UBC Faculty Research and Publications

Distant water fleets : an ecological, economic and social assessment Bonfil, Ramon; Munro, Gordon; Valtysson, Hreidar Tor; Wright, Miriam; Preikshot, David; Haggan, Nigel; Pauly, Daniel; Sumaila, Ussif Rashid; Pitcher, Tony J. 1998

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ISSN 1198-6727 m F i s h e r i e s C e n t r e R e s e a r c h R e p o r t s • • • • • • • M — — — — — 1 • mil 'I If mil W I B B M a a a a M i a B i M M M M M B B B M B M W M B M a B M M ^ B M W M M I M B M M M a 1998 Volume 6 Number 6 Distant Water Fleets: An Ecological, Economic and Social Assessment Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Canada edited by Ramon Bonfil, Gordon Munro, UssifRashid Sumaila, Hreidar Valtysson, Miriam Wright, Tony Pitcher, David Preikshot, Nigel Haggan, and Daniel Pauly published by The Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia 2204 Main Mall Vancouver, B.C., Canada ISSN 1198-6727 151 Directors Foreword The first distant water fleet was a secret. In 1497, Giovanni Caboto (aka John Cabot), a Venetian adventurer financed by Bristol merchants and the English King Henry 7th, found seasonal villages already thriving on the shores of 'New Founde Lande'. His voyage, usually represented as an attempt to procure oriental spices, may actually have been prompted by reports of Portuguese sailors who, for some years, had been returning with a stunning abundance of cod, and who had, understandably, kept the location of their prolific and profitable fishing grounds concealed. Britain was having problems with Icelanders over cod at the time. Almost 500 years later in the 1970s, British distant water trawlers, greatly expanded after WW2, sparked off a 'cod war' with Iceland, an echo of the earlier conflict. Iceland was ahead of the pack in extending its jurisdiction beyond 12 nautical miles, but, soon, under the law of the Sea, everyone did this, and there was hope that 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones would solve the problem. They didn't. At home, the establishment of EEZs sparked off government subsidies to catch 'what are now our own fish'. Such actions, in false expectation of catches matching those of the former DWFs, invariably overcapitalized domestic fleets and in Canada, analysis now shows, ultimately doomed those Newfoundland cod, already reduced to a shadow of their former abundance by DWFs. Indeed, the legacy of DWFs effects around the world is only just beginning to be comprehended. For example, packs of eastern block large trawlers, supported by factory vessels and commanded to catch tonnes per ship each day, scoured what were then international waters. They destroyed long-lived sponge forests that harboured juvenile snapper and groupers off northern Australia and shifted the ecological balance towards more volatile pelagic fish in marine ecosystems off the west coasts of North America and Latin America. Moreover, displaced DWFs have shaped world fisheries over the past two decades. For example, cleverly-worded and politically-levered joint venture or licence agreements have disadvantaged developing nations, who, hoping to earn benefits from their fisheries, have typically received less than 5% of the catch value. These issues are analysed in Distant Water Fleets: an ecological, economic and social assessment which publishes the Fisheries Centre teams' contribution to a larger project sponsored by WWF's Endangered Seas Campaign and published in 1998 as Footprints of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries. The Fisheries Centre's work reviews DWFs for selected case studies, especially from developing nations, in whose waters 85% of fish products now originate. We use ecosystem simulations (ECOSIM) to make a detailed economic evaluation for Namibian fisheries, and employ the Centre's recently developed rapid appraisal technique, RAPFISH, to examine the impact of DWFs on West African fisheries. The work is reprinted as papers under individual authorship here with the permission of WWF. Fisheries Centre Research Reports publishes results of research work carried out, or workshops held, at the UBC Fisheries Centre. The series focusses on multidisciplinary problems in fisheries management, and aims to provide a synoptic overview of the foundations, themes and prospects of current research. Fisheries Centre Research Reports are distributed to appropriate workshop participants or project partners, and are recorded in Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts. A full list appears on the Fisheries Centre's Web site, htpp://fisheries.com. Copies are available on request for a modest cost-recovery charge. Tony J. Pitcher Professor of Fisheries Director, UBC Fisheries Centre Abstract This report reviews the balance of costs and benefits of distant water fleets (DWFs) for coastal nations. It is based on selected case studies representative of a wide range of conditions: off Mauritania and Senegal, Northwestern Africa; off Namibia; off Iceland; in the North Atlantic waters between Iceland and Norway; around the Galapagos Islands and in the North Pacific 'Donut Hole' between Russia and Alaska. The analyses are based on catch and landings data of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), complemented with national and other data where available. Two detailed evaluations were made. First, for Namibian fisheries, mass-balance simulations (ECOPATH and ECOSIM) of the upwelling ecosystem from which the catches originate, serve as the basis for comparing economic scenarios with and without DWFs. The results show that activities of DWFs can halve the potential earnings of home fisheries. Secondly, a rapid appraisal technique (RAPFISH) provides an ordination of relative status of West African DWFs and home fleets in ecological, economic, social and technological areas. In relation to similar fisheries that focus on small pelagics, the DWFs can reduce sustainability by 20%, The overall conclusion of these analyses is that extended fisheries jurisdiction, which has radically altered the relationship between coastal states and DWFs, provides a framework within which both coastal nations and DWFs can work jointly to define the nature of their relationships. This can avoid the negative impacts of unregulated DWFs on coastal resources, documented in this report. For fishing grounds outside of EEZs, formal agreements, involving all potential players, are required to prevent the resources from being rapidly depleted. 151 Table of Contents DIRECTOR'S FOREWORD 3 ABSTRACT 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS 5 LIST OF EXHIBITS 8 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 1 0 1. INTRODUCTION (Ramon Bonfil etal.). 1 1 • Project Direction and Management 12 2. METHODOLOGY (Ramon Bonfil et al.). 1 3 • Overall Strategy 13 • Ecological and Economic Modelling 14 • Rapid Appraisal of Fisheries Sustainability 15 3. A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 1 7 • Fishing Patterns of DWFs 1950-1994 (RamonBonfil) 17 • Selected Case Studies of DWFs (Ramon Bonfil) 20 • Case Study: DWFs off Mauritania and Senegal (Ramon Bonfil) 20 • Ecosystem 20 • The DWF Nations 23 • The Fishery Resources and Fishing Sectors 24 • Historical Catches 27 • Catches of the DWF 29 • Fleet Characteristics and Numbers 30 • Fisheries Management by Coastal States 33 • Bycatch 34 • Fishing Agreements 34 • Benefits 34 • Conflicts 36 • Boxed Case Study 1. Illegal Fishing in the Galapagos Islands {Ramon Bonfil et al) 38 • Case Study: Walleye Pollock and the North Pacific "Donut Hole" (Ramon Bonfil) 40 • Ecosystem 40 • The DWF Nations 40 • The Fishery Resources 40 • Historical Catches 42 • Fleet Characteristics and Numbers 43 • Fisheries Management 44 • Bycatch 46 • Fishing Agreements 46 • Benefits 47 • Conflicts 47 151 • Case Study: Iceland and DWFs (Hreidar Valtysson). 47 • Ecosystem 47 • The Coastal Nation 49 • The Fishery Resources 49 • Historical Catches 53 • Catches of the DWFs 55 • Iceland as a DWF Nation 59 • Fleet Characteristics and Numbers 60 • Fisheries Management by Iceland 61 • Fishing Agreements and Conflicts 62 • Benefits 64 • Boxed Case Study 2. The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring. 65 (.Hreidar Valtysson) • Case Study: Newfoundland Cod Fishery 1950-1992 (Miriam Wright,) 68 • Prelude : 68 • A Long History if Overfishing 69 • Peak and Decline 69 • Technological Change and Market Forces 70 • Early Hints of Decline 72 • The Dominion Strikes Back 74 • Inshore Fishery Perspectives 74 • Who's Fault was it? 75 • Lessons for the Future 76 • Case Study: DWFs off Namibia (Ramon Bonfil) 77 • Ecosystem 77 • The Coastal Nation 77 • Historical Catches 79 • Fleet Characteristics and Numbers 81 • Fisheries Management by Coastal State 81 • By catch 81 • Fishing Agreements 81 • Benefits 82 • Conflicts 82 ECOSYSTEM / ECONOMIC IMPACTS (UssifRashid Sumaila) 8 3 • Analysis of the Impacts of DWFs on Namibia 83 • The Scenarios 84 • The "With" DWFs Scenario ! 84 • The "Without" DWFs Scenario 85 • Ecological Impacts 85 • Economic Impacts 86 • Implications for Namibian Fisheries 87 5. STATUS OF WEST AFRICAN FLEETS (Tony Pitcher and David Preikshot) 90 • Rapid Appraisal of Distant Water Fleet Fisheries Relative to Home Fleets Using the RAPFISH Technique 90 6 . DWFNs AND COASTAL STATES. • Economic and Social Aspects of their Interactions {Gordon Munrd) 94 • The Pre-EFJ Era 94 • Fishery Resources Wholly within EEZ 95 • Fishery Resources Found both within the EEZ and the Adjacent High Seas 98 • Social Considerations (Nigel Haggan). 100 • International and Hemispheric Issues 101 • National Issues 102 • Concluding Remarks {Ramon BonfileX al.). 7 . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 8 . REFERENCES 9 . APPENDIX 7 List of Exhibits FIGURES Fig. 1 Cumulative catches (1950-94) of DWFNs by FAO Statistical Area... 20 Fig. 2 Sardines catches in the Western Central Atlantic 25 Fig. 3 Senegalese fishers and their rich fishery 27 Fig. 4 DWFNs catches off the coast of Mauritania and Senegal 29 Fig. 5 DWFNs catches in northwest Africa 30 Fig. 6 Catches of walleye pollock in the northwest Pacific 41 Fig. 7 DWFs pollock catch until the mid-1970s 43 Fig. 8 Japan's and US walleye pollock catches 43 Fig. 9 Trawlers in the Bering Sea 44 Fig. 10 Capelin, herring, and cod catches in Icelandic waters 50 Fig. 11 Catches of other species in Icelandic waters 52 Fig. 12 Iceland's control over fishery resources 58 Fig. 13 Distant water fishery by Icelandic fleets 59 Fig. 14 NSS herring stock crash of the late 1960s 66 Fig. 15 DWFs northern cod catches 69 Fig. 16 Distant water and Canadian fleets in the ICNAF/NAFO area 71 Fig. 17 Canadianization of the northern cod fishery 74 Fig. 18 Otter travel effort in areas 2J3KL 75 Fig. 19 Exploitation by the DWFs in the 1960s off Namibia 80 Fig. 20 Stock profiles for pichard, hake and horse mackerel 87 Fig. 21 Discounted rent paid to the DWF and Namibia 88 Fig. 22 Discounted rent to Namibia in two scenarios 88 Fig. 23 Rapfish ordinations performed on attributes scores 92 Fig. 24 Combined interdisciplinary ordination of fisheries 93 Fig. 25 Differences in status of best and worst fisheries 93 BOXES Box 1 Case Study: Illegal Fishing in the Galapagos Islands (Ramon Bonfil et aJ.) 38 Box 2 Case Study: The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring (Hreidar Valtysson) 65 151 TABLES Tab. 1 Main DWFNs and the resources and FAO areas they fish 18 Tab. 2 Main fishery resources pursued by DWFNs (1950-1994) 19 Tab. 3 The DWFNs known to have fished off Mauritania and Senegal 24 Tab. 4 Marine catches of Mauritania for the years 1950-1995 28 Tab. 5 Marine catches of Senegal for the years 1950-1995 28 Tab. 6 Number of fishing vessels by type and subtype in Senegal 32 Tab. 7 Estimated proportion from Senegal and Mauritania 35 Tab. 8 Reported catch of walleye pollock in the donut hole area 42 Tab. 9 Marine catches in Icelandic waters since 1950 55 Tab • 10 Historical and present DWFs operating in Icelandic waters 56 Tab • 11 Agreements and conflicts over various species from Iceland 63 Tab • 12 Average total landings by ICNAF countries 72 Tab • 13 Catches of important deep-sea fishes off Namibia 79 Tab • 14 Fish catch off Namibia by gear type and species 80 Tab • 15 Total allowable catches for fishery resources off Namibia 82 Tab • 16 Ecological and economic results in "with" DWF scenario 85 Tab • 17 Ecological and economic results in "without" DWF scenario 85 Tab • 18 Codes used for different fisheries 91 MAPS Map 1 The seven case studies of distant water fleets analysed 21 Map 2 Mauritania and Senegal 20 Map 3 The Galapagos Islands 38 Map 4 The "donut hole" 40 Map 5 Iceland 48 Map 6 Area of distribution of the NSS herring stock 65 Map 7 The northern cod on the Canadian Shelf 68 Map 8 Namibia 77 APPENDIX 1 DWFNs and their catches, 1950-1994 .. I l l Acronyms and Abbreviations APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CECAF Commission for Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries cm centimetre (s) CSD United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development CSRP West African Sub-Regional Commission on Fisheries d day(s) DWF distant water fleet DWFN distant water fishing nation EEZ exclusive economic zone EFJ extended fisheries jurisdiction EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FFA Forum Fisheries Agency g gram(s) GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades GDP gross domestic product GRT gross registered tonnes ICNAF International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries INPFC International North Pacific Fisheries Commission ITQ individual transferable quota kg kilogram (s) km kilometre (s) m metre (s) MDS multidimensional scaling mm millimetre (s) NAFO Northwest Adantic Fisheries Organization NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OY Optimum yield RFMO regional fisheries management organization t tonne (s) TAC total allowable catch UN United Nations UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development W T O World Trade Organization y year(s) Note: miles quoted are nautical miles, 1 nautical mile is equivalent to approximately 1.852 kilometres. 151 Introduction Distant water fleets (DWFs), loosely defined in the past as collectives of fishing vessels operating outside the waters surrounding their own territories, and presently best defined as those fishing outside their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs), have been roaming the global oceans since ancient times (the best modern example being perhaps the whaling fleets of the last two centuries). As time passed and technological advances permitted more remote voyages and longer times at sea, DWFs extended their range of action to faraway places. The growth of these operations in modern times was led initially by a few nations after the end of World War II but others joined later. By the 1970s, DWFs were diverse in nationality and covered practically every ocean basin and sea around the world while fishing for a great variety of species. Around the same time, fisheries expansion in the developing world started to take place. These two events brought fleets from coastal and distant nations in contact with one another, and often led to conflicts over ownership of fishery resources and most frequently caused the overexploitation of marine populations. Where fishing occurred on the high seas, the typical situation of open-access common-property resources prevailed, also leading often to overexploitation. The establishment of EEZs by most countries around 1977 and the ensuing agreement for extended fisheries jurisdiction of the United Nations (UN) in 1982 dramatically changed the rules of the fishing game between countries. In recent years, the activities of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) have been circumscribed by the need to obtain legal access to the EEZs where they want to fish, or otherwise having to remain restricted to fishing in the high seas, or as shown below, to engage in illegal activities such as poaching. Although DWFs have been at times thought of as a negative element of the global fishing industry, our research shows that this is not always necessarily the case. The ecological impacts of DWF fisheries have often been negative in the past, but the same overfishing effects have happened and still occur inside many EEZs without any DWF activity: the real problem in both cases is overcapacity and excessive effort. From the economic and social point of view, each situation of DWF-coastal nation interaction offers possibilities for failure or success. The final outcome depends on the decisions made by each party and varies from case to case. While some coastal nations are better prepared for dealing with the challenge posed by granting access to DWFs others are less prepared. Choosing between licensing, chartering, or setting up joint-venture schemes can determine the success or failure of the whole enterprise. The capacity to administer the fishery and monitor and enforce compliance with regulations plays another important role in the success of the interaction. Usually, these capabilities are intrinsically linked with the level of economic and social development of the coastal nation. On the other hand, the attitude of the DWFNs performs perhaps an even more important role: whether seeking their own benefit or an equitable deal, DWFNs have in their hands most of the power in situations where the coastal nation is not fully prepared for the challenge. The possible combinations of these and other factors are complex and difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it is clear that the possibilities for successful and efficient DWFN-coastal nation relations exist, and these interactions are not negative per se. The last few years of DWF activities offer a great variety of situations that range from failed attempts for cooperation or unfair business between DWFs and coastal nations, to exemplary cases of sensible and successful cooperation, with equitability in the share of benefits among all parties. The present report provides a broad-brush picture of the current state and the effects of DWF operations around the world. The work, as agreed with WWF at the beginning of the project, addresses the ecological, economic, and social effects of DWF fisheries. The final deliverables are: 1. a map showing the most important cases including stocks and players 2. an overview of the recent and current state of DWFs based on seven case studies around the world 3. an ECOPATH/ECOSIM model of the ecological and economic effects of DWFs in Namibia 4. an overview of the economics of distant water fisheries 5. an overview of social impacts of distant water fisheries 6. a multivariate analysis of a distant water fishery. • Project Direction and Management The project was directed by the principal investigator Dr Daniel Pauly. Dr Ram6n Bonfil was in charge of overall research, coordination and report production, and editing. Management of the project was done by Mr Nigel Haggan. All the work was discussed and planned by a team composed of the above-mentioned researchers plus Drs Gordon Munro and Ussif Rashid Sumaila. Additional collaborators who provided specific parts of the case studies and who were added halfway through the project were Mr Hreidar Valtysson and Dr Miriam Wright. Methodology j The Footpr in t of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies Overall Strategy The initial planning of the work, designation of responsibilities, and strategies for achieving the aims of the project were discussed in a couple of meetings with full participation of the research team. Weekly meetings were held to discuss progress and "brainstorm" on approaches. This was important in developing a common mind in an interdisciplinary team such as this. More importantly, from a WWF perspective, it served to identify several key sources of biological and economic information as well as sources on international conventions, legal agreements, etc. As a result of the planning phase, a decision was taken to address specific fisheries that can be defined in terms of geography, and focus on species rather than fleets which can and do target more than one resource and/or move from one resource to another. This makes it possible to perform ecological, economic, and rapid appraisal assessments. Nevertheless, a global overview of DWFs was also performed and is presented as a preamble to the case studies. Although we originally planned for a total of nine case studies to be included in the study, the constraints of availability of information, timeliness in accessibility of information, and overall amount of work prevented the preparation of some cases. Most of the case studies were to be addressed in as much detail as the overall size of the report and the availability of information allowed. A few more cases were to be briefly presented as shorter "boxed" cases. The selected case studies reflected the range of situations currently found in DWF fisheries around the world, including examples from the north and the south, interactions between developed and developing countries, situations of DWFs in the high seas, and from all geographical regions of the world. According to correspondence exchanged between Tony Pitcher and Michael Sutton on 29 October 1997, the project deliberately did not consider tuna fisheries. This decision was reached as tuna fisheries are quite complex, are considered a whole league of their own, and are known for being very difficult to document in enough detail. Given the scope of this project and the resources available for it, it was not possible to consider them here. In the present report, we allude to industrial fisheries in the sense of those carried out with technologically advanced systems (i.e. large size of vessels, mechanized deployment/recovery of gear, electronic instrumentation for fish detection and navigation) as opposed to the alternative use of the term which refers to fisheries whose catch is destined for industrial production of fishmeal. Alternatively and for readability, we sometimes also use the term large-scale fisheries. In a similar fashion, we apply the terms artisanal fisheries or small-scale fisheries to those carried out from small-sized vessels that typically lack modern electronic instrumentation for positioning or fish detection and might even lack powered retrieval of gear. 13 T h e Footpr in t of D is tan t W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d F isher ies Of those case studies included in this final report, the case study of Namibia suffers from a lack of historical information on catches by DWFs. The Namibian case study was originally singled out as the case chosen for the ECOPATH and economic analysis because it is a current and important example of DWF-coastal state interactions, and because of the global significance of the fisheries off Namibia. In addition, the research team decided that this case offered the best possibilities in terms of the availability of information (expected good contacts in the Namibian Fisheries Department and the coincidental participation of one of the project's collaborators on a separate project in Namibia, that would allow him to obtain first-hand information during his visit to Namibia). As it happened, all the contacts we explored for obtaining the valuable pre-independence information for Namibia proved to be of no use for data acquisition. Although this has not affected the modelling exercise, it prevented the proper documentation of the case study under the global overview. In a similar fashion, the lack of good contacts to gather the information required for our study made it impossible to address the Chilean horse mackerel case. Nevertheless, a new case study - from Iceland - was incorporated. Iceland presents an interesting case of a country formerly host of many DWFs and now in complete control of its own resources and a DWFN in its own right. The following is the final list of the case studies that are presented below and that constitute the core of the report: 1. Mauritania and Senegal 2. Illegal fishing in the Galapagos Islands* 3. Pollock in the Bering Sea "donut hole" 4. Iceland 5. Norwegian spring-spawning herring* 6. Northern cod in eastern Canada 7. Namibia. An asterisk (*) denotes case studies that are presented in brief format only as boxed cases. The case studies are presented in a standardized format agreed by the research team to facilitate comparison among cases. The major part of our strategy rested on finding reliable data collaborators. This took longer than anticipated and for some cases was not as fruitful as originally expected. A second-level strategy was to research several sources of economic and fisheries information, such as scientific literature databases, Internet resources, and review of newspaper archives for relevant articles. A specialist in library studies was sub-contracted for the latter task. • Ecological and Economic Modelling The ecological and economic impact analyses were done for the Namibia fishery for hake, horse mackerel, and pilchards. For details of the ECOPATH and ECOSIM modelling frameworks and software see Christensen and Pauly, 1992 and Walters et al., 1997. Core papers on the specific ECOPATH models used to capture the essence of the Namibian ecosystem are Jarre-Teichmann and Christensen, 1998a and b. To permit economic analysis, a framework based on valuation techniques developed by environmental economists was used (see Angelsen et al., 1994 and the references therein). Essentially, what we did was to take the catches and fishing efforts generated by ECOPATH/ECOSIM under the "with" and the "without" DWF scenarios, and apply appropriately determined unit prices for the fish landed, the cost of exploiting the fish, and the discount rate. In this way we were able to compute the net discounted economic rent that is achievable under the different scenarios, which in turn allowed us to determine the economic impacts of DWFs under these scenarios. • Rapid Appraisal of Fisheries Sustainability The technique employed for evaluating the sustainability or "health" of fisheries uses multidimensional scaling (MDS) to achieve ordinations of fisheries in four different fisheries science disciplines: biology, economics, sociology, and technology. An overall combined ordination is produced using the results of the four disciplinary ordinations to generate an unweighted interdisciplinary assessment of fisheries sustainability. Full details of the method are provided in Pitcher and Preikshot, 1998. Disciplinary ordinations are produced first in the four disciplines. Each discipline has a checklist of nine attributes that are scored on a ranked scale from 0 to 4 according to information available in published literature, "grey literature", and from personal contacts. Scoring is generally carried out as a team exercise. The attributes for the biological, economic, sociological, and technological ordinations were selected to meet the following criteria: utility in representing long-term sustainability of fisheries, ease of assigning extreme scores to "good" or "bad", discrimination of changes in time series information, addition of independent information to the overall assessment, agreement in scoring, and wide availability for all fisheries. MDS is then used to reduce each multidimensional data matrix to a two dimensional output. The first two axes of the MDS ordination represent different contributions from the associated attributes in order to explain as much total variation in the original data as possible. Goodness-of-fit is provided by "stress" scores, and ordinations with stress above 0.27 are rejected. Two simulated fisheries are included to supply fixed reference points and a gradient of sustainability. The "good" fishery was given the highest possible scores on all attributes contributing to long-term sustainability in the ecological, economic, sociological, and technological spheres. The "bad" fishery was scored in the opposite fashion. In addition, 20 random sets of attribute scores are included, and expressed as 95 per cent confidence intervals along the x and y axes after ordination. The original data is then re-centred to the zero of these "random fisheries", and the 95 per cent confidence interval plotted. Impac ts : M e t h o d o l o g y 1 5 1 Simulations have been carried out to validate the monotonicity of the sustainability axis from "good" to "bad", the central tendency of the random fisheries, and the lateral displacement normal to the sustainability axis of changes unrelated to sustainability (see Pitcher and Preikshot, 1998). After the data have been ordinated within each discipline, they are subjected to the following conventions to make their appearance more suitable for interpretation. The axes are rotated so that the "good" fishery is plotted in the upper left corner of the graph and the "bad" fishery opposite to it at lower right. The interdisciplinary ordination is the result of performing MDS on the first two axes of the fisheries in the four disciplinary ordinations. M Global Overview The Footpr in t of D is tan t W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d F isher ies • Fishing Patterns of DWFs 1950-1994 Although our research focuses on the activities of DWFNs in specific regions and fisheries around the world, we first provide a brief analysis of global trends in distant water fisheries. This study is based on catches reported to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and includes historical data from 1950 to 1994. The present analysis is approximate as it is impossible to obtain exact figures of the catches made by any one nation outside of its own EEZ from the FAO fishery statistics. The approach used here is to group the catches of each country by FAO Statistical Area, and then exclude the catches reported in the FAO area(s) pertaining to the EEZ of each country. Thus we work only with catches made outside each nation's own FAO areas. This method might produce somewhat underestimated catches for the DWFs, but it is hoped this bias will be similar for all nations and that these data will still reflect the relative importance of each fleet and preserve the most relevant trends. Catches from 1950 to 1994 were summed over species or species groups to arrive at cumulative totals by species. These numbers are the ones used to infer the most important patterns and trends in distant water fisheries. Two countries stand out as the all-time most dominant DWFNs: the USSR (until its disappearance) and Japan. Together, they account for over half of the total catches by DWFs, the USSR with 32 per cent, and Japan with 21 per cent of the total. Spain follows in third place with about 10 per cent of the catches. Other important DWFNs are, in order of importance: the Republic of Korea (5 per cent), the Russian Federation and Poland (4 per cent each), Taiwan, Portugal, Germany, and France (3 per cent each), Ukraine (2 per cent), Norway, Romania, Cuba, Bulgaria, and the United States (1 per cent each), and then 53 other nations with smaller catches. Table A1 in the appendix is a complete list of all the DWFNs identified through this analysis. Throughout its existence, the Soviet block and in particular the USSR, dominated the catches made by DWFs, together accounting for nearly 50 per cent of the total. Even today, the ex-Soviet block nations keep a very high profile in distant water fisheries. Asian countries, led by Japan, are the second most important group of DWFNs. Some other important DWFs are of western European origin: Spain, Portugal, France, and Norway are notable. The main fishery resources pursued by each of the top 21 DWFNs and the FAO areas where they have centred their activities are shown in Table 1. For each DWFN, the list of species and areas follows a hierarchical order. Most fleets from eastern Europe and Asia have very long ranges of activity, whilst nations from western Europe tend to concentrate their fishing in more discrete parts of the world. Interestingly, there seems to be a very strong correlation in fishing practices among eastern European DWFNs, as well as between Japan and the Republic of Korea. In both cases the species and areas fished are strikingly similar among nations. 