Title	Miner Collusion and the BitCoin Protocol
Creator	Lehar, Alfred
Publisher	Banff International Research Station for Mathematical Innovation and Discovery
Date Issued	2020-03-14T14:24
Description	Bitcoin users can offer fees to miners who record their transactions in the Blockchain. We document high variation of bitcoin fees, not only over time, but also within blocks. Further, the blockchain rarely runs at capacity, even though fees tend to be higher when blocks are fuller, so miners appear to be leaving money on the table. We present a simple model of price discrimination to explain our results. We note that mining pools facilitate collusive equilibria, and estimate that they have extracted least 200 million USD a year in excess fees by making processing capacity scarce.
Extent	56.0 minutes
Subject	Mathematics; Mathematics
Type	Moving Image
File Format	video/mp4
Language	eng
Notes	Author affiliation: University of Calgary
Series	BIRS Workshop Lecture Videos (Banff, Alta)
Date Available	2020-09-14
Provider	Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
DOI	10.14288/1.0394356
URI	http://hdl.handle.net/2429/76013
Affiliation	Non UBC
Peer Review Status	Unreviewed
Scholarly Level	Faculty
Rights URI	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Aggregated Source Repository	DSpace

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