is a necessary, but not sufficient factor to explain structural change. This is where confidence-building measures come in. But the main problem remains that Asian countries still  perceive each other as enemies and unless they overcome this major obstacle, they will not be able to bond within a collective identity that would otherwise exists in opposition to the West, similar to the clash of civilizations envisioned by Samuel Huntington24. UNRCPD and Russia Russia is  making the headlines recently due to  the diplomatic  deadlock with NATO over a missile shield in Europe that would deter missile threats from Iran, but Russia fears it would negatively affects its own deterrence power. We could think that Russia is becoming Eurocentric in the sense that its foreign policy is designed around political activities in Europe. However, Russia is an important player in Asia. For instance, during the period 2005-2010, Asia was the recipient of about 70% of all 23Ibid. 162-163. 24Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 27 Russian arms deals25. China and India alone make up to 29% of the transactions each, other important trade partners being Indonesia,  Malaysia and Vietnam. Still  with regards to the strategic impact of armament, Russia is developing a joint-project with India for a fifth-generation multirole fighter and a hypersonic missile26, testing ICBMs at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan27, and modernizing the defensive capacities of the Kuril Islands, a territory it disputes with Japan28. Despite the suspension of the Six-Party talks, Russia is an important player in improving the nuclear stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, and its economic interests in Central Asia, China, India, Korea and Mongolia are important enough to justify a return in the Asia-Pacific. For all the reasons aforementioned, and the fact that Russia is detrimental to the disarmament efforts led by UN agencies such as the UNRCPD, it would legitimate to claim that since Russia is geographically and politically present in Asia, the UNRCPD should expand the membership coverage to include Russia as well.  Given its limited resources, it  is doubtful that UNRCPD will be able to convince Russia to cooperate with the agency. But unless UNRCPD unilaterally steps up to safeguard the principles of peace and stability in the region, it will remain subordinated to the political will – or lack, thereof – of egoistic States. Conclusion I am glad I had the opportunity to work in my field of studies and I realized how broad security studies are. Beyond theoretical knowledge on the causes of war or structural factors projecting State's behaviours, the hands-on experience on the field is quite different. More than trying to prevent war at 25SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Trend Indicator Value of arms exports from Russia, 2005-2010, (2012) Online. http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (Retrieved on January 20th, 2012). 26Raja Pandit, “India, Russia to ink new military pact”, The Times of India, (October 10th, 2009) Online. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-10-10/india/28069553_1_india-and-russia-anatoly-serdyukov-admiral- gorshkov (Retrieved on January 20th, 2012). 27Global Security Newswire, “Kazakhstan Reopens Launch Site to Russian ICBMs”, Global Security Newswire, (October 18th, 2011) Online. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kazakhstan-reopens-launch-site-to-russian-icbms/ (Retrieved on October 19th 2011). 28RIA Novosti, “Russie to build two military posts in disputed Kuril Islands”, RIA Novosti (December 16th, 2011) Online. http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20111216/170305690.html (Retrieved on January 20th, 2012). 28 the structural level, agencies and dedicated personnel exist to alleviate the suffering caused by conflicts at the very individual level. It involves a moral dimension that is not considered in traditional circles. Fortunately, non-traditional security studies remedy to this lacuna by incorporating the aspect of human security. In this regard, disarmament is only a small fraction of non-traditional security, which itself is a part of development efforts. Security studies are highly theoretical and, according to the specialization one chooses, it becomes heavily technical. I was able to get a glimpse at the activities concerning mine action and armed violence and I was confident I could understand everything, but the securitization of nuclear weapons for instance, necessitates a high level of knowledge regarding physics. Nevertheless, I am confident I want to operate in this field of activity, may it be in the foreign services or for a non-governmental organization. My internship with UNRCPD was valuable, since I was able to put into contribution the knowledge and the methodology I learned during my stay in UBC. It is unfortunate I didn't have the opportunity or the financial means to go abroad and help with the Jeju Conference in Korea and try networking with foreign officials, but nevertheless it gave me an accurate vision of what a background in security could lead me to. My actions at the centre did not lead to perceptible change or to a new direction. But the knowledge I got my hands on allows for a cogitation on the orientation actors involved in international relations are taking in addressing particular issues, and this is quite relevant for a number of sector of activities, not just in disarmament. Although this would necessitate more research to become a full-fledged thesis (and some additional coherence when lining up pieces of thought), this practicum report proposed a few glimpses into my “new” perception of world affairs and the course that should be taken, in addition to the recapitulation of this formidable journey. 