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Performance Analysis of a Markovian Queue with Service Rate and Customers' Joining Decisions Zhang, George
Description
We consider the customers' equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy in a single server Markovian queueing system with changeable service rates controlled by a threshold. When a customer arrives at an empty system, he is served by the server at a lower service rate. When the queue length reaches the threshold, customers are served at a high service rate. The optimal joining strategies of customers are studied under two information scenarios. The first scenario, where the server' state and the queue length are observable, is called a fully observable case. The second scenario, where the system state is not observable, is called an unobservable case. We analyze the steady-state distribution and performance measures of the system, and derive the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we compare the equilibrium strategy with socially optimal strategy via numerical examples.
Item Metadata
Title |
Performance Analysis of a Markovian Queue with Service Rate and Customers' Joining Decisions
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Creator | |
Publisher |
Banff International Research Station for Mathematical Innovation and Discovery
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Date Issued |
2020-08-22T11:29
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Description |
We consider the customers' equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy in a single server Markovian queueing system with changeable service rates controlled by a threshold. When a customer arrives at an empty system, he is served by the server at a lower service rate. When the queue length reaches the threshold, customers are served at a high service rate. The optimal joining strategies of customers are studied under two information scenarios. The first scenario, where the server' state and the queue length are observable, is called a fully observable case. The second scenario, where the system state is not observable, is called an unobservable case. We analyze the steady-state distribution and performance measures of the system, and derive the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we compare the equilibrium strategy with socially optimal strategy via numerical examples.
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Extent |
29.0 minutes
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Subject | |
Type | |
File Format |
video/mp4
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Language |
eng
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Notes |
Author affiliation: Simon Fraser University
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Series | |
Date Available |
2021-02-19
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0395919
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URI | |
Affiliation | |
Peer Review Status |
Unreviewed
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Scholarly Level |
Faculty
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Rights URI | |
Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International