17 The Footprint of D is tant W a t e r Fleets on Wor ld Fisheries Table 1. M a i n DWFNs and the resources and FAO areas they fish, arranged by total cumulative catches in distant waters 1950-1994 Country Catch Main fishery resources caught (t x 105) Main oceans and FAO areas fished USSR 74,370 Diverse resources, horse mackerels, Chilean horse mackerel, Cape hake and horse mackerel, European pilchard 49,570 Diverse resources, Alaska pollock, skipjack and bigeye tunas, squids, yellowfin tuna 22,860 Diverse resources, Atlantic cod. Cape hakes, European pilchard, yellowfin and skipjack tunas, octopi Korea Rep. 11,090 Diverse resources, Alaska pollock, squids, yellowfin and skipjack tunas Japan Spain Russian Fed. 10,450 Poland Taiwan Portugal Germany France Ukraine Norway 8,200 7,370 7,090 6,850 6,040 4,210 2.820 Diverse resources, Chilean horse mackerel, European pilchard Diverse resources, southern blue whiting, Cape horse mackerel, Atlantic mackerel, Pacific cod Diverse resources, albacore, Argentine squid, yellowfin and skipjack tunas Diverse resources, Atlantic cod, Cape hakes Diverse resources. Atlantic cod, Atlantic herring, Atlantic redfishes, horse mackerels Diverse resources, Atlantic cod, yellowfin and skipjack tunas Diverse resources, European pilchard, Cape horse mackerel, Chilean horse mackerel Atlantic cod, harp seals, sardines, horse mackerels Romania 2,530 Diverse resources, Cape horse mackerel, horse mackerels Cuba 2.320 Diverse resources, Chilean and Cape horse mackerels, Cape hake, silver hake, other hakes United States 2.250 Skipjack and yellowfin tunas Bulgaria 2,140 Diverse resources, Cape horse mackerel, Atlantic mackerel Latvia Italy Lithuania Estonia Faeroe Is. ,810 Diverse resources, Chilean horse mackerel, horse mackerels, European pilchard Marine fishes, marine molluscs ,790 Diverse resources, Chilean horse mackerel, sardines, horse mackerels 1,460 Diverse resources, Chilean horse mackerel, horse mackerels. European pilchard 1.440 Atlantic cod Worldwide, CE Atlantic Ocean, NW Atlantic Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean, NE Pacific Ocean, SE Pacific Ocean Worldwide, large catches in NE Pacific Ocean, then CW Pacific Ocean Atlantic and Indian Oceans, CE Atlantic Ocean, NW Atlantic Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean Worldwide, NE Pacific Ocean, CW Pacific Ocean, CE Atlantic Ocean, SW Atlantic Ocean, W Indian Ocean Worldwide, CE Atlantic Ocean, SE Pacific Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean, Atlantic-Antarctic Oceans Worldwide, NW Atlantic Ocean, SW Atlantic Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean, CE Atlantic Ocean, NE Pacific Ocean Worldwide. CE Pacific Ocean, SW Atlantic Ocean, CW Pacific Ocean, W Indian Ocean Atlantic Ocean, NW Atlantic Ocean, CE Atlantic Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean Worldwide, large catches in NW Atlantic Ocean, then CE Atlantic Ocean Atlantic and Indian Oceans, NW Atlantic Ocean, CE Atlantic Ocean. W Indian Ocean Worldwide, CE Atlantic Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean, Atlantic-Antarctic Oceans, SE Pacific Ocean Atlantic and South Pacific Oceans, NW Atlantic Ocean, CE Atlantic Ocean Atlantic and Indian Oceans, CE Atlantic Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean Atlantic and South Pacific Oceans, SE Pacific Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, CW Pacific Ocean Worldwide, SE Atlantic Ocean, CE Atlantic Ocean. NW Atlantic Ocean, NE Atlantic. SW Atlantic Ocean Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, SE Pacific Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean, SW Atlantic Ocean Atlantic and Indian Oceans, CE Atlantic Ocean, some NW Atlantic Ocean, W Indian Ocean Atlantic, Indian, and South Pacific Oceans, CE Atlantic Ocean, SE Pacific Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean Atlantic and South Pacific Oceans, CE Atlantic Ocean, SE Pacific Ocean, SE Atlantic Ocean NW Atlantic Ocean Data from FAO Fishery Statistics Although most DWFNs catch a large variety of fishery resources there are clear patterns showing that eastern European nations specialize in fishing for high-volume, low-value small and middle pelagic fishes such as horse and true mackerels, and sardines. In contrast, Asian nations, while also fishing for a wide range of species, tend to diversify into both low-price high-volume species such as pollock, and high-price species such as tunas and squid. Other nations, such as the Faeroe Islands, concentrate on only one area and species. Overall, tunas are the fishery resources most intensively fished by DWFNs, amounting to just over 32 million tonnes (t) during 1950-1994 (Table 2). These are followed closely by horse mackerels - and in particular the Chilean horse mackerel - of which over 31 million t have been fished. However, throughout modern fishing history, two species stand out as the most heavily fished by DWFNs: Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma), each accounting for more than 20 million t of accumulated catch. Other important stocks are sardines and hakes. Cephalopods, true mackerels, flatfishes, grenadiers, billfishes, and crabs also rank prominently among the fishery resources sought by DWFs. Table 2. Main fishery resources pursued by DWFNs (cumulative catch 1950-1994) Species Catch 1950-94 (t xlO3) Notes Tunas 32,096 38% Skipjack, 29% yellowfin Horse mackerels 31.779 65% Chilean and Cape horse mackerels Sardines etc. 23.502 77% Sardines (59% European pilchard), 18% herrings (74% Atlantic herring) Cods 23,152 91% Atlantic cod Hakes 21,290 53% Cape hakes, 19% silver hake, 13% North Pacific hake Walleye pollock 20,620 Cephalopods 14,997 77% Squids (22% Argentine shortfin squid), 14% octopi True mackerels 7,962 92% Atlantic and chub mackerels Flatfishes 3.825 26% Yellowfin sole, 19% Greenland halibut Grenadiers 2,777 59% Blue grenadier Billfishes 2.187 34% Indo-Pacific blue marlin, 23% swordfish Crabs 443 95% Snow and king crabs Source: FAO fishery statistics Geographically, the activities of DWFNs cover the entire globe, from the Antarctic Ocean to the Arctic. However, the catch data of DWFNs show that most of the fishing activity has historically been centred on four main FAO areas: the Central Eastern Adantic (FAO Area 34), the Northwest Adantic (FAO Area 21), the Northeast Pacific (FAO Area 67), and the Southeast Atlantic (FAO Area 47) (Figure 1). Fishing in these four areas represents about 75 per cent of the total historical catches by DWFs as defined here. Fishing in Area 34 was dominated by the USSR and Spain. Fishing by DWFs in Area 21 (mainly for Adantic cod) was dominated by the USSR which took by far the largest catches, although other countries such as Spain, Portugal, Germany, France, Poland, Norway, and the Faeroe Islands also had important catches. For Area 67, most of the catches were walleye pollock and were made mainly by Japan and to a lesser The Footprint of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries Figure 1. Cumulative catches (1950-94) of DWFNs by FAO Statistical Area The Central Eastern Atlantic, the Northwest Atlantic, the Northeast Pacific, and the Southeast Atlantic have been the hardest h i t Map 2. Mauritania and Senegal lie along one of the richest coastal upwelling systems in the world 120 Indeterminate Indian-Atlantic Other* W Indian Atlantic-Antarctic </» CO SW Pacific Q> CO CE Pacific O 2 SW Atlantic CW Pacific SE Pacific SE Atlantic NE Pacific NW Atlantic CE Atlantic 20 30 Catch (t x 10s) Other (*) includes Mediterranean-Black Seas, Pacific-Antarctic, Antarctic intermediate, E Indian, and NE Atlantic areas. Based on FAO Fishery Statistics extent by the USSR and the Republic of Korea. In Area 47, the main DWFN was the USSR, with Spain, Japan, and Poland having also very important catches. • Selected Case Studies of DWFs Map I identifies the seven case studies selected for analysis within the global overview. There are two categories within these case studies: five are reviewed in detail and two are presented briefly as boxed cases. This division reflects both the relevance of each case and the availability of information. • Case Study: DWFs off Mauritania and Senegal ECOSYSTEM Environmental Conditions The coasts of Mauritania and Senegal are situated in the eastern central Atlantic between 15° and 25° N in a very productive area of major upwellings, the Canary Current System. The coasdines of these two countries extend for more than 1,200 kilometres (km) (754 and 531 km respectively; Map 2). The continental shelf in this region is on average 50 km in width. According to Minas et al. (1982; cited by Mann and Lazier, 1991), this region is divided into two major zones by a front that separates North Adantic central water from South Atlantic central water at around Cap Blanc. Map 1. The seven case studies of distant water fleets analysed provide a diverse mixture of situations Case study presented in detail THE COD-LAPSE IN THE GRAND BANKS: An embarrassing failure Case study presented in detail "Boxed" case study NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING: ienewed hopes for successful international coopergtion Case study presented in detail THE NORTH PACIFIC DONUT HOLE: ICELAND: ouccGssTui rescue snd role rev GALAPAGOS ISLANDS Pirate fishing NAMIBIA: Ecological and economic analysis MAURITANIA AND SENEGAL: Mixed success in social and economic development Case study presented in detail "Boxed" case study Case study used for ecological and economic assessment The nutrient-rich water to the south of Cap Blanc is carried northwards well into the Cap Blanc area by the poleward subsurface counter-current of the upwelling region. The region around Cap Blanc and northwards enjoys year-round upwellings, whilst the southern region has upwellings mainly in winter and spring. The result of this combination of oceanographic features gives the area around Cap Blanc the highest primary productivity in western Africa (about 730 grams per square centimetre per year (g cm2 y"') or 2 grams per square centimetre per day (g cm'2 d'1) on average) because upwelling is from nutrient-rich South Atlantic central water and occurs year-round. The northern region's primary production is lower as North Atlantic central water is poorer in nutrients and to the south, upwelling is seasonal. Food Chain In general, phytoplankton blooms occur in upwelling systems during the slack between upwelling events, when stratification occurs allowing phytoplankton to remain and thrive in the shallow nutrient-rich layers of water (Mann and Lazier, 1991). Strong upwelling in the Mauritania-Senegal area generally tends to carry offshore the abundant zooplankton production that follows phytoplankton blooms (Trumble et al., 1981; cited by Mann and Lazier, 1991). As upwelling intensity weakens towards the autumn, zooplankton remains in the continental shelf and populations attain their peak of abundance (annual mean estimated at 60 g cm'2 y1 wet weight; low and high of 40 and 120 g cm2 y1). This outstanding biological production means that the coast off sub-Saharan Africa is one of the world's most productive regions (during 1986, 2 per cent of the world's marine catch was taken in this area representing about 0.0002 per cent of the world ocean; Goffinet, 1992). Fish production in this system is dominated by pelagic species, mainly sardines (Sardma pilchardus and SardineUa aurita), followed by horse mackerels (Trachurus trachurus and T. trecae) and jacks (Decapterus ronchus); some redfish (Sparidae) are also abundant. The four first species mentioned constituted about 75 per cent of the fish catch in the early 1980s (Trumble et al., 1981; cited by Mann and Lazier, 1991). The two sardine species seem to occupy different parts of the system with Sardina dominating the cooler northern region and SardineUa the warmer southern part. The ranges of these two species are dynamic as seasonal northern migrations are observed with the approach of summer. The Coastal Nations Mauritania is mostly a desert country that suffers from harsh periodic droughts. It is a very poor nation offering limited resources to its nearly 2.3 million inhabitants (CIA, 1997), many of whom are nomadic. Agriculture and mining (iron and copper) were the main economic activities, but protracted droughts and decreased world demand for iron and copper had strong negative impacts on these activities during the 1970s and 1980s. The government thus turned to the rich marine stocks as the main source of foreign currency and income. The declaration of the EEZ regime in 1979 was the first step of a new fisheries policy that set the stage for a more successful control over fishery resources. This policy required all foreign companies to establish joint ventures (with 51 per cent Mauritanian ownership), to land their catches in the port of Nouadhibou or have them inspected at sea, to construct fish processing facilities at Nouadhibou, and to employ at least five Mauritanians per vessel...This focus on fisheries provided clear initial benefits, but declines in the fishery sector were evident by the early 1990s (Maus, 1997). This decline was mainly caused by the deterioration of the industrial national fleet in the late 1980s. New policies adopted during this period encouraged expansion of the artisanal fisheries aimed at trying to solve pressing problems of unemployment and increased urban immigration, and the slowdown in fishing activity. The growth of the artisanal fisheries sector has been outstanding in the last few years. An estimated 93 per cent of the entire fleet was motorized by 1993 and the share of the valuable octopus production of this sector increased to about 20 per cent in 1992. However, a large part of this growth is at least partially due to the influx of Senegalese artisanal fishermen using pirogues (Maus, 1997). Thus, the aims of solving unemployment and developing a truly Mauritanian fishing capacity probably have not been fully met. Nouadhibou, the oldest deep water port in Mauritania, has been in operation since 1919. A new deep water port off Nouakchott opened in 1986. Although these two ports concentrate all of the industrial fleet and about 56 per cent and 26 per cent of the artisanal fleet respectively, there are approximately 23 different landing sites for artisanal vessels along the Mauritanian coast (Maus, 1997). In comparison with Mauritania, Senegal is a more densely populated country (9 million in 1996) and has more abundant water resources. Agriculture (peanuts and grains) and phosphate mining were the main economic activities until the 1980s. With the downturn in world markets for peanuts and phosphates, fish became Senegal's main source of foreign exchange with seafood exports accounting for nearly 25 per cent (US$15 million) of this country's total export earnings (Goffinet, 1992). Senegal has a very long tradition of skilful artisanal fishermen unparalleled in western Africa. This capacity to take advantage of their rich natural marine fauna has meant that Senegalese artisanal fisheries account for most of the total catch in their EEZ, limiting the activity of DWFs to a minor role (Goffinet, 1992). Most of the total annual fishery catches of Senegal (about 350,000 t) are caught by artisanal vessels. Dakar is the only industrial port, but there are approximately 200 landing sites for small-scale vessels along the Senegalese coast (Samba, 1994a). After centuries of using sail-powered pirogues, Senegalese fishermen started motorizing their fleet in the early 1970s: in 1971 49 per cent was motorized and by 1976 this reached 73 per cent. Presendy almost 100 per cent of the pirogues are motorized (Gerlotto et al., 1979; Kebe, 1994). This development, together with the successful introduction of purse seines for these pirogues initiated a steep expansion of the pelagic artisanal fishing sector and concurrent increases in the overall catches. The industrial fishing sector of Senegal relied mostly on shrimp and flatfish stocks in the late 1960s, but declines in shrimp stocks in the late 1970s and most of the 1980s inspired the diversification of demersal catches. A suite of favourable conditions is responsible for the successful growth of Senegalese artisanal fisheries in the last 30 years. Among these, Kebe (1994) mentions: improvements in the pirogue (motorization and cold storage capacity); introduction of purse seines, introduction and improvement of cuttlefish traps, improvements in bottom longlines, etc.; adaptability to changes and dynamism of the fishermen; favourable conditions with strong local and external demand for fishery products; and adequate incentive and aid policies from the government. Impac ts : A Global O v e r v i e w THE DWF NATIONS The poor monitoring and enforcement capabilities of these two west African countries allowed several DWFs to fish unchecked for many years in this area, especially before 1977. The USSR, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Norway, Greece, Poland, Romania, Portugal, and Bulgaria were among the main fishing nations catching fish during the pre-EEZ period in the region. In fact, the USSR, Spain, and Japan were known to fish off Mauritania since the early 1960s (Maus, 1997). At least a dozen nations are suspected to have exploited fish stocks in the region, but since the establishment of the EEZ regime, many nations have signed fishing agreements or pursued joint ventures with Mauritania and Senegal. Still, monitoring and compliance remains an important problem. Table 3 lists the countries reporting catches off Mauritania and Senegal to the Commission for Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries (CECAF) since 1972, together with the importance of their fishing operations. A total of 32 countries is included, however; it is worth noting that many countries seemed to have stopped fishing in the region more than 10 years ago (Norway, Poland, Egypt, Iceland, Libya, and France). Other nations have started fishing operations only in the last decade (Belize, China, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Vanuatu). Several of the small nations included in the list are well known flag-of-convenience countries. Nations and groups of nations fishing under agreements in this region presently or in the recent past are: Nigeria, the European Union (EU), Japan, and Ukraine. The joint- 23 • Table 3. The DWFNs known to have fished off Mauritania and Senegal Data include Mauri tania and Senegal for comparison. Countries w i th mean landings less than 1,0001 have been combined. DWFN Period fishing Catch (t x 103) Total Mean USSR 1972-1991 17,856 893 Senegal 1972-1995 5,731 239 Russian Fed. 1992-1995 703 176 Ukraine 1992-1995 656 164 Spain 1972-1995 3,232 141 Norway 1972-1975 467 117 Poland 1972-1981 692 69 Latvia 1992-1995 273 68 Romania 1972-1993 1.470 67 Lithuania 1992-1994 180 60 Estonia 1992-1993 96 48 Germany 1972-1990 532 30 Italy 1972-1995 687 29 Japan 1972-1991 513 26 Korea Rep. 1977-1995 274 25 Bulgaria 1972-1992 314 22 Georgia 1992-1995 88 22 Greece 1972-1995 396 16 Mauritania 1972-1995 327 14 Egypt 1972-1977 69 12 Iceland 1975 11 11 China 1990-1995 48 8 Portugal 1972-1974/1986-1995 101 8 Honduras 1986-1995 47 5 C6te d'lvoire 1972-1995 97 4 Libya 1980-1988 28 3 Cuba 1972-1995 58 2 Panama 1984-1995 21 2 St Vincent 1988-1993 5 1 Others 1973-1995 17.548 2,078 Source: CECAF Fishery Statistics venture fishing scheme promoted by Mauritania since 1979 has resulted in partnerships with the following countries: Algeria, China, France, Libya, Romania (ceased early 1993), Russia, the Republic of Korea, and Tunisia. The main DWFs fishing off Senegal are the eastern European pelagic fish fleets and the demersal fish fleets of the EU (Samba, 1994a). THE FISHERY RESOURCES AND FISHING SECTORS The waters off sub-Saharan Africa are favoured with diverse and very abundant fishery stocks, being one of the most productive marine ecosystems in the world. The total reported catch of all species for the northwest Africa upwelling system in 1974 was 2.68 million t (Ansa-Emmin, 1982; cited by Mann and Laziei; 1991). One million t were clupeids, with 0.67 million t of these being sardines. Half a million t were horse mackerel and 0.2 million t were squid. A dozen industrialized countries led by the USSR took most of the catches. The USSR caught 287,000 t of sardines, 55,000 t of sardinellas, 360,000 t of horse mackerel, and almost 200,000 t of true mackerel (Scomber spp.). Fisheries production in the region has not grown since then, indicating perhaps that the sustainability of the fisheries has already been achieved or surpassed. In general terms, fisheries production in Area 34 (from Morocco to Congo), has averaged about 2.8 million t for the last 20 years (Figure 2). However, there have been substantial fluctuations over this period principally attributable to variations in the catch of sardines and jack mackerels. Sardine production attained an all time peak of 2.2 million t in 1990 then dropped to 1.5 million t by 1995. Meanwhile, jack mackerel catches have shown an overall decrease from the circa 0.5 million t/y level of the 1970s to about 300,000 t in 1995. These reductions in catch might be more linked to decreases in effort in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the ensuing disarray of its former fishing fleet, rather than to decreases in fish abundance. Figure 2. Sardines account for the majority of the catches in the Western Central Atlantic -FAO Area 34 (All catches are in t x 103, except sardines (tx 104)) According to Resources Development Associates (1985; cited in Goffinet, 1992), cephalopod and sardine stocks in the western African area had been overexploited since the early 1980s, while sardinellas, mackerels, and sea breams were classified as "possibly fully exploited". Russian research suggests that the size and structure of the spawning populations of horse mackerels have remained unchanged over the last 10 years (Sedletskaya, 1995). Sutinen et al. (1980; cited in Goffinet, 1992) give tentative estimates obtained in the late 1970s of sustainable yields for the fisheries off northwest Africa. Reportedly, the potentials were of about 1 million t of sardine, 0.5 million t of « • • — Sardines It xlD f l) JackmackBrels True mackerels Tuna - - - RedFish Squid . — - Flatfish, cod & hake The Footprint of sardinella, 0.2 million t of mackerel, and 0.4 million t of demersal fishes (sea breams, Distant Water Fleets hake, croakers). The abundance of very valuable stocks of octopus off the coasts of on World Fisheries Mauritania and Senegal has been linked, to a certain extent, to changes in the community structure as a result of fishing activity (Pereiro and Bravo de Laguna, 1980 and Gulland and Garcia, 1984; cited in Caveriviere, 1994). This seems to be particularly true for the surprising increase in the abundance of octopus off the southern coast of Senegal starting in 1986, which prompted the development of a new fishery with artisanal as well as industrial vessels. The decrease in abundance of sparids and serranids in these areas has been proposed as one of the mechanisms to explain the increased recruitment in octopus populations (Caveriviere, 1994). Most of the DWFs fishing in sub-Saharan Africa can be classified in three groups. Those fishing mainly for small and medium pelagic fish (sardines, sardinellas, jack mackerels, etc.) were mainly the Soviet-bloc DWFs and their descendants. Those fishing for demersal fish and shellfish were mainly European nations, while cephalopods were pursued chiefly by Asian nations such as the Republic of Korea, China, and Japan, along with some European countries. DWF trawlers fishing in the south of Senegal catch mainly cuttlefish, octopus, and Sparidae (Thiam and Gascuel, 1994). The DWFs of the EU (mosdy Spanish) fish mainly hake and shrimp, although some vessels fish for lobster and tuna (Maus, 1997). According to Maus (1997) the main species in Mauritania are: (1) demersal species: cephalopods such as octopus (Octopus vulgaris), squid (Loligo spp.), and cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis hierredda), hakes (Merluccius merluccius, M. senegalensis, and M. polli), prawns (Parapenaeus longirostris), rubber-lip grunt (Plectorhynchus mediterraneus), canary dentex (Dentex canariensis), burro (Pamadasys incisus), smooth hound (Mustelus mustelus), barbelled houndshark (Leptocharias smithii), and spiny lobster (Panulirus regius); (2) small pelagics: European sardine (Sardina pilchardus), Spanish sardine (Sardinella aurita), Madeiran sardinella (S. maderensis), Adantic horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus), Cunene horse mackerel (Trachurus trecae), bluefish (Pomatomus saltator), mullet (Mugil spp.), and false scad (Decapterus ronchus); (3) tunids: yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares), bigeye tuna (T. obesus), skipjack (Euthynnus pelamis), West African Spanish mackerel (Scomberomorus tritor), Adantic bonito (Sarda sarda), and Atlantic little tuna (Euthynnus quadripunctatus). There are three distinctive fishing sectors in Mauritania (Maus, 1997): the artisanal fishermen, the industrialized "local" fishermen (which can be further split into national and joint-venture components), and the DWFs. The artisanal fisheries target mainly octopus, burro, grunt, dentex, smooth hound and hound shark, spiny lobster, bluefish, mullet, Spanish mackerel, bonito, and little tuna. The industrialized local fleets target mainly cephalopods, but also some demersal fishes, lobsters, and some pelagic fishes. In Senegal, artisanal fishermen are by large the most important sector accounting for more than two-thirds of the total catches of the country (Samba, 1994a). Pelagic pirogues comprise the largest part of the Senegalese fisheries production, landing more than 50 per cent of the total catches in 1991. Pelagic fishes (mosdy clupeids, with some carangids and scombrids) account for about 80 per cent of the total artisanal catch. Demersal fisheries in Senegal used to concentrate on high-value species such as shrimps and soles, but H 26 reductions in shrimp stocks induced a diversification of this sector. More recendy, fish such as Pagellus, Arius, and Pseudolithus account for most of the demersal catches (Samba, 1994a). The artisanal pirogues of Senegal catch a wide range of species depending on the type of gear they use. Samba (1994a) lists about 25 major species for the pelagic pirogues and 22 for the demersal pirogues. Among the most important species reported in artisanal fisheries by Gerlotto et al. (1979) are: Sardinella spp., Cybium tritor, Caranx ronchus, Pomadasys spp., Sphyraena spp., Euthynnus alleteratus, Ethmalosa fimbriata, Arius spp., Brachydeuterus auritus, sharks and rays, soles, and others. More recently, Octopus vulgaris has become a very important species for the Senegalese artisanal sector (Caveriviere, 1994). According to Thiam and Gascuel (1994), the trawl fleet catches and lands at least 70 different species. The most important in weight for the Dakar-based trawlers are: Pseudolithus, Arius, Galeoides decadactylus, Sparidae, cutdefish, and octopus. In A Global Ov HISTORICAL CATCHES Catches of the Coastal Nations The fisheries of Mauritania were minor before 1970 (10,000-20,000 t/y) when increasing but unstable landings were recorded. However, the real growth of Mauritanian fisheries took place between 1980 and 1985. Statistics from FAO indicate a peak of landings in 1985 with 95,0001, and relatively stable landings fluctuating around 85,000 t/y since then (Figure 3). In contrast, the evolution of fisheries in Senegal shows a better performance. With the exception of the years 1994 and 1995, Senegalese catches have generally maintained a trend of growth since very early in the statistical record, with maximum growth during the early 1970s. Landings of Senegal currently attain some 320,000 t/y. Figure 3. Senegalese fishermen have capitalized more successfully on their rich fishery resources than their Mauritanian counterpart The bulk of Mauritanian landings is composed primarily of squids, redfishes, and sardines; unfortunately a large proportion of the landings of this country are masked under the term "various fishes" (Table 4). It is evident that despite the relatively large coast of the country, Mauritania does not utilize much of the very abundant pelagic stocks found in and just outside its EEZ, such as sardines and horse mackerels. In general, the participation of Mauritania in the exploitation of its fishery stocks continues to be very limited. While some reports quote the potential of Mauritania's Table 4. Marine Catches of Mauritania for the years 1950-1995 Species Mean catch (t) Maximum catch (t) Year of maximum 55,344 1993 21,840 1989 33.859 1984 17,400 1971 2,020 1989 4,030 1979 2.718 1982 564 1981 686 1981 921 1987 Table 5. Marine Catches of Senegal for the years 1950-1995 Species Mean catch (t) Maximum catch (t) Year of maximum Sardines 72,204 228,508 1993 Redfishes 26,248 60,730 1985 Horse mackerels 16,777 38.183 1978 Various fishes 16,091 42.050 1975 Octopus and squid 3,074 20,217 1991 Flatfishes 2,825 11,857 1994 Conchs etc. 2,645 10,000 1980 Sharks 2,126 7.477 1995 Shrimps 3.231 12.703 1989 Tunas 2,707 12,402 1985 Tilapias 7,483 19,215 1975 Mackerels 1.262 8,000 1987 Clams and Cockles 20 926 1995 Molluscs 6 267 1995 Oysters 115 600 1963 Crabs 99 520 1994 Lobsters 116 787 1994 Aquatic plants 33 360 1975 Cods and Hakes 3 33 1993 Crustaceans 5 108 1974 fishery resources to be around 930,0001 per annum, only about 90,000 t or slightly less than 10 per cent is caught by the national fleet (Anon., 1996a). Senegal capitalizes to a greater extent on its availability of large fishery resources. The fisheries of Senegal are driven by sardine catches, which account for almost two-thirds of the total (Table 5) and peaked in 1993 at almost 230,000 t. Other significant stocks in order of importance include redfishes, horse mackerels, squids, shrimps, tunas, and flatfishes. CATCHES OF THE DWFs It is very difficult to provide reliable historical catch statistics for DWFNs fishing off the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal. The most detailed geographical references used by FAO for purposes of reporting fishery catches (FAO Statistical Areas) do not provide enough geographical detail to pinpoint catches off Mauritania and Senegal since 1950. CECAF reports data starting only in 1972. The best we can do to provide figures for the 1950-1971 period is to speculate around the figures reported for the Central Eastern Atlantic (FAO Area 34) using available knowledge of the distribution of fishery resources within this area and ancillary information from the fishing operations of the DWF. A first approximation of the total catches of DWFNs off the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal can be made by subtracting the catches of all west African coastal states. After this, the catches of tunas and tuna-like fishes are estimated from the totals of Area 34 by pro-rating the catches of each species each year, according to the approximate proportion of each species that has been traditionally fished in Mauritanian or Senegalese waters. The maps of catches of tuna and related species by geographical grid reported by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT, 1997) were used for this task. The results (Figure 4) show that high exploitation in the region started in1967 and reached a first peak of just over 2 million t in 1971. Catches decreased sharply in 1978 with the establishment of the EEZ regime, and bounced back in 1980. The period 1988-1991 again saw catches around 2 million t but fisheries production declined greatly after 1991 mainly due to political change in the ex-Soviet world, which before its collapse took the lion's share of the catches and accounted for over 50 per cent of all DWF catches over the same period. I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the extremely disproportionate share of the total catches between coastal and DWF nations. Although there is a very slight trend of increased share of the fishery resources by the coastal nations, for over 45 years about 80 per cent of the total catch has been taken by the DWFs leaving only about 20 per cent to the coastal nations. Figure 4. DWFNs took peak catches of almost 2 million tonnes off the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal (FAO Area 34) 29 • Others Senegal Mauritania Spain USSR/ Russia Pre-1971 estimated DWF catches The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies Figure 5. DWFNs take the largest proportion of the catches in northwest Africa, fishing about 6.25 times more than the coastal nations FLEET CHARACTERISTICS AND NUMBERS There is little easily accessible information on numbers of vessels fishing off Mauritania and Senegal, especially historical data. Most of the information available is scanty and dispersed. However, two things seem to come out from this information: foreign fleets have always been more important off Mauritania than off Senegal and, with time, the DWFs fishing off Mauritania seem to have either increased in number or at least remained more or less constant. Brulhet (1976) provides some figures for the fleets fishing off Mauritania in the mid-1970s before declaration of the EEZ regime. According to his report, there were three Mauritanian purse-seiners of 62 t and about 40 purse-seiners from the Canary Islands (maximum of 201) in operation. Norway had two large oceanic seiners and a factory ship supplied by about 15 catching vessels. Another large factory ship from the Netherlands was supplied by some 20 South African catchers under Dutch flag. Japan had 23 trawlers of 100-293 t fishing mainly for cephalopods which were iced and delivered at Nouadhibou. In addition, 30 large freezer trawlers from Japan were fishing for cephalopods but did not land their product in Mauritania. The USSR had 25 trawlers using ice, all of 273 t, also fishing mainly for octopus, some squid, and cuttlefish. Kuwait had four old shrimp freezer trawlers of 1601 fishing for octopus. Algeria had four trawlers of 62 t and Spain two smaller trawlers. There were also five French vessels fishing for lobster which landed their catches in Nouadhibou to be air-shipped to Europe. An unknown number of Spanish oceanic tuna freezers were also fishing in the area. Brulhet adds that while some 60 industrial vessels were based at Nouadhibou during those years, more that 100 larger vessels fished with licences off Mauritania without ever landing fish in Nouadhibou. These reports amount to a total of some 175-200 vessels with an installed fishing capacity of more than 20,000 t (not considering the factory vessels of Norway and the Netherlands). • 30 Beaudry et al. (1993) report 65 vessels fishing in Mauritanian waters under joint-venture schemes in 1991. Before its disintegration, the USSR operated with fleets of 30-40 large stern factory trawlers managed by a commander with headquarters in a large mother ship which received and processed catch from the trawlers, then passed it to refrigerated carriers that took fish to home ports. More recently, Russia and Romania had "Super-Atlantic" freezer vessels of circa 80-100 metres (m) length specializing in pelagic fish. Libyan and Algerian joint ventures with Mauritania use refrigerator vessels fishing for demersal (deep-sea) fish and cephalopods (chiefly squid). By 1993, the Mauritanian industrial fishing fleet totalled 263 vessels (Beaudry et al., 1993). Of these, 149 had fishing permits, 106 were freezers, and 43 had refrigerators. The remaining 114 vessels were chartered (70 with freezers, 44 with refrigerators). Ismail (1992; cited in Maus, 1997) reports chronic problems of old age and poor maintenance that led to high operating costs in the Mauritanian industrial fishing fleet. Of the 327 vessels operating in 1992, 165 were national, 74 joint-venture, and 88 EU and Japanese, but only 250 of them were fishing. Up to 38 of the national vessels were permanently out of operation (22 freezer and 16 ice box). Most of the national and joint-venture vessels in Mauritania are Chinese made and chartered to national companies. I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w The small-scale fishing sector has been consciously promoted by the Mauritanian government since the early 1990s and it is currently the fastest growing fisheries sector (Maus, 1997). The aims of the government are to promote employment, national food production, currency generation, and distribution of wealth. The small-scale fleets operate out of Nouadhibou (56 per cent) and Nouakchott (26 per cent) and by 1995 comprised some 1,800 boats, 96 per cent of which were motorized. This compares to only about 60 Senegalese pirogues operating out of Nouadhibou in the mid-1970s (Brulhet, 1976). The rapid growth of this sector in the 1990s is mainly attributable to an increase in participation of Senegalese pirogue fishermen and the establishment of an aluminium boat-building facility in Nouadhibou. By 1993, nearly 6,000 people were employed by the small-scale fishing sector while only about 1,500 took part in the industrial fishing sector (CNROR 1995; cited in Maus, 1997). There are very few statistics about the number of foreign vessels fishing in Senegal. It is known that shrimp trawlers as well as groundfish trawlers - both with freezing capabilities - were fishing in Senegal in the 1980s. Thiam and Gascuel (1994) report between 8 and 17 of these vessels in the period 1979-1982, and 6 to 12 in 1983-1990, with this number increasing after 1990. Since 1986, some large Korean trawlers with freezing capabilities have fished off Senegal, mainly for octopus (Thiam and Gascuel, 1994). In Senegal, the predominant artisanal fishing sector is composed of pelagic and demersal pirogues, the former fishing with purse seines, encircling nets, and beach seines, and the latter with bottom longlines, traps, jigging hooks, and setnets (Kebe, 1994; Caveriviere, 1994; Samba, 1994a). There is also a smaller industrial sector mainly composed of bottom trawl vessels and some small sardine seiners. The number of artisanal fishing vessels in 1977 was 2,400 pirogues with motor and 600 with sail, employing a total of about 25,000 artisanal fishermen (Gerlotto et al., 1979). Data presented in Table 6 (Samba, 1994a) indicate that while some 3,900 pirogues were recorded in 1960, their numbers had increased to nearly 4,500 in 1970, 8,500 in 1980, and reached 10,900 in 1991. Reportedly, some 7,000 of these are motorized, but this information seems at odds with reports from Kebe (1994) stating that 100 per cent of the artisanal fleet is motorized. Meanwhile, the number of fishermen involved in the 311 The Footprint of Table 6. Number of fishing vessels by type and subtype in Senegal Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries Year Pirogues Trawlers Sardine seiners with oars with motor based non-based local foreign 1960 3,900 11 1961 3,900 20 1962 3,100 26 1963 5,500 23 1964 5,500 33 1 1965 5,400 36 1 1966 4,600 39 2 1967 4,400 34 1968 5,100 38 1969 4,400 1970 2,451 1,995 68 4 4 1 1971 2,715 2,578 69 14 4 1972 2,408 3,209 67 25 3 2 1973 2,369 3,561 68 24 12 0 1974 2,255 4,187 64 23 13 0 1975 2,000 4,041 71 19 11 0 1976 2.257 3,743 76 4 12 0 1977 3,593 3,263 82 85 9 0 1978 3,796 3,957 88 91 8 0 1979 3,986 4,631 99 85 13 0 1980 3,869 4,616 103 89 17 0 1981 4.180 4,931 110 65 14 0 1982 4,327 4,774 128 58 19 0 1983 3,226 5,300 140 28 20 0 1984 3.904 5,138 133 30 12 0 1985 1,445 3,640 142 43 8 0 1986 2,813 4,808 136 43 5 0 1987 2,731 5,830 144 43 3 0 1988 2,413 6,210 137 80 5 0 1989 3,580 6,425 139 81 9 0 1990 3.889 6.522 121 78 9 0 1991 3.920 6,979 131 60 8 8 Source: Samba, 1994 artisanal sector grew from 25,000 in 1966 to 32,000 in the early 1990s (Kebe, 1994). In total, over 100,000 people are employed in the fisheries sector in Senegal (Goffinet, 1992), although it is not clear if this includes only direct employment in fishing or added-value activities such as processing and services. The industrial fleet grew at a slower, but still rapid, rate during this period, from 20 trawlers and a single sardine fishing vessel in 1961, to 72 and 5 respectively in 1970, 192 and 17 in 1980, and slightly decreased to 191 and 16 in 1991 (Samba, 1994a; • 32 Thiam and Gascuel, 1994). Trawlers are of diverse types, some with freezers others with ice boxes. Since 1985, the number of vessels with freezer has surpassed ice-box vessels, and in 1991 about 100 freezers and 50 ice-box vessels were recorded (Thiam and Gascuel, 1994). Foreign high-seas tuna and sardine vessels fishing out of the Senegalese coast are not considered in this table. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT BY COASTAL STATES There is little information available about specific fishery regulations in Mauritania. A system of closed areas and seasons is in place but it is unknown if total allowable catches (TACs) are set for the different stocks. According to Maus (1997), catch limitation for the industrial fisheries is set through controls on effort (maximum length of trips for pelagic fisheries is 40 days and for demersal fisheries 60 days). Each type of industrial fishery has to follow particular specifications on allowed fishing areas, targeted species, legal sizes, bycatch levels, gear types, mesh sizes, engine power, etc. All demersal catches (except those from EU vessels) must be landed in Mauritania; pelagic catches are transhipped under the supervision of Mauritanian customs officers. Other requirements are that bycatch from demersal vessels should not exceed 10 per cent and only 3 per cent for pelagic fisheries, crews must be 80 per cent Mauritanian in joint-venture vessels and 35 per cent on foreign chartered vessels. For joint-venture fisheries, at least 35 per cent of the turnover in the case of cephalopod/demersal fisheries and 33 per cent in the case of small pelagic fisheries, must go to the Mauritanian partners. Observers should be allowed in all fishing vessels. The DWF and industrial sectors of Mauritania are controlled through licensing. The artisanal fleet, although not controlled through a licence system, has to follow area and season restrictions. Artisanal fleets have no restriction on which species they can target, but cannot use trawl nets and cannot have freezing facilities on board (Maus, 1997). There are conflicting reports about some of the management policies. While Maus (1997) reports that until 1995 the costs of fishing licences in Mauritania were negligible (only administrative charges), Kaczynski (1989) reports on DWF (not joint-venture) vessels having to pay licence fees that are set according to the vessel's gross registered tonnes (GRT). What is clear, is that the main source of fisheries revenue in Mauritania is through export taxes. These are set according to the commercial value of the processed products and vary from 6.5 per cent to 17 per cent (Kaczynski, 1989). This strategy, combined with compulsory landing of most of the catch and inspection of transhipped catches is the basis of the Mauritanian fisheries policy. Senegal has a system of zoning to allocate exclusive fishing rights to the different sectors involved in the industry. The "Grande Cote" north of Dakar and the region of Casamance have a 6 nautical mile-wide zone from the shoreline set exclusively for artisanal boats (pirogues) where industrial vessels are prohibited. This zone is 7 miles wide in the "Petite C6te" south of Dakar (Diallo, 1994). The Centre of Oceanographic Research of Dakar-Thiaroye has collected fishery data since the early 1970s (Ferraris et al., 1994). The few available reports on stock assessment indicate that trawl survey estimates of total exploitable biomass for demersal fish in 1974 were of 266,0001 between Cape Timiris and Cape Roxo (Samba, 1994b). Further research indicated reductions in the biomass from 173,000 t in 1983 to 81,000 t in 1991. Acoustic surveys for pelagic fish are very variable and indicate biomasses of 1,600,000 t in 1974 and 755,000 t in 1980 (Freon and Lopez, 1983; cited by Samba, 1994b). More recent acoustic survey estimates average about 588,000 t for the period 1983-1988 (Marchal, 1991; cited by Samba, 1994b). frhe Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d F isher ies BYCATCH There is almost no information available on bycatch and discard for the fisheries of Mauritania and Senegal. However, some reports indicate that bycatch in squid and shrimp fisheries can be five times larger than the targeted species (Kaczynski, 1989). Mauritanian fishing regulations stipulate that bycatch should not exceed 10 per cent and 3 per cent in demersal and pelagic fisheries respectively (Maus, 1997). The Senegalese shrimp trawlers had discard rates of 75 per cent in the early 1980s (Monoyer, 1980; cited in Thiam and Gascuel, 1994), mainly from small bottom fishes. Caveriviere and Rabarison (1988; cited in Thiam and Gascuel, 1994) report discard rates of 68 per cent and 71 per cent in cold and warm seasons respectively for Senegalese shrimp trawlers. According to Lamourex (1985; cited in Thiam and Gascuel, 1994) during 1983 foreign trawl vessels in Senegal had discard rates (mainly Balistes, gastropods, and rays) of 69-73 per cent (shrimp boats) and 52-56 per cent (groundfish boats). The discards were of adults of non-commercial species as well as of juveniles of species of importance to the Senegalese artisanal and industrial sectors. 134 FISHING AGREEMENTS Nigeria had fishing agreements with Mauritania and Senegal in the mid-1980s (Fadayomi, 1987). Furthermore, Mauritania and Senegal have bilateral fishing agreements with each other and Senegalese pirogue fishermen are known historically to fish in Mauritanian waters. According to Beaudry et al. (1993), Mauritania signed agreements between 1987 and 1992 with the EU and Japan (only minor Japanese catches were taken during this period). An agreement with Ukraine was signed in 1993. A renewed agreement with the EU for August 1993-July 1996 allowed some 100 EU-flagged ships to fish in Mauritania. The terms of this latter agreement stipulated quotas for crustaceans (10,000 t/month annual average), black hake (15,000 t/month annual average), and pelagic trawlers and seiners (9,000 t/month annual average). The EU agreement included provisions stipulating legal mesh sizes, gear restrictions for lobster fishing, catch reporting, and employment of 25 per cent Mauritanian crews. Further fishing agreements were recently signed between the EU and Mauritania for the period 1996-2001, and between the EU and Senegal for 1997-2001. BENEFITS The benefits of granting fishing rights to DWFs can be of various kinds. The most obvious is direct cash revenue and foreign currency acquisition, but additional benefits can occur in the form of training, infrastructure (processing plants, ship yards, patrol vessels, etc.), and development of local fishing capacity. While it is difficult to assess the real economic benefits of DWFs in sub-Saharan Africa because of limited information, it seems that at least in the case of Mauritania, there have been clear benefits but these seem to have fallen short of their full potential (see principal-agent discussion in chapter 6 of this report). Because of structural and cultural differences, Mauritania has a larger and more complex interaction with DWFs than Senegal. The latter is much less dependent on DWFs to realize benefits from its fishery resources which are largely exploited by its own very strong artisanal sector. Mauritania has only half-heartedly tried to develop its own fishery Table 7. Estimated proportion of fishery catches taken by each fleet out of each country's EEZ Year Mauritania DWFs Senegal DWFs 1972 0.051 0.949 0.312 0.688 1973 0.039 0.961 0.572 0.428 1974 0.016 0.984 0.671 0.329 1975 0.011 0.989 0.762 0.238 1976 0.009 0.991 0.970 0.030 1977 0.012 0.988 0.770 0.230 1978 0.028 0.972 0.623 0.377 1979 0.028 0.972 0.704 0.296 1980 0.014 0.986 0.622 0.378 1981 0.039 0.961 0.618 0.382 1982 0.017 0.983 0.612 0.388 1983 0.025 0.975 0.806 0.194 1984 0.041 0.959 0.972 0.028 1985 0.040 0.960 0.788 0.212 1986 0.031 0.969 0.759 0.241 1987 0.024 0.976 0.717 0.283 1988 0.016 0.984 0.709 0.291 1989 0.014 0.986 0.778 0.222 1990 0.014 0.986 0.661 0.339 1991 0.018 0.982 0.676 0.324 1992 0.031 0.969 0.688 0.312 1993 0.038 0.962 0.849 0.151 1994 0.047 0.953 0.941 0.059 1995 0.035 0.965 0.956 0.044 sector and relies heavily but inefficiently on DWFs to exploit its fisheries. Table 7 illustrates how Senegal has consistently kept control over its fishery stocks by developing its artisanal and industrial fleets, while Mauritania has virtually remained with the same share of its own fishery resources throughout the last 25 years. Thus, Mauritania has not benefited from DWFs in terms of developing its independent fishing capacity. Economic benefits have certainly been obtained through Mauritania's government-led open policy for foreign investment (encouragement of joint ventures with at least 51 per cent local capital). This policy brought initial tangible benefits to the nation as fisheries grew at an annual rate of 28 per cent during the period 1980-1986 to become the most important sector in the economy. By 1988 the rent from fisheries attained US$308 million and constituted 68 per cent of the total foreign income (Maus, 1997). Despite some success, there continued to be problems of surveillance whilst illegal fishing still accounted for about 50 per cent of the total catches (see next section). During 1991 the fisheries sector shrank to US$236 million, but continued to account for about 20 per cent of foreign revenues. Currently, fish processing is one of the main industries in Mauritania. DWFs have usually agreed to land at least part of their catch in Mauritania, but at least in the early years, large quantities of fish never made it to the mainland. Brulhet (1976) reports Dutch and Norwegian vessels in the mid-1970s The Foo tp r in t of transhipping part of their catches of pelagic fishes and landing another part in the port Dis tan t Wa te r Fleets of Nouadhibou. The Mauritanian system of taxation and licensing as a way t o harness on W o r l d F isher ies revenues from fishery resources seems to be favoured and praised by Cunningham et al. (1995) and Maus (1997), but is seen with scepticism by other authors such as Kaczynski (1989) and Gofiinet (1992) (see next section). Aid programme assistance has been given to Mauritania's fishing sector by France, Germany, Japan, and Spain, as well as from the African Development Fund, European Development Fund, Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, and the World Bank. These resources have been used to develop local fisheries and coastal surveillance programmes, and to promote traditional fishing development (Beaudry et al., 1993). During 1994, Germany agreed to aid Mauritania with US$4.4 million to support surveillance, monitoring, and control of fisheries (Anon., 1996a). There is little information about licensing, and about any benefits accrued from DWF operations in Senegal. Goffinet (1992) observes that United States and Canadian aid has been granted to the Senegalese navy in order to reinforce its surveillance and monitoring capabilities. CONFLICTS Having one of the most productive fishing regions in the world off an underdeveloped coast poses serious problems for management. These problems range from poor or non-existent knowledge of the biological potential of the stocks, to lack of capability to set adequate management policies, and inability to implement monitoring and surveillance effectively. In this region of the world, very frequently the limited regulations that exist to control fisheries are not adequately enforced (Goffinet, 1992). Under-reporting and illegal fishing have been old problems for Mauritania and Senegal and many vessels are still suspected to be fishing illegally (Anon., 1996a). The most obvious consequence of this problem is loss of revenue through taxes and licence fees, but longer-term concerns are overfishing and the lack of accurate statistics to assess the levels of exploitation of the stocks. In Mauritania, a joint-venture policy failed during the 1970s as there was widespread under-reporting of catches because of poor inspection systems, Mauritanian crews were paid to stay on shore, and most of the foreign companies failed to process their catches on shore preferring instead to tranship at sea and transport them to foreign ports (Maus, 1997). The very limited surveillance and enforcement capability of Mauritania has allowed widespread overfishing (Beaudry et al., 1993). Industrial fishing vessels continuously violate areas reserved for small-scale fisheries and when fines are imposed these are not always paid by violators (from 1988 to 1992 only US$3 million of fines were paid out of a total of US$5 million in violations). 151 As mentioned above, the benefits of DWF activities seem to have fallen short of expectations in this region. According to Kaczynski (1989) the share of the catches between DWFs and local nations in the sub-Saharan region remained practically unchanged between 1977 (90 per cent for DWFs) and 1985 (81 per cent for DWFs). In contrast, a 25 per cent reduction in total catches was observed for the whole of the CECAF area between 1976 and 1985, mainly because of lower catches of the DWFs, increased costs of access, and overexploitation of some commercial stocks by long-range fleets (Kaczynski, 1989). I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w Another problem is that of lost revenue. In Mauritania, Kaczynski (1989) estimates that perhaps some 50 per cent of the fees payable by the total permitted fleet and only 33 per cent of the fees payable by DWF vessels are actually paid to the government. On top of this, taxation on fishery exports, the largest source of income, also falls short of its supposed targets. Kaczynski estimates that in 1983, only about 38 per cent of the expected revenues from fish exports were actually collected by the Mauritanian government. Under-reporting of up to 50 per cent of the total catches by DWF nations is one of the main reasons for the low level of revenue. Poor investment and overcapacity are additional pressing problems. Due to the lack of shipyards in the country, Mauritania promoted the purchase of fishing vessels in the 1980s. However, this has turned into a financial problem as many owners have been unable to pay back loans to the local banking system, causing major losses to the banks. As a consequence, a large part of the fleet is ageing and paralysed. In 1993, more than 50 per cent of the cephalopod fishing fleet was over 15 years old. Large-sized freezer vessels are sub-optimal for the relatively low-volume cephalopod catches so that very frequently they return to port with only 25 per cent of their hold capacity filled after their 40-day allowed trips (Maus, 1997). Although the zoning system of Senegal is supposed to avoid any possible direct interaction between the industrial and artisanal fleets, in practice the illegal fishing of industrial vessels inside the artisanal exclusive zone and the non-regulated fishing of artisanal vessels outside their 6-7 mile zone are known problems in the region (Diallo, 1994). Additionally, the exploitation of mutual stocks by the two fleets leads to indirect competition for the resource and for the corresponding markets. In short, lack of adequate surveillance systems and lack of compliance by the developed nations' DWFs is one of the main factors responsible for the lack of fully realized benefits to the coastal countries in this region. However, due to the prohibitive costs of effective surveillance systems, it seems unlikely that the coastal countries will be able to take full control and obtain fair benefits from their rich fishery stocks without external technical and financial aid. What is needed here is a more involved participation of DWF countries that assumes full responsibility of their role as developed nations trying to do honest business with coastal nations, instead of taking advantage of the difficulties these countries have in managing and surveying their natural resources. On the other hand, the full control of these countries' fisheries will not come only from effective surveillance through (typically) military bodies, but will need improvements in the civilian monitoring, control, management, and policy-making functions (Kaczynski, 1989). Ironically, the above problems are compounded by the relatively good management of fisheries in other parts of the world (i.e. developed countries). Comparatively speaking, more-developed countries are more successful at managing their fishery stocks than less-developed countries. This effectiveness, although beneficial to the more-developed 37 The Footprint of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries nations, usually has the effect of shifting the effort towards overseas fisheries and therefore increasing the pressure on fishery stocks belonging to countries with less effective or absent management systems (Goffinet, 1992). The only solution to the problem of fisheries management in coastal nations allowing DWFs is for the DWFNs to assume a more responsible role. One option for this, proposed by Goffinet (1992) is the internationalization of fisheries management. Map 3. The Galapagos Islands lie more than 1,000 km from Ecuador in the Equatorial Pacific Ocean Boxed Case Study 1. Illegal Fishing in Uie Galapagos Islands Background Tho Gafppagns are a group of volcanic islands situated about I,DSD km off Ecuador in ihe liqualorial Pacific Ocean, TWs 7,0-11 l(m7 archipelagn is a province of Ecuador consisting of IS large and many small islands, Although situated right in ihe equator, the climate and oceanographic regime of tho islands are influenced by cold waters From the Antarctic, thus providing a unique setting for a very diverse marine life. In addition, its isolation from the mainland has allowed terrestrial life to evolve into singular forms. Those islands are heme to 11 subspecies of giant tortoise, the unly marine iguana and flightless cormorant in the world, the only tropica I penguin, and 13 unique finches. Overall, ihe Galapagos are regarded as one of ihe most important places in the wotld for their unique biodiversity and high rate of endemism. For these reasons, in 1959 Ecuador set aside 97 per cent of the land aroa of ihe archipelago as a national park. The islands have also been recognized internationally as a Man and Biosphere Reserve and as a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Furthermore, in 1906 the Galapagos Marine Resources Reserve was established to protect the waters around the archipelago, Conservation Issues Despite the protected status of Ihe Galapagos (stands, they suffer some serious conservation problems, There are severe issues of infestation by exotic land species introduced by man which threaten the local flora and fauna. In addition, because agriculture and fishing are economically important they are often as odds with conservation objectives. Since early this century, the fishery resources of the Galapagos have been under exploitation. First, focal fishermen using oar and sail powered boats caught mainly M^vteropowa o/fexand a suite of serranids, labrids, lutjanids. and canangids (Marian, 19951, and pole and line tuna vessels from the United States fished for yellowfin tuna. A t e World War II. a fish processing plant and up to 3D diesel powered boats 5-1Q m long formed, the "traditional" fishery in the archipelago. During those years, fishing was almost exclusively a localiy owned, industry. In the 1950s and 1970s, four 20-30 ni iarge-capacily ships carrying 12-16 divers arrived from (he mainland to exploit rock lobsters. Foreign boats started buying the catches from the local fishermen, thus creating a lucrative market for afl fishery products. The export of lobster was banned and foreign vessels were prohibited from entering the archipelago in 1974. But the local fishermen remained and the exploding human population of the islands motivated by the tourism industry created conditions for increased fishery exploitation. To make matters worse, scientific investigation in fisheries ceased in 19B1 leaving a void of vital catch statistics {Merlon, 1995), • 38 Recent Problems of I l legal Fishing The last two decades have been characterized by the activities of high-mobility fibreglass boats. Fisheries diversification and lack of control led to all kinds of illegal fishing practices and conflicts between government and fishermen (Merlen, 1995). The trade of shark fins, based exclusively on finning practices, was initiated and stimulated by Asian fishing vessels in earlier decades and is now widespread among local S fishermen. Fishing for sharks within 80 nautical miles from shore was banned in 1989, but the fishing close inshore continued. Lobsters (Panulirus spp.), sea cucumbers (Isostichopus fuscus), and shellfish are also heavily exploited. The government closed the lobster fishery in 1992, but illegal fishing carried on. In the late 1980s, the sea cucumber industry became one of the most important fisheries, causing not only depletion of sea cucumbers in some areas of the ocean floor, but also inducing mangrove cutting in the delicate island ecosystem for preservation of the cucumbers (boiling). This fishery was closed in 1992, but illegal fishing continued. Aitr.n'.igh the Ga'apagos Marina Resources Reserve - declarer! in 15B6 • protects an area more than 15 nautical miles from shore, the regulations^! usage within the reserve have never been fully enforced. According to Merlen (1995), among the many reports of illegal fishing practices in nxent years in the Galapagos Islands are: fishing by purse-seine tuna vessels within 500 m from shore; gillnets close to shore so full of hammerhead sharks {Sphyrna lewini) that they could not be lifted by fishermen; fishing for sea cucumbers and opening of illegal camps on shore plus transhipment of the product by tuna vessels; and large fishing vessels operating at night 5 km from the coast Camhi (1995) reports that up to 80 major DWF fishing vessels from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan licensed to fish for tuna have illegally longlined for sharks and traded for other marine stocks within the reserve. During. 1997 the fishing vessel Magdalena was captured by personnel from the Galapagos National Park within the confines of the biological reserve carrying 40,000 processed sea cucumbers on board. This vessel also acted as a mother ship to small boats fishing illegally for sea cucumbers. As a result of the seizure, a park guard was seriously injured when he was shot by illegal sea-cucumber fishermen. After a long and difficult judicial process marred with accusations of extortion, breach of confidence, bribery, and legal irregularities, the original penalty allowing the auction of the Magdalena was still not acted upon and the legal battle continues. It is evident that there are great conflicts between the objectives of conservation and those of pursuit of economic growth and development in the Galapagos Islands. This has often led to ineffective conservation measures that are not enforced properly or that are overturned as a result of political pressure. The list of ineffective or not-respected measures is impressive: the declaration of the Marine Resources Resetve in j f 1SB6, prohibition of lobster exports fram the archipelago in 1974 and closure of HIE- fishery in tS32. banning of shar* fishing near shore in 1909, closure of sea-cucumber fishing in 1992. the management plan ior usaije"':': of the mgnn'e reserve in 1S92. All have failed to attain contra! of the exploitation ol natural resources in the region. Clearly, one of Hie most pressing problems in ihc archipelago js the lack of a capacity and perhaps a will to monitor illegal activities arid enforce compliance with regulations. There is a sl/ong nesd for effective patrolling of the national park and the marine resources reserve. .. • •: i ' - : . . On 6 March 1998, the Galapagos special law was passed. The new law recognized the islands as a "priority area", banned commercial fishing, imposed limits for immigration to the islands, implemented an inspection and quarantine system, and required that a larger part of the hard currency earned through ecotourism be used towards conservation. It remains to be seen if this time finally, the laws wil l be respected. The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies Mercitor projection Map 4. The "donut hole" high seas enclave sustained an important DWF fishery for walleye pollock 140 • Case Study: Walleye Pollock and the North Pacific "Donut Hole" ECOSYSTEM Environmental Conditions The Bering Sea is a sub-polar area bounded by the Aleutian Islands in the south and the Bering Strait in the north. It has a total surface of 2,274,020 km2 and a mean depth of 1,636 m. The Bering Sea is generally regarded as an extension of the North Pacific Ocean, significantly influenced by the Arctic Ocean (Canfield, 1993). The eastern Bering Sea is considered as one of the most productive marine ecosystems.in the world, a feature probably related to the size of its continental shelf which, at 500 km wide at its narrowest point, is the second widest in the world (Bakkala, 1993). The "donut hole" is a portion of the Bering Sea surrounded by the EEZs of Russia and the United States. It lies just off the eastern Bering Sea on the Aleutian Basin, and at 55,000 square nautical miles comprises 19 per cent of the Aleutian Basin and 8 per cent of the Bering Sea. The "donut hole" is essentially a high-seas enclave outside the jurisdiction of any country. Food Chain The Aleutian Basin, and in particular the pollock stocks of the "donut hole", depend greatly on resources from the eastern Bering Sea. A large part of the yearly primary production from the outer shelf of the eastern Bering Sea is channelled into the pelagic food web of the Aleutian Basin though the effect of tidal currents. This energy supply is what supports the large population of walleye pollock and other semi-demersal species of this area (Bakkala, 1993). THE DWF NATIONS The modern exploitation of fisheries in the Bering Sea started in the early 1950s when Japanese vessels began fishing for flatfishes, mainly yellowfin sole (Pleuronectes asper). The Soviet fleet followed at the end of the decade. Although there were some catches of walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) in the late 1950s, the real breakthrough in the exploitation of this fish came in the 1960s. According to Bakkala (1993), the major development in the fishery was the implementation by Japan of on-board production methods for surimi (minced meat) from pollock. The Japanese fishery thus shifted to walleye pollock and production grew from 175,000 t in 1964 to 1.9 million t in 1972. Other nations followed suit, among them the Republic of Korea (1968), Poland (1973), Taiwan (1974), Germany (1980), and Portugal (1984). Although most of these countries fished for pollock, their catches were minor compared with those of Japan. By 1988, however, the United States was catching all of the pollock in the eastern Bering Sea and delivering it to foreign vessels through joint-venture fisheries that were set up soon after declaration of the 200-mile EEZ (Bakkala, 1993; Traynor et al., 1990). THE FISHERY RESOURCES Walleye pollock is the single most important fishery resource of the entire North Pacific and particularly the Bering Sea. This species single-handedly supported peak catches of 6.7 million t in 1987 (Figure 6), more than 7 per cent of all fishery catches in the world that year. The Sea of Okhotsk and the eastern Bering Sea are the main fishing grounds, although important catches are also taken in the Aleutian Basin's "donut hole". According to data from the early 1990s taken from Wespestad (1993), Figure 6. Most of the reported catches of walleye pollock are taken in the northwest Pacific NW Pacific NE Pacific 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year FAO 1995 40 per cent and 56 per cent of the total pollock catches are taken in the Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea respectively; the "donut hole" (Aleutian Basin) and the eastern Bering Sea catches account for 19 per cent and 23 per cent of the total. After pollock, groundfish constitute the most important commercial fisheries in the Bering Sea, specially yellowfin sole, Pacific halibut (Hippoglossoides stenolepis), Pacific cod (Gadus macTocephalus), sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria), and Pacific Ocean perch (Sebastes alutus). Other important fishery resources for DWFs in the Bering Sea are Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.), king crabs (Lithodes spp. and Paralithodes spp.), and snow crabs (Chionoecetes spp.). The Japanese catches of Pacific salmon inside the "donut hole" were phased out in 1991. Wespestad (1993) summarizes information on the biology of walleye pollock. The species is endemic to the North Pacific. In the eastern Bering Sea, pollock live on average to 9 years, but strong year classes remain abundant for up to 12-15 years; the oldest recorded age is 21 years. They mature at about age 3-4 (40-45 cm or 0.5 kilogram (kg)) and tend to become more demersal as they age. The natural mortality rate is estimated at 0.3 for fish less than 2 years old (Bakkala, 1993) and there are reports of cannibalism in this species. The maximum sustainable yield estimate for the eastern Bering Sea pollock stock is 1.5 million t. Genetic studies have shown the existence of two clearly distinct stocks of pollock, one in the Bering Sea-Gulf of Alaska region, and another in the Sea of Okhotsk (Iwata, 1975; cited in Bakkala, 1993). There is less clear information about stock structure in the Bering Sea. Some studies suggest the presence of western and eastern stocks but evidence is not conclusive. Furthermore, the eastern Bering Sea might host several stocks. Length-at-age data suggest a stock inhabiting the NE shelf and slope and the Aleutian Basin that would be distinct from pollock in the remaining eastern Bering Sea (Lynde et al., 1986; cited in Traynor et al., 1990). However, genetic studies do not support this hypothesis (Grante and Utter, 1980; cited in Traynor et al., 1990). A basin stock, a northeastern slope stock and a rest of the eastern Bering shelf and slope stock were suggested by studies showing differences in spawning site and fecundities (Hinckley, 1987; cited in Traynor et al., 1990). The Footprint of According to reports from the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) Distant Water Fleets (1992), poor recruitment since 1984 caused declines in pollock abundance in the eastern on World Fisheries Bering Sea and Aleutian regions towards the early 1990s. The allowable biological catch for 1992 was estimated at 1.497 million t, based on a policy of an F0.1 exploitation rate. In general, pollock stocks appeared to be in decline in most regions of the Bering Sea. HISTORICAL CATCHES The fishery for walleye pollock in the "donut hole" developed in the mid-1980s as a result of the exclusion of DWFs from inside the EEZs of the USSR and the United States (Traynor et al., 1990; Dunlap, 1995). Catches increased rapidly from over 180,000 t in 1983 to 1.3 million t in 1987. The main DWFs involved in fishing operations inside the "donut hole" were Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Poland, although the USSR and China also participated in the fishery (Table 8). During this period, the catches of pollock in the "donut hole" slighdy exceeded those made by United States vessels in the eastern Bering Sea (Traynor et al., 1990). During the peak year of 1989, the 1.4 million t of pollock caught in the "donut hole" represented 22 per cent of the world catches of this species. International management of the walleye pollock resource led to a moratorium of fishing in the "donut hole" area since 1993 which is still in place (see agreements section). Table 8. Reported catch (t x 103) of walleye pollock in the donut hole area 1983-1992 Year China Japan Korea Rep. Poland USSR/FSU Total 1983 175 1984 181 1985 2 164 82 116 - 363 1986 3 706 156 163 12 1,040 1987 17 804 24Z 230 34 1,326 1988 18 750 269 299 61 1.378 1989 31 655 342 269 151 1.416 1990 28 417 244 223 5 917 1991 17 140 78 55 3 293 1992 - 11 Sources: Traynor et al.. 1990; McDorman, 1991; Canfield, 1995; and Wespestad. 