29 Bibliography OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Duarte, Sergio. 2010. Statement of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs: Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Arms Trade Treaty. United Nations: New York. Gillis, Melissa. 2009. Disarmament: A Basic Guide. United Nations: New York. Gopinathan, A. 2011. Statement by PR/Ambassador of India to the CD at the First PrepCom on the ATT. Permanent Mission of India to the UN Geneva: Geneva. Trung, Hoang Chi. 2011. Statement by Mr. HOANG CHI TRUNG Director General, Department of International Organisations Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam at the 2nd Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. Ministry of Foreign Affairs:Vietnam. United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51. UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011. United Nations: New York. 2011. MONOGRAPHS Banyan, Margaret E. 2007. "Capacity Building". In Mark Bevir, ed. Encyclopedia of Governance. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 67-68. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Krause, Keith et al. 2011. Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011. Geneva Declaration Secretariat: Geneva. Maslen, Stuart. 2010. A Guide to Mine Action, 4th Edition. GICHD: Geneva. Moyes, Richard and Lamphane Vannachack. 2005. A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR. GICHD: Geneva. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. JOURNAL ARTICLES 30 Aldrich, Daniel P. 2009. “The 800-Pound Gaijin in the Room: Strategies and Tactics for Conducting Fieldwork in Japan and Abroad”, PS: Political Science and Politics. Vol. 42, No 2. PP 299-303. Ayoob, Mohammad. 2002. “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”. The International Journal of Human Rights. Vol. 6, No 1. PP 81-102. Bier, Gregory L. 2005. “The economic impact of landmines on developing countries”. International Journal of Social Economics. Vol. 30, No 5/6. PP 651-662. Buzan, Barry. 2003. “Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels”. The Pacific Review. Vol. 16, No 2. PP 143-173. Sagan, Scott D. 2009. “Shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament”. Daedalus. Vol. 138, No 4. PP 157-168. Sahni, Varun. 2004. “From Security in Asia to Asian Security”. International Studies. Vol. 41, no 3. PP 245-261. Wanandi, Jusuf. 2005. “Towards an Asian Security-Community”. The Asia Europe Journal. Vol. 3, No 3. PP 323-332. ONLINE DOCUMENTS BBC News. 2001. “US cuts UNESCO funds over vote for Palestinian seat”. BBC News. October 31st. Online. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15527534 (Retrieved on January 5th, 2012). Global Security Newswire. 2011. “Kazakhstan Reopens Launch Site to Russian ICBMs”. Global Security Newswire. October 18th. Online. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kazakhstan-reopens-launch-site-to-russian- icbms/ (Retrieved on October 19th 2011). Heinrichs,  Raoul. 2011. “A Cold and Clever U.S. Base Move”. The Diplomat. November 17th. Online. http://the-diplomat.com/2011/11/17/a-cold-and-clever-u-s-base-move/ (Retrieved on January 11th 2012). Lauder, Simon. 2011. “US troop deployment raises cluster bomb concerns”. ABC News. November 17th. Online. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-17/troop-deployment-raises-cluster-bomb-concerns/3677506 (Retrieved on January 12th 2012). Nakamura, David. 2011. “U.S. troops headed to Australia, irking China”. The Washington Post. November 16th. Online. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-troops-headed-to-australia-irking- china/2011/11/16/gIQAiGiuRN_story.html (Retrieved on January 11th 2012). Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representative. 2010. Criminal Code Amend- ment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010: A Bill for an Act to criminalise some acts involving certain munitions, and for related purposes. Online. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r4487_first/toc_pdf/10263b01.pdf;fileTyp e=application%2Fpdf (Retrieved on January 12th 2012). 31 Raja Pandit. 2009. “India, Russia to ink new military pact”. The Times of India. October 10th. Online. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-10-10/india/28069553_1_india-and-russia-anatoly-serdyukov-admiral- gorshkov (Retrieved on January 20th, 2012). RIA Novosti. 2011. “Russie to build two military posts in disputed Kuril Islands”. RIA Novosti. December 16th. Online. http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20111216/170305690.html (Retrieved on January 20th, 2012). SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 2012. Trend Indicator Value of arms exports from Russia, 2005-2010. Online. http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (Retrieved on January 20th, 2012). UN General Assembly, 42nd Session. 