1993 A comparison of pollock catches of DWFs and countries surrounding the "donut hole" (United States and USSR) oudines the major trends of the fishery in the North Pacific (Figure 7). Up until the mid-1970s the catches by DWFs - led by Japan - far exceeded those of the local nations. This trend was reversed with the implementation of 200-mile EEZs. While the DWFs' share decreased, the ex-USSR rapidly increased its share and has since taken the largest part of the total pollock catch, mainly in the Sea of Okhostk. The United States has also expanded its catches of pollock since the early 1980s. During the late 1980s DWFs' catches showed a slight increase due to catches taken inside the "donut hole" after the DWFs were excluded from their former main fishing grounds in the eastern Bering Sea. Overall, pollock catches of foreign fleets have declined steadily since the early 1970s. • 42 Catch statistics specific to the Bering Sea are available only for the United States and Japan through the INPFC reports. These partial data show the same trend as the whole Figure 7. DWFs took the largest part of the walleye pollock catch until the mid-1970s North Pacific data: a reassignment of catches from DWFs to the coastal nations (Figure 8). While Japan took most of the pollock until 1980, a slow but definite growth of United States pollock catches since the mid-1980s was matched by a concurrent decrease of Japanese catches. By 1992, Japan had ceased to fish for pollock in the Bering Sea. Figure 8. Japan's walleye pollock catches were gradually replaced by USA catches INPFC data Two events were responsible for this trend. First the establishment of joint-venture fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea inside the United States EEZ to replace DWFs, and second the moratorium on pollock fishing inside the "donut hole" area - which was the last enclave of DWFs in the Bering Sea - since 1993. FLEET CHARACTERISTICS AND NUMBERS Information on the size, number, and characteristics of the fishing fleets is fragmentary. Bakkala (1993) provides some data on the fleets catching pollock in the eastern Bering Sea. Japan had two different fleets targeting pollock in the 1970s. The mother-ship fishery used large processing vessels supplied by fleets of trawl catchers. These catcher The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies vessels used Danish seines, pair trawls, and stern trawls to fish pollock and ranged from about 100 to 350 GRT. The second fleet was composed of land-based stern trawlers of 2,500 to 5,500 GRT These vessels were prohibited from transhipping at sea and had to return to land their catches in Japan. Soviet factory stern trawlers fishing for pollock were of 2,600 to 3,900 GRT] and Republic of Korean stern trawlers ranged between 2,200 and 5,700 GRT. Fredin (1987) indicates that the number of Japanese mother-ship groundfish fleets in the Bering Sea increased from 2 in 1954 to 33 in 1961. By 1984, 6 mother-ship fleets supplied by 77 catcher vessels were operating in the Bering Sea while 43 land-based stern trawlers were also present (INPFC, 1987). There is no readily available information on the number of vessels fishing in the "donut hole". Limited data on sightings of foreign vessels indicate that these peaked at 2,470 vessels during 1990-1991, were 1,221 in 1989, and fell to 871 during 1991-1992 (Canfteld, 1993). It should be noted that sightings include an unknown number of multiple sightings of the same vessels. The INPFC is an alternative source of partial information on number of vessels fishing for groundfish in the Bering Sea. However, it is difficult to distinguish how many of these vessels were fishing for pollock and how many were targeting other groundfish stocks. The data presented in Figure 9 mirror the trends observed in the share of the catch by these two countries (see above). Japan maintained between 100 and 180 trawling vessels until 1983, then decreased steadily to only 11 boats in 1992. Meanwhile the United States fleet grew rapidly between 1986 and 1992, virtually replacing the Japanese fleet. Figure 9. The number of trawlers in the Bering Sea reflects the changes in the share of the catches between Japan and the United States 250 r 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 Year "information not available prior to 1975 but vessels known to have operated in the Bering Sea INPFC data 144 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT Before the declaration of EEZ regimes by the United States and USSR, the management of the Bering Sea fisheries was mostly a decision of each country. Initially, the United States had jurisdiction only in a 3-mile zone from the coast. Under this provision, the United States permitted groundfish trawling in its waters starting in 1942. The Japanese DWF was managed direcdy by the Japanese government. In 1959, Japan declared some areas closed to its own trawl fisheries in the Bering Sea and around some of the Aleutian Islands, mainly to avoid gear conflicts with other fisheries (Fredin, 1987). Furthermore, Japan limited the number of licences and areas of operation of all components of its groundfish fleets in the Bering Sea during 1967. The United States extended its jurisdiction to a 9-mile contiguous fishery zone in 1966 which led to a number of bilateral fishing agreements. These provided some limited management measures for pollock. Area and seasonal closures were established during several years. In the early 1970s, pollock quotas agreed upon were: Japan 1.5 million t (1973), 1.3 million t (1974), and 1.1 million t (1975-1976); the USSR 210,000 t (1975-1976). These quotas were based on average catches over a number of preceding years and were intended to serve as a cap while stock assessments were carried out (Fredin, 1987). The implementation of the EEZ regime by the United States in the eastern Bering Sea during 1977 changed the rules of the game. Optimum yield (OY) levels for the different groundfish species were identified by United States scientists and used to provide fishing quotas for DWFs. The OYs for pollock ranged between 950,000 t and 1.5 million t during 1977-1985. In addition to this, DWFs were required: (1) to stop fishing in the United States EEZ once the specified quotas were fulfilled; (2) to carry on-board United States observers at no cost to the United States (in contrast to this, see the Mauritania and Senegal case study above); and (3) to provide the United States government with catch and effort statistics for each vessel on a regular basis. Additional regulations were included to minimize the bycatches of juvenile Pacific halibut. Initial efforts for international fisheries management in the North Pacific took shape in 1952 in the form of the INPFC. This body - formed by Canada, Japan, and the United States - was to undertake research and management of fishery resources for situations where no bilateral agreements existed between at least two of the member countries. Effectively, the work of INPFC was centred on salmon stocks. Although some research on groundfish took place under the auspices of the INPFC (sablefish and Pacific Ocean perch), no management recommendations were ever issued for walleye pollock (Fredin, 1987). Extended jurisdiction in the late 1970s initiated a process of retreat of the DWFs from coastal nations' waters. The DWFs fishing pollock in the eastern Bering Sea were replaced by joint-venture fisheries in the early 1980s, forcing the rapid development of the Aleutian Basin's "donut hole" pollock fishery. The uncontrolled growth of this fishery spurred worries about overfishing and the effects of Aleutian Basin catches on the pollock populations of the eastern Bering Sea. Such worries were underscored by the precipitous fall of pollock catches in the "donut hole" during 1989-1991 and the accompanying decreases in catch per unit effort (Canfield, 1993). Effective management of the "donut hole" fishery did not come about until the early 1990s. This took shape in the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea which is one of the rare examples of successful international cooperation. This agreement - detailed below - offered the possibility of a complete halt of fishing in the "donut hole" area. Under provisions of this agreement, all DWFs involved in the "donut hole" pollock fishery during the 1980s agreed to stop fishing from 1993 in order to allow recovery of a depleted stock in need The Footpr in t of D is tan t W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d F isher ies 146 of strong conservation measures. At time of writing of this paper, the moratorium on pollock fishing is still in force and is scheduled for review in 1998. BYCATCH Information on bycatch in the walleye pollock fisheries of the Bering Sea is not readily available. According to Canfield (1993), some reports indicate that Alaskan trawlers fishing for pollock and Pacific cod discarded about 9,0001 of halibut and some 250,000 t of groundfish in 1990. However, it is difficult to know how much of this pertains to pollock-targeted fishing. Judging from the nature of the "donut hole" fishery for pollock where all the fishing is by mid-water trawl it is expected that only minimal problems of bycatch occur. FISHING AGREEMENTS During the 1950s and 1960s, all of the bilateral agreements between nations fishing in the Bering Sea included provisions for avoiding gear conflicts and bycatch of valuable species but no provisions existed for the management of pollock stocks. For example, an agreement of May 1967 imposed some time/area restrictions for trawling by Japanese vessels in parts of the Aleutian Islands, but in the words of Fredin (1987), controlling the impact of foreign fisheries on pollock and other groundfish stocks was not an issue for the United States at that time. This changed drastically in 1972-1973 when Japan and the USSR agreed to a United States proposal of adopting catch quotas for pollock for the first time in addition to seasonal/area restrictions (see management above). Most of the bilateral agreements of the mid-1970s were political tools used to allocate shares of the fishery rather than means of "selling" fish to DWFs as is the case in many DWF situations in other parts of the world. The most important international agreement for managing pollock fisheries in the Bering Sea is the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea. This agreement, signed by China, Japan, Poland, Russia, the Republic of Korea, and the United States in 1994, came into force in 1995. Dunlap (1995) provides a compelling account of the development of this agreement. In his opinion, it has a unique combination of enforcement mechanisms, and offers potential to become one of the most effective multinational agreements ever reached. It is one of the few fishing agreements in the world signed by all the parties fishing in the area of interest. The agreement was developed during 1991-1994 in a very swift process which was undoubtedly fertilized by the rapid and evident collapse of the stocks in question. Unequivocal evidence of the decline in pollock abundance in the Aleutian Basin was becoming available as the ten conference meetings proceeded, causing a swift change in the positions initially adopted by the DWF nations. This fortunate incident was perhaps the most important breakthrough in the signing of the convention. Under the terms of reference of this agreement, the contracting parties agreed to a suite of commitments aimed at the conservation, management, and optimal utilization of the pollock resources of the central Bering Sea ("donut hole" area). Among the most important aspects of the agreement are: (1) provisions for the determination of annual harvest levels and individual nation quotas for each year; (2) effective mechanisms for dealing with non-complying parties; (3) broad provisions for dealing with nations who are not a party to the agreement and intend to undermine the objectives of the Conference; (4) cooperation in research and exchange of fisheries data; (5) satellite tracking for all fishing vessels; and (6) establishment of a scientific observer programme for full coverage of fishing activities. BENEFITS One obvious benefit from the occurrence of DWFs in the Bering Sea is probably the discovery and development of the important pollock fisheries. It was the Japanese who found a use for pollock in the form of surimi. The coastal nations, in particular the United States, have capitalized through joint-venture fisheries and thanks to extended jurisdiction, on the market and fisheries developed by the DWFs, particularly Japan. At the end of the day, there is benefit for all nations as the management brought about in recent years will be the only chance to avoid repetition of the far too common overexploitation of marine stocks that occurs in most open access situations. However, the most important benefit derived (even though a little late) from the fishing activities of DWFs in the "donut hole", was the realization of the recent agreement for conservation and management of pollock describe in the preceding section. This agreement constitutes a breakthrough in modern international fisheries agreements for the "high seas" and will probably serve as the benchmark for several years to come. CONFLICTS Overall, the DWF fisheries in the Bering Sea area have been devoid of major conflicts. Ignoring the overexploitation of the pollock resource in the "donut hole", currently under a recovery regime, there have been no major negative effects of DWF activities. For a number of years, there were several instances of alleged illegal incursions of DWF vessels from the "donut hole" into the eastern Bering Sea to catch pollock. Between 1989 and 1992, at least 11 seizures of vessels supposedly fishing pollock in the "donut hole" were made by the United States Coast Guard in the eastern Bering Sea (Canfield, 1993). These relatively minor problems have apparendy been successfully resolved through the "donut hole" agreement described above. Recent news, however, indicates that illegal fishing in the Bering Sea is still attempted occasionally by some nations. A Chinese vessel was recendy caught fishing illegally for salmon in the Russian EEZ (The Vancouver Sun, 1998; Omori, 1998). On 31 May 1998, the Russian fisheries enforcement vessel Brest intercepted and seized 13 trawlers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea allegedly fishing illegally in Russian waters in the Bering Sea (Dow Jones News, 1998). • Case Study: Iceland and DWFs* ECOSYSTEM Environmental Conditions The three major current systems that influence Icelandic waters are (1) the warm and saline Irminger current - an offshoot from the Gulf Stream - flowing from the south; (2) the colder and less saline East Greenland current of Arctic origin flowing from the Prepared by Hreidar Valtysson The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets On W o r l d F isher ies Map 5. Iceland has moved from being a nation hosting DWFs to becoming a DWFN itself 148 northwest; and (3) the East Iceland current from the northeast, made up from mixing of cold arctic waters and the warmer Gulf Stream northeast of Iceland (Map 5) (Stefansson, 1962). There is also a freshwater-induced coastal current flowing clockwise around the country. The Irminger current and the mixing of all these currents is the main reason for the high productivity found in Icelandic waters. The Irminger current keeps the waters south and west of Iceland relatively warm and stable both inter- and intra-annually. Phytoplankton blooms around Iceland occur in early spring and autumn. The spring bloom is driven by longer-lasting days and by warmer; stratified waters. This allows phytoplankton to stay in the surface waters. By summer, the rapid growth of the phytoplankton renders the surface waters nutrient deficient and photosynthesis declines to a low level. The autumn bloom is aided by vertical mixing caused by temperature differentials in the air-sea interface. Stronger bloom years are generally linked to warmer ocean temperatures caused by a stronger Irminger current. The total primary production in Icelandic waters has been estimated to be around 55 million t carbon annually, or 218 g carbon m'2 y1 in the continental shelf and 151 g carbon m2 y1 offshore (Thorthardottir, 1995). The biomass of zooplankton (dominated by the copepod Calanus finmarchius) in northern surface waters increases in May, then declines during the summer. Productivity is generally greater in the waters south and west of the country, where blooms also occur earlier and autumn blooms are also more prominent (Astthorsson and Gfslason, 1995; Gfslason and Astth6rsson, 1997). Food Chain Among the large benthic invertebrate fauna in Icelandic waters, the most important crustaceans are northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis), Norway lobster or scampi (Nephrops norvegicus), and a few crab species that are currently not utilized. The main molluscs are the Icelandic scallop (Chlamys islandica), ocean quaghog (Arctica islandica), horse mussel (Modiolus modiolus), common mussel (Mytilus edulis), and whelk (Buccinum undatum). The only echinoderm fished is the green sea urchin (Strongylocentrotus droebachensis). These are all low in the food web, either filter feeders or bottom scavengers, or feeding on algae. The main pelagic species off Iceland are capelin (Mallotus villosus) in the colder waters and herring (Clupea harengus) in the warmer waters. They feed on zooplankton, mostly copepods. Other common pelagic or benthopelagic species such as redfishes (Sebastes spp.), blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), Norway pout (Trisopterus esmarki), Arctic cod (Boreogadus saida), greater silver smelt (Argentina silus), and sandeels (Ammodytidae) share similar trophic levels. They feed predominantly on euphasids but also other zooplankton and benthic invertebrates. Many of these fishes are important food for other species. Basking sharks (Cetorhinus maximus), fin whales (Balaenoptera physalus), and sei whales (B. borealis) are common in Icelandic waters and feed also predominantly on zooplankton, as does the much rarer blue whale (B. musculus). Minke (B. acutorostrata) and humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) are also abundant but feed on fish as well as zooplankton. The main benthic feeding fish are haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), wolf-fishes (Anarhichas lupus and A. minor), grenadiers (Macrouridae), rattails (Chimeridae), sculpins (Cottidae), eelpouts (Lycodidae), common skate {Raja bads), starry ray (Raja radiata), and flatfishes. However, they feed also on capelin in large quantities when available. Higher in the trophic level are the piscivorous fishes, dominated by Atlantic cod in the warmer waters and by Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) in colder regions. Other species in this level are mostly gadoids such as saithe (Pollachius virens), whiting (Merlangius merlangus), tusk (Brosme brosme), and lings (Molva molva and M. dypterygia). Other less numerous groups are salmonids, Adantic halibut (Hippogbssus hippoglossus), spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias), and angler fish (Lophius piscatorius). In general, species in this group eat mostly small invertebrates when small, shrimp and capelin at medium sizes, and other fish when fully grown. The top predators are the Greenland shark (Somniosus microcephalics), porbeagle (Lamna nasus), seals, and toothed whales, which eat squid and various fish species (P&lsson, 1983; Jonsson, 1992; Anon., 1997a). I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w THE COASTAL NATION Iceland is the second largest island in Europe, and lies close to the Arctic Circle in the North Atlantic. The maritime boundaries are Greenland in the west and northwest, Jan Mayen (Norwegian) in the north, and the Faeroe Islands in the southeast. The total size of the 200-mile EEZ is 758,000 km2, of which 111,000 km2 is continental shelf less than 200 m deep, where most of the fishing is done. The south shore is characterized by sandy beaches without good harbours; the west, north, and east coasts however have many fjords and bays with good harbours. The total length of the coastline is about 5,000 km. Considering how far north it is, the climate in Iceland is temperate but is nevertheless not well suited for agriculture. Only 1 per cent of the land is cultivated, a further 20 per cent is used in summer for pasture, the rest is glaciers, lava fields, deserts, and other wasteland. Besides fish, relatively cheap electricity from hydro and geothermal power plants is almost the only other natural resource. Virtually no minerals are available in commercial quantities. About 270,000 people of homogeneous Norwegian/Celtic ancestry live in Iceland. More than half of them live in or close to the capital Reykjavik and the rest mostly in small fishing villages scattered along the coast. Agriculture, mainly sheep farming, has historically been the mainstay of the economy, fisheries coming close second, usually being conducted seasonally by the farmers or farm workers. This century, fisheries have however become far more important, and are the main reason the nation was able to develop from a poor agricultural country to a prosperous modern society. Since fisheries are so dominant, the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in fish prices and stock sizes. THE FISHERY RESOURCES The most important fishery resources in Icelandic waters are medium- to long-lived demersal species typified by the Atlantic cod; the most obvious exception is the capelin which is a short-lived pelagic fish. Most of the important species do not generally leave the Icelandic EEZ, the exceptions are: (1) capelin that undertake large-scale feeding migrations up to Jan Mayen in the north and Greenland in the northwest; (2) Greenland halibut which undertake feeding/spawning migrations to Greenlandic and Faeroese waters; (3) blue whiting which spawn in British waters but undertake feeding migrations to Icelandic waters; (4) the large whales which use Icelandic waters for feeding but have nursery areas in 49 The Footpr in t of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies tropical waters; (5) the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock, which when not depressed spends the summers and winters feeding in Icelandic waters (see Boxed Case Study 2). In addition to these migratory species, there are straddling stocks such as shrimp and some of the redfishes living on the edge of the Icelandic EEZ. Occasionally, some quantities of mackerel (Scomber scombrus), horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus), squid, and bluefin tuna (Thunnus thymus) wander through the Icelandic EEZ, but generally not in fishable quantities. Few boats use only one gear or target one species. Purse-seiners catch capelin during part of the year, herring in other seasons, and sometimes trawl for shrimp during other parts of the year. Many of the smaller shrimp boats switch seasonally between Danish seine, gillnet, shrimp trawl, and longline. Large trawlers fish for Atlantic cod in one season, Greenland halibut in another, redfish the third, and then go for Atlantic cod or shrimp in distant waters. The most important fishery resources of Iceland can roughly be split into ten major groups as follows. Offshore Groundfish This fishery is conducted on the continental shelf with bottom trawls. Atlantic cod is the main target species but others such as haddock, saithe, tusk, common ling, wolf-fishes, and flatfishes are also important. The distinction between bycatch and target species in this fishery is however blurred, depending on the quota status of the boats and area fished. Economically, this fishery — which was started late last century by British trawlers - is the most important. Before World War I, total groundfish catches were around 200,000 t/y, mosdy Atlantic cod (Figure 10). Between the wars, catches were 400,000-700,000 t/y, and after World War II they ranged from 600,000 to 800,0001; roughly half of this is Atlantic cod. About two-thirds of the groundfish catches were taken by trawlers, the rest by smaller inshore boats. The importance of Atlantic cod in trawl Figure 10. Capelin, herring, and cod have dominated the catches in Icelandic waters by foreign and domestic fleets 2,000 Capelin Herring Cod Other species Capelin Other species Cod Herring 1,000 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 96 Year • 50 fisheries has been diminishing lately because of restricted quotas. Other species in deeper waters, such as Greenland halibut, redfishes, and shrimp are being targeted more in turn. Impac ts : A Global O v e r v i e w Inshore Groundfish Similar in species composition to the offshore fishery, this is however more seasonal and is conducted by many small, primarily Icelandic boats with handlines, longlines, or gillnets. Catches from these boats were below 100,000 t/y until after World War I, when they increased to about 150,000 t before the Great Depression. After World War II catches increased to 300,000 t and have remained at that level since. Pelagic Fish Capelin and herring are the main target in these fisheries, but Norway pout and blue whiting have also been targeted. These fisheries are usually conducted with purse seines, but also recently with pelagic trawls. Until the mid-1920s, herring catches in Icelandic waters were around 10,000 t/y, mainly by Norwegian boats. Catches increased steadily after Iceland joined the fishery. Production reached a peak of 770,0001 in 1966, but collapsed almost entirely two years later. The Icelandic summer-spawning stock has recovered and now supports a fishery of 100,000 t/y. This stock is currently the only herring stock in Icelandic waters and is only fished by Icelanders. Capelin fisheries started around 1963 and increased rapidly, specially after the collapse of herring stocks. Since 1978, with few exceptions, the capelin has sustained a catch of around 1 million t/y, by boats from Iceland, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, and Greenland. Landings from these fisheries are now usually more than half of the total annual catch in Icelandic waters, but since most of it is reduced to meal the total value is not as high as for many of the demersal species. Greenland Halibut This is a recent bottom trawl fishery conducted in deep waters west, north, and east of Iceland. The Greenland halibut fishery was probably started in the 1950s by the German countries. However, early on, landings of Greenland and Atlantic halibut were not separated so the statistics by species are not readily available. Catches increased rapidly and reached a peak of 30,000 t in 1974 when fleets from the USSR and later Poland joined the fishery. Catch declined rapidly afterwards due to the extended fisheries jurisdiction regime. Icelandic catches for this species started to increase rapidly after 1976, Faeroese catches after 1979, and Greenlandic catches after 1991. The total catch from these countries reached a peak of 60,000 t in 1989, mainly by Icelanders, but has declined since. The stock now shows signs of overfishing. Redfish These fisheries target the three major redfish stocks in rather deep waters south and west of Iceland. Sebastes marinus and demersal S. mentella are primarily caught with bottom trawls, but mid-water trawls are used for oceanic S. mentella. The fishery was developed mainly by German trawlers after World War II with catches of 50,000 - 100,000 t/y although Icelandic catches were also substantial (Figure 11). After the 200-mile EEZ declaration, catches of redfish by Icelanders increased. Initially most of the bottom trawl catches were S. marinus, but recently the annual catches of the two species have been similar at around 40,000 - 50,000 t each. These catches are almost entirely by Iceland. Catches of oceanic redfish started in 1982 by the U S S R Iceland joined the oceanic 511 Figure 11. Catches of other species than cod, capelin, and herring in Icelandic waters Icelandic catches DWFNs catches Redfish Haddock Saithe Grooniand halibut Other flatfish os Invertebrates Marine mammals Overfishes Other fishes Other flatfishes Greenland halibut SartJia Haddock Redfish redfish fishery in 1989. Recendy catches have been around 150,000 t/y. The majority of these catches are however conducted outside the Icelandic EEZ and the foreign fleets have never fished for this stock in Icelandic waters. The demersal redfish stocks show signs of overexploitation, but very little is known of the status of the mid-water stock. Offshore Shrimp The shrimp fishery is exclusively conducted by Icelandic vessels using fine mesh trawl nets mainly off northern Iceland. The offshore shrimp fishery began on an experimental basis in 1975, catches increased sharply after 1983 to the current level of around 60,000 t/y. One of the shrimp stocks however lives on the Dhorn Bank at the boundary of the Greenlandic and Icelandic EEZs. This is a small stock and has therefore not sustained large-scale fisheries by Icelanders; other nations are however targeting it in Greenlandic waters. The shrimp catches are now the second most valuable in Icelandic waters after Atlantic cod. Bycatch is very low compared to many shrimp fisheries in warmer waters since species diversity is lower in these waters and the use of sorting grids is compulsory. Inshore Shrimp The fishery takes place in western and northern Iceland fjords with similar gear but smaller boats than the offshore fishery. Experimental shrimp fisheries started in 1924, but it was not until the late 1950s that real fisheries started. Since 1970, the inshore shrimp fisheries have fluctuated between 5,000 and 10,000 t/y. Only Icelanders have been involved in this fishery. Furthermore, large offshore shrimp trawlers are not allowed to catch inshore shrimp; only small boats from local towns are allowed to fish in each fiord. The smaller inshore shrimp boats can however buy quotas for offshore shrimp. Flatfish With the exception of plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and halibut, Icelanders did not target the flatfish species in large quantities until recently. British trawlers however targeted them intensively until declaration of the Icelandic EEZ. This was followed by a 15-year period of low flatfish catches. The large-scale fishery started in the early 1980s by Icelandic boats using Danish seines. At first plaice was the main target, but from 1984 to 1988 catches of dab (Umanda limanda), lemon sole (Miarostomus kitt), witch flounder (Glyptocephalus cynogbssus), megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis), and long rough dab (Hippoglossoides platessoides) started to increase sequentially. Currently the total catches of flatfishes in Icelandic waters have been around 30,000 t (10,000 t of plaice, 5,000 t of dab and long rough dab, 2,000 t of witch flounder, 1,000 t of lemon sole, and less than 500 t of megrim). In general, flatfish catches are now larger than before DWFs were driven out of the fishery (Hjorleifsson et al., 1998). Roughly half of the catches of plaice, megrim, and lemon sole are taken with Danish seines, the rest is caught by demersal trawlers. Atlantic cod, haddock, and other demersal species are a frequent bycatch in these fisheries. I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w Norway Lobster The Norway lobster or scampi fishery takes place along the south shore with fine mesh trawls. The bycatch rate is high, especially for various flatfish species. Norway lobster is the most valuable species per weight in Icelandic waters. The fisheries started after World War II by foreign boats. These caught up to 500 t/y, but ceased after the extension of the Icelandic EEZ. In 1958 Icelanders started fishing for Norway lobster, the catches increased rapidly to more than 5,000 t/y but then declined and have been around 2,000 t/y for the last two decades. Currently only Icelandic vessels fish for Norway lobster in Icelandic waters. Other Benthic Invertebrates This fishery targets large benthic invertebrates, mainly with ploughs. Scallop has been the main target, but plough catches of sea urchin and ocean quaghog, and catches of whelk with traps have increased recently. The scallop fisheries started in 1969 and increased until 1982 when they levelled off at around 10,000 t/y. The ocean quaghog fishery started in 1987 and has been fluctuating up to 6,000 t/y. The sea urchin fishery started in 1992 with around 1,000 t/y, and the whelk fishery started in 1996, and is still very much on an experimental basis. Only Icelanders have been involved in these fisheries. The bycatch rate of other benthic invertebrates can sometimes be high. Other Fisheries Many other minor fisheries exist or have existed in Iceland. Examples are the lumpsucker (Cyclopterus lumpus) fishery with specialized gillnets, the Atlantic halibut fishery with longlines, the porbeagle fishery with special hooks, the Greenland shark fisheries (prior to this century) with handline, and sport fisheries for brown trout (Scdmo trutta), Arctic char (Salvelinus alpinus), and salmon (Salmo salar). The latter fishery is mainly conducted in freshwater, since it is illegal to catch salmon in the sea. Whaling and sealing can also be put into this group. Most of these fisheries were only conducted by Iceland; the exceptions are whaling by Norwegians early this century and longline fisheries for halibut up to this day by the Faeroese. HISTORICAL CATCHES Total fishery catches in Icelandic waters increased from roughly 200,000 t prior t o , World War 1 to about 700,000 t between the wars (Figure 10). After World War II the catches increased to 1.5 million t, then declined again because of the collapse of the 53 The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies herring stocks. Production increased again in the late 1970s and has fluctuated between 1 and 2 million t/y since. These fluctuations are explained by the volatile changes in the size of the capelin stock, which makes up roughly half of the total recent catch. Icelandic Catches In Iceland, Atlantic cod has always been the most important fish, accounting for more than half of total demersal catch until the early 1980s. The Icelandic fishery had changed little from the times of the first settlers until the beginning of the 20th century, when small oar or more rarely sail powered boats fished in shallow waters with handlines or longlines. The catches were probably 10,000 - 30,000 t/y during this period (Jonsson, 1994). The first Icelandic owned trawler started operating in 1905 (see also Kurlansky, 1997). At that time the total demersal catch by Icelandic vessels was 55,000 t. By 1924, 40 Icelandic trawlers were operating (Jonsson and Magnusson, 1997), and the total catch had a fourfold increase to 230,000 t. Demersal catches and number of Icelandic boats decreased during the Great Depression, but increased rapidly during and shortly after World War II, to a peak of 490,0001 in 1958. The deterioration of the trawler fleet caused the catches of this sector to fall to 57,000 t in 1972, but this was compensated by increased catches from other sectors; the total catch was 330,000 t that year. After extension of the EEZ to 200 miles, the number of Icelandic trawlers -now mostly state-of-the-art stern trawlers - increased rapidly to more than 100 vessels. Catches also increased rapidly, first catches of Atlantic cod, then followed by other species. New species are also added almost every year to the list of exploited species. Examples of the new fisheries are ratfishes (Chimaera monstrosa) and orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) in 1991, green sea urchin in 1993, Sebastes viviparus (small redfish species) in 1996, and probably bluefin tuna in 1998. This, together with the decreasing TAC for Atlantic cod has also meant that the importance of Atlantic cod has been declining and was about one-third of total demersal catch of 522,000 t and a quarter of the value of total landings in 1996. Other important demersal species are redfish (14 per cent of total demersal catch and 13 per cent of total landed value in 1996), shrimp (13 and 20 per cent), haddock (11 and 7 per cent), saithe (8 and 3 per cent), Greenland halibut (4 and 7 per cent), wolf-fish (3 and 2 per cent), and plaice (2 and 2 per cent). The trawl fleet now accounts for more than half of the total demersal catches of 520,000 t. The herring fishery has also been very important for Iceland both economically and historically. It was especially prominent in the 1960s, when 400,000-600,000 t/y were caught (Table 9, Figure 10). The herring stocks collapsed in 1967, and catches remained low for a long time. The herring stocks have however recovered fully now. Iceland takes more than 100,000 t/y from the Icelandic summer-spawning herring stock, and catches of more than 150,000 t in international waters from the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock (see Boxed Case Study 2). After the herring stocks collapsed, the Icelandic purse-seiners turned their attention to the capelin, which was largely ignored before. This fishery increased rapidly to around 1 million t/y. The capelin stock size can however fluctuate wildly, since it is short lived and dies after first spawning. In 1982 the stock collapsed and there was a moratorium on capelin fisheries for almost 2 years. The stock however recovered quickly and the capelin now sustains a fishery of up to 1.5 million t/y. Landings from pelagic fisheries are now usually more than Table 9. Marine catches in Icelandic waters since 1950 (t x 103) SPECIES ICELAND FOREIGN FLEETS Mean Maximum Year of Catch Mean Maximum Year of Catch catch catch maximum catch catch maximum 1950-1996 1950-1996 1996 1950-1996 1950-1996 1996 Capelin 337.6 1,182.2 1996 1.182.2 49.1 315.2 1996 315.3 Cod 273.0 460.6 1981 180.8 97.9 262.5 1953 0.7 Herring 111.7 590.4 1965 95.9 21.4 172.4 1962 0.0 Redfish 50.4 122.7 1983 67.9 39.4 124.6 1953 0.5 Saithe 44.1 99.8 1991 39.5 26.9 76.4 1971 0.8 Haddock 39.5 67.0 1982 56.3 18.6 65.3 1962 0.6 Marine mammals 13.5 24.2 1957 A few seals 0.0 0.0 0.0 Greenland halibut 12.3 58.5 1989 22.1 3.3 30.1 1967 0.0 Shrimp 11.6 75.7 1995 68.7 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 Wolf-fish 10.3 17.8 1991 14.7 4.6 13.4 1952 0.0 Plaice 6.0 14.4 1985 11.1 2.5 8.0 1957 0.0 Iceland scallop 5.0 17.1 1985 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 Ling 4.3 8.9 1971 3.7 3.1 6.5 1971 0.6 Lumpsucker 3.6 13.1 1984 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Tusk 3.4 7.0 1960 5.2 2.9 5.2 1973 1.0 Norway pout 3.2 34.6 1978 0.0 ? 0.0 0.0 Blue whiting 2.7 34.8 1978 0.3 ? 0.0 0.0 Norway lobster 2.1 5.6 1963 1.6 0.1 0.6 1959 0.0 Blue ling 1.3 8.1 1980 1.3 1.4 3.4 1966 0.1 Atlantic halibut 1.2 2.4 1951 0.8 1.6 4.6 1950 0.1 Others* 3.3 36.7 1955-1996 28.3 1.8 6.3 1951-1963 0.0 "includes dab, witch flounder, lemon sole, long rough dab, whiting, ocean quahog, megrim, green sea urchin. Year of maximum catch is a range over which the maximum for each species occurs. half of the total annual catch in Icelandic waters, but since most of it is reduced to meal, the value is only 15 per cent of the total value, lower than for many of the demersal species. Most of the important stocks in Icelandic waters such as shrimp, Norway lobster, haddock, herring, and capelin are in good condition and sustain considerable fisheries. However the reason the capelin and shrimp are in such a good shape has probably also a lot to do with the low stock size of their main predator, the Adantic cod. Other stocks such as Greenland halibut, Adantic halibut, saithe, redfishes, plaice, and witch flounder are however declining. Fishery biologists generally realize this, but managers have been too optimistic or under pressures from the fishing industry and thus often set the TAC higher than recommended. Often the fishers then in turn catch more than the TAC. These stocks were basically sacrificed so Adantic cod quotas could be reduced. Very little is known about many other stocks that have been exploited at an increasing rate recendy. CATCHES OF THE DWFs DWFs probably first came to Icelandic waters in the 15th century (Table 10), when English boats were first reported (j6nsson, 1994). Later, boats from the Netherlands and France joined and dominated this fishery. There were also some small contingents of boats from other nations. From 1880 to 1890 there were even American schooners catching halibut in Icelandic waters (Saemundsson, 1926). The other fleets were however primarily targeting Atlantic cod. The catches from these DWFs were roughly 5,000 - 15,000 t/y from the late 18th century to the beginning of this century. Although considerable at that time, these fisheries probably did not have a great impact on the fish stocks, since the weather limited fishing to the summer months. Table 10. Historical and present-day DWFs operating in Icelandic waters Nation Gear Target species Period Annual catch range (t x 103) Belgium Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1994 1 to 25 Denmark Danish seine Flatfish 1890 to 1955 Less than Faeroe Islands Longline + handline Cod + haddock 1905* to present day 5 to 50 Faeroe Islands Purse seine Herring 1926 to 1966 1 to 10 Faeroe Islands Purse seine Capelin 1977 to present day 2 to 65 Finland Purse seine Herring 1931 to 1967 1 to 7 France Handline Cod Mid-18th c. to 1915 1 to 5 France Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1973 1 to 15 Germany Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1977 10 to 200 Germany Purse seine Herring 1931 to 1968 1 to 27 Greenland Purse seine Capelin 1993 to present day Italy Trawl Demersal fish Between wars Unknown but small Japan Longline Bluefin tuna 1996 and 1997 Less than 1 Netherlands Handline Cod Mid-18th to mid-19th c. 1 to 3 Netherlands Trawl Demersal fish 1905* to 1965 1 to 3 Norway Longline Cod + haddock 1905* to 1989 1 to 15 Norway Purse seine Herring 1905* to 1968 10 to 150 Norway Purse seine Capelin 1978 to present day 50 to 200 Poland Trawl Greenland halibut 1970 to 1974 Less than 1 USSR Trawl Greenland halibut 1965 to 1974 1 to 20 USSR Purse seine Herring 1960 to 1968 10 to 200 Sweden ? Demersal fish 1928 to 1950 Less than 1 Sweden Purse seine Herring 1905* to 1961 1 to 8 United Kingdom Handline Cod 15th to 17th century Unknown United Kingdom Trawl Demersal fish 1891 to1976 100 to 200 United States Handline Atlantic halibut 1880 to 1890 Unknown •Official statistics not available before 1905. Large-scale fishing by DWFs started when the first British steam-powered trawler came to Icelandic waters in 1891 (Guthmundsson, 1981; Th6r, 1982). The number of trawlers increased rapidly to around 200 in 1904, initially most of them British (both English and Scottish) but later on also a large German fleet. Boats from Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, France, the Faeroe Islands, Italy, Poland, Norway, and the USSR also fished for groundfish in Icelandic waters, but the quantities caught were far lower than the British and German catches. There are no reports of boats from other nations fishing for groundfish in Icelandic waters. Impacts : A Global Overv iew The first British trawlers came to Icelandic waters for flatfishes; initially they even discarded large quantities of Atlantic cod (Guthmundsson, 1981; Th6r, 1982). Later on, Atlantic cod became the main target although other demersal fishes were also important. After World War II, large parts of the German (then West German) catches were saithe and redfish while Eastern European boats were targeting Greenland halibut. Foreign catches of demersal fishes increased steadily from 132,000 t in 1906 (official statistics are not available earlier) to 343,0001 in 1938 (Figure 10) (Th6r, 1995). During World War II, foreign catches in Icelandic waters virtually ceased, but increased rapidly after the war to a peak of 505,000 t in 1953. Catches declined slowly afterwards due to overexploitation and the gradual extension of the Icelandic EEZ. Litde less than half of the catches or 100,000-200,000 t/y were Atlantic cod. Catches of other species were around 50,000 t/y for haddock, saithe, and redfish and 1,000-5,000 t for most of the other species. Foreign catches of Atlantic cod were roughly similar to Icelandic catches, but foreign fleets caught much higher quantities of most other species (Anon, 1997b; Jonsson and Magnusson, 1997; Hjorleifsson et al., 1998). Another historical DWF fishery conducted in Icelandic waters this century was for herring, mainly for the Norwegian spring-spawning stock. Most of these foreign catches were by Norwegian boats, but there were also contingents from the Faeroe Islands, Finland, USSR, Sweden, and Germany (J6nsson and Magnusson, 1997). With two exceptions, the foreign catches of herring were 10,000-20,000 t/y for this entire period. In the 1930s the catches increased slowly to 57,000 t in 1937 and then declined and finally stopped as a result of World War II. The other episode happened after 1958 when catches increased again, to a maximum of 172,0001 in 1962, then declined again and finally stopped entirely when the stock collapsed in 1968. Since then there have not been any herring fisheries in Icelandic waters except by Icelanders. The foreign purse-seine fisheries did not worry Icelanders in any way. The foreign boats generally landed their catches in Iceland and there was a belief that there was enough herring for everyone. The near complete collapse of the herring stocks came as a surprise for all parties involved. In contrast, the foreign-trawler DWF posed many problems for Iceland. The trawlers did not land their catches in Iceland, they frequently destroyed the more primitive Icelandic fishing gear, and, of course, Icelandic fishermen were concerned that the trawlers were destroying the bottom and overexploiting their fish stocks. But since the oceans were considered free for everyone, any real measures to protect the stocks were quite hopeless. The two world wars offered a relief that might have saved the stocks from early collapse. This did not last long however as after the wars the DWFs always came back with larger boats and more advanced equipment, equipment often developed for military use during the wars. Iceland emerged as an independent nation after World War II and was determined to reduce foreign fisheries in her waters. This resulted in the extension of the Icelandic EEZ to 4 miles in 1952, 12 miles in 1958, 50 mUes in 1972, and finally 200 miles in 1975. These extensions resulted in conflicts with DWF nations, primarily Britain and 57 Germany. These were dubbed "the Cod Wars". A few shots were fired, and at least one life was lost during the conflicts. In the end, Iceland managed to expel the foreign fleets from the 200-mile zone. Foreign catches have been negligible in Icelandic waters ever since. The only exceptions were a few Belgian trawlers and Norwegian longliners that were allowed to catch small quantities of demersal species until recendy, Faeroese longliners that are still allowed to catch various demersal fish species (about 4,500 t in 1996), Greenlandic, Faeroese, and Norwegian boats that have the right to catch 19 per cent of the total capelin TAC, Greenlandic boats that are allowed to catch half of their oceanic redfish TAC, and Faeroese, Norwegian, and Russian boats that are allowed to catch the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock if it migrates into Icelandic waters. Other foreign boats can, under certain circumstances, get permits to fish experimentally in Icelandic waters. This is however rare, the most recent example happening in 1996 and 1997 when Japanese vessels were allowed to catch bluefin tuna in the southern edge of the Icelandic EEZ. This was allowed because Icelanders did not know how to catch tuna but saw a chance to learn the trade (Anon., 1997c). Until the middle of this century (with the exceptions of the wars), DWFs took half or more of the total catch in Icelandic waters (Figure 10); after 1955 Icelanders however started catching the larger part. This trend has continued and foreign catches are now only a small part of the total in Icelandic waters (Figure 12). Figure 12. Iceland regained control over its fishery resources in the 1970s There are several fisheries on straddling stocks just outside Icelandic waters including fisheries for Greenland halibut in Greenlandic and Faeroese waters, for shrimp on the Dhorn Bank, and for oceanic redfish on the Reykjanes ridge southwest of Iceland. In 1996, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands were virtually the only nations catching Greenland halibut in their own waters, 22,000 and 6,000 t/y each respectively. However, 7,5001 were caught in Greenland waters by the United Kingdom, Norway, and Germany (Hjorleifsson, 1997). A similar situation occurs with shrimp on the Dhorn Bank. In 1997, estimated catches in the Greenlandic EEZ were Denmark 301 t, Faeroe Islands 588 t, Greenland 1,355 t, and Norway 1,2191. Iceland caught 2,8561 in its own EEZ. The catches of oceanic redfish are conducted in international waters by many nations (Magnusson and Magnusson, 1995). The total catch has been increasing from 60,0001 in 1982 (caught by Russian trawlers) to the current catch of 170,000 t, of which Iceland takes around 30 per cent. I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w ICELAND AS A DWF NATION Until recently Iceland has mostly been a coastal fishing nation. There are however some exceptions. Early this century, Icelandic trawlers went fishing experimentally to Newfoundland, Norway, and Greenland (Thorleifsson, 1974). With the exception of Greenlandic waters, these fisheries were not maintained. Other exceptions were herring fisheries in the Norwegian Sea (mainly after the herring stocks collapsed in Icelandic waters), a small scale capelin fishery in Newfoundland waters in the mid-1970s, and considerable Atlantic cod and redfish fisheries in Greenlandic and Newfoundland waters during the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 13) (Oskarsson, 1991). Figure 13. Distant water fisheries by the Icelandic fleet have been increasing recently Year The current outward expansion of the Icelandic fleet has two main roots: the shortage of quotas in Icelandic waters, coupled with an oversized fleet, and the recent emergence of some very healthy fishing enterprises that began looking for expansion opportunities. Presently most stocks in Iceland have a TAC, but there is overcapacity in the fishing sector. Accordingly, fleets started to look at fishing opportunities elsewhere. These fisheries are now considerable and are mainly conducted on four species in four areas; Arcto-Norwegian cod outside the Norwegian EEZ in the Barents Sea, oceanic redfish on the Reykjanes ridge close to the Icelandic EEZ, Norwegian spring-spawning herring in the Norwegian Sea, and shrimp on the Flemish Cap off Newfoundland. Other brief experimental fisheries have also been conducted within the 200-mile zone of Rockall (British) and Svalbard (Norwegian). These ventures were actually implemented to find out if the nations claiming these islands were willing to defend the EEZ around them, which they did (Anon., 1994a). The current individual transferable quota (ITQ) system has allowed many Icelandic companies to make very healthy profits. This has allowed them recently to buy fishing companies, boats, and fishing rights, or to act as advisors to foreign companies all over the world. This includes the Falkland Islands, Chile, Mexico, the United States, Canada, Russia, Namibia, Malawi, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom. 59 Currently Icelandic companies own the majority of the German DWF. These are not allowed to fish in Icelandic waters but are catching Greenland halibut in Greenlandic waters and redfish on Reykjanes ridge, the same stocks as in Icelandic waters. Large parts of the EU quotas are thus actually used by the Icelanders to fish their own stocks in other waters. Some Icelandic fishing ventures abroad, such as the pollock fishery of Alaska and squid fishery of the Falkland Islands failed. Others such as the shrimp fisheries in Mexico seem to be successful. Due to reduced or restricted quotas on most species in Icelandic waters, distant water fisheries are without doubt important for the Icelandic economy (see also Bates, 1996). However, with the exception of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring, all the Icelandic distant water catches declined between 1996 and 1997. Some of this can be explained by restricted quotas on the distant water stocks, or by unfavourable environmental conditions. Another factor is that quotas for Atlantic cod in Icelandic waters are increasing and boats can thus fish more at home. If this continues to increase as predicted (Anon., 1997d), then a large part of the incentive for distant water fishery is gone. In a similar way, if the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock migrates back to Icelandic waters as predicted, this fishery will overnight switch from being a distant water fishery to a coastal fishery, although the catches and fleet composition will be the same. The sustainability of this outward expansion of the Icelandic fleet and fishing companies is thus difficult to evaluate at present time. FLEET CHARACTERISTICS AND NUMBERS The capacity of the Icelandic registered fleet declined in 1990 compared to the previous year for the first time since 1970, and continues in a slight decline. The total tonnage decreased until 1992 but has increased since as the boats are getting fewer but larger. In 1996 there were slightly fewer than 2,000 boats licensed to fish in Icelandic waters. The fleet is split into three major categories: about 1,000 small undecked boats, 679 decked boats of various size categories, and 121 trawlers (Anon., 1997b). Fifty-four trawlers are more than 500 GRT and roughly half of the total trawler fleet processes and freezes at sea. The decked boats are the most diverse category and often switched between different fishing gears: 17 of these boats are more than 500 t. These boats and some 30 other slightly smaller vessels are specialized for purse-seining, but can also use other fishing gear. The Icelandic DWF is made up of the large trawlers and the purse-seiners. Distant water fisheries are however only seasonal for most of them. Only seven to ten Icelandic boats fish purely in distant waters, with no fishing rights in Icelandic waters. The land-based processing industry is made up of 140 freezing plants, 210 salting plants, 30 herring processing factories, 13 scallop plants, and 13 canning factories (PSlsson, 1996). The fishing industry provides full-time jobs for about 6,000 fishers and 7,000 people working on fish processing ashore (Anon., 1997b). This is a total of 11 per cent of the national workforce. Foreign boats fishing in Icelandic waters are few compared to the Icelandic fleet and their number varies between years. Norwegian purse-seiners and Faeroese purse-seiners and longliners are mostly boats that conduct distant water fisheries seasonally, similar to the Icelandic DWF. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT BY ICELAND The priorities of the fishery management in Iceland are (Palsson, 1996): "To ensure and maintain maximum long-term productivity through responsible exploitation of all marine stocks. To ensure that all decisions are based on the most reliable biological and economic information and conclusions available at any time. To ensure that individuals and enterprises in the Icelandic fisheries sector have clear and generally applicable, non-discriminatory guidelines to follow, providing them with a positive working environment which will strengthen the sector's competitive position internationally." The Marine Research Institute in Iceland provides assessment of the Icelandic fish stocks. Based on recommendations from scientists, the Ministry of Fisheries decides the TAC for each stock. Currently, the TACs are set exacdy as recommended. Recendy a catch rule has also been established for Atlantic cod, the annual quota being set at 25 per cent of the fishable stock. The Directorate of Fisheries, within the Ministry of Fisheries, is responsible for the daily administration of the fisheries. Inspectors from the government monitor adherence to the regulations by monitoring all landings and also by frequendy going out to sea with the boats. Production from fish processing plants is also monitored, as are all exports (the Icelandic fish market is very small compared to catches, therefore most of them are exported); this offers several checkpoints. Inspectors from the Directorate of Fisheries, the Coast Guard (whose primary responsibility is to monitor the fishing activities), and the Marine Research Institute all have the power to immediately close areas for all fishing if catches are found to contain high numbers of young fish. The Icelandic Coast Guard also jealously guards the 200-mile EEZ against foreign fleets. As a result of all this, compliance with fishery regulations is believed to be high, and the only major unknown is discarding at sea (Halliday and Pinhorn, 1996). There are area limits in Icelandic waters depending on the size and gear of fishing vessels. Boats larger than 42 m and all trawlers except shrimpers are not allowed within 12 miles of the coast. Smaller boats can fish up to 3 miles from shore depending on the area, fishing gear, and size of the boat. Furthermore there are many other areas where some fisheries are not allowed, mainly to protect juveniles. After foreign fleets were expelled from Icelandic waters in 1975, the Icelandic fishing fleet increased rapidly in size. Soon Icelanders were catching more than all the fleets combined prior to the expulsion of the foreigners and, because of this, the fish stock did not get a long respite from fishing. Several attempts were made to try to control the expanding Icelandic fleet. These include overall catch quotas, fisheries licences, fishing period limitations per vessel, increased minimum mesh size to 155 millimetres (mm) (the largest minimum mesh size in the North Atlantic), and real time area closures. Most of these management measures were primarily aimed at protecting the Adantic cod. These probably slowed down the stock decline but did not manage to reverse it. Furthermore, these measures also led to inefficiency and overcapitalization in the fishery. In 1979, the ITQ system was established in the herring fishery, for the capelin fishery in 1980, in 1984 for groundfish including Adantic cod, and in 1990 all the fisheries were managed through this system. Only Icelandic citizens are allowed to own these quotas, and in fact with few exceptions, to fish in Icelandic waters. Furthermore foreigners are only allowed to own up to 25 per cent of Icelandic fishing companies. The ITQ system was rather easily circumvented in the beginning and overexploitation thus continued for some time. The system has however been getting more efficient and the declining TACs set by the government have been getting closer to what was recommended by fishery biologists. As a result of this, the Atlantic cod stock, which decreased from about 2.7 million t in the late 1920s to little more than 500,000 t in the early 1990s (Schopka, 1994; Anon., 1997d), has been increasing in size for the last three years, despite poor recruitment for more than a decade. The main stocks have been efficiently protected under the ITQ system. Its effect on other stocks is however difficult to evaluate at the present time. Although it is illegal, discarding is probably still practised. It is not clear if this is a major problem or has in fact increased much. Other species of low value that have no TAC such as grenadiers, rattails, megrim, starry ray, and long rough dab are however retained or even targeted now instead of being discarded as in the past. The decline of other stocks cannot be blamed directly on the ITQ system; either the catches have simply been higher than recommended as with the redfishes, plaice, and Greenland halibut, or they are almost exclusively caught as bycatch in other fisheries and therefore difficult if not impossible to manage with ITQs, as with the Atlantic halibut and the skate. To make the problem worse, the two last mentioned species are relatively rare, are caught in virtually all fishing gear, of high value per weight, large, long lived, reach maturity late, and are usually caught way before maturity - a recipe for disaster. Sociologically the system has been very controversial. Some towns have lost large parts of their quotas, while others have accumulated them. There were instances where a large part of the population in some towns was unemployed while in nearby towns there were not enough people to process the fish. The fishing rights are also accumulating in fewer hands, but presumably these are the hands that can run the fishery most efficiently. The main area of controversy has however been that the quotas were originally assigned according to what each vessel was fishing in 1981-1983. This makes it difficult for newcomers to enter the fishery except by buying quotas at high prices. The economic benefits of the ITQ system are however obvious (see also Arnarson, 1994; Arnarson, 1996; Anon., 1996b). The value of the catch per weight has increased as fishers now go more for quality than quantity. New (non-traditional) stocks are now exploited. The industry has diversified and is less vulnerable to fluctuations in prices and stock sizes. Secondary industries are also thriving because of the increased efficiency of the fishing sector. The secondary industries are in fact currently the most rapidly expanding sector in Iceland. The increased efficiency of the fleet thus has a multiplying effect on the society. This is also one of the major reasons Iceland is now rapidly changing from a coastal fishing country to a DWF nation. FISHING AGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS The catches of Greenland halibut in Icelandic waters are exclusively by Icelanders. This same stock however migrates to Faeroese and Greenlandic waters where other nations are fishing for it. This fishery is regulated by individual countries independently setting their own quotas (Table 11). This stock however needs some protection since it seems Table 11. Agreements and conflicts over various species of commercial interest to Iceland Species Area Other countries involved Agreements [YOS/NQ), status Capelin Cod Greenland halibut Groundfish Herring Pelagic fish Redfish NE Atlantic Iceland, Greenland. Jan Mayen International (Barents Sea) Iceland, Faroe Is., Greenland Iceland International (Norwegian sea) Faroe Is. International (Reykjanes ridge) European Union. Faroe Is., USSR (Russia), Yes, but Iceland not involved Norway Norway, Greenland, Faroe Is. Norway, USSR (Russia) Greenland, Faroe Is., Norway, United Kingdom, Germany Faroe Is. Norway. Faroe Is., USSR (Russia), European Union Faroe Is. NEAFC (Iceland, Greenland, Faroe Is. Norway, USSR (Russia), Poland, and European Union) + others Iceland, Greenland Greenland, Faroe Is., Norway, Denmark Flemish Cap of Faroe Is., Greenland, Norway. Estonia. Newfoundland USSR (Russia), Canada, Lithuania, European Union, Poland Yes No No, each country sets its own quota Yes Yes Yes Yes for NEAFC members, non-members fish unrestricted No, each country sets its own quota No, effort controls by NAFO, but Iceland has its own quotas to be declining rapidly. Ironically the German boats that are exploiting the Greenland halibut in Greenlandic waters are or have been owned by Icelanders. The shrimp fishery on the Dhorn Bank is also regulated by individual countries setting their own quotas. The redfish fishery on Reykjanes ridge is now regulated by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), which includes Iceland, Greenland, the Faeroe Islands, Norway, Russia, Poland, and the EU. The nations that are not members of this agreement, such as the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Canada, Japan, and flag states such as the Marshall Islands and Cyprus, can however fish without restrictions. Ironically again, Icelanders own some of the flag boats. These are however denied access to Icelandic ports (Anon., 1996c). The Icelandic share of the quota in 1998 will be 45,0001. Greenland and Iceland can catch up to 50 per cent of their quota in the EEZ of the other country. The blue whiting in the northeast Adantic is considered to be from only one stock, which is managed by NEAFC, as is the redfish. An overall quota is set, but not split between nations. Iceland is however not a participant, since catches in Icelandic waters are low. The Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery is regulated with an agreement between Iceland, Norway, Russia, the Faeroes, and the EU (See Boxed Case Study 2). The capelin fishery is regulated with an agreement between Iceland, Norway, and Greenland (boats from the Faeroe Islands usually catch most of the Greenlandic quota). The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d F isher ies A total TAC is split between the nations: Iceland has 81 per cent, Greenland 11 per cent, and Norway 8 per cent. The Norwegian share has been reduced since last year and the Icelandic quota increased. The shrimp fishery off the Flemish Cap is managed by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). Iceland has however not accepted the current regulation method by effort control, and has thus set its own quotas, based on catches in 1995. Iceland does obey other general agreements, such as having independent observers on each boat and leaving the area fished if bycatch is more than 5 per cent of the total weight of the catch. In 1998, the Icelandic TAC was set to 6,800 t, a reduced quota from the previous year since there are indicators of overfishing. In 1996 the total catches were 51,154 t, of which Iceland caught 20,9001. In 1997 Iceland caught 6,334 of a total catch of 23,817 t. The other nations fishing for shrimp on the Flemish Cap are the Faeroe Islands 7,335t, Norway 1,974 t, Greenland 100 t, Estonia 3,166 t, Russia 1,067 t, Canada 608 t, Lithuania 1,708 t, EU (Spain and Portugal) 569 t, Poland 288 t, and St Vincent 75 t. The most severe fishery conflict involving Icelanders is the Atlantic cod fishery in international waters of the Barents Sea. This fishery is currently not regulated, and has caused severe diplomatic conflicts between Iceland and Norway. The current situation in and close to Icelandic waters is thus complicated. Iceland is in conflict with Norway over the Barents Sea cod and the capelin, but is an ally of Norway and Russia in the Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery against the EU. Icelanders are also alienating the Russians by fishing for cod in the Barents Sea, but the Russians are in turn alienating the Icelanders by catching more than their share of oceanic redfish. Iceland has not reached an agreement with Greenland over the Greenland halibut and the Dhorn-Bank shrimp, of which a large part is caught by EU countries. A large part of the EU quotas is then in turn used by European companies owned by Icelanders, as are some of the boats from non-NEAFC countries fishing for oceanic redfish. The conflicts and agreements involving Icelanders are mostly with neighbouring countries, not against large DWFs coming from far away. The fleets from all the countries involved are roughly similar in composition and technology. The only neighbouring country that there seems to be no conflict with is the Faeroe Islands, which in 1997 was allowed to catch 5,0001 of demersal fish, 30,0001 of capelin, an undetermined amount of blue whiting, and its share of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock in Icelandic waters. Icelanders were in turn allowed to catch 2,000 t of herring other than the Norwegian spring-spawning stock, all their share of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock, 1,000 t of mackerel, and undetermined amounts of blue whiting in the Faeroese EEZ. The Icelandic quotas have however usually not been caught. 64 BENEFITS The successful recovery by Iceland of control over its fishery resources has proven to be the major benefit for this nation. This century, fisheries have been overwhelmingly important for the Icelandic economy. During recent years, the relative importance has been about 75 per cent of export earnings or US$1.3 billion in 1996. Currently there is no direct monetary benefit to Icelanders for allowing other nations to fish in their waters, but as a general rule, DWFs are not allowed in Iceland. The minor exceptions are either based on historical reasons and close ties between the countries as with the Faeroese, or are unavoidable since the stocks migrate between EEZs as with the Greenlanders, Norwegians, and Russians. Boxed Case Study 2. The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring' The herring (Clupea harengus) is one of the most abundant fish species in the world and the most abundant fish in the North Atlantic. It is found on both sides of the North Atlantic, from the Bay of Biscay to the Barents Sea on the east side and from the southwest coast of Greenland to North Carolina in the west. The herring is a pelagic zooplankton feeder, measuring between 30 and 40 cm length. It is a multiple spawner and can reach up to 25 years of age (J6nsson, 1992). The herring is split into several different stocks, based on where and when they spawn (Hamre, 1990). Historically, the largest of these stocks is the Norwegian spring-spawning herring (NSS herring). This stock spawns along the coast of central Norway. The larvae then drift to nursing areas along the coast of northern Norway and the Barents Sea, where they stay until they mature at age 4-6. Formerly, once mature the herring undertook large-scale feeding migrations to the waters north and east of Iceland (Map 6). During winter the stock condensed into large schools in the waters east of Iceland, during the spring it went back to the Norwegian spawning grounds. But this pattern changed after the stock collapse of the 1960s. In recent years the overwintering areas have been in fjords in northern Norway and the stock has not ventured into Icelandic waters. The herring stocks in the northeast Atlantic have sustained small-scale coastal fisheries for centuries. This century, however, with increased technology these fisheries evolved into large-scale offshore fisheries. The total catch of the NSS herring was between 200,000 and 400,0001 annually from 1925 until after World War" II when they increased rapidly to 1.65 million t in 1956 (Figure 14). The catches declined again until 1962 and then increased again to a peak of nearly 2 million t in 1966, but then collapsed almost entirely (Hamre, 1990). This rapid increase in catches can be explained by rapidly advancing technology, mostly the power block which made the boats able to haul larger catches and sonar which allowed the boats to find schools in deep waters. Most herring stocks in the northeastern Atlantic collapsed during this period. This collapse is now one of the "classics" in the history of fisheries. During this period, oceanographic conditions worsened and colder currents from the north dominated the warmer Atlantic waters. At the same time fishing technology was rapidly advancing and the boats were able to chase the herring wherever it went. Considerable catches ... of 200,000 to 500,0001 annually of juvenile herring in Norwegian waters were probably also one of the main '"reasons for the collapse (Jakobsson, 1985). This collapse was a big blow for the economies depending on these fisheries. Icelanders were specially hard hit because of the overwhelming importance of fisheries for their economy. The period between 1960 and 1970 was dubbed the herring years in Iceland. This was a period of great prosperity, unemployment virtually did not exist, and many people became rich in a short time. The herring was the main fuel for this progress. Because of this sociological and economic importance Icelanders now claim a large share of the current NSS herring fishery although the stock has not migrated back to Icelandic waters. • Prc-|u-ed by HreifeT Valiyssari !m Impacts: A Global Overview Map 6. Area of distribution of the NSS herring stock and its former migration 65 ttantor projection _ Spawn ing area Feeding area Q Win te r ing area The Footprint of Distant W a t e r Fleets on Wor ld Fisher ies Figure 14. The NSS herring stock crashed in the late 1960s and has only recently recovered 2,000 Faeroe Is. + EU UK + USSR/ Russia Iceland Norway 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 98 Year The herring fisheries can be split into winter, summer, and the previously mentioned juvenile fisheries. The original fishery was conducted during winter on the spawning grounds in Norway, mainly by Norwegian purse-seiners and drifters. This was the main fishery until 1960, when summer fisheries were for the first time higher (Hamre, 1990). The summer fishery was conducted on the feeding grounds in the Norwegian Sea between Norway and Iceland and in Icelandic waters. At first, this fishery was mainly by Norwegians but after World War I also by Icelanders. Boats from Finland, the Faeroe Islands, USSR, Sweden, and Germany also participated, but Icelandic and Norwegian catches were higher. Catches in Icelandic waters were less than 30,0001 until after World War I when they increased to around 200,0001 (Jonsson and Magnusson. 