1987. Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia (A/42/39D). Online. http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/512/71/IMG/NR051271.pdf?OpenElement (Retrieved on November 30th, 2011). 32 Annex 1 On Building Relationships The following list includes the contact information of persons I met during my search of an internship and could be of valuable help for future MAAPPS students. This list is of convenient use may IAR seek to build bilateral relationships with the institution they represent. ANDO, Rika North American Division, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organization Tel.:  E-mail: BAHADUR MALLA, Trilochan National Program Officer, Peacebuilding and Recovery Unit, United Nations Development Programme Tel.:  E-mail: BOGATI, Subindra Project Coordinator, Nepal Armed Violence Assessment, Small Arms Survey Tel.:  E-mail: CHANO, Junko Executive Director (Programs), Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tel.: E-mail: DUJARRIC, Robert Director, Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University (Japan Campus) Tel.: E-mail: FUKUSHIMA, Akiko Senior Fellow, Japan Foundation / Research Fellow, Aoyama Gakuin University Tel.:  E-mail: MANICOM, James SSHRC PostDoctoral  Fellow,  Balsillie  School  of  International  Affairs,  Waterloo University/Wilfrid Laurier University Tel.:  E-mail: KATO, Kazuyo Program Manager, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tel.:  E-mail: KAWANA, Shinji Research Fellow, Research Institute for Peace and Security Tel.:  E-mail: 33 KOWASE, Shinji General Manager, Corporate Strategy & Research Department, Mitsubishi Corporation Tel.: E-mail: MICIC, Aleksander Deputy-Director, United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament Tel.:  E-mail: MURATA, Aya Program Manager, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tel.: E-mail: NAKAGAWA, Naoto Secretary-General, Socialist Party of Japan Tel.: E-mail: NISHIHARA, Masashi President, Research Institute for Peace and Security Tel.: E-mail: UEDA, Keiko Legislative Aide, Office of MP Mizuho Fukushima Tel.: E-mail: TODA-OZAKI, Takuya Program Manager,  Social Science Research Council (Tokyo Office) Tel.: E-mail: YOSHINO, Takashi Dean, Organization for Japan-US Studies, Waseda University Tel.: E-mail: 34 Annex 2 India Policy Project India's strategic environment is mainly defined by two factors: her relationship with Pakistan and her relationship with China. Moreover, the two factors are closely related and intertwined. They encompass a broad range of concerns such as nuclear diplomacy, arms race, terrorism and non-state actors, territorial disputes and border problems, competition for influence over the South Asian region and beyond. From Indian policy makers’ point of view, India is the natural leader of South Asia, thanks to its millenarian civilization, to its legitimate succession to British India, to the dimension of its territory, its demographic importance and incredible economic growth. India believes her influence allows her to bring about change in surrounding states' behaviour1. However, India has been deprived of her self- claimed title of leader from her South Asian neighbours. Consequently,  India seems to be wary of multilateral forums, given the likelihood of becoming the target of joint criticism from South Asian counterparts,  further  challenging India's  foreign  policy2.  Likewise,  India's  neighbours  are  likely to avoid bilateral relations with India, by fear of confrontation with the giant. With the accession of China to the SAARC as an observer, India's neighbours have delivered a powerful jab to India by limiting her capacity to shape the political and the security agenda in the immediate region. Nevertheless, India still assumes to be the natural  leader and focuses her efforts  in  establishing herself  as a  global  power, growing  beyond  the  surrounding  environment  and  borrowing  the  concept  of  “extended neighbourhood”. This policy can be seen as a counterstrategy to China's growing presence in South 1Robert Stewart-Ingersoll & Derrick Frazier, “India as a Regional Power: Identifying the Impact of Roles and Foreign Policy Orientation on the South Asian Security Order”, Asian Security, Vol. 6, No 1 (2010), 58. 2Smruti S. Pattanaik, “India's Neighbouring Policy: Perceptions from Bangladesh”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No 1 (2011), 77. 35 Asia3 - considered to be India's backyard – by deepening relationships with Central and South-East Asia - regions adjacent to China. India's growing relationship with Afghanistan, however, can be read as a function of India's strategies to hold Pakistan in check. Since Pakistan possesses a cultural and ethnic heritage similar to the one found in Afghanistan, she has sought to dominate the region since ancient times. India's economic and military involvement in Afghanistan has the particular purpose to deter both Pakistan's presence and Pakistan’s support to terrorists that are active in both Afghanistan and India4, to the delight of the NATO coalition. India  has  been  following  an  independent  foreign  policy,  first  under  the  idealist  but  anti- imperialist Nehru's guidance and later the more pragmatic approach of Indira Gandhi, leading to the development of a nuclear weapon program. Somehow, experts argue that India's pragmatism is still misguided, since no national doctrine has been articulated to embark the country towards a long-term vision5. Indian analysts push for an active stance rather than a passive and reactive one. In other words, in order to achieve pre-established objectives, India should come up with a grand strategy that meets her rapidly developing material capabilities. The nuclear doctrine is strongly emphasized here. While India pledges for global disarmament, officials also understand that nuclear deterrence is a logical outcome for their country since reliance on nuclear weapons is likely to remain part of the calculus in international relations6. Furthermore, India has to allocate an important part of her military resources to combat domestic threats, preventing the country from playing a greater role in regional politics and protecting it from foreign influences. The security environment in South Asia has been dubbed as “Power Restraining Power”, which is slightly different from balance of power in that power 3David Scott, “India's “Extended Neighborhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power”, India Review, Vol. 8, No 2 (2009), 123. 4Harsh V. Pant, “India in Afghanistan: a test case for a rising power”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 18, No 2 (2010), 138. See also 141. 5Subrata Mitra, “The Reluctant Hegemon: India's Self-Perception and the South Asia Strategic Environment”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No 3 (2003), 406. 6Zorawar D. Singh, “Thinking about an Indian Grand Strategy”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No 1 (2010) 62. 36 is used to curb another state's power to attain a satisfactory or stable regional distribution of power7. The balance of power might not be attainable in this instance because of the limitations inherent of the allocation of capabilities.  As Morgan puts it:  “Where the members pursue security in this  fashion, intrastate conflicts are of concern primarily in terms of their impact on the distribution of power. The members put great emphasis on autonomy and manipulate their relationships primarily on the basis of relative power capabilities, with intrastate conflict of significance in this context”8. India might not have the power to match its ambitions as a global power since she experiences some difficulties to assert her predominance at home and within the region. India faces numbers of ethnic and ideological insurgencies, mainly in contested territories in the North-East (Assam, Manipur, etc.) and the North-West (Jammu, Kashmir). Some of them are officiously supported by Pakistan in order to wage a subconventional warfare over disputed territories with India, in which an important majority of inhabitants are Muslim. Suffering from inferior capabilities to India, Pakistan resorts to this technique so she can avoid overt conflict with India and thus prevent an escalation of war. Pakistan also keeps a minimum nuclear deterrence that would inflict unacceptable damage to India, despite the latter having second strike capabilities. India adopted a ”no first-use” policy, meaning her nuclear battery is essentially for deterrence and defensive purposes, but also has a “countervalue” strategy, meaning she would  target  civilian  targets  in  retaliation  (i.e.  cities)  rather  than  military  targets,  thus  affording powerful deterrence with fewer warheads9. With  regards  to  her  nuclear  diplomacy  with  China,  both  countries  are  engaged  in  fierce competition, developing in an “ensured retaliation” situation, where both forces have the capacity to deliver second-strike retaliation10. The fact that China helped Pakistan with her own nuclear program 7Robert Stewart-Ingersoll& Derrick Frazier, Loc. Cit., 68. 8Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania University Press), 33. 9Vernie Liebl, “India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrine”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No 2 (2009), 156. 10Rajesh Basrur & Bommakanti Kartik, “The India-China Nuclear Relationship”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No 2 (2011), 37 demonstrates  the  need  to  analyze  India's  security  environment  from a  China-Pakistan  relationship standpoint11. For a country so wary of multilateral platforms at the regional level, it is quite surprising to find India actively present within the UN system. During the years of the Non-Aligned Movement, India first developed a foreign policy formulated around an ideal perception of international relations, where key  issues  would  not  be  decided  and  imposed  by imperialist  power,  but  discussed  multilaterally between likeminded nations with equal respect for international laws12. At the moment, India is the third in-kind contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, with 8 115 police officers and soldiers on active duty in December 201113. Efstathopoulos makes a distinction between the characteristics of a Northern (Western) middle power and a middle power coming from the South. While a Northern middle power is likely to be a status quo power, a Southern middle power is often moderately revisionist. Hence, it will probably push for reform within the system: “Reform internationalism may promote, on grounds of justice and fairness, the redistribution of income and resources among nations accepting that the global economy disadvantages  weaker  states  but  the  implicit  assumption  remains  that  the  existing  order  can  be reformed and potentially work to the mutual advantage of North and South while sustaining global peace and stability”15. In light of this theoretical conception, we can assume that India falls into this category.  