1997). After the war, catches declined again but increased rapidly after 1960 to more than 600,0001 and then collapsed almost entirely after 1967. After the collapse in the late 1960s, a near moratorium was established on all herring fisheries in Icelandic and Norwegian waters. The stocks have since slowly recovered. All the herring catches in Icelandic waters since the collapse have been on the Icelandic summer-spawning herring. This stock has historically always been far smaller then the NSS stock and does not undertake migrations outside Iceland's EEZ. The size of the Icelandic stock is now close to record high levels and sustains catches of around 100,000 t annually (Jakobsson, 1992; Anon., 1997d). Another Icelandic stock, the Icelandic spring-spawning herring is however virtually extinct despite a total moratorium on fishing for three decades. The fishery in Icelandic waters is however only conducted by Icelanders. The NSS stock took longer to recover. Until 1984 catches were always less than 20,000 t/y and the juvenile fishery has almost completely been stopped. From 1986 to 1992, catches were around 100,000 t/y. All - these catches were by Norwegian and Russian boats in Norwegian waters. After this time, strong year classes have been recruited to the fishery, the stock has been rebuilding fast, and catches have been increasing rapidly to 1.5 million t in 1997. After the collapse, the stock was carefully managed by the Norwegians. This was made easier since the stock was then almost entirely confined to Norwegian waters. Because of the increased stock size, the NSS herring does now again undertake large migration movements to the Norwegian Sea. Although it has not yet gone back to Icelandic waters, it is expected to do so soon. This has also made management more difficult since the stock spends long periods in international waters. The aim of current management is to keep the spawning stock biomass over 2.5 • 66 million t which is regarded as the minimum biologically acceptable level. Furthermore, all fisheries for immature herring have been stopped. The fishery has been traditionally controlled by the setting of a TAC, which is then divided between the fishing nations according to annual agreements. Since the collapse and until 1994, the TAC was only shared between Norway and USSR/Russia. However, more recently the stock has migrated again to international waters so that multinational agreements have been necessary. In 1996 an agreement was signed between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands, and in 1997 there was an agreement with the EU (mainly Denmark and the Netherlands). The NSS herring fishery is currently regulated with an agreement between Iceland, Norway, Russia, the Faeroe Islands, and the Eli. There have however in the past been conflicts with the EU, which claims a larger share of the catch. After some failed attempts at cooperation in the recent past, a successful management agreement for 1997 was finally achieved (Anon., 1996d), and was followed by a similar agreement the following year (Anon., 1997e). Obviously, a regional fisheries management organization appears to be in the making, one which, interestingly, has adopted a top-down approach to resource management, in spite of the apparent dominance of one coastal state, Norway (Orebech et al., 1997). For 1998, Iceland is getting 202,0001 of the total quota, the Faeroe Islands 71,000 t, Norway 741,0001, Russia 166,6001, and the EU 109,0001. The countries can catch a certain percentage of their catch in each other's EEZ. Annual acoustic surveys are conducted by research vessels from all countries involved. Norway distributes its quotas roughly according to the capacity of its 100 purse-seiners (60 per cent of the total TAC), gross tonnage of the 70 trawlers (10 per cent), or length of the 400 smaller coastal vessels (30 per cent). For the Icelandic boats, 60 per cent of the TAC is split between vessels according to capacity and 40 per cent is split equally. Most of the Icelandic catches are by 50 large purse-seiners, but trawlers also catch a small part of the catch. The Icelandic quotas are partly transferable (sold or leased) between vessels, but the Norwegian quotas are not. No information is currently available on how the other nations split their quotas or the number of boats they use, but the Faroese probably use around 20 purse-seiners and the Russians some 50 trawlers. The division of the TAC between countries has been based on distribution of the stock, historical catches, contribution to scientific research, and the nation's dependency on fisheries. There are however many grey zones within these. Annual acoustic surveys are conducted by research vessels from all fishing countries (Bjerndal et al., 1997). The herring fisheries have been closely linked to the capelin (Mallotus villosus) fisheries. After the collapse of the herring stocks, the Icelandic and Norwegian f leets changed to capelin, which had been virtually ignored before. The Icelandic capelin stock migrates to Norwegian waters close to Jan Mayen. This stock is managed by agreement between Iceland, Norway, and Greenland. Agreements and conflicts involving NSS herring affect this fishery since the same countries are involved and the same fleets are targeting these species. There is also an ecological conflict between these species, recruitment failures of capelin in the Barents Sea having been linked to high mortality rates on larvae and juveniles due to predation by herring (Gjasaetter, 1994). This could also happen in Icelandic waters if the NSS herring migrates back there. Currently the Icelandic capelin stock is at a high level, which might be explained by the low abundance of herring in Icelandic waters. No commercially important fish species depend heavily on adult herring as food, adult capelin is however very important for many species, specially the Atlantic cod. If the capelin stock in Icelandic waters declines due to increase in the stock size of NSS herring, it could affect the growth of the Atlantic cod stock. The increase of the NSS herring stock can thus cause increased management complexity and cause potential future conflicts between the countries bordering the northeastern Atlantic. The Footpr int of D is tant W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d F isher ies Map 7. The northern cod (areas 2J3KL) off the Canadian Eastern Shelf and Grand Banks was one of the largest fish stocks in history Map shows the ICNAF/NAFO areas. • Case Study: The Shadow of the Past: An Historical Perspective on the Newfoundland Cod Fishery, 1950-1992* PRELUDE The waters off the coast of Newfoundland once held one of the richest fishery resources in the world (Map 7). Fifteenth-century European explorers first ventured across the stormy Atlantic in search of the riches of the orient, but soon realised that the cod found teeming off the coast of Newfoundland offered a different path to economic prosperity. Soon, the Atlantic cod became the central staple of a new international transatlantic economy. Cod were so plentiful in the three centuries following John Cabot's first voyage in 1497, they could be taken "not only with the net but in baskets let down with a stone" (di Soncino, 1983). Migratory fishers from England, France, and Spain began making annual pilgrimages to these fishing grounds. These nations competed, and sometimes fought, with each other for the best fishing areas and choice locations for curing fish on land. Indeed, the wars between France and England over trade and colonies in the latter half of the 17th century spilled over into Newfoundland. Under the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, Britain held its claim to Newfoundland, but continued to allow French and other fishers to take fish off its coast. By the early 19th century, the rapidly growing resident population, comprised mainly of settlers from England and Ireland, was taking the majority of the cod landed off its shores. The fishery continued to provide the mainstay of the economy of Newfoundland, despite many political changes. Britain's oldest colony received self-government in 1855, and became a province of Canada nearly 100 years later in 1949. After Newfoundland joined Confederation, the offshore fishing grounds once again became a site of intense international competition. These fishing grounds occur in one of the largest shelf banks in the American continent (Map 7). With the advent of the diesel-powered stern trawler and the factory freezer ships, European fleets joined Canadian vessels fishing for cod and other groundfish. Fishing capacity and effort in both the Newfoundland inshore and Canadian and international offshore fisheries continued to escalate throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Centuries of dependence on the Atlantic cod by both European and North American fishers came to an end, however as the stocks collapsed in the early 1990s. In 1992, the Canadian government declared a moratorium on fishing northern cod (the populations in the NAFO areas 2J3KL), followed by a moratorium on fishing cod on the south coast of Newfoundland and the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1993. Except for a limited re-opening of the south coast fishery in 1997, the moratorium remains in effect to this day. Overnight, over 40,000 fishers and plant workers lost their livelihoods, hundreds o f coastal communities lost their ability to maintain their populations, and the entire Newfoundland economy was shaken to its core. This paper will look at the changes in the nature of the fishery and changes in the resource itself off the coast of Newfoundland from the beginning of the intensification of the offshore fishery in the 1950s to the eve of the moratorium in 1992. In particular, it will examine the historic context behind the escalation of offshore fishing in the CANADA >{«fc*!X projection • 68 Prepared by Miriam Wright, Memorial University of Newfoundland, and Ram6n Bonfil, Fisheries Centre 1950s and 1960s, and its impact on the resource as noted by contemporary Canadian fisheries scientists. A LONG HISTORY OF OVERFISHING It is a common misconception that overfishing dates from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, the tendency in the past few years to focus on problems of fisheries management during the 1980s gives the erroneous impression that all the answers to the problems of the decline of the cod stocks lay in that period. Recent work by historians and fisheries scientists who have attempted to reconstruct cod landings over time, however; suggests that ecological problems in the Newfoundland fishery are much oldei; dating to at least the 19th century (Cadigan, 1995 and 1996; Hutchings and Myers, 1995). When we look at historic landings for northern cod over the past 300 years, it is clear that the 1960s were a period of unprecedented fishing of the resource. In the 19th century, northern cod landings ranged from 100,000 t to 300,000 t (Hutchings, 1995). At the turn of the century, landings had stabilized at 300,000 t, increasing during World War I when prices were particular good. Decades of economic depression and technological limitations contributed to decreased effort in the fishery in the inter-war years. By the 1940s and 1950s, landings had fallen to 150,000-200,0001. PEAK AND DECLINE The 1960s, however, reveal a much different picture. Total landings of northern cod — led by DWFNs - tripled between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s, reaching an all-time high of810,0001 in 1968 (Figure 15). The record-breaking catches of the late 1960s were never to be repeated. Landings showed a steady decline from 1968 to 1977, when the international 200-mile fishing limit was declared. Figure 15. DWFs usually took the largest part of the northern cod catch, especially during the late 1960s when the stock was fished very hard. Canada gained control of the fishery in the late 1970s Hutchings and Myers (1996) argue that by 1977, "Northern cod were on the verge of commercial extinction". In fact, they claim that between 1962 and 1977, fishable biomass had declined by 82 per cent, spawning biomass by 94 per cent, and numbers of recruits to the fishery by 84 per cent. Although landings recovered somewhat in the late 1980s, The Footprintof reaching highs of nearly 270,0001, the recovery was short lived. In 1990, the biomass had Distant Water Fleets fallen below 1977 levels. Even more ominous was the dramatic change in the age on World Fisheries structure of the remaining population, most particularly the drop in the numbers of older (10-14 year old) individuals, which generally were the most productive spawners. By 1992, the population had declined to the point where commercial fishing was no longer advisable, and the moratorium was declared. When viewed over the long term, Hutchings' figures regarding the declines in the northern cod biomass between 1962 and 1977 suggest that much of the "damage" to the stocks occurred much earlier than is generally believed. For this reason, a closer look at this earlier period, the introduction of new technology to the cod fishery in the northwest Atlantic, and its impact, is merited. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND MARKET FORCES The roots of the intensification of offshore fishing in the 1950s and 1960s lay in economic and technological developments following World War II, both in North America and in Europe. The most important technological developments for both continents were diesel-powered otter trawlers, factory freezer stern trawlers, which allowed the catch to be processed on board, and quick-freezing processing methods. These technologies set the groundwork for increased production of Atlantic cod. Developments in refrigeration, transportation, and marketing in the food sector also contributed to the expansion and industrialization of the fishing industry. In the United States, the New England fishing industry, which had been undergoing capital restructuring and consolidation, began to take advantage of these technological developments. Further fuelled by a growing population and increased demands for frozen food products, the New England and Nova Scotia fishing industries underwent a period of capital expansion. This in turn paved the way for increased production in Newfoundland, as the large New England firms that dominated the North American side of the Atlantic fishery turned northward in search of a steady supply of groundfish. Events in Europe would also have a profound effect on the increased competition for the resource off the coast of Newfoundland. In the wake of World War II, many European countries began rebuilding their economies. Obtaining self-sufficiency in food, and finding a way to feed growing populations became an important consideration for these countries devastated by years of war. As Newfoundland cod had long been a feature of the European diet, building up capacity in the offshore fishery seemed a logical solution. By the early 1950s, Spain, Portugal, and France, which had fished off the Newfoundland coast for centuries, replaced their smaller, side trawlers, pair trawlers, and dory schooners with diesel-powered otter trawlers. By the end of the decade, they were joined by the USSR, East and West Germany, Italy, Norway, and Iceland. The factory freezer stern trawler was of particular value to these distant-water fleets, as vessels could stay on the fishing grounds for a much longer period. The USSR was the major employer of this technology in the early 1960s. 151 Collectively, the size of the fleets fishing in the northwest Atlantic increased dramatically (Figure 16). In 1953, there were 540 otter trawlers over 50 GRT fishing in the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) management area; by 1962, the number had risen to 975. (ICNAF was formed in 1949 and was the precursor to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), an international Figure 16. The distant water and Canadian fleets fishing in the ICNAF/NAFO area (all gears) grew at similar rates and showed little signs of a decrease in fishing capacity 1,600 -1,400 -« 1,200 -to V> 1,000 -> o 800 -Q) F 600 _ 3 400 -200 -0 1950 1990 Data from ICNAF 1964 and NAFO 1992 body to regulate fishing in the North Atlantic from Greenland to the coast of the northeastern United States.) In 1968, the year cod landings reached an historic high, 1,398 otter trawlers were fishing in the northwest Adantic. The sheer size of these vessels also expanded. In 1962, the total of vessels 50 GRT and over was nearly 500,000 GRT By 1971, the total had nearly tripled, to 1.3 million GRT. This growth in fleet size and capacity was accompanied by a level of effort never to be seen again in the fishery. In 1970, vessels in the 1,000-1,999 GRT category put more than 8,000 fishing days together, a figure accounting for more than 60 per cent of the total otter trawl effort in the area. The size of the fleets of individual countries also grew rapidly. In 1962, the USSR had 344 vessels totalling 198,196 GRT fishing in the northwest Atlantic. By 1971, the Soviet fleet had increased to 502 vessels totalling 782,223 GRT Other countries with substantially increased fishing capacity included Spain, Portugal, France, and West Germany. In relative terms, Canada's offshore fleet was small. In 1962, Canada had 272 vessels over 50 GRTj but they tended to be smaller and totalled only 34,525 GRT. Together, these fleets began fishing the waters with an intensity never known in the nearly 500-year history of the international fishery off the coast of Newfoundland. Not only did the sheer amount of technology change in this period, there were significant changes in the way in which this technology was used (Hutchings, 1995). Between 1800 and 1959, the majority of fish taken off the coast of Newfoundland was landed by the small boat, inshore fishery, using such methods as hook and line and cod traps. It was a seasonal fishery, with most of the fish being caught between June and September. It was also physically restricted to the waters within a few miles of shore. The arrival of the diesel-powered otter trawlers changed both the time and place that fish was caught in the northwest Adantic. The steel-hulled construction of the large vessels allowed fishing to take place all year round and in rougher weather, a considerable factor on the stormy North Atlantic. As well, the otter trawlers could advance to new offshore fishing grounds that had not previously been exploited to any great extent. The intensification of fishing off the coast of Labrador in the 1960s, particularly by the USSR, is just one example of the spread of fishing effort to areas with little previous fishing activity. The Footprint of EARLY HINTS OF DECLINE Dis tan t Wa te r Fleets Perhaps not surprisingly, fisheries scientists working in the Newfoundland area began to on Wor ld F isher ies notice changes in the fishery by the early 1960s, just a few years after the intensified offshore fishery began. Dr Wilfred Templeman, director of the Canadian government's fisheries research station in Newfoundland from 1944 to 1972, began talking about the impact of offshore fishing as early as 1962. At a fisheries conference sponsored by the provincial government in 1962, Templeman told the audience of assembled fishers and government officials that the populations of major commercial groundfish species -Atlantic cod, haddock, redfish, and flounder - were all subject to intense international competition (PANL, 1962). He claimed that as fishing continued, the catch per person, and the size of the fish would inevitably decline. Although he was reluctant to predict how long it would take before the Newfoundland fishery reached the point of exhaustion (he claimed it was like "witch doctoring into the future"), he had a rather bleak view of the ability of ICNAF to regulate fishing. He noted that the ICNAF countries were concerned mainly with obtaining the maximum sustainable yield, but he believed that those goals could conflict with the Canadian fishery. In 1966, Templeman published a major report on the state of the marine resources in Newfoundland (Templeman, 1966). In this document, he talked more specifically about the impact of the intensified offshore fishing on the Newfoundland fishery. After just a few years since the arrival of the European fleets, it was clear that Newfoundland fishers were having trouble competing for the resource. Newfoundland's share of the total catch was falling, despite increased effort. In Sub-area 2 (Labrador), the Newfoundland inshore share of the total catch fell from 32 per cent in the years 1955-1958 to 9 per cent in 1961-1964 (Templeman, 1966). Likewise, in Sub-area 3, the Newfoundland fishery took 32 per cent of the catch in 1961-1964, down from 43 per cent in 1955-1958 (Table 12). Table 12. Average total landings by ICNAF countries (includes Newfoundland inshore landings) ICNAF division Catch (t xlO3) Catch (t xlO3) 1955-1958 1961-1964 2J 32 229 3K 79 114 3L 153 170 Part of the reason for this decline was that the European fleets were so much larger and more technologically advanced than the Canadian and Newfoundland vessels. Newfoundland's fleet of mainly smaller, less efficient side trawlers could barely compete with the newer stern trawlers and factory freezer trawlers from Europe. Templeman also believed that the intensification of offshore fishing was having an impact on fish populations. Despite increased landings for many groundfish species, standing stocks were being reduced and the average size of the fish caught was declining - an indicator that the larger; older fish were being fished out (Templeman, 1966). Catch per unit of effort was also falling. Templeman argued that no major concentrations of "undiscovered" groundfish remained, meaning that henceforth, further declines in the populations could be expected. He warned that these trends would continue, as all • 72 ICNAF countries planned to increase their fishing activities in the coming years. Templeman believed that for the Newfoundland inshore fishery, the increased offshore fishing posed a particular threat. Although the migration behaviour of Atlantic cod is not completely understood, a significant portion of Atlantic cod were believed to migrate from offshore grounds to inshore waters during the fishing season. The Newfoundland inshore fishery traditionally depended, to a certain extent, on the ability of offshore fish to make the migration towards shore. When inshore landings began to show dramatic changes from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, Templeman concluded that the intensified offshore fishing was partly to blame. Templeman made the rather starding observation that between 1956 and 1964, despite increases in the number of inshore fishers (53 per cent), vessels (57 per cent), and gear (traps 69 per cent; gdl nets 1819 per cent), total inshore landings had remained relatively stable (Templeman, 1966). Impac ts : A Global O v e r v i e w Alister Fleming, another federal fisheries scientist based in Newfoundland, documented the fall in yields per fisher in the ICNAF Sub-areas 2 and 3 (PANL, 1964). Despite an increase in landings in Sub-area 2 after 1959, yields per fisher had fallen by 25 per cent from the 1954-1957 average. In Sub-area 3K, the number of fishers had remained the same, but landings and yields per fisher fell 40 per cent below the 1954-1955 level. Likewise, in Sub-area 3L, the number of fishers rose by 30 per cent while landings fell 20 per cent. Both Templeman and Fleming argued that, with continued offshore fishing, the only chance for the survival of the inshore fishery was through equipping it with more efficient gear and vessels to catch the increasingly scarce groundfish. Templeman and others had evidence, however, that the impact of intensified offshore fishing in this period was uneven, with some areas affected more than others. The heavy offshore fishing in the Labrador area in the early 1960s had the potential to affect the inshore fishery. Templeman noted: "With this great development of the European offshore deep-water fishery, Newfoundland landings from the coastal fishery off Labrador (Sub-area 2) declined from about 100 per cent of the total in 1950 to 32 per cent in 1955-1958 and to 9 per cent in 1961-1964. The new offshore fishery affects the inshore fisheries of Labrador and northern Newfoundland by reducing both quantities and sizes of cod" (Templeman, 1966). Bonavista, on the northeast coast of Newfoundland (ICNAF Sub-area 3L), also experienced problems. In the early 1950s, the federal government established an experimental longliner fishery when excellent deep-water grounds were discovered 20 miles from shore (Templeman, 1966). Longliners, near-shore vessels typically between 15 and 20 m in length, had not previously been used in the Newfoundland fishery. After several successful years, landings for the Bonavista-based longliners declined rapidly. By 1960, the average catch for these vessels had fallen to 40 per cent of earlier landings. The average size of the fish landed by the longliners decreased by 5 cm. The local inshore fishery also experienced declines, with cod trap landings falling by two-thirds in the same period. Several otter trawlers and a large fleet of longliners from Norway and the Faeroe Islands that joined the Bonavista longliners on the fishing ground beginning in 1956 were widely blamed for these difficulties. As landings for the Europeans also declined in the early 1960s, they eventually left the area. The incident, however, alerted fishers and fisheries scientists alike to the potential impact of intensified offshore effort on the groundfish stocks. 73 THE DOMINION STRIKES BACK These changes began sending alarm bells throughout the Newfoundland fishery. Not only were the scientists concerned about the changing fishery, but Newfoundland frozen fish company owners, inshore fishers, and provincial Department of Fisheries officials feared the implications of intensification of offshore fishing (Wright, 1997). By the early 1960s, increasing pressure was put on the federal government to address the issue. The government began taking tentative steps towards implementing a 12-mile fishing limit in an attempt to decrease foreign fishing on inshore fishing grounds (Wright, 1997a). The federal government also took a renewed interest in increasing the technological capacity of the Newfoundland fishery, particularly the offshore sector. With several hundred European trawlers regularly fishing just a few miles from Canadian shores, the federal Minister of Fisheries vowed to equip the Canadian offshore fishery to compete with the more technologically endowed Europeans, promising to double the number of Canadian offshore vessels. In 1966, the Fisheries Development Act was created to provide loans and financial assistance to the frozen fish industry for the acquisition of processing plants and trawlers, the first federal programme to do so. In the years that followed, the Newfoundland offshore fleet increased significantly. Unfortunately, if the exploitation led by DWFNs in the 1960s was unsustainable, the Canadianization of the fishery (Figure 17) did not bring much relief to the Adantic cod. After the 200-mile fishing limit was declared in 1977, and Canada effectively gained control over the larger portion of the northern cod stock, the Canadian fleet expanded steadily to fill the void left by the European fleets (Figure 18). Between 1977 and 1986, the number of vessels over 50 GRT grew from 561 (128,007 GRT) to 795 (158,754 GRT). Figure 17. The Canadianization of the northern cod fishery occurred after declaration of the EEZ regime in the late 1970s 1.0 r ,0l I I I ! 1 1 MN 1955 1970 1975 19B0 1985 1990 Y e a r INSHORE FISHERY PERSPECTIVES The early 1960s also marked the beginning of over 30 years of increasing technological and vessel capacity in the Newfoundland inshore fishery. Researchers with the Traditional Ecological Knowledge section of the Eco-Research Project at Memorial Figure 18. Otter trawl effort in areas 2J3KL decreased in the 1970s only to grow again in the 1980s Data from ICNAF/NAFO Statistical Bulletin, various years University of Newfoundland interviewed fishers from the Bonavista/Trinity Bay area on the northeast coast of Newfoundland in an attempt to document fishing people's understanding of the resource and the changes that had occurred over the past decades (Neis et al., 1996). Fishers from a variety of age groups were interviewed, from those who began fishing in the 1920s, to relatively recent entrants to the fishery. To track increases in technology and technological capacity, interviewers asked fishers to report the vessel size, capacity, horsepower of the engines, and the type and amount of gear used throughout their fishing careers. The interviews showed that overall catchability per boat, along with vessel capacity and the horsepower of the engines, increased between 1950 and 1990. The numbers of cod traps and gill nets soared, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, while mesh sizes declined. With the growing use of electronic fish sounders and heightened overall skill in catching fish by the late 1980s, the inshore fishers were more highly technologically equipped than ever before. This increase in technology has not meant a corresponding increase in landings, however, as the inshore catch remained relatively stable and catch rates actually declined. Indeed, the dramatic changes in the resource have meant that inshore fishers of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have used the technology simply to catch the same amount of fish as their counterparts had generations earlier with relatively simple vessels and gear WHO'S FAULT WAS IT? When the northern cod stocks collapsed in the early 1990s, fisheries scientists and other observers were left scrambling to offer an explanation. Despite strong evidence that human predation had been the main cause of the decline, other theories focusing on environmental change have gained some support. One such hypothesis is that unnaturally high mortality owing to colder than average ocean water temperatures in the North Atlantic in early 1991 precipitated the collapse of the Atlantic cod stocks (de Young and Rose, 1993; Lear and Parsons, 1993). Although this explanation was particularly attractive to government fisheries managers (it absolves humans from blame), others have challenged these findings. Myers and Cadigan (1995) found little The Footpr in t of evidence of increased adult natural mortality in 1991, but substantially more evidence Dis tan t Wa te r Fleets of increased mortality due to fishing. Likewise, Hutchings and Myers argued there was on Wor ld F isher ies no clear relationship between poor recruitment (the ascendance of 3-year-old fish to the stocks) and environmental factors, either water temperature or salinity (Hutching and Myers, 1994). From an historical standpoint, the "cold water theory" is difficult to sustain as extremely cold water temperatures have been recorded in the past without causing the collapse of the stocks. Another issue bearing on this debate is whether or not the "collapse" of northern cod stocks in the early 1990s was as sudden as Department of Fisheries and Oceans officials would lead one to believe. Newfoundland inshore landings, particularly for fixed gear such as gill nets, suggest that the final decline in biomass began in 1985, long before the most extreme cool water temperatures were recorded in the early 1990s (Myers and Cadigan, 1995). As well, the tendency for Department of Fisheries and Oceans scientists to rely on commercial catch data for doing stock assessments may have led to an overestimation of stock size for many years (Finlayson, 1994). The difficulty with commercial catch data - specifically trawl landings - is that it fails to take effort into account. Increasing or stable landings over time may not be indicative of a growing or stable population, but of increased effort and efficiency in fishing. Although most scientists would admit that many factors may have contributed to the disappearance of northern cod, the evidence pointing to years of overfishing remains cogent. The long-term declines in catch per unit of effort in both the inshore and offshore fisheries from 1962 onward, the dramatic changes in the age structure of the cod populations, the declining size of cod, and spatial shifts in fishing activity over time all point to human, rather than environmental factors (Hutchings and Myers, 1994). In all likelihood, the intensified fishing effort that took place in the 1980s put increased pressure on a population that was already weakened by the fiercely competitive international fishing activity that took place between 1962 and 1977. The resource, which had fed so many for centuries, was finally unable to sustain itself. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE This evidence suggests that we need to look more closely at the link between changes in the resource over the past, the escalation of technology, and how these changes are connected to the larger ecological crisis in the northwest Adantic fishery. Technological and international economic developments in the 1950s led to the exploitation of the resource in the late 1950s and early 1960s on a scale never known before. Very early in this process, fisheries scientists such as Wilfred Templeman noticed that fish populations were being affected, and that Newfoundland fishers would have to arm themselves with even greater amounts of technology if they were to compete in this changed environment. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, fishing capacity in the Newfoundland inshore and offshore fishery continued to escalate. As Hutchings has argued, the effect of this technological build-up, and the constant shifting of effort from lower-yield areas to higher-yield areas, has been to "mask" the full impact on the populations of northern cod, both inshore and offshore (Hutchings, 1995). Although we still have much to learn about the reasons for the collapse of one of the richest fishery resources in the world in the early 1990s, this historical perspective I 76 demonstrates that unprecedented fishing by DWFNs in the pre-200-mile EEZ days, and by Canadian fishermen afterwards, set the stage for one of the most dramatic fishery collapses in the northern hemisphere. I m p a c t s : A Global O v e r v i e w Case Study: DWFs off Namibia ECOSYSTEM Environmental Conditions Namibia has an extensive coastline spanning 1,572 km. The marine environment off the coast of Namibia is dominated by the northerly Benguela current system which extends some 200 km along the west coast of southern Africa, from Cape Town to about 15° S. The upwelling area is bound by the warm currents of Agulhas in the south, and Angola in the north. This is an eastern boundary current upwelling system driven by prevailing southerly longshore winds. The system is somewhat larger during winter than during summer. There are three major distinctive upwelling cells: the most extensive and frequent occurs off Luderitz, the Agulhas cell is the southernmost, and the Cunene cell is the northernmost (Lutjeharms et al., 1995). During summer, the major upwelling occurs off Luderitz and Cape Columbine, in South Africa, while in winter Cape Frio reaches the maximum upwelling (Mann and Lazier, 1991). Reportedly, primary production in the Benguela system ranges between 0.04 and 1.0 g C m'2 h'1 (Painting et al., 1993; Estrada and Marrase, 1987). Map 8. Namibia only emerged as an independent country and as an important fishing nation in 1990 Food Chain The Benguela system is dominated by small pelagic fish, mainly Sardinops oceUata and Engraulis capensis. The former species dominated the system and supported catches of up to 1.3 million t (1968). More recendy, the sardines have been replaced by anchovies which are now the most important small pelagic species. Dense populations of horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus capensis) are also important. The demersal ecosystem is dominated by the valuable stocks of hakes (Merluccius capensis) (shallow water Cape hake) and Merluccius paradoxus (deep water Cape hake). The interactions between the main species in the food web include predator-prey relationships between Cape hake and horse mackerel, and cannibalism in hake (Konchina, 1986). Kinglip (Genypterus capensis) is also an important predator of Cape hake. The main food web in the ecosystem includes seals as the top predator, hakes, squid, snoek, and chub mackerel as the piscivorous species and horse mackerel, round herring, saury, pilchard, and anchovy as the main pelagic prey, and lightfish, lanterfish, and goby as the main demersal prey (Shelton, 1992). THE COASTAL NATION Namibia is mostly a desert country with a hot and dry climate. Rainfall is sparse and erratic, thus there are very limited natural fresh water resources. The Namib Desert lies along most of the coast, whilst the Kalahari Desert lies in the east of the country (Map 8). Namibia is a young country that only attained independence on 21 March 1990. The Namibian economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export (diamonds, copper, uranium, gold, lead, tin, lithium, cadmium, zinc, salt, vanadium, natural gas). Mining accounts for almost 25 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Namibia is the fourth largest exporter of non-fuel minerals in Africa and the world's fifth largest producer of uranium. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make 77 sotjtti VTX * The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Half of the population depends on agriculture (largely subsistence agriculture) for its livelihood, but Namibia must import some of its food. The main agricultural products are: millet, sorghum, peanuts, and livestock. Prior to independence in 1990, the country effectively did not have an EEZ along its 200-mile coast, one of the richest in the world. The result was overfishing as foreign vessels which fished in Namibian waters were completely free of quota restrictions, although the South African-controlled administration had jurisdiction within a 22-kilometre coastal limit. Upon independence, the new government immediately took steps towards a recovery of the fish stocks and set a new policy of "Namibization" of the fisheries sector. The number of licences granted to foreign trawlers to fish Namibian waters is now limited and joint ventures between foreign and local interests are encouraged. In addition, new deep-water fisheries have developed in Namibia as a result of the change to independence (Beaudry et al., 1993). The fish catch potential of Namibia is calculated over 1 million t, and perhaps as high as 1.3-1.5 million t (Jurgens, 1991)but is not being totally fulfilled (CIA, 1997). Namibia has no ship-building capabilities but it has dry-dock facilities for foreign vessels in Walvis Bay. Ironically, Namibia has become a DWFN itself. Vessels based in Walvis Bay fish for the lucrative toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) in the Antarctic Ocean. The Distant Water Fishing Nations A large number of DWFNs used to fish off Namibia when this country was under South African rule and the 200-mile EEZ had not been declared. The most important DWFNs operating in Namibian waters since in the early 1960s were: the former USSR and Spain (since 1964); Japan, Bulgaria and Israel (since 1965); Belgium and Germany (since 1966); France (since 1967); Cuba (since 1969); Romania and Portugal (since 1970); Poland (since 1972); Italy (since 1974); Iraq (since 1979); Taiwan (since 1981); and the Republic of Korea (since 1982). Reportedly, in the years prior to independence, more than 300 mid-water and bottom trawl vessels were operating off the Namibian coast (Beaudry et al., 1993). According to one report (AED, 1993), the former USSR had a 32 per cent market share in the country's fish, followed by Spain with 26 per cent, and South Africa with 7 per cent. Hake stocks declined by more than half, whilst the pilchard stock fell to only 2 per cent of its previous level between 1976 and 1986. As soon as the independent government announced the EEZ regime in 1990, there was a drop of more than 90 per cent in the number of unlicensed foreign vessels fishing in the area. The Fishery Resources and Fishing Sectors The four main fishery resources of Namibia in terms of weight are pilchard, horse mackerel, and hake, and to a lesser extent anchovy. Exploitation of fisheries in Namibia began in 1948 concentrating on pdchards (Jurgens, 1991), then moved to horse mackerel and anchovy as pilchard declined. The main fishing gears used for these stocks are bottom trawl and longlining for hake, purse-seining for pilchard and anchovy, and mid-water trawl for horse mackerel. There are two species of hake in Namibia: Merluccius capensis (shallow water, 100-200 m), and Merluccius paradoxus (deep water, 200-400 m). MacPherson and Gordoa (1995) report on survey-based biomass estimates for these two species off Namibia during 1983-1990. These varied depending on the season of the surveys at 0.25-2.0 million t for M. capensis and 0.1-1.0 million t for M. paradoxus. The hake population suffered a recruitment collapse in 1993-1994 apparently due to anoxia-induced mortality in shelf bottom waters (Blatt, 1998). Soviet research indicated overfishing effects (decreases in mean length and truncation of age structure) in Cape mackerel stocks (Chuksin and Kuderskaya, 1991). Polish vessels exploited hake and horse mackerel off Namibia at least in the period 1973-1987 and probably beyond this. Polish research suggested that the state of the hake stock was still satisfactory just before independence, although abundance has declined visibly (Wysokinski and Czykieta, 1989). Lasch (1994) provides estimated maximum sustainable yield levels for the most important fishery resources of Namibia. These are: 450,000 t for horse mackerel, 350,000 t for Cape hake, 250,000 t for pilchard, and 150,000 t for anchovy. However, the pilchard population off Namibia is currently severely depleted (Anon., 1998a). Other Fishery Resources There are other fisheries which are minor in volume but increasingly important in economic terms. Among these are monkfish (Lophius vomerius and L. vaillanti), the deep-sea red crab (Chaceon maritae)(peak catch of 10,000 t in 1983), and spiny lobsters (Jasus spp.). More recently, new fishery resources have been targeted by the expanding and diversifying fishing industry of Namibia. Probably the most important new fisheries are for orange roughy (Hoplostetus atlanticus), alfonsino (Beryx splendens), and oreos (Allocyttus spp., Pseudocyttus spp., and Neocyttus spp.). Most of these fisheries aim for the export market. The growth of the new fishery for deep-sea fish is remarkably rapid (Table 13). Table 13. Catches (t x 103) of important deep-sea fishes off Namibia Species 1994 1995 1996 0.16 6.83 12.46 1.08 1.73 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.65 HISTORICAL CATCHES Catches of the Coastal Nation The record of fisheries catches of Namibia as a nation start only in 1990. Statistics on catches for the major stocks are presented in Table 14 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998a). Mackerel has been the major fishery since independence followed by hake and a slowly rebounding pilchard fishery. Catches of the DWFs Data on DWF catches off Namibia prior to independence are not readily available, so that the information presented here is fragmentary. Hewitson (1988) and Hewitson et al. (1989) report on the catches of the three main fishery resources for 1987 and 1988. The Footprint of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries Table 14. Fish catch off Namibia by gear type and species Fishery and target species 1989 1990 1991 Catch (tx 103) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Purse seine net fishing pilchard 76 92 69 81 115 116 43 horse mackerel 31 85 83 116 74 34 51 anchovy 79 51 17 39 63 25 48 91 Trawling & coastal fishing hake 14 55 56 87 108 112 130 129 horse mackerel 1 93 353 311 401 328 260 230 Ring & bow net fishing crab 0.80 4.40 2.70 2.80 3.20 3.60 2.00 1.70 rock lobster 5.60 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.30 Adapted from Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998a and Anon., 1998a According to their data, during 1987 fishing off Namibia was the highest since 1976, with pilchard catches of 65,500 t (which considerably exceeded the quota), anchovy landings of 376,000 t, which were the highest on record until then, and horse mackerel landings of 33,500 t. For 1988 the catches were: pilchard 62,000 t, anchovy 117,000 t, and horse mackerel 169,000 t. According to Beaudry et al. (1993) just prior to the independence of Namibia, the USSR and Portugal caught about 88 per cent of the hake off Namibia, and the USSR, Romania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Spain, and Poland caught 78 per cent of the horse mackerel. According to Goffinet (1992), the USSR fished so hard off Namibia that it caused the collapse of the hake stocks in the late 1970s. Horse mackerel catches peaked at 570,0001 in 1982, hake catches peaked at 800,000 t in 1972, and the pilchard catch is estimated to have reached 1.5 million t in 1968 (Stuttaford, 1994). The reported catches of pilchard and anchovy off .Namibia before independence are shown in Figure 19. Figure 19. After heavy exploitation by DWFs in the 1960s, the pilchard fishery off Namibia declined and was partially replaced by an anchovy fishery • 80 FLEET CHARACTERISTICS AND NUMBERS There is little information on the size of the DWFs fishing off Namibia before 1990. According to Stuttaford (1994), South Africa had two factory ships supported by about 28 purse-seiners fishing for pilchard since the mid-1960s. Although there are no statistics readily available, anecdotal accounts (Stuttaford, 1994) point to some 150-300 foreign trawlers fishing for hake off Namibia in the pre-independence days. For the period after Namibian independence Beaudry et al. (1993) report 80 companies holding 95 concessions in Namibia during 1993. This amounted to 190 licensed vessels, up from 137 in 1991. Although 88 per cent of the demersal fleet was flagged in Namibia, 61 per cent actually carried their catch back to Spain or other foreign markets (freezer trawlers), while the rest of the fleet delivered iced product to the growing on-shore based processing industry. These authors also report that almost all of the mid-water trawling fleet (about 76 per cent of the total licensed fleet tonnage) were former Soviet vessels now chartered by local companies. In a similar way, all the tuna fleet is based in South Africa. During 1994, there were 40 pelagic purse-seiners of 100-500 GRT fishing anchovy and pilchard, 70 demersal trawlers targeting hake (about half of these are 180-960 GRIj the rest being 60-170 GRT and a few factory vessels of 1,300-1,800 GRT), and 45 Eastern European mid-water trawlers of 200-7,750 GRT fishing horse mackerel (Anon., 1994b). Overall, the fleets fishing off Namibia have grown from a total of 214 vessels in 1991 to 309 in 1996, with the proportion of Namibian owned vessels increasing from 50 per cent in 1991 to 76 per cent in 1996 (Anon., 1998a). FISHERIES MANAGEMENT BY COASTAL STATE After DWFs overfished many of the most important stocks off Namibia, strong management measures imposed by the independent government after 1990 allowed stocks to recover (Anon., 1994b). Table 15 lists a history of TACs determined by the Namibian government for the main fishery resources. Namibia has relatively good monitoring capabilities to deter pirate fishing. Beaudry et al. (1993) report that over the period 1990-1993 more than ten Spanish fishing vessels operating illegally in Namibian waters have been seized, discouraging further illegal fishing. BYCATCH The Namibian government manages bycatch through bycatch fees. These are intended to avoid the complications of multiple quotas being necessary for any vessel. There is no specific information on the levels of bycatch by fleet and fishery. FISHING AGREEMENTS Currently, Namibia does not allow any foreign companies to fish in its EEZ. At least until 1993 Namibia had no fishing agreements with any country. The only way for foreigners to have access to the fishery is through investing in joint-venture companies in Namibia. Many local concessionaires sell their quotas to foreigners by chartering foreign-owned and operated vessels. Some of the main countries having set up joint ventures in Namibia are: Norway and Spain, for demersal fishing; Norway and South Africa in pelagic fishing; Russia and Spain in horse mackerel fishing; and South Africa in tuna fishing (Beaudry et al., 1993). The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies Table 15. Total allowable catches for main fishery resources off Namibia Year Pilchard Horse mackerel Hakes 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 115 125 40 20 25 80 60 465 450 450 500 400 400 350 60 90 120 150 150 170 110 Source: Namibia Brief, 1997 BENEFITS The benefits of the new system of "foreign fishing" in which former DWF interests are now partners with Namibian entrepreneurs in joint-venture companies has proven very successful for Namibia and presumably is still beneficial to the DWFNs. Fisheries have acquired an increasingly important role in the Namibian economy since it became an independent state. The growth of the fisheries sector was from 7.6 per cent of total exports to 22.9 per cent by 1995, making it the second largest export earner after mining (Anon., 1998b). Fish products in 1994 contributed about 28 per cent to total goods exported and 7.6 per cent to the GDR Gross value of exports for 1994 was estimated to be more than US$365 million, an increase of 35 per cent from the previous year (IPS, 1995). Pescanova, one of the largest fishing companies to build a processing factory in Namibia, exports most of the production. Most fish is now processed on land, and Pescanova employs more than 1,000 people. Investment is also up in the fisheries sector of Namibia as a result of its joint venture policy. In 1991-1995 some N$300 million was invested in new processing capacity, largely for hake and principally at Walvis Bay, the main fishing industry centre, with a further N$200 million invested in locally owned fishing vessels. One of the largest developments by Spain's Pescanova involved a N$100 million investment in expanding a hake factory complex in Luderitz, while during 1995-1996 most fish factories were upgraded at a cost to the industry of around N$80 million to meet stringent EU hygiene requirements for fish exports (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998b). Foreign aid has helped Namibia build respectable capabilities for controlling and monitoring foreign fishing. The main countries providing assistance in this area are Norway - which funnelled at least US$4 million in aid to the fisheries sector for training Namibian personnel and reducing the dependency on expatriates - and the United States. Iceland has also provided technical assistance. Namibia has effectively closed access to DWFs through its licensing policy which does not allow foreign-based DWFs. Instead, most deep-water and mid-water concession holders charter foreign-owned or operated factory ships, mainly from CONFLICTS • 82 Russia and Spain. ^ Ecosystem/Economic Impacts' ) T h e F o o t p r i n t of D i s t a n t W a t e r F lee ts on W o r l d F i s h e r i e s Analysis of the Impacts of DWFs on Namibia The objective of this analysis is to assess the impact of fishing by DWFs on both the ecology of the Namibian ecosystem and the economics of Namibia's fisheries. To do this, the ECOSIM/ECOPATH modelling tools are employed to capture the natural dynamics of the ecosystem. The starting point for the analysis are the two ECOPATH models of the northern Benguela ecosystem off Namibia developed in Jarre-Teichmann and Christensen (1998a and 1998b). These models were constructed for the periods 1971-1977 and 1978-1983. The outputs from the models are fed into the EcosiM framework (Walters et al., 1997), which is a dynamic version of ECOPATH (Christensen and Pauly, 1992), to allow dynamic simulations and analysis of different exploitation scenarios both "with" and "without" DWF participation in the ecosystem. The dynamic simulations are performed in a manner that allows the isolation of the ecological impacts of the activities of DWFs on the ecosystem during the pre-independence era. These impacts are then valued to give an indication of their economic effects. Distant water fleets (DWFs) started operating in Namibian waters in the early 1960s. Fleets from the former USSR and Spain arrived in 1964, followed by Japan, Bulgaria, and Israel in 1965, Belgium and Germany in 1966, France in 1967, Cuba in 1969, Romania and Portugal in 1970, Poland in 1972, Italy in 1974, Iraq in 1979, Taiwan in 1981, and the Republic of Korea in 1982, according to the FAO Yearbooks of Fishery Statistics. In concrete terms, this study does the following: • Extends the ECOPATH models in Jarre-Teichmann and Christensen (1998a and 1998b) to ECOSIM models to serve as the framework for the dynamic analysis of the impacts of fishing by DWFs on both the economics and ecology of the ecosystem. • Develops scenarios of the Namibian ecosystem in which the activities of the DWFs in Namibian waters before independence in 1990 are captured. The scenarios are developed using information on the catches of hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard during this period. • Addresses the following questions. (1) What is the state of the ecosystem in terms of its ecology "with" and "without" DWFs? We interpret the ecology here somewhat narrowly to mean the stock size of the fishes in the ecosystem. We are interested in questions such as, given the catch of hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard in the "with" and "without" DWFs scenarios, what are the impacts of DWFs on the biomass of the major species in the ecosystem? (2) How does the impact on the biomass of the system affect the potential catch of these species? (3) How do these impacts on catch levels translate into economic values? Prepared by Ussif Rashid Sumaila The Footpr in t of In pre-independence days there was little or no surveillance of most fishing operations Dis tan t Wa te r Fleets in Namibian waters (Namibia Foundation, 1994), hence there was a massive assault on Wor ld F isher ies on the fishery resources of Namibia during this period. For example, the official statistics, which are suspected of being on the low side, show that 1.4 million t of pilchard were caught in 1968. Before this massive catch, pre-1968 catches are reported to have been between 100,000 and 600,000 t, most of it taken by DWFs. The massive, almost uncontrolled, exploitation of Namibian hake started in 1964 and reached a peak in 1972 when 800,000 t of hake were reported to have been caught. It is believed by many that the catch was most probably considerably higher. The catches were lower between 1972 and 1980 at about 150,000 t. Catches improved again to around 400,000 t in 1985, and declined again until 1991 when Namibia took full control of its resources for the first time. Again most of these catches were taken by DWFs. In fact it is reported that up until 1985, 99 per cent of hake catch was by DWFs. After 1985, 90 per cent was still taken by DWFs (Namibia Foundation, 1994). Horse mackerel were also heavily targeted by DWFs active in Namibia's EEZ before independence. Annual catches were seldom below 300,000 t, with the peak of 570,000 t landed in 1982, according to the statistics. • The Scenarios Two scenarios are developed, "with" DWFs, and "without" DWFs. THE "WITH" DWFs SCENARIO Based on the background information outlined above, we assume that in the 1970s and 1980s an average of 475,000 t of pilchard were caught annually. The equivalent numbers for hake and horse mackerel are 248,000 and 354,000 t, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that during this period about 90 per cent of these catches were taken by the DWFs, while the remaining 10 per cent were fished by the domestic fleet. It is also assumed that the ECOPATH model presented in Jarre-Teichmann for the period 1971-1977 captures the state of the Namibian ecosystem in the early 1970s. The output from this model is fed into the ECOSIM framework to obtain what we call ECOSIM 7 1 7 7 . ECOSIM 7177 is run using fishing efforts that give the DWFs 90 per cent of the assumed catch of hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard. Similarly, fishing efforts that will ensure the domestic fleet 10 per cent of the catch are applied. The model is run for 20 years until about 1990 when Namibia attained independence. From the model runs we isolate the effects of these high pre-independence fishing levels on the potential stock levels of (1) hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard, and (2) the other major species in the ecosystem. Similarly, we determine the impacts on the a 84 potential catches from these species and the other major species in the ecosystem. THE "WITHOUT" DWFs SCENARIO ECOSIM 7177 is re-run but this time with only the domestic fishing effort exerted. That is, we eliminate the DWF completely. From the runs we determine the state of the stock and the catch potential of the species in the habitat. Finally the biological results under the two scenarios outlined above are priced and costed to determine the possible bioeconomic impacts of the activities of the DWFs on Namibian fisheries. • Ecological Impacts The main results of the analysis are presented in Tables 16 and 17. Table 16 reports results for the "with" DWFs scenario, while Table 17 does the same for the "without" DWFs scenario. The second columns in each of these tables present the average annual standing biomass for all the main commercial species in the ecosystem. It is worth noting that to obtain these results, the modellers' best estimates of the ecological parameters of ECOPATH and ECOSIM are used. A more elaborate study would include sensitivity analysis on these parameters to see what impact they will have on the results of the study. Table 16. Ecological and economic results in the "with" DWF scenario Species Biomass Catch 1995 Price Value Net value Domestic DWF (tx 103) (t x 103) (N$) (MS) (IMS) M) <N$) Anchovy 706 233 215 50 25 3 23 Pilchard 1,650 476 819 424 212 21 191 Mackerel 108 26 1,050 28 14 13 Horse mackerel 777 249 1,050 261 131 13 118 Snoek and Tuna 8 8 6,000 49 25 2 22 Other pelagics 1.269 16 191 3 2 0 1 Hake 1,074 354 4,000 1,417 709 71 638 Other demersals 210 4 3,150 13 6 1 6 Table 17. Ecological and economic results in the "without" DWF scenario Species Biomass Catch 1995 Price Value Net value Domestic DWF (txlO1) (t x 103) <N$) (N$) M) <N$) (N$) Anchovy 373 215 26 13 13 0 Pilchard 2441 891 63 31 31 0 Mackerel 38 1,050 10 5 5 0 Horse mackerel 1,303 1,050 43 21 21 0 Snoek and Tuna 6 6,000 36 18 18 0 Other pelagics 436 191 1 1 1 0 Hake 2,122 4,000 281 140 140 0 Other demersals 190 3,150 12 6 6 0 The Footprint of A comparison of the "with" and "without" DWFs scenarios reveals the following. For Distant Water Fleets hake, the average standing biomass in the "with" scenario is only 5 1 per cent of that in on World Fisheries the "without" scenario. For pilchard and horse mackerel it is about 6 8 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively. For the ecosystem as a whole, the effect of DWF activities is to reduce the potential standing biomass by about 16 per cent. The above observations highlight one of the two important impacts of DWF activities on Namibia's ecosystem, namely the impact on the future potential of the stocks at independence. We see that because of the overexploitation that occurred during the period of DWF activities, and according to model estimates, Namibia received at independence, 51 per cent, 68 per cent, and 60 per cent of the potential of the hake, pilchard, and horse mackerel stocks, the three key commercial species in the ecosystem. With respect to the ecosystem as a whole, a 16 per cent decrease in total biomass of exploited species due to the activities of DWFs is predicted. This value is relatively small compared to the losses of hake, pilchard, and horse mackerel. There are two inter-related reasons for this. First, our analysis assumes that only hake, pilchard, and horse mackerel are targeted by the DWF. Second, ECOPATH/ECOSIM account for the indirect effects of release in predation, and increase in competition for resources in the food web. Hence, the balance of masses in the food web causes an increase in the biomass of preys and competitors (e.g. anchovy, mackerel, other pelagic and small demersal fish), with the depletion of hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard; the converse is expected with the reduction in fishing pressure on these three species in the "without" DWFs scenario. To further illustrate the effect of DWFs on the future potential of the stocks, Figure 20 plots the stock profiles for pilchard, hake, and horse mackerel in the "with" and "without" scenarios. This figure clearly shows that much healthier stock sizes are left over at independence in the "without" than in the "with" scenarios. The above results on the biomass are reflected in the catch taken in the "with" and "without" DWFs scenarios. We see from the third column in Tables 16 and 17 that much more hake, pilchard, and horse mackerel are taken in the "with" than in the "without" DWFs scenarios. • Economic Impacts Tables 16 and 17 report the net landed value or the added value obtained from fishing the resources in the Namibian ecosystem in the two scenarios. The net landed value is the revenue from fish landed less all costs, it is therefore the added value obtained by exploiting the resources in the ecosystem. To obtain this, the average catch levels determined from ECOSIM are multiplied by 1995 constant prices obtained from the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources for each of the species of fish. Finally, the gross landed value obtained is reduced by half to obtain the net landed value. This is in accordance with data from the ministry which shows that on average the cost of fishing is about 5 0 per cent of the gross landed value. • 86 Tables 16 and 17 also show how much of the added value goes to the DWFs and how much to the domestic fleets. We see from these tables that in the "with" scenario, the DWFs make on average N$l ,012 million annually while the domestic fleet makes only Figure 20. Stock profiles for pilchard, hake and horse mackerel in the "with" and the "without" DWF scenarios about N$112 million. In the "without" DWFs scenario, in which the fishing effort by DWFs is taken away, while maintaining the same fishing effort for the domestic fleet as in the "with" scenario, the domestic fleet makes N$236 million. This part of the analysis reveals the second impact of DWF activities in Namibian waters: their presence has led to a loss of about 53 per cent of what Namibia would have earned in their absence employing the same amount of fishing effort as in the "with" case. This is because in the absence of the DWFs, the domestic fleet benefits from exploiting much higher stocks of fishes at lower costs. Figures 21 and 22 plot the discounted economic rents to the DWFs and Namibia in the "with" and "without" DWFs scenarios. Figure 21 shows that the DWFs take the lion's share of the economic benefits throughout the period. In Figure 22, only the payoffs to Namibia in the "with" and "without" scenarios are plotted to highlight the impact of DWFs. This figure shows that Namibia does consistendy better in the "without" scenario, even though it is employing the same fishing effort as in the "with" scenario. The decline in economic rent seen in the figures from 1970 to 1989 is due to discounting. • Implications for Namibian Fisheries The modest objective of this part of the report is to use computational methods to isolate the impact of DWFs on Namibia's ecosystem in the period before independence. Other aspects of DWF impacts are addressed by other parts of the report. By combining the ECOPATH and ECOSIM approaches, a simple ex post facto analysis has revealed two important impacts of DWF activities on the Namibian ecosystem. First, the analysis shows that because of the overexploitation by DWFs in the years before independence, the newly independent Namibia inherited an ecosystem whose production potential was severely reduced. In the case of the important hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard stocks the reduction ranged between 32 and 49 per cent of the Figure 21. Discounted rent paid to the DWF and Namibia in the "with"scenario, and to Namibia in the "without" scenario Figure 22. Discounted rent to Namibia in the "with" and "without" scenarios 500 w Z e 400 \ ^ " s ^ W i t h DWFs o — 1 ** c a> 300 a> w C a Without DWFs o o <n • 200 " " " " r — — mn i i i i 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 Year biomass potential. It is little wonder that in the years right after independence, relatively small TACs for hake, horse mackerel, and pilchard had to be authorized by the new government in an effort to recapture some of the lost potential. In 1990 and 1991 the TAC for hake was 60,0001; for pilchard the 1990 TAC was 40,000 t and the 1991 TAC was 60,000 t; while the 1990 TAC for horse mackerel was 150,000 t (Namibia Foundation, 1994). Second, the analysis shows that had Namibia employed the same fishing effort it used in the "with" DWF scenario, it would have made more that 100 per cent more economic rent from exploiting the resources in the ecosystem in the absence of DWFs. As mentioned earlier, this is an ex post facto analysis of the exploitation of the stocks of the Namibian ecosystem. The analysis is simple because the scenarios analysed were developed using information on catch data as the starting point. The analysis could be extended in several ways. To mention a few, a more detailed analysis could be undertaken by looking at data on the actual fishing efforts employed by both the DWFs and the domestic fleet, and the cost of fishing. One might also look into how the profits made by the DWFs were appropriated. Furthermore, the current study could be extended to an analysis that seeks to find out the possible ecological and economic outcomes that would have emerged had Namibia taken control of her ecosystem in the 1970s rather than the 1990s. One could then aim to determine what we term the maximum sustainable ecosystem yield and the maximum sustainable ecosystem economic rent. Presumably, the use of these two criteria would reveal greater losses than found here as a result of the activities of DWFs in the Namibian ecosystem. E c o s y s t e m / E c o n o m i c Impac ts of DWFs on N a m i b i a n F isher ies 89 • T h e F o o t p r i n t of D i s t a n t W a t e r F lee ts on W o r l d F i s h e r i e s itatus of West African Fleets' Rapid Appraisal of Distant Water Fleet Fisheries Relative to Home Fleets Using the R A P F I S H Technique This section presents a preliminary analysis aimed at assessing the status of fisheries from the point of view of sustainability, by comparing them using RAPFISH, a multidisciplinary, multivariate rapid appraisal technique recently developed at the Fisheries Centre. The technical details of this approach are utlined in the methodology section above. Here, we analyse three of the fisheries escribed in the case studies. These are the competing fisheries targeting small elagics off the coast of northwest Africa. The assessment focuses on the situation revailing in 1989 for a DWF, namely the USSR, and the small-scale home fleet sheries of the coastal nations, Mauritania and Senegal. For comparison purposes, t|hese three fisheries are analysed alongside 16 other small pelagic fisheries from round the world, which have been previously evaluated using RAPFISH (Pitcher et |1., 1998a). The RAPFISH technique has been developed by Pitcher et al. (1998b), itcher and Preikshot (1998), and Preikshot and Pauly (1998) to produce interdisciplinary ordinations and evaluations of the sustainability status of a variety f fisheries. The fisheries analysed with RAPFISH are listed in Table 18. The four disciplinary ordinations, in ecological, social, economic, and technological areas, are shown in Figure 23. RAPFISH ordinations are bounded by fixed reference points in the form of "good", "bad", and "random" simulated fisheries. "Good" represents the best possible fishery that may be constructed using the attributes, and "bad" the worst possible fishery. "Random" fisheries are constructed from randomly chosen