Indeed,  India aims to  reform the UN from within,  seeking a  permanent  seat  at  the  UN Security Council  and trying  to  get  her  way around international  treaties  that  do no recognize  her nuclear power status. 190. 11Jaideep Saikia, “Quest for a Chindian Arc: Leadership in the Asian Century”, Defence & Security Analysis, Vol. 22, No 4 (2006), 427. 12Subrata Mitra, Loc. Cit.,410. 13United Nations, Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, December 2011, (2011) Online. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/dec11_1.pdf (Retrieved on January 14th, 2012). 15Charalampos Eftstathopoulos, “Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism”, Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No 1 (2011), 79. 38 India has been one of the pioneers of global disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. By being a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India pushed forward the need to bring about global disarmament to prevent a nuclear arms race between the two superpowers of the time, the United States on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. However, when India lost the war to China in 1962 over Himalayan territories and with the subsequent success of the Chinese nuclear program as early as 1964, India embarked in a quest to develop her own nuclear program, in spite of numerous internal debates on the repercussions for her non-aligned policy.  The Indian vision of international politics changed when the country acknowledged that multilateral platforms and non-alignment could not always prevent the materialization of realpolitik and the release of military capabilities16. An advocate of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), India is now one of the most outspoken opponents of the treaty that has yet to enter into force. One line of rhetoric that is often served is that non-proliferation initiatives, while laudable in essence,  contribute to the discrepancy existing  between  industrialized  and developing  countries  by impeding  indigenous  development  of technologies and keeping a Western monopoly on those17. Explicitly on the CTBT, India criticized the fact that the treaty gave a tremendous advantage to the countries that already have conducted nuclear tests18.  Moreover, India is increasingly critical of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. India cannot be expected to become a member of the treaty, since she would have to revert back to being a non-nuclear-weapon state, leaving it vulnerable to Chinese and Pakistanese attacks. The 1962 Sino- Indian War left an important scar in the social psyche and India wants to make sure a new potential conflict would not lead to the same conclusion. While India advocates for global disarmament, she also develops a double discourse, building up and modernizing her arsenal19. India also refused to allow 16Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesim, “Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy”, India Review, Vol. 8, No 1 (2009), 9. 17Rajiv Nayan, “The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No 4 (2011), 560. 18Ibid, 561. 19Leonard Weiss, “India and the NPT”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34, No 2 (2009), 262. 39 inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate nuclear facilities on her territory.  The US-India  civil  nuclear  agreement  tried  to  remedy to  this  problem,  giving  India  the officious status of nuclear-weapon state, but it implies only the civilian use of nuclear energy. Still, India wants to be fully recognized as a nuclear power under the NPT regime. Current Prime Minister Singh argues that India is a responsible nuclear power but: “[...] it omits a key distinction between India and the five original weapon states: the latter have abjured any further nuclear tests (without hedging), and at least four of them are no longer producing plutonium production for weapons. Nor are the five weapon states engaged in nuclear arms race. India, on its part, is still in the mode of building a `credible minimum deterrent` [...]”20. In addition to nuclear politics,  India has to deal with domestic threats  and armed violence. While the issue of ethnic and ideological insurgencies is well documented, the case of armed violence proves to be more subtle when it comes to the roots of the problem. For example, India is well known for being a safe-haven for illegal firearms production and trafficking. There is a widespread use of those amongst terrorist organizations, insurgency groups, but also amongst city criminals and citizens who use weapons as a mean to resolve personal conflict and domestic disputes21. India has porous borders, making