values for the scored attributes. The unrotated axes are the thicker grey axes seen in Figure 23; their size represents the 95 per cent confidence interval for 20 random simulated fisheries. Tfhe axes after rotation are represented in black. In this analysis, most of the real data points in the analysis are outside the 95 per cent confidence interval of the "random" fisheries, which implies that the results of ordination are not random and represent differences that are significant. In the ecological RAPFISH ordination we see that the home-based fisheries lie in the mid-range of the other small pelagic fisheries for herring, sardine, and anchovy, but both extremes of the likely range of values for the USSR DWF fisheries are of lower status. In the economic ordination, the home fleet fishery for Senegal lies close to the best of the herring fisheries (the roe fishery of British Columbia) and to the best anchovy fisheries (fixed gear Japanese fisheries). Senegal has slightly higher status than Mauritania, which lies close to the two Atlantic herring fisheries. Both DWF • 90 ' Prepared by Tony ]. Pitcher; David Preikshot, and Ramon Bonfxl Table 18. Codes used for the different fisheries Code Fishery Adanclam Adriatic Anchovy Lampara Adancvol Adriatic Anchovy Volante Adsarlam Adriatic Sardine Lampara Adsarvol Adriatic Sardine Volante Bad Modelled "Bad" BC96 British Columbian Herring Roe Brasar Brazilian Sardine Good Modelled "Good" Japsar Japanese Sardine Jpanc Japanese Anchovy JpSET anc Japanese Anchovy Set Net JpSRN anc Japanese Anchovy Surround Net Maur Mauritanian Small Pelagic MexCzsar Mexican Gulf of California Sardine Nor96 Norwegian Herring NS97 North Sea Herring Peranc69 Peruvian Anchovy Peranc75 Peruvian Anchovy SAanc South African Anchovy SAsar South African Sardine Seneg Senegalese Small Pelagic USSR-hi USSR High Catch per Fisher Scenario USSR-lo USSR Low Catch per Fisher Scenario points have much lower economic sustainability status than these, falling among the worst of the fisheries in the analysis, the Peruvian anchovy before and after its major 1971 collapse. In the social ordination, the DWF fishery is little different to the two home-based west African fisheries, all of them falling in the lower quartile of small pelagic fisheries worldwide. They lie on opposite sides of the plot, meaning that there are large differences, but these differences are not related to sustainability along the axis from "good" to "bad". The same thing occurs in the technological ordination, except that here the west African fisheries lie in the mid-range of sustainability. Figure 24 shows the combined (multidisciplinary) RAPFISH ordination, which provides an unweighted conflation of the scores from the four separate disciplines. (Note that in Figure 24 the "good" and "bad" fisheries are off the scale of the plot, which has been enlarged for clarity.) The home fleet in Senegal plots among the top quartile of the world small pelagic fisheries, close to the Adriatic "lampara" fisheries which use small wooden purse-seiners operated with lights at night by family groups working from small coastal fishing communities. The Mauritanian home fleet lies close to mid-range of sardine and anchovy fisheries, comparable to the Mexican sardine and South African anchovy fisheries. In contrast, both the DWF range points lie in the bottom quartile of sustainability status, almost as poor as the 1969 Impacts: Status of West African Fleets 91 Figure 23. Four RAPFISH ordinations as performed on attributes scores in ecological, economic, social, and technology data sets Ecolc Good Peranc75 B C 9 6 A j a p F X a n c . " Adsar lam. . | Japsar • Adanclam Brasar MexCzs Jpanc ^ ^ ^ igical " a S A a n c | O S ^ l ^ Norse . S e n e g — N S 9 7 ar S A s a r * ^ " " O USSR-hi A d s a r v o r - X " * Adancvol ^ ^ N Bad Econ Good BC96 a m S e n e g \ I I P^ . ^ omic ^ ANor96 ^ U M a u r , •JpSETanc J * * " • J p a n c S A a n c a < N S 9 7 A d a n c l a m - J a p s a r A d s a r * JpSRNanc S A s a r * Brasar M e x C z s a r * • c \ Peranc75 Peranc69 • • )USSR B a d So< Good JpSETanc • Jpanc ^ • • Adanclar Brasar Adsarlam • Japsar JpSRNan" M " ^ :ial 0 Seneg i % Maur j- «Peranc75 Peranc69 A d s a r v o l * a SAanc • Adancvol N S 9 7 A O U S S R Nor96 A k. BC96 S . • S A s a r Bad Techno Good i logical • JpSETanc 9 Seneg Jpanc B BC96. * Brasar S A s a r * A * Nor96 JpSRNanc B NS97A^ U S S R O MexCzsar -# M a u r t Adanclam • Adsarlam Adancvol • Peranc69 lAdsarvol SAanc Peranc75 Japsar B a d Peruvian anchovy fishery on the verge of major collapse in 1970. This analysis suggests that these DWFs, at the least, have low sustainability among the worst of the world's small pelagic fisheries. Figure 25 quantifies the results of comparing the difference in sustainability status from the combined RAPFISH ordination. The plot was rotated so that "good" to "bad" axis was horizontal, and each location expressed as a percentage of the distance between them. For the sardine, herring, and anchovy fisheries we note that the differences between the best and worst fisheries were 10 per cent, 14 per cent, and 20 per cent, respectively. By this technique, the DWF USSR fishery was 7 per cent to 12 per cent less sustainable than the Mauritanian home fleet fishery, and 13 per cent to 18 per cent less sustainable than the Senegalese home fleet fishery. Note, too, that this is likely to be an underestimate of this effect since the local fisheries attributes were collected after the arrival of the DWF. The DWF fishery has almost as great a reduction in status compared to the home fleets as the difference between the best and the worst of small pelagic fisheries worldwide. Figure 24. Combined interdisciplinary ordination of fisheries Com Good JpSETanca JpancB S e n e 9 ^ BC96A Adsarlam^ Adanclam" Q jpSRrs B r a s a r « ^ j a p I i i SAanca l ined anc sar ^ M a u r Ad^ncvol MexC NS97A Nor96 A zs®r •Adsarvol • SAsar • Peranc75 ^.USSR-lo O —~^__/-vUSSR-hi • Peranc69 Bad Impacts: Status of West Afr ican Fleets Figure 25. Differences in sustainability status of best and worst fisheries by category Scores were percentage of the distance between the simulated best and wors t f ishery f rom the combined RAPFISH ordination. 93 • The Footpr int of D is tan t W a t e r F leets on W o r l d F isher ies DWFNs and Coastal States Economic and Social Aspects of their Interactions The relations between coastal states and DWFNs have been profoundly affected by the extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) arising from the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. As a consequence of the conference, and the resultant UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN, 1982), coastal states have been given the power to establish 200-mile EEZs. From this it follows that, when discussing coastal state-DWFN relations, a clear distinction must be made between those fishery resources which lie wholly within the coastal state EEZ, and those stocks which lie both within the EEZ and the adjacent high seas. It also follows that, as a preliminary to discussing coastal state-DWFN relations under the EEZ regime, we should comment on the state of affairs which existed prior to the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea and the advent of EFJ. • The Pre-EFJ Era Prior to the advent of the EFJ and the EEZ regime, coastal states typically had jurisdiction over fishery resources off their shores out to no more than 3 miles. Fisheries jurisdiction out to 12 miles was deemed to be unusual. Hence, the bulk of marine fishery resources were high seas fishery resources. The high seas fishery resources were subject to control by international commissions, or were subject to no control whatsoever Where the'stocks were subject to management by international commissions, the management was, more often than not, weak. The ICNAF discussed in the Newfoundland case study, provides an example. In any event, the high seas fisheries were characterized by open access, in which DWFs could fish at will. The economics of open access fisheries, in which property rights to the resources are non-existent, are well known (e.g. Munro and Scott, 1985). Overexploitation of the stocks is all but guaranteed. The fishers, be they coastal state fishers or DWFNs, have no incentive to conserve the resource. Hence, we should not be surprised to find that the pre-EFJ history of DWF activity was one of chronic overexploitation of the stocks. The cases of Iceland, Namibia, Newfoundland, and Mauritania and Senegal all provide examples of pre-EFJ overexploitation of fishery resources by DWFs. It was, in fact, the decidedly unsatisfactory state of affairs in high seas fisheries management which provided the motivation for EFJ. To cite but one example, Canada became a strong advocate of EFJ in large part because of its dissatisfaction with ICNAF resource management off Canada's Atlantic coast. • 94 With these preliminary comments completed, let us now turn to coastal state-DWFN relations under EFJ - the EEZ regime. Fishery Resources Wholly within the EEZ Fishery resources which lie wholly within the EEZ can be said to constitute, to all intents and purposes, the property of the coastal state (McRae and Munro, 1989). It is true that, in the years immediately following the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, there was considerable dispute over whether tuna, and other highly migratory species, found within the coastal state EEZ, could be said to constitute coastal state property. The United States insisted that they were not. The United States was to reverse its position in the early 1990s, and the issue appeared to be settled (UN, 1992). Thus, all fishery resources within the EEZ could now be said to constitute coastal state property. Nonetheless, it did appear, at first glance, that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea circumscribed these coastal state property rights in a manner which is of key importance to the issue of coastal state-DWFN relations. While Article 56 of the convention grants the coastal state "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting and conserving the...living resources within the EEZ", and while Article 61 explicidy grants the coastal state the right to set the TACs for fisheries within the EEZ (UN, 1982), Article 62 lays down the so called "surplus principle". In essence, the principle states that the coastal state is to assess its fishing capacity in relation to each of the aforementioned TACs. In those instances in which the coastal state fishing capacity falls short of the TAC, a "surplus" is deemed to exist. Article 62 then calls upon the coastal state to grant "other" states (e.g. DWFs) access to the "surplus" (UN, 1982). The "surplus principle" is, however, something of an illusion, at least from an economic perspective. First, Article 61 grants the coastal state what amounts to a free hand in setting the relevant TACs. Hence, the coastal state could go a long way towards eliminating surpluses through judicious setting of the TACs. More importantly, Article 62 grants the coastal state very broad powers in imposing terms and conditions of access (e.g. imposition of fees) upon DWFs seeking access to any "surplus" (UN, 1982). In no sense whatsoever is the coastal state expected to grant DWFs free access to the "surpluses" (Munro, 1985 and 1989). With a modest amount of imagination a coastal state could, in fact, devise sets of terms and conditions of access which would serve to discourage all DWFs seeking access (Munro, 1985 and 1989). Given that the fishery resources within the EEZ constitute coastal state property, and given that the so called "surplus principle" is largely empty in economic terms, then the decision as to whether or not DWFs are, or are not, to be granted access to the EEZ can be seen to rest with the coastal state. Of course, DWFs may attempt to enter an EEZ, and catch the stocks contained therein, without obtaining access agreements from the coastal state, as is exemplified by the case of the Galapagos Islands. Such action constitutes poaching, pure and simple. In principle, such action is no different from say, the stealing of livestock from a farmer or rancher. The question then becomes why a coastal state, which is capable of defending its marine property rights, should contemplate establishing access arrangements for one or more DWFs, as opposed to phasing out DWF activities within its EEZ with all possible speed. The economic answer is that the coastal state may find that it can increase its economic returns from its fishery resources by establishing the arrangements. The coastal state can be thought of as "importing" the fishing, and/or processing, services of the DWFs. Alternatively, the coastal state can be thought of as "hiring" the services of the DWFs (Munro, 1985 and 1989). If we think of the coastal state as "importing" the services of the DWFs, then the question as to whether or not it is in the economic interest of the coastal state to grant access to DWFs can be cast as an international trade question. A prima facie case can be made for "importing" such services if the DWF has a comparative advantage in fishing a particular resource within the EEZ, and/or processing the catch. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the DWF can both fish the relevant resource and process the catch at costs much lower than those which would be incurred by domestic fishers and processors. Then the coastal state might well find that the net economic benefit which it can obtain from the resource would be maximized by granting access to the DWF, with the granting of access being accompanied by a set of fees designed to capture a portion of the net economic benefits, or economic resource rent, from the fishery. The Pacific island nations of the western and central Pacific, which have seen up to 80 per cent of their offshore tuna catches taken by DWFs under access arrangements involving fees, could be thought of as one example (Munro, 1990). Alternatively, the DWF might have a comparative advantage in fishing the resource, but not in processing the catch. In such circumstances, it could be to the coastal state's economic advantage to enter into a joint-venture arrangement with the DWF, in which the fleet fished the resource and delivered the catches to onshore processors. Namibia provides an illustration of a coastal state which has adopted the joint-venture approach. If the DWFs have a comparative advantage in neither fishing nor processing, then the coastal state's decision will be straightforward. No access arrangements should be contemplated. The argument for not granting access arrangements, even when the DWFs possess a comparative advantage, is really an argument for granting protection to the domestic fleets and/or processors (Munro, 1989). Economists maintain that many arguments for protection, when judged from a national perspective, are specious. Not all such arguments are invalid, however. A prominent "legitimate" argument is the so called "infant" industry argument: a country may have a comparative advantage in the production of a particular good or service. The domestic industry producing the good or service is newly established, an "infant". Until the industry has gone through a learning period its costs will appear to be higher than those of its foreign competitors. Thus the country's comparative advantage is latent. Hence, unless the "infant" industry is granted temporary protection, it will not survive, and the country's latent comparative advantage will remain unrevealed. Hence, one could argue that a coastal state implementing an EEZ regime should provide protection for the domestic industries taking advantage of the new opportunities created thereby, until such time as the "infants" achieve maturity. The infant industry argument has validity, but it has to be handled with great care. The problem in applying the argument is that it is very difficult to determine a priori which "infants" do in fact have a real chance of achieving maturity. Those that remain in permanent childhood risk becoming a permanent drain upon the economy. I m p a c t s : D W F N s and Coas ta l S t a t e s New Zealand is an example of a developed coastal state that has explicitly followed a policy of "importing" foreign fishing/processing services. When New Zealand established its EEZ (the fourth largest in the world), it established a quota regime for its domestic fishing companies exploiting the offshore stocks now encompassed by its EEZ. The companies were enabled, within limits, to fish the stocks, and process the catches, with their own vessels and processing facilities, or to engage foreign vessels under charter to do the fishing/processing for them. Extensive chartering of foreign vessels did in fact take place (Munro, 1989). In an address, given a few years ago, the then New Zealand Minister of Fisheries, stated that his country followed a policy of "free trade in fishing services", and noted that 100 foreign vessels were under charter from DWFNs such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine (Kidd, 1994). Two key points must be made in passing. The first is that the use of domestic fishing/processing services, as against the "importation" of foreign services, is not an either/or situation. It is quite possible that it will be optimal for the coastal state to have a mix of domestic and foreign services. The foreign comparative advantage may prove to be limited and specific. New Zealand does, for example, have a definite mix of foreign and domestic services. The second point is that comparative advantage is not static, but rather can be expected to vary over time. Thus, a coastal state may initially find that it is in its economic interest to import DWF services, but may find that this ceases to be the case, because of shifting comparative advantage. In other words, the initial comparative advantage of DWF over domestic fishing/processing services may be transformed into a comparative disadvantage. What we might term the "trade in services" argument for establishing access arrangements with DWFs will, if positive, provide a prima facie case for establishing the access arrangements. It does not, however, settle the matter. It is naive to suppose that a coastal state, even if developed, can exert absolute control over DWFs granted access to the EEZ. Consequently, the full benefits of the DWF comparative advantage are unlikely to be enjoyed by the coastal state. For example, the coastal state is likely to find it costly to ensure that the DWFs comply fully and precisely with the terms and conditions laid down by the coastal state. This type of problem is not unique to the coastal state-DWFN case. Indeed, it is a commonplace in economics, and is referred to by economists as the "principal-agent" problem. It arises when the principal, say an employer, "hires" the agent to perform certain tasks, but cannot control the agent's actions with precision. The principal must remain content with establishing an incentive scheme to motivate the agent. A textbook example is that of a landlord and a sharecropper. The landlord, the principal, cannot exercise absolute control over the sharecropper, the agent, but must rather rely upon a set of incentives. 971 At an earlier point, we said that one might, as well as thinking of the coastal state "importing" the services of DWFs, think of the coastal state "hiring" the services of DWFs. Thought of in this way, the coastal state can be seen as the principal and the DWF(s) as the agent(s). The terms and conditions of access then can be viewed as the incentive scheme. Principal-agent analysis has in fact been applied to the coastal state-DWF problem (see, for example, Clarke and Munro, 1987 and 1991; Munro, 1994). In principal-agent analysis, one talks about "first best situations" and "second best situations" faced by the principal. In a first best situation, the agent is no more than the principal's slave. In the second best situation, the agent is imperfectly controlled by the principal through a set of incentives. The difference between the benefits which the principal receives under the realistic second best situation, and what it would receive under the Utopian first best situation, is referred to as the "incentive gap" (Munro, 1994). The typical coastal state, in granting access to one or more DWFs, is very much confronted with a second best situation. In terms of benefits, the coastal state must recognize that there will be some "slippage" - an incentive gap - and realistically assess the benefits to be derived from DWF participation, in comparison with those to be derived by relying solely on domestic fishing and processing services. One aspect of incentives and "slippage" involves monitoring and surveillance of DWFs, in ensuring that they comply with the terms and conditions of access (e.g. not exceeding their allowed catches). Few coastal states have sufficient surveillance capacity to police the DWFs with absolute effectiveness. Indeed, most would find the costs prohibitive, and thus must rely upon incentive schemes of some sort to achieve a reasonable degree of compliance. One of the best examples is provided by the aforementioned Pacific island nations. The combined EEZs of the Pacific island nations equal the area of Africa. Most of the island nations are at relatively low levels of development, and cannot afford extensive fleets of patrol vessels and aircraft to monitor DWFs operating in the EEZs. The island nations cooperatively have developed an effective incentive scheme, involving a Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels. One aspect of the scheme is that a foreign vessel found in violation of its access terms and conditions in the EEZ of one island nation faces the threat of banishment from the EEZs of all of the island nations (Munro, 1990). Among the case studies, Mauritania probably provides the best example of "slippage". Mauritania has the potential to enjoy significant economic benefits from the granting of access to DWFs. Due to the coastal state's limited monitoring and surveillance capabilities, however, these benefits have certainly been below the maximum. "Slippage" has been apparent. Fishery Resources Found both within the EEZ and the Adjacent High Seas Over the last decade and a half, managing fishery resources that are to be found both within the EEZ and the adjacent high seas has emerged as a serious problem. Such resources, referred to as straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks, were the focus of a major UN intergovernmental conference (UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks) from 1993 to 1995. The agreement to which the conference gave rise (UN, 1995), which was designed to supplement, or buttress, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, is now up for ratification. The process of implementation is only just beginning. With such resources, the coastal state-DWFN relations become quite different. The sovereign rights to the intra-EEZ portions of the stocks, granted by Article 56 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea to the coastal state, remain unchanged. What the coastal state does not have, however, are full property rights to the high seas portions of such stocks. In fact, the nature of the property rights to the high seas portions of these stocks is not entirely clear at the time of writing. The aforementioned UN agreement calls for straddling stock type of resources to be managed on a region by region basis through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), in which membership will be open to relevant DWFs. The coastal state will have no choice but to deal with the relevant DWFs, although the coastal state will still be left with the power of determining whether the DWFs in question should or should not be granted access to the EEZ. It should be emphasized, in passing, that the consequences of ineffective cooperation between coastal states and DWFNs in the management of straddling/highly migratory stocks can be severe. Evidence is provided by the case study on the "donut hole" in the Bering Sea. The Alaska pollock stocks in this high seas enclave clearly constitute a straddling stock. The stocks were subject to massive overexploitation by DWFs, as a result of non-cooperation between the DWFs and the relevant coastal states - Russia and the United States. There was cooperation in the end, but only after the damage had been done. It was examples, such as the "donut hole", that provided the motivation for the aforementioned 1993-1995 UN conference. It has been argued that, if the RFMOs are to be successful, the relevant adjacent high seas will become high seas in name only (Munro, 1998). It is further argued that, on a de facto, if not de jure, basis, the coastal state and DWF members of an RFMO will share joint property rights to the high seas portions of the stocks (Munro, 1998). It should also be noted that the 1993-1995 UN conference recognized at a very early stage that it is nonsensical to think of the high seas portion and EEZ portion of a straddling type of stock being subject to separate management regimes. If a DWFN member of a RFMO becomes a de facto joint owner of the high seas portion of the stock in question then it can be expected to exert influence over the management of the stock within, as well as without, the EEZ. Given that the nature of the management of straddling and highly migratory stocks is still being determined, and will continue to be determined for some time to come, there is little more that can be said about coastal state-DWFN relations with regards to these resources at the present time. Social Considerations* Social impacts can be analysed at three different levels, global, hemispheric or international, and national. Global impacts include those of industrial fishing on the common heritage of humankind, primarily the reduction in abundance and diversity of marine fish stocks and the consequent foreclosing of options for future generations. At a hemispheric level, DWFs transfer protein and wealth from underdeveloped to developed nations. At a national level, and certainly prior to EEZs, DWFs impacted on indigenous and artisanal fishers. While the creation of EEZs was widely expected to improve conservation and management, this has not always proved to be the case. Nor have EEZs in themselves alleviated the situation of indigenous and artisanal fishers as each country is free to decide how resources are allocated between coastal and offshore fisheries. The two key points are that first, for most of human history, fishing communities were located close to the fish. Second, fish populations were more than adequate for local needs. There was little or no population pressure, no global markets. Fish were thus protected by the limited needs of the dependent community, by limitations of vessels and gear, and above all, by weather and sea conditions. Newfoundlanders fished cod from June to September (see the Newfoundland case study above). Similarly, DWFs fishing off Iceland up to the beginning of this century were restricted to the summer months. After that, the cod were safe enough. In fact, merchants who supplied the necessities of life in exchange for salt cod often complained that people commonly stopped fishing while there were still plenty of fish to be caught (Ommer, 1994). GLOBAL ISSUES Vessel technology severed the ancient link between fishing and communities anchored by geography. Fishing communities, whether Newfoundland outports, BC Aboriginals, or Senegalese pirogues came to be looked on as relics of the past, or at best, quaint. Big government and big industry became the key players. As local stocks became depleted, various nations took to the high seas in search of new stocks. The evolution of fisheries management lags very shortly behind the growth of industrial fleets. As the realization dawned that fisheries were finite, government stepped in with successive control measures. The commercial industry is thus the parent of modern fisheries management. It is little wonder that traditional systems received short shrift. The marginalization of traditional management systems and the criminalizing of traditional fishing practices are significant social issues that remain to be addressed (Thorns, 1996). Pauly et al. (1998) show that, as large, commercially valuable species are depleted, modern industrial fishing is moving steadily down the marine food web. If this continues unchecked, the end result will be a world ocean full of krill, lanternfish, and squid. Areas like the South China Sea are already dominated by fast-turnover pelagic species. This reduces the options for future generations. The most popular remedy, very large no-take marine protected areas, also has significant social implications for indigenous and longstanding coastal fishing communities who might wake up one day ' Section prepared by Nigel Haggan to find most or all of their traditional fishing grounds declared a "no-take" area in the interest of conservation. Subsidies are another major issue. Garcia and Newton (1997), estimate the annual global cost of fishing at around US$116 billion, with corresponding revenues of US$70 billion. The difference, US$46 billion per year, consists of direct and indirect subsidies. Subsidies are also a national and indeed domestic issue. The northern cod study shows that Canada's response to international fishing pressure was to invest heavily in advanced catching and processing technology. The former Soviet bloc invested enormous amounts in distant water vessels. In the Newfoundland case, the inshore trap fishers ate into their savings and home equity to buy more traps and gear - running ever faster to stand still. There is a real reluctance to abandon this level of investment. INTERNATIONAL AND HEMISPHERIC ISSUES The realization that catching power has outstripped the productive capacity of world oceans led inexorably to the creation of EEZs. Iceland led the way by extending its EEZ to 4 miles in 1952, 12 miles in 1958, 50 miles in 1972, and finally 200 miles in 1975 (see the Icelandic case study above). Well and good, but the new national domains had no effect on the behaviour of walleye pollock in the Bering Sea. Atlantic herring were equally indifferent to the new ocean frontiers. The social implication is that nations with little or no history of dialogue, cooperation, or indeed war have, all of a sudden, to start to deal with each other. This requires a rapid maturation. Some achieve it, for example the parties to the Bering Sea "donut hole" and Norwegian spring-spawning herring agreements. Others do not, as witnessed by the annual tomfoolery and posturing between Canada and the United States over Pacific salmon and the 1996 Turbot War between Canada and Spain, where the question of whether Canada was within its rights to seize a vessel on the high seas is still being debated in court. Mauritania, and to a lesser extent Senegal, exemplify the problem of transfer of protein and wealth from poor "southern" nations to the relatively rich DWFNs. The case study shows that for a 45-year period (1950-1994), DWFNs took over 80 per cent of the catch. In recent years, the Mauritanian catch has remained at around 10 per cent while Senegal, with an aggressive artisanal fishery, has increased its catch significantly. Namibia has made a commitment to rebuild stocks depleted prior to independence and appears well placed to maximize economic and social benefits as stocks rebuild. The need for "internationalization" of fisheries management and responsible behaviour by developed nations identified at the end of the Mauritania/Senegal case study is apparent. The role of Norway, the United States, and Iceland in aiding Namibia to build "respectable capabilities for controlling and monitoring foreign fishing... [and] . . . for training Namibian personnel and reducing the dependency on expatriates" is encouraging. The need for international bodies which can exert more than moral suasion and the unequivocal political backing of powerful nations for measures such as the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing remains to be met. NATIONAL ISSUES While the allocation of stocks within the EEZ is at the sole discretion of the coastal nation, there are nonetheless significant social and equity considerations involved in how these stocks are fished. Both Mauritania and Iceland recognized this in setting out regulations to restrict large vessels from inshore areas to protect the small boat fleet. In the case of Mauritania, these measures have not been entirely successful. The economic impacts of offshore fisheries can also be significant. Canada's failure to protect the inshore cod fishery has, so far, cost Can$4.2 billion to mitigate community impact. This raises a number of important social questions, not least of which is whether longstanding communities such as Newfoundland outports have a "right" to continue to exist after their original economic bases have been eroded. When management by big government played a role in eroding the economic base, what is the nature and extent of government's responsibility? Is Can$4.2 billion enough? • Concluding Remarks Extended fisheries jurisdiction has radically altered the relationship between coastal states and DWFNs. DWFs no longer have unimpeded freedom to operate as they please. With regards to fishery resources wholly within the EEZ, the decision as to whether DWFs should be allowed access to these resources lies with the coastal state. The coastal state, if it is acting rationally, will, or will not, decide to grant such access in light of the expected impact that this decision will have upon the state's long-term economic and social interests. Fishery resources that lie both within the EEZ and the adjacent high seas present a far more difficult problem. In the case of these resources, the coastal state has little option but to seek the cooperation of the DWFNs. An endeavour of this magnitude would not have been possible without the kind help of a large number of people. 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Appendix 1 DWFNs and the cummulative catches 1950-1994 outside of their own FAO Statistical Areas D W F N Cummulative (t x 103) 1950-1994 D W F N Cummulative ( tx 103) 1950-1994 The Footprint of Distant W a t e r Fleets on W o r l d Fisheries USSR 74,372 Ecuador 87 Japan 49,569 Samoa 58 Spain 22,860 Iraq 57 Korea Rep. 11,086 Chile 57 Russian Fed. 10,453 Denmark 55 Poland 8,201 Greenland 48 Taiwan 7,370 Peru 48 Portugal 7,095 Netherlands 39 Germany 6,847 Bermuda 32 France 6,044 Libya 31 Ukraine 4,209 Sri Lanka 30 Norway 2,819 St Vincent 26 Romania 2,530 Ireland 19 Cuba 2,323 Nigeria 16 United States 2.254 Malta 14 Bulgaria 2,140 Brazil 14 Latvia 1,886 Cayman Is. 14 Italy 1,808 Costa Rica 9 Lithuania 1,790 Australia 8 Estonia 1,455 Argentina 4 Faeroe Is. 1,439 El Salvador 4 UK 696 Vanuatu 3 Greece 660 Cape Verde 2 Iceland 513 Sierra Leone 1 Georgia 425 Bahamas 1 Panama 369 Sweden 0.353 China 302 New Zealand 0.176 Ghana 261 Philippines 0.146 Israel 182 South Africa 0.132 Venezuela 168 Tonga 0.026 Egypt 152 St Helena 0.010 Canada 101 Somalia 0.007 Honduras 92 Colombia 0.001 Mexico 89 111 • 


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