the traffic of arms very easy for criminal groups and insurgents. Moreover, India is surrounded by conflict-plagued countries, where the insurgents might share similar interests with the ones present in India and collaborate in arms smuggling. Law enforcement seems to be problematic where corruption is endemic. Findings show that around 86% of all firearms victims have been shot by illegal weapons between 1999 and 200822. At the international level, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) aims to curb diversion of weapons to the illicit  market,  but India has not been so much cooperative in framing the treaty. India fears the treaty could impede the development of countries and their national 20Idem. 21Anuradha M. Chenoy, “India and the Arms Trade Treaty”, International Studies, Vol. 46, No 3 (2009). 350. 22Small Arms Survey, “Mapping Murder: The Geography of Indian Firearm Fatalities”, India Armed Violence Assessment Issue Brief, No 2 (2011), 7. 40 security if dual-use technologies are covered by the treaty. Furthermore, India stressed the need for States to remain responsible for the implementation of regulations according to the existing national legislation.  Although  laws  already  exist  in  India  to  circumvent  the  firearms  issue,  poor  law enforcement structures and resources renders an effective crush down on the illegal arms industry virtually impossible23. For enemies of the State of India, the illicit arms industry is not just an efficient way to achieve political objectives to the detriment of the State authorities, but also to make profits out of this lucrative industry24. BIBLIOGRAPHY Basrur, Rajesh & Bommakanti Kartik. 2011. “The India-China Nuclear Relationship”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 35, No 2. PP 186-193. Chenoy, Anuradha M. 2009. “India and the Arms Trade Treaty”. International Studies. Vol. 46, No 3. PP 349-356. Dasgupta, Anindita. 2001. “Small Arms Proliferation in India's North-East: A Case Study of Assam”. Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 36, No 1. PP 59-65. Efstathopoulos,  Charalampos. 2011. “Reinterpreting  India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism”. Asian Journal of Political Science. Vol. 19, No 1. PP 74-95. Ganguly, Sumit and Manjeet S. Pardesi. 2009. “Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy”. India Review. Vol. 8, No 1. PP 4-19. Goswani, Namrata. 2011. “Chinese `Agressive` Territorial Claim on India's Arunachal Pradesh: A Response to Changing Power Dynamics in Asia”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 35, No 5. PP 781-792. Lake, David A. & Patrick M. Morgan, eds. 1997. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press. Liebl, Vernie. 2009. “India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrine”. Comparative Strategy. Vol. 28, No 2. PP 154-163. Mitra, Subrata. 2003. “The Reluctant Hegemon: India's Self-Perception and the South Asia Strategic Environment”. Contemporary South Asia. Vol. 12, No 3. PP 399-417. Nayan, Rajiv. 2011. “The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India”. Strategic Analysis. 23Anuradha M. Chenoy, Loc. Cit.,352. 24Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India's North-East: A Case Study of Assam”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No 1 (2001), 63. 41 Vol. 35, No 4. PP 559-563. Pant, Harsh V. 2010. “India in Afghanistan: a test case for a rising power”. Contemporary South Asia. Vol. 18, No 2. PP 133-153. Pattanaik, Smruti S. 2010. “India's Neighbourhood Policy: Perceptions from Bangladesh”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 35, No 1. PP 71-87. Saikia, Jaideep. 2006. “Quest for a Chindian Arc: Leadership in the Asian Century”. Defense & Security Analysis. Vol. 22, No 4. PP 421-434. Scott, David. 2009. “India's `Extended Neighbourhood` Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power”. India Review. Vol. 8, No 2. PP 107-143. Singh, Harinder. 2011. “Assessing India's Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns”. Asian Security. Vol. 7, No 2. PP 147-168. Singh, Zorawar D. 2010. “Thinking about an Indian Grand Strategy”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 35, No 1. PP 52-70. Small Arms Survey. 2011. “India's States of Armed Violence Assessing the Human Cost and Political Priorities”. India Armed Violence Assessment Issue Brief. No 1. PP 1-12. Small Arms Survey. 2011. “Mapping Murder: The Geography of Indian Firearm Fatalities”. India Armed Violence Assessment Issue Brief. No 2. PP 1-12. Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert & Derrick Frazier. 2010. “India as Regional Power: Identifying the Impact of Roles and Foreign Policy Orientation on the South Asian Security Order”. Asian Security. Vol. 6. No 1. PP 51-73. Thakur, Ramesh. 2011. “India and the United Nations”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 35, No 6. PP 898-905. United Nations. 2011. Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, December 2011. Online. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/dec11_1.pdf (Retrieved on January 14th, 2012). Weiss, Leonard. 2010. “India and the NPT”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 34, No 2. PP 255-271. 42 Annex 3 43 Annex 4 44 45


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